Talmud sobre Guitín 4:4
עֶבֶד שֶׁנִּשְׁבָּה וּפְדָאוּהוּ, אִם לְשׁוּם עֶבֶד, יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד. אִם לְשׁוּם בֶּן חוֹרִין, לֹא יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר, בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד. עֶבֶד שֶׁעֲשָׂאוֹ רַבּוֹ אַפּוֹתִיקִי לַאֲחֵרִים וְשִׁחְרְרוֹ, שׁוּרַת הַדִּין, אֵין הָעֶבֶד חַיָּב כְּלוּם. אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי תִקּוּן הָעוֹלָם, כּוֹפִין אֶת רַבּוֹ וְעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ בֶן חוֹרִין, וְכוֹתֵב שְׁטָר עַל דָּמָיו. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר, אֵינוֹ כוֹתֵב אֶלָּא מְשַׁחְרֵר:
Si un esclavo (cananeo) fuera llevado cautivo y redimido [por otros israelitas después de que su amo se hubiera desesperado por su regreso] —si (fue redimido) por servidumbre, él sirve [al segundo maestro]; si por la libertad, no sirve [ni el primero ni el segundo. No el segundo, porque lo redimió por la libertad. No el primero, para que no lo rediman. R. Shimon b. Gamliel dice: En cualquier caso, él sirve [a su primer maestro, para que cada esclavo no sea cautivo de los bandidos para escapar de su maestro.] Si un maestro convirtió a su esclavo en un apotiki [po tehei kai ("Aquí quedará" ), es decir, de esto (el fiador) cobrará su deuda, y no de otra parte)], y él [su primer maestro] lo liberó, la justicia dicta que el fiador no debe nada [al segundo, por la manumisión de su primer maestro disuelto su servidumbre]; pero debido al "bien general" [no sea que el segundo lo encuentre en el mercado y le diga: "Tú eres mi siervo", lo que desacredita a sus hijos], su amo [el segundo] se ve obligado a liberarlo y él [ el fiador] le escribe (el segundo) una factura de deuda por su valor [es decir, por su valor de mercado (como fiador); no por el monto de la deuda si la deuda fuera mayor que su valor.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel dice: Él [el fiador] no le escribe [un recibo de deuda, porque no le debe nada. Pero su primer maestro, que "dañó" lo que le debía al segundo, debe pagarle su valía. Para quien daña lo que se le debe a otro es responsable. (La halajá está de acuerdo con R. Shimon b. Gamliel)], pero él (el segundo) lo libera.
Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot
This text is also in the Babli Baba Qama 89b. and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time29“Selling temporarily” is not selling the property but leasing the use of the property for a limited period.? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: 30Ševi‘it 10:1 (Notes 22–24), in a slightly different version Babli Giṭṭin41a. If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself31The buyer has to insure himself against the possibility that the creditor or the wife at the dissolution of her marriage will foreclose the property and he will have to sue the seller for restitution of the sale price.. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman32Without a male protector. Then the law has to protect her. should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel33Since the wife has a lien on the mortmain slaves, the husband cannot alienate them without her consent, just as he cannot alienate real estate put up as collateral for her ketubah.
Rosh (R. Asher ben Ieḥiel) in his commentary on this Yerushalmi (Yebamot 7 #1) holds that the husband is prevented even from leasing the property without his wife’s consent. Rif (R. Isaac Fasi), Giṭṭin #472 holds that the husband may not sell but may lease for a limited time.. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.
Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma
The statement is difficult to understand since at the moment of the second injury the slave already is a free Jew rather than a slave. As R. Eliahu Fulda points out, it also is superfluous since R. Joḥanan always follows the anonymous Mishnah as practice. Since the Yerushalmi is so elliptic, it may not be excluded that it follows the Babli (Giṭṭin 42b) in holding that the slave is automatically free only for eye and tooth which are mentioned in the verse, but for other injuries for which the court will force the slave’s freedom a bill of manumission would be required. Then R. Abbahu’s statement becomes relevant for the case of a slave in his period between servitude and freedom.. 46A text similar to the remainder of this paragraph is in Ketubot 5:5, Notes 120–130. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a person dedicates his earnings, he dedicates everything47Everything he earns automatically is Temple property; he cannot take anything to feed himself but has to beg his sustenance from others. Tosephta ‘Arakhin 3:8 does not support this statement.. If he dedicates the earnings of his slave, he48The slave can support himself from his own earnings; only the excess becomes Temple property; Tosephta ‘Arakhin 3:8, Babli Giṭṭin 12a. can take from there his upkeep and the remainder is dedicated. Here you say, the remainder is dedicated, but there you say, everything is holy. Rebbi Aḥa said, Jews are more obligated to support free people than slaves49Slaves would not be able to feed themselves from alms.. But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say: If somebody cuts off the hands of somebody else’s slave, his master collects damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earnings, and embarrassment, and that one should be supported by welfare50Babli Giṭṭin 12b.. Rebbi Aḥa said, Jews are more obligated to support amputated slaves than unimpaired ones. But did not Rebbi Joḥanan also give to his slave when he ate meat? Give also to his slave when he drank wine? And recited for himself the verse51Job 31:15.: “Did not His maker make me in the womb”? They said, there a rule of law, here a rule of mercy.