הַפֶּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, אוֹ לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ וְלִשְׁמוֹ, פָּסוּל. כֵּיצַד לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּלְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים. שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ וְלִשְׁמוֹ, לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים וּלְשֵׁם פָּסַח:
Si quelqu'un n'a pas massacré le lishmo de Pessa'h (en tant que tel, pour lui-même) [comme quand il l'a abattu comme offrande de paix], ou s'il a reçu [son sang dans le bol d'arrosage], ou a apporté [le sang au autel] ou aspergé [le sang sur l'autel] pas lishmo; ou lishmo et non lishmo [comme quand il l'a massacré lishmo et a reçu le sang pas lishmo]; ou pas lishmo et lishmo, il est invalidé. [Nous sommes informés par la présente que la pensée passe d'une fonction (sacrificielle) à une autre (c'est-à-dire s'il pensait en exécutant une fonction pour en exécuter une autre avec une pensée impropre, par exemple, s'il pensait: "Je vais l'abattre lishmo pour asperger son sang lo lishmo "), l'offrande est immédiatement invalidée, même s'il n'a pas exécuté la deuxième fonction avec cette pensée impropre. Et c'est ainsi que notre Michna doit être comprise, à savoir: «Ou [s'il pensait, en massacrant, asperger le sang lo lishmo] et [il l'a aspergé] lishmo, c'est inapte. Le fait que lo lishmo rend le L'offrande de Pessa'h impropre est dérivée de (Exode 12, 27): "Et vous direz:" C'est un sacrifice pascal ""—Elle doit être sacrifiée comme offrande pascale. Et «ça» («hu») implique une exigence catégorique (qui, si elle n'est pas observée, invalide l'offre)]. "Lishmo et pas lishmo": Comment ça? Leshem Pesach et leshem shelamim (offrande de paix). "Shelo lishmo et lishmo". Comment? Leshem shelamim et leshem Pesach. (Voir au dessus).
Tosefta Pesachim
One who slaughtered [the Passover offering] for its purpose but completed [the rituals associated with the sacrifice] for a different purpose -- it is valid because [a sacrifice] is rendered valid through the slaughter. How is it "slaughtered for those who cannot eat it" (Pes. 5:3)? [This applies where] he slaughtered for a sick person or for an elderly person who cannot eat an olive's-bulk. How is it [slaughtered] for "those who are not registered" (ibid.)? [This applies where] he slaughtered it for members of a different collective. [If] he slaughtered for [both] circumcised and uncircumcised, or for [both] impure persons and for pure persons, it is valid. Abba Shaul disqualifies it, and it is logical that it should be disqualified, since [a person's unfit status] at the time [of the sacrifice] disqualifies [a sacrifice], and an uncircumcised person is disqualified *and an impure person is disqualified (following the GR"A). Just as "the time" (i.e., where the butcher both intends that sacrifice be eaten in its proper time and not at its proper time, see Minchat Bikkurim) makes it [disqualified under the principle of] "the part is like the whole," so too an uncircumcised person makes it [disqualified under] "the part is like the whole." Or perhaps look at it this way: Since an impure person and an uncircumcised person are disqualified, just as [partial] impurity does not cause [application of the principle] "the part is like the whole," thus so too a [partially] uncircumcised person does not cause [application of the principle] "the part is like the whole." Let us see to what case it is similar: We derive a matter that does not apply to every offering (i.e., lack of circumcision), from a [different] matter that does not apply to every offering (i.e., impurity), and it is proven from "time," which [also] does not apply to all offerings. Or perhaps look at it this way: We derive a matter which does not permit exception to a general prohibition, from a [different] matter which does not permit an exception to a general prohibition, and it is not proven from impurity, which does permit an exception to a general prohibition.
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