Talmud zu Gittin 4:10

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold¹⁶Tosaphot in Giṭṭin 41a, s. v. אשה, are of the opinion that the Babli concurs.. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold¹⁷If the wife is not from a priestly family, then her slaves can eat only because he made her his wife. He cannot sell them since nobody can sell what is not his; Tosephta 9:1.. From your own they¹⁸The developers of rabbinic doctrine. gave to you. It would be logical that one¹⁹A paraphernalia slave who is not property of a Cohen. should not eat heave. But they said that he eats²⁰As if he were the property of a Cohen., and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye”²¹If a slave loses a body part through his owner’s fault, he gains his freedom (Ex. 21:26). Paraphernalia slaves are property of the wife but not the husband. This part of the baraita is quoted in the Babli. Baba Qama 89a. from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves²²This baraita holds that they are the husband’s property; therefore, he must have the absolute power to sell them, against R. Joḥanan. are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit²³The Babli agrees without a dissenting opinion., as we have stated²⁴Quoted as tannaitic text also in Giṭṭin 4:4 (fol. 45b), as amoraic in the Babli, Baba Qama 11b. 33b; Baba Meṣi‘a 44b.: If somebody mortgages²⁵Greek ὑποθήκη “mortgage”. a slave and later sold him, he is not sold²⁶The creditor can foreclose on the slave in the hands of the buyer.; if he freed him, he is freed²⁷The creditor has to sue the borrower for damages; he cannot put his hand on the ex-slave.. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days”²⁸Ex. 21:20. The exemption for the owner who hits his slave which provided that he is not prosecutable if the slave survives for two days is not available to either wife or husband. This baraita defines “owner” as a person who has both the right to and disposition of his property.
This text is also in the Babli Baba Qama 89b. and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time²⁹“Selling temporarily” is not selling the property but leasing the use of the property for a limited period.? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: ³⁰Ševi‘it 10:1 (Notes 22–24), in a slightly different version Babli Giṭṭin41a. If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself³¹The buyer has to insure himself against the possibility that the creditor or the wife at the dissolution of her marriage will foreclose the property and he will have to sue the seller for restitution of the sale price.. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman³²Without a male protector. Then the law has to protect her. should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel³³Since the wife has a lien on the mortmain slaves, the husband cannot alienate them without her consent, just as he cannot alienate real estate put up as collateral for her ketubah.
Rosh (R. Asher ben Ieḥiel) in his commentary on this Yerushalmi (Yebamot 7 #1) holds that the husband is prevented even from leasing the property without his wife’s consent. Rif (R. Isaac Fasi), Giṭṭin #472 holds that the husband may not sell but may lease for a limited time.. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Rebbi Ḥuna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes [are from their words, it is understandable that Hillel instituted prozbol. But following him who says tithes] are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah⁸⁴The disagreement about tithes is between R. Yose ben R. Ḥanina and R. Eleazar in Halakhah 6:1 (Note 11). “Their words” are the rabbinic institutions.? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah [because it is an obligation of the person⁸⁵While this may be the correct reason, the language is Babylonian rabbinic Hebrew; the insert probably is a gloss that found its way into the text. In Sifry Deut. 111, the reason given is not this logical argument but the verse (Deut. 15:2): “this is the word of the remission: every creditor remit what is in his hand, what he loaned to his fellow; he shall not press his fellow because a remission was declared for the Eternal.” Since God is Lord over the universe, remission is applicable everywhere in the universe.]? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment⁸⁶Agricultural Sabbatical. is followed as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There⁸⁷Babylonia. The Babli (Giṭṭin36a) quotes only Rebbi’s statement below. The commentators of the Babli assume that the majority of rabbis oppose Rebbi. There seems to be no basis for that assumption. The sketchy treatment of the subject in the Babli is explained by Meïri (Magen Avot, ed. Last, London 1909, Chap. 15.)., they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. As we have stated (Deut. 15:2): “this is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, these two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “[All its] inhabitants.⁸⁸From here to the end of the Halakhah, the argument is also in Babli Arakhin 32b and Sifra Behar Pereq2(3). The verse reads: “You shall sanctify the fiftieth year and call freedom for all its inhabitants, a Jubilee it shall be for you so that everybody return to his ancestral land, everybody return to his family.” “Ancestral land” is the plot given to the family in the original distribution after the conquest. It follows that there can be no Jubilee if the distribution of land by Joshua is no longer known.” In the time when its inhabitants lived on it, not when they went into exile. If they lived on it but intermingled, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee is operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.

Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? As Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, nobody may revoke his agency by words. Explain it that he said, go and fix it to the North and [the agent] went and fixed it to the South⁴¹The disagreement between R. Simeon ben Laqish and R. Joḥanan, whether a verbal authorization may be revoked by simple pronouncement, not necessarily in the presence of the agent, is in Giṭṭin 4:1–2, fol. 45c, and Babli Qiddušin 59a. The Babli explains the problem away; its opinion is that R. Simeon ben Laqish disallows verbal revocation only in matters of marriage and divorce which never can be executed by words alone. The Yerushalmi disagrees and holds that R. Simeon ben Laqish always requires an action (in the case of authorization to proceed with a divorce, a court action) to terminate duly established agency. In our case here, he permits a shortcut for termination only if the agent deviates from his instructions. On the other hand, the Yerushalmi notes that in case of an action of divorce, agency can be terminated only in the presence of the agent or by written document delivered to the other party even for R. Joḥanan since any other course of action would have unforseeable consequences..

A convert was a barber and astrologer¹⁴⁵Greek ἀστρόλογος, ἀστρολογία.. He saw in his astrology¹⁴⁵Greek ἀστρόλογος, ἀστρολογία. that Jews were spilling his blood. This only referred to his circumcision but when a Jew came to him to get a haircut, he killed him. How many did he kill? Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said eighty. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said three hundred. At the end they prayed about him and he returned to his origin¹⁴⁶Then Jews who came to his place had to watch in a mirror what he was doing..

HALAKHAH: “This is more severe regarding a human than an ox,” etc. “A person who hits his father or mother,” etc. It was stated⁴³A similar statement is in Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Neziqin 9.: If the witnesses said, we testify that X blinded both of his eyes simultanously, or that he knocked out two of his teeth simultaneously, he does not have to pay anything. One after the other, he gains his freedom by the first and he pays him damages for the second⁴⁴Ex. 21:26–27 states that a slave gains his freedom if his master blinds him or knocks out one of his teeth. If the master injures the slave repeatedly, the slave gains his freedom by the first injury and, therefore, can claim full payment for the second as a free Jew (Babli Giṭṭin 42b). But if a double injury was inflicted in one blow, the slave was not free and has no claim beyond his automatic freedom.. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This implies that one estimates embarrassment for slaves⁴⁵Since there is no exception made for shame in the previous statement.
The statement is difficult to understand since at the moment of the second injury the slave already is a free Jew rather than a slave. As R. Eliahu Fulda points out, it also is superfluous since R. Joḥanan always follows the anonymous Mishnah as practice. Since the Yerushalmi is so elliptic, it may not be excluded that it follows the Babli (Giṭṭin 42b) in holding that the slave is automatically free only for eye and tooth which are mentioned in the verse, but for other injuries for which the court will force the slave’s freedom a bill of manumission would be required. Then R. Abbahu’s statement becomes relevant for the case of a slave in his period between servitude and freedom.. ⁴⁶A text similar to the remainder of this paragraph is in Ketubot 5:5, Notes 120–130. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a person dedicates his earnings, he dedicates everything⁴⁷Everything he earns automatically is Temple property; he cannot take anything to feed himself but has to beg his sustenance from others. Tosephta ‘Arakhin 3:8 does not support this statement.. If he dedicates the earnings of his slave, he⁴⁸The slave can support himself from his own earnings; only the excess becomes Temple property; Tosephta ‘Arakhin 3:8, Babli Giṭṭin 12a. can take from there his upkeep and the remainder is dedicated. Here you say, the remainder is dedicated, but there you say, everything is holy. Rebbi Aḥa said, Jews are more obligated to support free people than slaves⁴⁹Slaves would not be able to feed themselves from alms.. But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say: If somebody cuts off the hands of somebody else’s slave, his master collects damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earnings, and embarrassment, and that one should be supported by welfare⁵⁰Babli Giṭṭin 12b.. Rebbi Aḥa said, Jews are more obligated to support amputated slaves than unimpaired ones. But did not Rebbi Joḥanan also give to his slave when he ate meat? Give also to his slave when he drank wine? And recited for himself the verse⁵¹Job 31:15.: “Did not His maker make me in the womb”? They said, there a rule of law, here a rule of mercy.

HALAKHAH: “If the mixed-up children became adults,” after it happened¹³²One would have expected the Mishnah to read: Once adults, they manumit one another. Does the formulation of the Mishnah imply that the manumission is not recommended?. Does that mean, not from the start? So is the Mishnah: It is permitted from the start to manumit¹³³The Babli, 100a, insists that the court forces them to manumit one another.. Even Rebbi Yose the Galilean, who said that one is forbidden to manumit¹³⁴Based on the verse Lev. 25:46: “You shall have them work for you forever”. In the Babli, this interpretation is quoted in the name of the Amora Rav Jehudah (Berakhot 47b), R. Aqiba (Soṭah 3b, against R. Ismael who reads “You may have them work for you forever”), Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel (Giṭṭin 38b)., will agree here that it is permitted for the benefit of children. What means “appropriate”? Not disabled.

¹¹⁴Tosephta 7:8; quoted in Babli 74b; also in Yerushalmi Qiddušin 2:5 (62c l. 66).“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” ¹¹⁵In the Babli (previous Note) this is quoted as a tannai'tic text. What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. ¹¹⁶The following text has a parallel with different emphasis in the Babli, loc. cit. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.¹¹⁷The reference is to Mishnah Giṭṭin 4:7 where it is stated that a man who divorces his wife because of her vows is never permitted to take her back. This is a rabbinic rule. R. Meïr holds that no remarriage is permitted in case of any vow that needs to be annulled by an Elder (cf. Nedarim Chapter 9). The reason is that one has to avoid a situation in which the divorcee marries another man and for him goes to an Elder to have him annul the vow. If the ex-husband says, “if I had known that her vow will be annulled, I would not have divorced her,” he retroactively would annul the bill of divorce, make his ex-wife a bigamist and bastards of her children from the second husband. Therefore, one has to make clear to him that the divorce is final and irreversible, to prevent him from having second thoughts. But if the cause of the divorce is an invalid vow, the divorce is not caused by the vow and the husband may remarry his divorcee (as long as she did not marry another man). R. Eleazar says that remarriage was forbidden in the second case because of the first one since it is obvious that the husband must be an ignoramus if he divorces his wife because of a vow which every competent scholar will immediately declare as invalid if asked about it (“a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage” because the Sage will declare it invalid at first sight.)” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage¹¹⁸This text is clearly elliptic. There does not seem to be a lacuna, but rather the text is a reference to an extensive argument in Giṭṭin 4:7 (and a related text in Qiddušin 2:5):אָמַר רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר. לֹא אָֽסְרוּ זֶה אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי זֶה. בְּדִין הָיָה שֶׁאֲפִילוּ נֵדֶר שֶׁהוּא צָרִיךְ חֲקִירַת חָכָם יַחֲזִיר. שֶׁהַזָּקֵן עוֹקֵר אֶת הַנֵּדֶר מֵעִיקָּרוֹ מִפְּנֵי מָה אָֽסְרוּ נֵדֶר שֶׁאֵין צָרִיךְ חֲקִירַת חָכָם. מִפְּנֵי נֵדֶר שֶׁהוּא צָרִיךְ חֲקִירַת חָכָם. “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other. It would have been logical that even in the case of a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage he could take her back. For the Elder uproots the vow from the start. Why did they forbid a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage.”. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry¹¹⁹The woman whose preliminary marriage has been declared invalid because of her vows may marry any other man without a divorce from the first. without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce¹²⁰This is also quoted in the Babli, loc. cit.. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar¹²¹Who holds that all these prohibitions are only extreme precautions., and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis¹²²This position, rejected here, is the one adopted in the Babli. It seems that the Babli would reject the argument given for the permission to remarry as unreasonable (cf. R. Nissim Gerondi, ad Aliassi 35a.). Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce¹²³If she does not go to stay married to the first husband, one does not expect her to try to dissolve her vow for any other man.. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder¹²⁴Having used the vows to escape a marriage chosen for her when adolescent by her father, she might be expected to have the vow annulled as an adult for a man of her choice. who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce¹²⁵From her first husband, who in executing the divorce has to forswear any hope ever again to be married to her..

HALAKHAH: “Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent,” etc. ²¹⁹Since the argument is repeated for Mishnah 9, it is clear that the Halakhah refers both to Mishnah 8 and Mishnah 9. The statement of R. Joḥanan is in Giṭṭin 4:1, see Notes 2–3 there for explanation. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates agency by a declaration? He explains it by the stringency of the rules of adultery and incest. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun understood this from the latter part: “Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent to contract preliminary marriage for her and then went and contracted for herself.” Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates agency by a declaration? He explains it by the stringency of the rules of adultery and incest.