Si son intention était de tuer une bête et qu'il tuait un homme; un gentil et il a tué un juif; un enfant prématuré (qui ne survivrait pas) et il en a tué un qui aurait survécu, il n'est pas responsable. Si son intention était de lui frapper un coup non mortel sur ses hanches, et qu'il est allé à son cœur, où il était mortel, et il est mort, il n'est pas responsable. [Car les deux doivent être satisfaits: qu'il a l'intention de tuer et que le coup suffira à tuer.] Si son intention était de lui porter un coup mortel sur son cœur, là où il serait mortel, et il irait à ses hanches, où il ne suffisait pas de tuer, et il est mort, il n’est pas responsable. Si son intention était de frapper un adulte, mais que le coup ne suffirait pas à le faire, et qu'il est allé à un enfant, là où cela suffirait, et qu'il est mort, il n'est pas responsable. Si son intention était de frapper un enfant et que le coup suffirait à le tuer, et qu'il allait à un adulte, qu'il ne suffirait pas de tuer, et qu'il mourrait, il n'est pas responsable. Mais si son intention était de frapper un sur ses hanches, là où le coup suffirait à le tuer, et il est allé à son cœur et il est mort, il est responsable. Si son intention était de frapper un adulte, que le coup suffirait à tuer, et qu'il allait à un enfant décédé, il est responsable. R. Shimon dit: Même si son intention était d'en tuer un et d'en tuer un autre, il n'est pas responsable. [Cela ne se réfère pas à la dernière déclaration du premier tanna, à savoir: "Si son intention était de frapper un adulte, que le coup suffirait à tuer, et il est allé à un enfant, qui est mort, il est responsable"; car si c'était le cas, il aurait simplement dû être dit: "R. Shimon dit qu'il n'est pas responsable." Et pourquoi répéter: «Même si son intention était d'en tuer un et d'en tuer un autre, etc.»? Le premier tanna le déclare explicitement. Pourquoi le "Even"? R. Shimon se réfère plutôt à la première déclaration, à savoir: "Si l'intention était de tuer une bête et qu'il a tué un homme, il n'est pas responsable", l'implication étant que si son intention était de tuer un homme et il a tué un autre homme, il est responsable. C'est à cet égard que R. Shimon dit: «Même si son intention était d'en tuer un et d'en tuer un autre, il n'est pas responsable». La halakha est conforme à R. Shimon.]
Bartenura on Mishnah Sanhedrin
והיה בה כדי להמית על לבו ומת פטור – That both are necessary, that he intends to wound [to cause] death and also that they should stripe him a wound [to cause] death.
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English Explanation of Mishnah Sanhedrin
Introduction
This mishnah deals with a murderer who intends to kill either in a certain manner or a certain person but does not fulfill his intention and yet nevertheless he kills someone. The question is, since he did not fulfill his intention is he liable to the death penalty. Before learning this mishnah we should note that the Exodus 21:12-13 states: “He who fatally strikes a man shall be put to death. If he did not do it by design, but it came about by an act of God…”. The Rabbis in our mishnah seem to be discussing what does “by design” mean. How much intention must there be in the act of murder for someone to be liable in the death penalty. While I am not an expert on modern law, I know that our modern law system also distinguishes between degrees of murder based on the level of intention in the act.
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Bartenura on Mishnah Sanhedrin
ר"ש אומר אפילו נתכוין להרוג את זה. – this does not refer to the end of the matter of the first Tanna, on that which the first Tanna [mentioned]– that he had the intention to wound the large individual but if it struck the small individual and he died, he is liable. For it is upon this that it refers, Rabbi Shimon exempts this person, is needed to be said, and why should he retract and explain that even if he intended to kill this one and killed that one, as the first Tanna explicitly stated this, what is the purpose of the word “even?” But, Rabbi Shimon is referring to the beginning – that if he intended to kill the animal and [instead] killed a person, he is exempt; but if he intended to kill a [particular] person but [instead] killed another person, he is liable. And on this, Rabbi Shimon comments – even if he intended to kill this one and killed [instead] that one, he is exempt. And the Halakha is according to Rabbi Shimon.
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English Explanation of Mishnah Sanhedrin
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. In this scenario a person intended to kill someone for whom he is not liable for the death penalty, either an animal, a non-Jew or a prematurely born child. However, instead of killing one of these, he kills someone for whom he is liable for the death penalty. In such a case, since he did not fulfill his intention, he is not liable for the death penalty, even though he did kill someone for whom he is generally liable. We should note that although according to our mishnah, one does not receive the death penalty for killing a non-Jew, Jewish law certainly today forbids doing so. With regards to the prematurely born child, it is also important to note that our mishnah is referring to a child who will certainly die. In our days a prematurely born child often times lives, and therefore is no different from any other child. We indeed can be thankful for the many advances in modern medicine, advances which have surely had and will continue to have an impact on many areas of Jewish law.
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English Explanation of Mishnah Sanhedrin
If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. If one intends to strike another person on his waist area (his loins) with a blow that would not kill in that area but instead struck him on his chest (his heart) where the blow was enough to kill, he is not liable for the death penalty, since, if he had landed the blow where he intended he would not have killed him. If he intended to strike him on his chest with a blow that would be sufficient to kill but he struck him on his waist where the blow would generally not be sufficient to kill, but nevertheless it did kill, he is not liable. Since normally this strike would not kill where it did end up landing, he is not held liable. We can summarize that in order to be liable one must strike a place on the victim’s body with a blow generally strong enough to kill when struck on that place, and one must have intended to strike that place from the outset. If one intended to strike an adult with a strike that was insufficient to kill an adult but struck a child he is not liable for the death penalty, since if the strike had landed where he had intended it would not have killed. If he intended to strike a minor with a strike insufficient to kill a minor but he struck an adult instead and the adult died he is not liable, since, normally this strike would not kill an adult. The final two clauses of this section teach cases where he is liable. If he intended to strike him on his waist and it was sufficient to kill and he struck him on his chest and killed him he is liable. Although he did not intend to strike him there, since his intention had been to strike with a blow strong enough to kill no matter where it hit, he is liable. Similarly, if he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill, and he struck and killed a minor, he is obligated, since his intention had been to strike with a blow strong enough to kill no matter whom it hit.
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English Explanation of Mishnah Sanhedrin
Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable. Rabbi Shimon goes even further than the other Sages in advancing the theory that in order for one to be liable for the death penalty he must completely fulfill his intentions. According to Rabbi Shimon if one intended to kill one person and killed instead another, he is not liable for the death penalty. The Sages in section one had stated that if he intended to kill an animal and instead killed a person he is not liable. The reason seems to be that he intended on killing something for which he would not receive the death penalty. One can deduce, therefore, that if he had intended on killing one adult Jew but instead killed another, he would be liable for the death penalty. Rabbi Shimon states that even if one intended on killing someone for whom one would receive the death penalty, if he did not fulfill his exact intention, he is not liable for the death penalty.
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English Explanation of Mishnah Sanhedrin
Questions for Further Thought: • How are the scenarios in 2d and 2e different from those in the previous clauses?
