O sheniyoth interditou os soferim (ver 2: 4): "Se ela fosse shniyah para o marido e não para os yavam [por exemplo, a mãe da mãe do marido, mas não a mãe do yavam, como quando eram irmãos da pai, mas não da mãe], ela é proibida ao marido e permitida aos yavam. Se ela era shniyah aos yavam e não ao marido, ela é proibida aos yavam e permitida ao marido. ambos são proibidos a ambos.Ela não tem kethubah [são os cento e duzentos, que é o principal dos kethubah, que ela não possui, mas tem o acréscimo], e ela não tem frutos [ Ele não paga a ela pelo fruto de seu nichsei melog. E mesmo que os rabinos lhe tenham concedido fruto por sua obrigação de resgatá-la, e ele não tem obrigação de resgatar este, na medida em que ela não satisfaz: "E eu causarei você mora comigo como esposa " — para que pareça que ele deveria reembolsá-la pelo que comeu do nichsei melog dela —ainda assim, os rabinos a penalizaram por não reivindicar o fruto que ele comia como condição do kethubah, assim como eles a penalizaram por não reivindicar o princípio do kethubah. Pois uma condição do kethubah é comparada ao próprio kethubah.], E ela não tem sustento. É desnecessário dizer que ele não precisa alimentá-la enquanto ela ainda está com ele, pois ele é obrigado a mandá-la embora. Mas mesmo que ele fosse para o exterior e ela pedisse emprestado e comesse, ele não precisava pagar. Pois com uma esposa kasher, se ela emprestou e comeu, o marido é obrigado a pagar. Para o credor afirma o que ele emprestou e ela afirma do marido. Pois é somente quando alguém a alimenta, não por meio de empréstimo, que dizemos no Kethuvoth que a halachá está de acordo com Chanan, que disse que se um fosse para o exterior e outro alimentasse sua esposa, ele (o último) colocaria seu dinheiro "em buzina de veado. " Pois desde que ele a alimentou por causa de seu marido, e ele não lhe emprestou nada, de quem ele pode reivindicar o pagamento? Ela não pediu nada emprestado e o marido não pediu que ele a alimentasse. Portanto, ele realizou uma mitzvá (mas ele não pode fazer nenhuma reivindicação). Se ele a emprestou, e ela é kasher, seu marido deve pagá-lo, mas se ela é uma das shniyoth, ele não é obrigado a pagar.], E ela não recebe belaoth [Se o marido usou seu nichsei melog até que eles estavam "desgastados" (balu), ele não precisava reembolsá-la. Pois podemos pensar que, como ela não tem kethubah, se o marido comeu seu nichsei melog, ele deve reembolsá-la pelo que foi "desgastado"; somos, portanto, informados de que os rabinos a penalizaram, de que seu marido não pagou belaoth, mas o que quer que ela ache remanescente (do nichsei melog) que ela leva], e o filho (da união) é kasher, e nós o forçamos a mande-a embora. Uma viúva de um sumo sacerdote, uma divorciada e uma chalutzah de um padre regular, uma mamzereth e uma netina para um israelita, a filha de um israelita para um nathin ou para um mamzer têm uma ketubah. [Eles têm uma cetuba e um fruto, o marido pagando pelo fruto que ele comeu do nichsei melog deles. E eles têm sustento, sendo alimentados de sua propriedade (mas somente após sua morte. Enquanto ele está vivo, ele não é forçado a alimentá-la, pois é obrigado a mandá-la embora. E se alguém emprestou sua comida durante a vida de seu marido, ele também não precisa pagar o empréstimo.) Eles também têm belaoth, sendo o marido obrigado a devolver o que ele "desgastava" do nichsei melog. E isso é apenas quando ele os conhecia (como uma viúva, etc.), mas se ele não os conhecia, eles não têm kethubah, fruto, sustento, nem belaoth. Mas eles têm a adição e a belaoth que permanecem. Quanto aos shniyoth não terem cetubá, fruto, sustento ou belaote, e uma viúva a um sumo sacerdote, e uma divorciada ou chalutza a um sacerdote regular que os possuam—isso ocorre porque os primeiros são interditados (apenas) pelos escribas e exigem reforço (do interdito), enquanto os últimos são interditados pela Torá e não exigem reforço. No capítulo "Estes recebem faixas", é mostrado que uma chalutzah para um sumo sacerdote é interditada pela Torá. E embora um chalutzah a um padre regular seja interditado pelos escribas, foi comparado ao interditado pela Torá a esse respeito.]
Bartenura on Mishnah Yevamot
שניה לבעל ולא שניה ליבם – if the husband’s mother and not of the levir, such as for example, brothers from the father bu not from the mother.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot
Introduction
In mishnah 2:4, we learned that there are secondary incest prohibitions that were instituted by the scribes.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
Bartenura on Mishnah Yevamot
אין לה כתובה – a Maneh (i.e., 100 Dinar or 25 shekels) and Two-Hundred, which are the essence of the Ketubah and she does not have [anything] from the secondary relationship (which are prohibited as incestuous by rabbinic decree), but she does have the supplement.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot
[Concerning] relatives of the second degree [of incest laws who are forbidden] by the words of the scribes: [A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the husband but not a second degree of kinship to the yavam, is forbidden to the husband and permitted to the yavam; A woman could be a second degree of kinship to her husband but not to her yavam if she was the husband’s grandmother, and her husband had a brother with the same father but not the same mother. The mishnah teaches that although the marriage was forbidden, she may still have yibbum. This is because the prohibition of second degree kinship is only of rabbinic origin.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
Bartenura on Mishnah Yevamot
ולא פירות – he doesn’t pay her the usufruct of the wife’s estate of which the husband has the fruition without responsibility for loss or deterioration that he consumed which are hers, [and even though] that the usufruct, the Rabbis instituted (see Talmud Ketubot 47b) [the duty of support as an equivalent for her handiwork], and that of redemption as an equivalent for the privilege of usufruct [of her property], but he is not liable to redeem her, for we do not call her ואותבינך לי לאינתו /and I will make you to be my wife, and therefore, it was appropriate that he would pay her what he had consumed from the usufruct of her estate, even so, the Rabbis fined her that she should not collect from him the usufruct that he consumed as conditions of the Ketubah. For just as they fined her that she should not collect from him the essence of the Ketubah, for the conditions of the Ketubah are like the Ketubah itself.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot
[A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the yavam but not a second degree of kinship to the husband is forbidden to the yavam and permitted to the husband; The same is true in the opposite case, if she is a second degree of kinship to her yavam but not to her husband. As we learned above in 2:3-4, in such a case she must have halitzah and not yibbum.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
Bartenura on Mishnah Yevamot
ולא מזונות – it is not necessary to state that he is not obligated to support her while she is still under him, for but surely, it is his duty to divorce her (literally: “he stands under the charge to get up and make her go out” – how, then, could he be expected to maintain her? ). But rather, even if he went abroad and he and he lent her and consumed from her [property], he does not pay, for if we were dealing with a fit woman, if he borrowed from her and consumed from her [property], the husband would be obligated to pay [her back]. For the loan claims her what he lent to her and she makes a claim to her husband. And especially for someone who supported her not through the matter of a loan, we state in Ketubot (see Tractate Ketubot, Chapter 13, Mishnah 2) that the Halakha is like Hanan, as he stated: He who went overseas and someone went and supported his wife, he left his money on the horn of a deer for since it was for her support from her husband, and he did not lend her anything – whom can he make a claim? She did not borrow and he husband did not request from him that he should support her, therefore, it was Mitzvah that he did, but if he lent her, the husband is liable to pay if she is fit, and if she is from one of the relationships of the second degree (i.e., of the second generation), he is not liable to pay.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot
[A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the one and to the other is forbidden to the one as well as to the other. If she was a second degree to both, she is forbidden to both.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
Bartenura on Mishnah Yevamot
ולא בלאות – if the husband used her usufruct until they wore out, he is not liable to pay for you might think I would say, for since she lacks a Ketubah, but the husband ate from her usufruct, he is liable to pay what was lost and worn out, it comes to tell us that the Rabbis fined her so that the husband would not pay for worn clothes (i.e.., and indemnity for clothes which have completely worn out), but what he finds from them existing, she takes them.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot
She cannot claim her ketubah or usufruct or support money, or her worn clothes. The child is fit [to marry a priest], but the husband is compelled to divorce her. If a couple transgressed the rabbinic prohibition and the man married a woman who was a second degree of kinship, there are serious economic consequences for the woman. The woman does not receive her ketubah (marriage payment), nor does she receive in return the usufruct, meaning the profit that the husband accrued from the use of her property while they were married. She does not receive support (food, clothing or shelter), nor does she receive in return the reduction in the value of her things that he has used while married. However, the status of the child is not effected, since the level of prohibition was only derabbanan. He is forced to divorce her. In summary, the consequences of this forbidden marriage are mostly economic and they are mostly upon the woman.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
Bartenura on Mishnah Yevamot
אלמנה לכהן גדול וכו' – they have a Ketubah and usufruct and the husband pays them (i.e., his wives) for the usufruct that he ate from his wive’s estates of which the husband has fruition without responsibility for loss or deterioration and food that they have as they are supported from his property [and especially after] [his] death. But during his lifetime, we don’t force him to support/feed them for we uphold regarding him that it is his duty to divorce her (i.e., literally, he stands under (the charge) to get up and make her go out) and if one of them borrowed her support during the life of her husband, the husband is not liable to pay the lender. And worn out clothing also, there are those who state that he is liable to restore what was worn out and lost from their usufruct, and these words, are when he recognized them, but if he did not recognize them, they have neither a Ketubah, nor usufruct, nor support, nor worn-out clothing, but they do have the supplement and the worn-out clothing that they have in their sight. But second-degree relations do not have a Ketubah, nor usufruct, nor support nor worn-out clothing and a widow [married to] a High Priest, a divorcee and/or a woman who had Halitzah performed to a standard Kohen, ,etc., they have a Ketubah, and usufruct and support and worn out clothing, because these things are from the words of the Scribes and require strengthening. And in the [third chapter of Tractate Makkot}: “Who are they who are flogged?” it is proven that the prohibition of a woman who had undergone Halitzah [is prohibited] to a [High] Priest from the Torah, and even though that [the prohibition] of a woman who had undergone Halitzah [who is married] to a regular Kohen is from the worlds of the Scribes, they made it of Torah law for this law.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot
A widow who was married to a high priest, a divorcee or halutzah who was married to an ordinary priest, a mamzer or a netinah who was married to an Israelite, or the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a natin or a mamzer is entitled to her ketubah. The mishnah now contrasts this type of forbidden marriage, with a marriage that was forbidden according to Torah law, but that was nevertheless an effective marriage. That is to say if a man betrothed one of these women, he has transgressed the prohibition, but she still requires a divorce. In all of these cases the woman receives her ketubah and all of the other rights listed in the mishnah. In the comparison of these two sections, we see that the consequences of marrying a second degree of kinship which is only a rabbinic prohibition are more serious than those of marrying one who is biblically prohibited. The reason is that a rabbinic prohibition needs the extra “strengthening” while the biblical prohibition does not.
