Kommentar zu Menachot 2:1

הקומץ את המנחה. מודה ר' יוסי שהוא פגול (Rabbi Yossi’s statement is equivalent to what is found in Tractate Menahot, Chapter 1, Mishnah 3) – because it is necessary to teach the ending clause: “to burn its frankincense on the morrow, Rabbi Yossi states that it is invalid, but there is no extirpation,” you might have thought that the reason of Rabbi Yossi is because that he holds that he does not make a sacrifice rejectable through improper mental disposal (see Leviticus 19:7) with the half which fits the sacrifices for eating, that is to say, that if he thought to perform the act of Divine service on the morrow that the act of Divine service of half permits it, he did not have an inappropriate intention, and this frankincense is one-half makes the object permissible for enjoyment, for whether it is the burning on the altar of the handful of meal-offering and the frankincense which permit the residue, but even the first clause of the Mishnah, when he thought with the burning on the altar of the handful of meal-offering is an act of Divine service which is half permissible, and Rabbi Yossi disputes, this comes to teach us that in this he agrees. For the reason is not because of this, but rather because that which permits does not invalidate by inappropriate intention that which is permitted.

Introduction In this mishnah, Rabbi Yose and the sages disagree concerning a case where a priest offered a minhah and had a disqualifying intention with regard to the accompanying frankincense.

If he took out the handful [intending] to eat the remainder or to burn the handful the next day, in this case Rabbi Yose agrees that the offering is piggul and he is obligated for karet. This is the same case that was mentioned in mishnah three of the previous chapter. Since he had a disqualifying intention with regard to either eating the remainder of the minhah or burning the handful that he removes in order to burn on the altar, everyone agrees that the offering is piggul (forbidden) and the penalty for eating it is karet (extirpation). This section is mentioned here to note that in this case Rabbi Yose agrees, but he will disagree below about a similar case.

אינה מן המנחה – it is not from the species of the meal-offering like the taking of a fistful of meal-offering, and even though it is from those that permit the meal-offering. For Rabbi Yossi holds that what makes an object permitted for eating cannot unfit another act of the same nature (i.e., if the priest on offering a handful of flour had in mind an unlawful application of the frankincense, the latter is not hereby made rejectable – see Talmud Menahot 13b, for the act of Divine service with that which is permitted which is the taking of a handful of the meal-offering have any effect to invalidate by inappropriate intention something else that is permitted which is the frankincense, which is a thought on the frankincense while performing the act of taking the handful of meal-offering. But the Rabbis say to him: just as we state , that what makes an object permitted for eating cannot unit an other act of the same nature, where he did not establish with one of them, as for example, the two lambs for Atzeret/Shavuot, where both of them permit the bread, but if he ritually slaughtered one of them in order to eat its companion on the morrow, both of them are kosher, but where he established with one of them, such as the handful of the meal-offering and the frankincense in one utensil, his thought-process [to eat one of them at a different time] of one act which fits the sacrifice for eating makes unfit by inappropriate intention another act of the same nature. And the Halakha is according to the Sages.

[If he intended] to burn its frankincense the next day: Rabbi Yose says: it is invalid but he is not liable for karet. But the sages say: it is piggul and he is liable for karet. The debate concerns a case where the priest’s disqualifying intention was in connection with burning the frankincense that accompanies the minhah. Rabbi Yose holds that the minhah is merely invalid it is not piggul and therefore one who eats it is not liable for karet. The sages disagree and hold that this minhah is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet, just as he would be if the disqualifying intention was with regard to eating the remainder or burning the fistful (section one).

They said to him: how does this differ from an animal-offering? He said to them: with the animal-offering the blood, the flesh and the sacrificial portions are all one; but the frankincense is not part of the minhah. In this section the rabbis argue out their position. As we have seen, the fistful of the minhah is parallel to the blood of an animal offering and the frankincense is parallel to the innards of the animal that are burned on the altar (the emurim). If one sacrifices the animal with the intention of burning the innards on the following day, the sacrifice is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet. So too, one who sacrifices the minhah with the intention of burning the innards on the following day, the minhah is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet. Rabbi Yose responds by pointing out the difference between the parts of the animal sacrifice and the components of the minhah. The three parts of the animal, the flesh, the blood and the innards, are all from the same source. When it comes to the minhah, the fistful and the remains are from the same source, but the frankincense is not. Therefore, with regard to disqualifying intentions, the minhah is treated differently from the frankincense.