Talmud sobre Ketubot 2:2

וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בְּאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ שָׂדֶה זוֹ שֶׁל אָבִיךָ הָיְתָה וּלְקַחְתִּיהָ הֵימֶנּוּ, שֶׁהוּא נֶאֱמָן, שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר. וְאִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁהִיא שֶׁל אָבִיו וְהוּא אוֹמֵר לְקַחְתִּיהָ הֵימֶנּוּ, אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן:

Y R. Yehoshua admite que si uno le dice a su vecino: Este campo era de su padre y se lo compré, se cree, porque "la boca que prohíbe es la boca que permite". [Aunque anteriormente, en el primer capítulo, re "Si ella dijo: 'Después de que me comprometiste, me forzaron'", R. Yehoshua difiere de R. Gamliel, diciendo que la mujer no se cree en esto (aunque) así se prohíbe al sacerdocio, cuando podría haber dicho: soy mukkath etz y se me ha permitido el sacerdocio—Esto es así en un caso de "prohibido" o "permitido", es decir, prohibido al sacerdocio o permitido a él. Es en este caso que R. Yehoshua difiere de R. Gamliel, diciendo que no se la cree con un miggo ("Podría haber dicho, etc."); pero aquí, donde no hay una cuestión de prohibido o permitido, sino (más bien una cuestión de) pérdida monetaria, como cuando uno le dice a su vecino: "Este campo era de su padre y se lo compré a él", admite R. Yehoshua. R. Gamliel que en tal caso se le cree con un miggo, después de haber podido decir: "Es mío", de modo que si dice: "Era de tu padre y se lo compré", se cree .] Y si hay testigos de que era de su padre, y él dice: se lo compré, no se le cree. [La gemara explica que esta Mishná habla de una instancia en la que él (el poseedor del campo) comió de ella solo dos años antes (es decir, en la vida de) el padre y un año antes del hijo. La Mishná nos informa que, dado que los tres años de jázakah (posesión) no se completaron en la vida del padre, el año que comió antes que el hijo no se acumula en la suma de los años de jázaca.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot

HALAKHAH: “A woman went with her husband,” etc. Just as you say, ³Mishnah Ketubot 2:4. This belongs to a series of statements illustrating the principle that “the mouth that prohibits is the mouth that permits”. If nobody at that place knew that she had been married before, then if she asserts that she was married she forbids herself for every other male. If then she qualifies the statement that now she is no longer married because she is divorced, her testimony must be accepted since if one believes her that she was married one must believe her that she is divorced; if one does not believe her that she was married, one does not have to believe her that she is divorced but it makes no difference since as an unmarried woman she can contract marriage. But if there were witnesses who could testify that she was married, she has to prove her case by documents or witnesses if she wants to remarry as a divorcee.“if there are witnesses that she is a married woman and she says, I was divorced, she is not trustworthy;” would I say it is the same here? There is a difference for witnesses of death since if he comes he disproves [the testimony]⁴But if the husband comes and claims that he did not divorce her, it is his word against hers; she is not automatically proven to be a liar.. Then she should be trustworthy to say: “my levir died”! That is impossible since we have stated⁵Mishnah 15:10. There is no relaxation of standards of proof before a court except in the case of testimony about a husband’s death.: “A woman is not trustworthy if she says ‘my levir died’ to remarry, or ‘my sister died’ to enter her house⁶To marry her brother-in-law..” Rebbi Abba said, she is trustworthy for her husband whom she married out of her free will; she is not trustworthy about her levir on whom she was thrown against her will. Rebbi Hoshaia asked, think of it, then she should not be trustworthy if she was forced to marry him⁷If she was married off by her father while she was underage. There is no mention in the Mishnah of a restriction on women marrying on their own. No answer is given to the question.!

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Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma

MISHNAH: He who stole according to the testimony of two people²¹To recover stolen property is a civil matter and is judged according to civil law. But for the owners to collect double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution requires a criminal conviction of the thief which can be based only on the testimony of at least two eye witnesses to the act. and slaughtered or sold according to their testimony or the testimony of two others, has to pay quadruple or quintuple restitution. He who stole and sold on the Sabbath²²This is forbidden but in itself is not a capital crime which would preempt the imposition of a fine. But if he slaughtered on the Sabbath he committed a capital crime and could not be sentenced to a fine; cf. Chapter 6, Note 102., stole and sold to pagan worship²³As long as he does not himself participate in pagan worship, no capital crime has been committed., stole and slaughtered on the Day of Atonement²⁴The punishment for this deadly sin is left to Heaven, not the human court., stole from his father, slaughtered, or sold, and then his father died,²⁵Even though he is an heir, he has to pay to his co-heirs their share in the fine payable to the estate. stole, slaughtered, and then dedicated it to the Temple²⁶Since he already was subject to the fine when he dedicated, the dedication cannot erase the liability., has to pay quadruple or quintuple restitution. He who stole and slaughtered for medical purposes or for the dogs, he who slaughtered and it turned out torn²⁷On inspection the animal was found to be sick and the meat unfit for human consumption., he who slaughtered a profane animal in the Temple courtyard²⁸The slaughtered animal is forbidden for any use., has to pay quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Simeon frees from liability in these two cases²⁹He holds that slaughter which does not prepare meat for human consumption technically is called “killing” rather than “slaughter” and is not covered by the rule of Ex. 21:37..

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