Talmud zu Yevamot 7:2

בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנִּסֵּת לְכֹהֵן וְהִכְנִיסָה לוֹ עֲבָדִים, בֵּין עַבְדֵי מְלוֹג, בֵּין עַבְדֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יֹאכְלוּ בַתְּרוּמָה. וּבַת כֹּהֵן שֶׁנִּסֵּת לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, וְהִכְנִיסָה לוֹ, בֵּין עַבְדֵי מְלוֹג, בֵּין עַבְדֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ לֹא יֹאכְלוּ בַתְּרוּמָה:

Wenn die Tochter eines Israeliten einen Cohein heiratete und er starb und sie schwanger ließ, essen ihre Knechte wegen des Anteils des Fötus (in den Knechten) keine Terumah. [Obwohl sie Kinder von ihm hat und Terumah isst, essen ihre Zon-Barzel-Knechte keine Terumah; denn sie gehören den Erben, und der Fötus hat einen Teil in sich, und dem Fötus fehlt die Kraft, sie dazu zu bringen, Terumah zu essen—entweder weil er der Meinung ist, dass ein Fötus im Mutterleib eines Fremden (zum Priestertum) (dh eines Israeliten) ein Fremder ist, oder weil er der Meinung ist, dass einer, der geboren wird, (andere) zum Essen veranlasst; Wer noch nicht geboren ist, lässt nicht essen, wie geschrieben steht (3. Mose 22,11): "Und einer, der in seinem Haus geboren wird— sie können essen ", was gelesen werden kann:" Sie können essen lassen. "] Denn ein Fötus disqualifiziert [Wenn die Tochter eines Cohein mit einem Israeliten verheiratet war und er sie schwanger ließ und sie kein anderes Kind hatte, das Der Fötus disqualifiziert sie von der Rückkehr zum Haus ihres Vaters.] und es gibt keinen Grund zum Essen. [Wenn die Tochter eines Israeliten mit einem Cohein verheiratet war und er sie schwanger ließ, fehlt dem Fötus die Kraft, sie zum Essen zu bringen, und Gleiches gilt für seine Knechte.] Dies sind die Worte von R. Yossi. Sie sagten zu ihm: Nun, da Sie uns über die Tochter eines Israeliten gegenüber einem Cohein, der Tochter eines Cohein, Zeugnis gegeben haben —Ihre Knechte sollten wegen des Anteils des Fötus (in ihnen) keine Terumah essen. Denn sie sind seine Knechte, und sie essen nur wegen ihm, und ihm fehlt die Kraft, sie zum Essen zu bringen. Die Halacha stimmt nicht mit R. Yossi überein.]

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot

Rebbi Eleazar explains the reason given in the Mishnah, that if he has a complaint about virginity he can quickly go to court¹⁶His explanation is given later, by R. Hila. He insists that the Mishnah does not refer only to the fact that if he married a girl supposed to be a virgin and he found her lacking virginity that he can divorce her without paying but he can claim “erroneous acquisition” and ask the court to void the marriage without bill of divorce.. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Since the time of danger¹⁷Tosephta 1:1, Babli 3b. As S. Lieberman points out (Tosefta ki-Fshutah vol. 6, p. 187), “danger” always refers to the persecutions after the war of Bar Kokhba, when Jewish observances were forbidden and, therefore, marrying on Wednesday would have been a capital crime. (The Babli explains otherwise.) they used to marry on Tuesdays and the Sages did not object; about Monday one does not listen to him, but if it was because of a danger it is permitted. What is “because of a danger”? because of sorcery¹⁸If somebody is afraid that sorceresses will put a spell on him to make him impotent if he marries on a day known to be a day for marrying, one lets him marry on any other day.. What is the difference between Monday and Tuesday? One who waits one day cannot be compared to one who waits two days. Why not let him wait two days? That his acquisition should not be sweet for him. Why should his acquisition not be sweet for him? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful¹⁹Here סוֹטָה means “unfaithful, deviant” in a general sense, not in the technical sense discussed in Tractate Soṭah. R. Eleazar holds that the Mishnah does not only give the husband the right to complain about lack of virginity but obligates him to go to court to annul his marriage since nobody can stay married to an adulterous wife (Mishnah Soṭah 5:1) and he presumes his bride was deflowered after she was preliminarily married to him, up to a year earlier. In the Babli, 8b/9a, the same argument is quoted in his name.. Could we not suspect that she was raped²⁰If a married woman is raped, the husband does not have to divorce her unless he is a Cohen.? A rape is public knowledge. And even if you suspect that she was raped, there is no other doubt²¹In editio princeps: לֹא סָפֵק אֶחָד “is there not only one doubt?” It is a generally recognized principle in both Talmudim that a single doubt referring to biblical precepts has to be judged restrictively, a double doubt leniently. Cf Yebamot 7:2, Note 73; Babli Beṣah3a.. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened²²If she was a willing partner to adultery. This only applies to a girl which has the status of adolescent since “the seduction of a minor is rape” (Babli Yebamot 33b).. From the words of the Torah one has to be stringent. Rebbi Yose said, if you suspect that she was raped, there are two doubts. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened; there is a doubt whether it happened after she was preliminarily married or before. From the words of the Torah, with two doubts one has to be lenient²³The husband who claims that his bride was not a virgin is not obligated to divorce his wife against his will; R. Eleazar’s interpretation of the Mishnah is rejected by R. Yose..

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Jerusalem Talmud Sotah

HALAKHAH: “The offering of an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen,” etc. What is the difference between a Cohen and a Cohen’s daughter? “The flour offering of a Cohen’s daughter is eaten, that of a Cohen is not eaten.” For it is written, “any flour offering of a Cohen shall be total, it should not be eaten²⁰⁷Lev. 6:16.;” not the Cohen’s daugher’s. Rebbi Abbahu asked before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Is it not written: “If a Cohen acquire a person with his money²⁰⁸Lev. 22:11. The verse states that slaves of a Cohen may eat of his sanctified food and we hold (cf. Yebamot 7:1) that the slaves of a Cohen’s daughter may eat if and only if she can eat. Should the mention of the masculine form “Cohen” not exclude the daughter of a Cohen. Accepted without discussion in Babli 23b; Sifra Ṣaw Pereq 8(4).,” should that apply to a Cohen but not ro a Cohen’s daughter? How is that? “The Cohen anointed in his stead, one of his sons;²⁰⁹Lev. 6:15. Verse 16 is an appendix to a paragraph speaking only of the (male) High Priest. The son of a Cohen’s daughter belongs to his father’s clan, not hers.” one whose son fills his place, that excludes her whose son does not fill her place.

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