Talmud do Sanhedryn 9:3
רוֹצֵחַ שֶׁנִּתְעָרֵב בַּאֲחֵרִים, כֻּלָּן פְּטוּרִין. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, כּוֹנְסִין אוֹתָן לְכִפָּה. כָּל חַיָּבֵי מִיתוֹת שֶׁנִּתְעָרְבוּ זֶה בָזֶה, נִדּוֹנִין בַּקַּלָּה. הַנִּסְקָלִין בַּנִּשְׂרָפִין, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, נִדּוֹנִין בִּסְקִילָה, שֶׁהַשְּׂרֵפָה חֲמוּרָה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, נִדּוֹנִין בִּשְׂרֵפָה, שֶׁהַסְּקִילָה חֲמוּרָה. אָמַר לָהֶן רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, אִלּוּ לֹא הָיְתָה שְׂרֵפָה חֲמוּרָה, לֹא נִתְּנָה לְבַת כֹּהֵן שֶׁזִּנְּתָה. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, אִלּוּ לֹא הָיְתָה סְקִילָה חֲמוּרָה, לֹא נִתְּנָה לַמְגַדֵּף וְלָעוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. הַנֶּהֱרָגִין בַּנֶּחֱנָקִין, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, בְּסַיִף. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, בְּחֶנֶק:
Jeśli morderca został zmieszany z innymi, wszyscy nie są za to odpowiedzialni. [Np. jeśli dwóch mężczyzn stało i strzała wyszła między nimi i kogoś zabiła, obaj nie ponoszą odpowiedzialności. I choćby jeden z nich był znany ze świętości, to jest pewne, że nie wystrzelił strzały, to jednak drugi nie ponosi odpowiedzialności z tego domniemania.] R. Juda mówi: Oni są uwięzieni. [Nasza Miszna jest wadliwa. Nauczano w ten sposób: „A jeśli wół, którego wyrok został wydany (za zabicie człowieka), został zmieszany z innymi wołami, wszystkie są ukamienowane”. Bo z konieczności nie wolno czerpać korzyści z nich wszystkich— nawet gdyby było ich tysiąc —z powodu tego, który się z nimi miesza. Dlatego wszyscy są ukamienowani, aby micwa ukamienowania była zadowolona z tego, kto jest do tego zobowiązany.] R. Juda mówi: Oni są uwięzieni. Nie trzeba ich kamienować, ale wszyscy są zgromadzeni w jednym pomieszczeniu i umierają z głodu. Halacha nie jest zgodna z R. Juda.] Wszyscy podlegający sądowej karze śmierci, którzy zostali wymieszani ze sobą, otrzymują karę mniejszą. Jeśli ludzie skazani na ukamienowanie zmieszali się z innymi skazanymi na spalenie, R. Shimon mówi: Są ukamienowani, bo spalanie jest cięższe. Mędrcy mówią: palą się, bo kamienowanie jest cięższe. R. Szimon powiedział do nich: „Gdyby spalanie nie było bardziej dotkliwe, nie zostałoby podane córce Coheina, która popełniła cudzołóstwo”. Powiedzieli mu: Gdyby ukamienowanie nie było cięższe, nie zostałoby wymierzone bluźniercy i bałwochwalcy! "Gdyby skazani na ścięcie głowy mieszali się z innymi skazanymi na uduszenie, R. Shimon mówi (mają być ścięci) z miecz, [uduszenie jest bardziej dotkliwe]. Mędrcy mówią: mają zostać uduszeni, [ścięcie głowy zaczyna się cięższe].
Jerusalem Talmud Nazir
HALAKHAH: 163The origin of this and the following paragraphs is in Sanhedrin 9:3 (fol. 27a). The first part of our text is almost identical with the text there; the second part is badly garbled and can be understood only from the Sanhedrin text. (ג denotes a Genizah reading.) So164Reading כיני as in Sanhedrin, in place of מני “who is the author”? is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated165The expression רגלים לדבר “the thing has feet” formulates prima facie evidence of guilt, not an argument which prohibits prosecution.. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation166Any “estimation” here is a judicial act. If the physician in charge as an officer of the court considered the victim as critically ill both at the beginning and at the end of treatment, this overrides the fact that for some time the victim was taken off the critical list. The attacker can be jailed only if the victim is in danger of his life and there is the possibility that the case may become one of capital crime (Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Mišpaṭim 6; Babli Sanhedrin 78b, Ketubot 33b).; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two167Once the victim was taken off the critical list, it is impossible to convict the attacker of premeditated murder.. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated168Ex. 21:19. Both Targum Onqelos and Mekhilta dR. Ismael explain משענת not as “cane” but as “health”. This meaning seems to be understood here..’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him169The verse seems to be superfluous (but its continuation, spelling out the financial obligations of the attacker, is not.)? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted170The term “exonerated” is read as “permanently exonerated.”.”171Babli Sanhedrin 78a/b, Ketubot 33b; Tosephta Baba qama 9:7; Mekhilta dR. Simeon bar Ioḥai pp. 174–175. What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden172Ex. 21:18..” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden173Otherwise there could not be any monetary claim derived from this paragraph. (There could be a claim under rabbinic rules for insult, etc.)? But if they estimated174In Sanhedrin: “estimated” and “did not estimate” are exchanged everywhere. This seems to be the correct version; in v. 18 the imperfect לא יָמוּת is read as “not expected to die”, since it does not say לֹא מֵת. But then v. 19 could simply mean that [the attacker] has to pay for disability and medical costs; the long introductory clause therefore refers to another case. For the Sages, the medical prognosis is irrelevant. that he would die. If they estimated174In Sanhedrin: “estimated” and “did not estimate” are exchanged everywhere. This seems to be the correct version; in v. 18 the imperfect לא יָמוּת is read as “not expected to die”, since it does not say לֹא מֵת. But then v. 19 could simply mean that [the attacker] has to pay for disability and medical costs; the long introductory clause therefore refers to another case. For the Sages, the medical prognosis is irrelevant. that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate174In Sanhedrin: “estimated” and “did not estimate” are exchanged everywhere. This seems to be the correct version; in v. 18 the imperfect לא יָמוּת is read as “not expected to die”, since it does not say לֹא מֵת. But then v. 19 could simply mean that [the attacker] has to pay for disability and medical costs; the long introductory clause therefore refers to another case. For the Sages, the medical prognosis is irrelevant. that he would die? If they did not estimate174In Sanhedrin: “estimated” and “did not estimate” are exchanged everywhere. This seems to be the correct version; in v. 18 the imperfect לא יָמוּת is read as “not expected to die”, since it does not say לֹא מֵת. But then v. 19 could simply mean that [the attacker] has to pay for disability and medical costs; the long introductory clause therefore refers to another case. For the Sages, the medical prognosis is irrelevant. that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay175As a matter of principle, a person convicted of a crime cannot be made to pay since that would constitute multiple punishment (cf. Terumot 7:1, Notes 3–73; Ketubot 3:1). Therefore, a verse is needed to force the potential murderer to pay if his victim survives.. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation176If the victim survives, it is proof that the first estimation was wrong; there is no criminal case and the civil case can proceed unhindered.. 177From here on, the sentences have to be re-ordered as indicated by the text in Sanhedrin (different text in Sanhedrin is in parentheses and italicized):
What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay, if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay178Even if the victim later dies. (does he have to pay?).
For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation, if he did not pay one does not order him to pay178Even if the victim later dies.. If he paid, can he take it back?
A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves179But for R. Simeon ben Laqish he has to pay for disability from the moment of the injury.. (It proves that the estimate was wrong.)
This (A baraita) supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died (die but he lived). From when does he have to pay him (count for him)? From the moment he turns worse180That means, even if he turns worse, since he had to pay from the start by court order. For R. Yose ben Hanina, he never pays once the case has turned into a criminal matter.. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.181Then the baraita is no support for R. Simeon ben Laqish since R. Yose ben Hanina will agree that the agressor has to pay the victim who is getting better.” (but from the start. That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.) What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”
What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay, if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay178Even if the victim later dies. (does he have to pay?).
For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation, if he did not pay one does not order him to pay178Even if the victim later dies.. If he paid, can he take it back?
A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves179But for R. Simeon ben Laqish he has to pay for disability from the moment of the injury.. (It proves that the estimate was wrong.)
This (A baraita) supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died (die but he lived). From when does he have to pay him (count for him)? From the moment he turns worse180That means, even if he turns worse, since he had to pay from the start by court order. For R. Yose ben Hanina, he never pays once the case has turned into a criminal matter.. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.181Then the baraita is no support for R. Simeon ben Laqish since R. Yose ben Hanina will agree that the agressor has to pay the victim who is getting better.” (but from the start. That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.) What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”
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Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something85A baraita. from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them86Ex. 21:28 discusses the tame bull which kills a human. Verses 29–32 deal with the notorious bull which is killing. Verses 35–36 then deal with both kinds of bulls as damaging goods.. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave87Since the payment for killed slaves is not treated as weregilt but as payment of damages to the owner for the loss of his slave, might it not be trated as part of the rules for payment of damages?; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free72Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said88A different but parallel argument is in the Babli, 42b., everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother)89It seems that one has ro read: “a male or female slave”. the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free72Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for fetuses90There is an obvious lacuna here which is filled by E: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah: “but the owner of the bull is free,” free from paying for fetuses.
The scribe’s error was induced by the repetition of the same text. For the statement of R. Eleazar ben Azariah, cf. Note 71.
The payment for fetuses refers to Ex. 21:22: If quarelling people unintentionally hit a pregnant woman who then has a miscarriage, they have to indemnify her husband. The argument in the text presupposes the statement later in the text: “ ‘people’ but not bulls.” (cf. Midrash Haggadol to Ex. 21:22) This exempts the owner of a notorious bull from payment if it causes a miscarriage. Therefore, there is no reason to think that the owner of a tame bull should pay. Why should R. Eleazar b. Azariah have to mention it?. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free72Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave92It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free72Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave92It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. But is it not written: “If people quarrel93Ex. 21:22.”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free72Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave92It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. But is it not written: “When they quarrel93Ex. 21:22.,” “when they brawl94Ex. 21:18, specifying the payments due for intentionally inflicted injuries.”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl95There is missing the corresponding rhetorical question “and fight the same as quarrel”? It is in E. The arguments are used to impose the payments mentioned in Ex. 21:18 for intentional injuries on the unintentional injuries mentioned in 21:22, and vice-versa (Nazir 9:5, Notes 183–184; Sanhedrin 9:3, 27a l. 58; Midrash Haggadol21:22).? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this96Which of the two contradictory arguments is to be accepted? Neither.? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
The scribe’s error was induced by the repetition of the same text. For the statement of R. Eleazar ben Azariah, cf. Note 71.
The payment for fetuses refers to Ex. 21:22: If quarelling people unintentionally hit a pregnant woman who then has a miscarriage, they have to indemnify her husband. The argument in the text presupposes the statement later in the text: “ ‘people’ but not bulls.” (cf. Midrash Haggadol to Ex. 21:22) This exempts the owner of a notorious bull from payment if it causes a miscarriage. Therefore, there is no reason to think that the owner of a tame bull should pay. Why should R. Eleazar b. Azariah have to mention it?. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free72Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave92It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free72Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave92It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. But is it not written: “If people quarrel93Ex. 21:22.”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free72Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave92It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. But is it not written: “When they quarrel93Ex. 21:22.,” “when they brawl94Ex. 21:18, specifying the payments due for intentionally inflicted injuries.”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl95There is missing the corresponding rhetorical question “and fight the same as quarrel”? It is in E. The arguments are used to impose the payments mentioned in Ex. 21:18 for intentional injuries on the unintentional injuries mentioned in 21:22, and vice-versa (Nazir 9:5, Notes 183–184; Sanhedrin 9:3, 27a l. 58; Midrash Haggadol21:22).? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this96Which of the two contradictory arguments is to be accepted? Neither.? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
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