Related su Pe'ah 6:1

There⁴⁵Ketubot 8:1; there this paragraph and the next one appear. we have stated: “A woman who inherited property before she was betrothed⁴⁶A Jewish marriage is performed in two stages. The first, qiddushin, which for lack of a better English equivalent was translated as “betrothed,” requires the groom to hand over to the bride an object of value (today, a gold ring) and to declare before two witnesses that the woman is betrothed to him. From that moment on they are married as far as penal law is concerned. In antiquity, the propective bride (who probably was in her early teens) did not prepare any trousseau. Hence, after qiddushin she was given adequate time to prepare and then was married to live with her husband in a second public ceremony, nissuïn, the execution of the ketubah document, in which the groom mortgages all his possessions and earnings for the upkeep of his wife and the care of his children, followed by the public recitation of seven benedictions (in the presence of 10 adult males). From that moment on, the couple is required to live in intimacy. Today, the two ceremonies are separated only by the reading of the ketubah and, sometimes, by a rabbi’s sermon. The period between qiddushin and nissuïn is one in which the groom is married, but as he is forbidden marital relations with his wife, as yet has no financial responsibility. After nissuïn, since the wife has a claim on his property enforceable in court, he receives administration of her estate., the Houses of Shammai and Hillel both are of the opinion that she may sell or give away and her actions are valid. If she inherited after she was betrothed, the House of Shammai say, she may sell, but the House of Hillel say, she may not sell⁴⁷Since the husband will have a monetary interest in the property after nissuïn..” Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel⁴⁸In the fourth chapter of Iddiut, the few cases in which the House of Shammai are more lenient than that of Hillel are enumerated. The first two Mishnaiot of the present chapter are included in that list, the one from Ketubot is not.? He said to him, the Mishnaiot come only for circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side⁴⁹On the wife, who is restricted in her actions. The law is lenient for the husband, who gets veto power over the actions of his wife before he mortgages all his property to her. and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor is abandoned?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! It is lenient for the poor⁵⁰In that non-poor persons may not acquire it. and not stringent for the householder, since it was abandoned by his intent. He said to him, did we not state: “The sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels, if it was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here⁵¹In the case of Ketubot., it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He⁵²Rebbi Yose. said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.

Rebbi Yehuda says, “A person who made his whole field into sheaves [in order to later] stook them [into stooks, which in turn will be taken to the final stack] is [considered to be] like someone who bundles [sheaves] in [order to put them in a] stack [of sheaves, which makes the sheaves inside the stooks eligible to become Shikcha (forgotten sheaves),] and [then] rounded it (i.e. the stack) out [as if he has completed the stack] and [then brought more sheaves and] pressed [them] into the stack [after the stack seemed to be already finished, which is still considered to be the final act of bundling, which makes these sheaves eligible to become Shikcha].” Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that if [a person] proclaimed [his produce to be] ownerless [only] to people, but not to animals, [or only] to Jews, but not to Non-Jews, [it is still considered to be] ownerless [and anyone can come and take it].