Comentario sobre Horayot 1:3
הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין לַעֲקֹר אֶת כָּל הַגּוּף, אָמְרוּ, אֵין נִדָּה בַתּוֹרָה, אֵין שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה, אֵין עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַתּוֹרָה, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְטוּרִין. הוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַיֵּם מִקְצָת, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ חַיָּבִין. כֵּיצַד. אָמְרוּ, יֵשׁ נִדָּה בַתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הַבָּא עַל שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם פָּטוּר. יֵשׁ שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הַמּוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, פָּטוּר. יֵשׁ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה פָטוּר, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ חַיָּבִין, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא ד) וְנֶעְלַם דָּבָר, דָּבָר וְלֹא כָל הַגּוּף:
Si Bet-din dictaminó desarraigar todo el cuerpo [es decir, todos los principios de la mitzvá] — si dijeron: No hay (institución de) niddah en la Torá, no hay Shabat en la Torá, no hay idolatría en la Torá, están exentos (de una ofrenda), [está escrito (Levítico 4:13 ): "Y hay algo escondido" —Léalo: "Y hay que esconderse de una cosa", parte de la cosa y no del todo.] Si decidieron anular parte y cumplir parte, son responsables (por una ofrenda). ¿Cómo es eso? Si decían: Hay niddah en la Torá, pero uno que vive con una mujer "que guarda un día (de taharah [limpieza] contra un día de tumah [impureza]" no es responsable (a kareth). [(La Gemara pregunta: Pero guardar un día contra un día está escrito en la Torá, a saber (Levítico 15:22): "Entonces ella contará por sí misma", de donde aprendemos que cuenta uno (día de taharah) contra uno (día de tumah), y para cualquier cosa escrita en el Beth-din de la Torá, ¡no traigas una ofrenda! Y la Guemara responde: Estamos hablando de una instancia en la que dijeron que la zavah (una mujer con flujo) solo se obtiene durante el día; es decir, solo cuando ve sangre durante el día y no cuando la ve por la noche, está escrita (Ibid.) "todos los días de su flujo")]; (si decían :) hay Shabat en la Torá, pero el que lleva de un dominio privado a un dominio público no es responsable [es decir, si dijeron: Está prohibido traer y sacar, está escrito (Éxodo 16:29): "Que nadie salga de su lugar, "pero se permite tirar y alcanzar.)]; hay idolatría en la Torá, pero inclinarse no es responsable, [es decir, si ellos dijeron que inclinarse donde hay postración de manos y pies está prohibido, está escrito (Éxodo 34:14): "No te inclinarás a otro dios, "pero donde no hay postración está permitido], son responsables (por una ofrenda), está escrito (Levítico 4:13):" Y se oculte una cosa "—una cosa y no todo el cuerpo (de la mitzvá). [En resumen: Beth-din no es responsable hasta que dictaminen (permitido) sobre algo que los saduceos no conceden (como prohibido; pero si dictaminaron (erróneamente) sobre algo que los saduceos reconocen (como prohibido), están exentos de una ofrenda congregacional. Y, en cuanto a los muchos que transgredieron por su decisión, cada uno puede traer una ofrenda por su inconsciencia. ¿Por qué? Porque esta es una instancia de "Ve y léelo en la casa de el maestro "(es decir, debería haberlo sabido)]
Bartenura on Mishnah Horayot
English Explanation of Mishnah Horayot
If, however, they ruled that a part [of a commandment] was to be annulled and a part fulfilled, they are liable. How is this so? If they said: [the law concerning the] menstruant occurs in the Torah but if a man has relations with a woman that awaits a day corresponding to a day he is exempt, [or that the law concerning the] Sabbath occurs in the Torah but if a man carries anything from a private domain to a public domain he is exempt, [or that the law of] idolatry occurs in the Torah, but if a man only bows down to an idol he is exempt, they are liable, for it says, “And if some matter escapes [the notice of the congregation]” (Leviticus 4:13), “some matter” but not the entire principle.
Our mishnah teaches that if the court rules that an entire commandment does not exist, they are not liable. Whereas if they rule that one part of the commandment does not exist, they are liable.
This mishnah teaches an important principle for establishing when the court is liable to bring the special sin-offering for having made a wrongful ruling. If the court were to state that the entirety of a well-known commandment does not exist, and people were to act upon the court’s ruling, the people who actually sin are liable and not the court. Since these three things, the prohibition of sexual relations with a menstruant, the prohibition of Sabbath laws and the prohibition of idol worship are so clearly stated in the Torah, everyone should have known that the court erred when it ruled that these things don’t exist. This is not even truly considered a ruling by the court, but merely an empty statement against the Torah. While interpretation of the Torah is flexible, it does have its limits.
However, if the court rules that a certain act which is one part of a larger prohibition, is permitted, and people act upon the court’s ruling, the court is liable and not the people. For instance, a woman who sees blood at a time when she is not supposed to be menstruating must wait one day for every day that she saw blood before she can resume sexual relations. If the court ruled that one could have relations with such a woman, they are permitting an act which is against the Torah. Similarly, if they permit a person to remove an object from one domain to another on Shabbat, they are permitting carrying, which is forbidden. Finally, if they admit that idol worship is prohibited, but bowing down is not considered idol worship, they have made an errant ruling. In all of these cases, since they admit that the commandment exists, but have made an error on a detail (these are all well-known and rather large details in rabbinic literature), they are liable if the people listen to their ruling. People might not have known that such actions were prohibited, even though they knew that the general commandment exists. Therefore, they are not liable for following the court’s ruling.
The mishnah ends with a midrash supporting this view. One can understand the word davar to mean “part of the matter”; from here the rabbis learn that if the whole matter escapes the court, the court is not liable.
Questions
Why do you think the rabbis posited this exception to the general rule of the court’s culpability for errors?