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כל הפסולין ששחטו שחיטתן כשרה – and the same law applies (regarding the list provided in Tractate Zevakhim, Chapter 2, Mishnah 1 of those who are ineligible to partake of the Temple Service) even ab initio, they may perform the slaughtering [of the sacrifice] as it is written (Leviticus 1:5): “The bull shall be slaughtered before the LORD; and Aaron’s sons, the priests shall offer the blood, [dashing the blood against all sides of the altar which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting],” from receiving the blood onward is the command of the priesthood, teaching regarding that the slaughtering [of the sacrifice] is appropriate for a non-Kohen and those who are ineligible, and it (i.e., the Mishnah) does not teach that they slaughtered it implying that de-facto it is fine but not ab-initio, but only because they are ritually impure, for a person who is ritually impure ab-initio cannot slaughter, as a decree lest he come in contact with the flesh/meat. But an impure person who slaughtered Holy Things and fit individuals are not found [together], other than with a long knife, as for example, when he stands outside the Temple courtyard and slaughters the animal that is within the Temple courtyard, for that is slaughtering of Holy Things (i.e., animals) in the Temple courtyard, but an impure person cannot enter into the Temple courtyard. But if he was defiled by an unclean reptile, that he doesn’t defile the knife, for he is not a primary source of ritual impurity. Or someone who is defied by contact with the dead who defiles the knife to become the primary source of ritual impurity in a similar manner, and the knife defiles the meat.

Introduction In chapter two, mishnah one we learned that only a fit priest can receive the blood, carry it to the altar and sprinkle it on the altar. Today we learn that anyone can slaughter the animal.

לפיכך הן פוסלים – the sacrifice through [improper] intention. Since they are appropriate for this [particular] Divine Service, their intention is [an inappropriate] intention and it invalidates.

All unfit persons who slaughtered, their slaughtering is valid, for slaughtering is valid [even when performed] by non-priests, and by women, and by slaves, and by the unclean, even in the case of most-holy sacrifices, provided that unclean [persons] do not touch the flesh. The first action in the process of sacrificing an animal can be performed by anyone, and not just a fit priest. This is true for all sacrifices, even most-holy sacrifices such as the hatat and the asham. There is one caveat if an unclean person slaughters the animal, they must not touch the flesh. The animal is not susceptible to uncleanness but once it has been slaughtered, its flesh is.

וכולן – those that are invalidated.

Therefore they invalidate [the sacrifice] by an [illegitimate] intention. Since anyone can slaughter the animal, even people who are unfit to perform the other three actions, if such a person has an illegitimate intention while slaughtering, he/she invalidates the sacrifice. In other words, since they can perform these actions, the same rules apply to them as apply to fit priests when performing the other three actions.

שקבלו את הדם – on the condition to consume and/or to offer it up outside its appropriate time framework or outside its appropriate location.

And in all of these cases, if they received the blood [in order to eat the sacrifice] after the prescribed time, or outside of the prescribed place, if there remains [in the animal] life-blood, a fit person should go back and receive the blood. Those people listed in section one cannot receive the blood of the sacrificed animal. Therefore, if they do receive the blood and while doing so have an illegitimate intention, it does not automatically render the sacrifice invalid. If there is still blood flowing from the animal’s neck, the life-blood, then a valid priest can still receive the blood and bring it to the altar and thereby preserve the validity of the sacrifice.

אם יש דם הנפש – still in the animal, an appropriate/fit person should go back to the Divine Service and receive [the blood] and toss/sprinkle it, and the offering will be fit/kosher. For the intention of these do not invalidate them in the reception, because they are not fit for it. For the [inappropriate] intention does not invalidate other than someone who is appropriate/fit for Divine Service, and for the appropriate thing, and in the appropriate place to perform Divine Service, as it is written (Leviticus 7:18): “it shall not count for him who offered it,” for the verse speaks about someone who is fit for offering it.

יחזיר לכשר – and he will not find fault in what that he gave to the invalid individual.

Introduction In this mishnah we learn that at certain times a priest may perform one of the sacrificial actions in an invalid manner and yet may afterwards remedy the situation and thereby preserve the validity of the sacrifice.

נתנו – that which was invalid.

If a fit person received [the blood] and gave [it] to an unfit person, he must return it to the fit one. A fit priest must receive the blood. Were an unfit person to receive it, the sacrifice would be rendered invalid. But if the fit priest receives the blood and then gives the vessel to an unfit person, the unfit person can give the vessel back to the fit priest and the sacrificial procedure can continue. The mere fact that an unfit person handled the vessel does not automatically render the sacrifice invalid.

על גבי הכבש שלא כנגד היסוד – this is placement that is not in its [appropriate] place. Or that he placed that (i.e., the blood) which should be placed below [the red line] above It, the fit/kosher individual should return and receive it. And it is necessary to tell us about all of them, for it has a remedy in its return. For if it (i.e., the Mishnah) had only taught only the first clause I might think that these that were appropriate for the Divine Service of the community such as an impure person who is worthy ab-initio for the community, therefore, regarding the individual, there is a remedy through a return, but the left [hand] which is not appropriate for the Divine Service of the community, I might say that he does not have a remedy in returning it. But if we only taught the case of someone who used his left-hand, I might think that the person using his left [hand] has a remedy in returning it, for it has acceptance on Yom Kippur, for the High Priest takes the coal-pan in his right hand and the censer in is left hand. But an unconsecrated utensil, I might so not [at all]. But if he had mentioned only the unconsecrated utensil, because it is appropriate to sanctify it, but these other cases [mentioned in the Mishnah], I would say not, so it is necessary [to mention them all] (see the Gemara, Tracate Zevakhim 26b).

If he received [the blood] in his right hand and transferred [it] to his left, he must return it to his right. As we learned in 2:1, all of the sacrificial actions must be performed with one’s right hand. If one received the blood with his right hand, but then transferred the vessel to his left, he can then transfer the vessel back to his right. This too has not rendered the entire procedure invalid.

If he received [it] in a sacred vessel and poured it into a secular [non-sacred] vessel, he must return it to the sacred vessel. The same structure works here. He must receive the blood with a sanctified vessel, but if he first receives it with a sanctified vessel and then pours it into a non-sacred vessel, all he has to do is pour the blood back into the sacred vessel and .

If he spilled it from the vessel on to the pavement and then collected it, it is fit. In 2:1 we learned that if the blood pours directly from the neck of the animal onto the floor and he doesn’t receive it in a vessel, the blood cannot be put back into the vessel. Here we learn that if the blood is first put into a sacred vessel, and then it spills onto the floor of the Temple, he can scoop it up and then use it to sprinkle on the altar.

If [the priest] applied it on the ascent [or on the altar], [but] not against [the altar’s] base; [or] if he applied what should be applied below [the scarlet line] above [it], or what should be applied above, below; or what should be applied within [he applied] without, or what should be applied without, within1 and life-blood is [still] available, a fit [priest] must receive [blood] anew. In all of these cases (these are the same cases mentioned in 2:1) the priest sprinkles the blood on the altar on a place where it should not be sprinkled. If he has no more life-blood then the sacrifice is not valid. But if he has other life-blood, he can go back, get the other life-blood and sprinkle that blood in the appropriate place.

לאכול דבר שאין דרכו לאכול – outside of its [appropriate] time period or outside of its [appropriate] place.

Introduction This mishnah lists cases in which a person has an improper intention while sacrificing the animal but this improper intention does not render the sacrifice invalid.

ור' אליעזר פוסל – But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Eliezer.

If one slaughters the sacrifice [intending] to eat what is not normally eaten, or to burn [on the altar] what is not normally burned [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], it is valid; But Rabbi Eliezer invalidates [the sacrifice]. Normally, having an intention to eat or burn something outside of the place or time it should be eaten or burned will invalidate a sacrifice. However, here he intends to burn or eat something that is not normally burned or eaten. Therefore, this improper intention does not render the sacrifice invalid. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that an improper intention even concerning that which is not normally eaten or burned will still render the sacrifice invalid.

[If he slaughters it intending] to eat what is normally eaten and to burn what is normally burned [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], [but] less than the size of an olive, it is valid. Here his improper intention was to do the action with less than an olive’s worth of the sacrifice, and therefore the sacrifice is still valid.

To eat half as much as an olive and to burn half as much as an olive [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], it is valid, because [intentions concerning] eating and burning do not combine. As we learned in 2:5, improper intentions with regard to eating a sacrifice and burning a sacrifice do not join together to add up to the requisite olive’s worth. Therefore, the sacrifice is still valid.

קיפה (jelly, sediments of boiled meat) – spices/seasoning and very fine [portions of meat] that are in rim at the bottom of the vessel.

One who slaughters the sacrifice [intending] to eat as much as an olive of the skin, or of the juice, or of the jelly, or of the hardened meat, or of the bones, or of the tendons, or of the horns, or of the hoofs, either after time or out of bounds, it is valid, and one is not liable on their account in respect of piggul, remnant, or uncleanness. This mishnah teaches that if one has an improper intention to eat a part of the sacrifice that is not normally eaten, then that does not render the sacrifice invalid. In addition, one who eats any of these things from a sacrifice that was offered with an improper intention has not transgressed the prohibition of “piggul.” If the sacrifice was “remnant,” meaning it was left over beyond the time in which it must be eaten, then one who eats these parts has not transgressed the prohibition of eating remnant. Finally, if these parts become impure or he is impure and he eats them, he has not transgressed the prohibition of eating impure sacrifices, or eating pure sacrifice while impure (see Leviticus 7:19-20). In short, when it comes to sacrificial eating laws, these parts of the animal do not count as “meat.”

אלל (fatty substance, offal of meat) – the remnants of the meat that are attached to the skin at the time of flaying [of the sacrifice]. Another explanation: the sinew of the neck that is hard and is not appropriate for consumption, that we call KAPILO in the foreign language.

הקרנים והטלפים – and even what is in them close to the flesh that we cut/sever them, blood comes out from it, is not considered like flesh/meat.

ואין חייבין עליהם משופ פיגול – if the sacrifice was disqualified by improper intention/פיגול, that he intended to eat its meat outside of the appropriate time, but ate from these, he is exempt.

וטמא – if he ate from one of these while in bodily impurity from a kosher sacrifice, he is not liable because of eating Holy Things while in an impure bodily state.

השוחט את המוקדשין – whenever that it (i.e., the Mishnah) uses this language, it speaks of females.

Introduction This mishnah deals with offspring, eggs and milk and their status vis a vis the sacrifice as a whole.

שליל (embryo) – that is in her womb

If one slaughters sacred animals [intending] to eat the fetus or the afterbirth outside [of the place or time where the animal must be eaten], he does not render it piggul. The fetus and the afterbirth are not considered integral parts of the sacrificial animal. Therefore, if one slaughters an animal with an improper intention concerning eating its fetus or afterbirth the sacrifice is not rendered invalid.

שליא (after-birth, placenta) – the skin that covers the fetus, this intention does not invalidate the sacrifice. For the embryo and the placenta are not the body of the sacrifice [in the strictest sense] (see Tractate Temurah 31b).

If one plucks off [the necks of] doves, [intending] to eat their eggs outside [of the place or time where the animal must be eaten], he does not render [them] piggul. Birds are slaughtered by having their heads plucked off. We will learn about this more later. Our mishnah teaches that if one has an improper intention concerning eating the eggs, this does not render the sacrifice invalid. The eggs are not part of the bird.

לא פיגל – this is what he said: A person who slaughters the [female] consecrated animal to eat the fetus or the placenta outside of its [appropriate] place, did not make it invalid. And if he intended to eat from them outside of its [appropriate] time, did not make a sacrifice rejectable through improper mental disposal (see Leviticus 19:7).

The milk of sacred animals or the eggs of doves one is not liable for eating them in respect of piggul, remnant, or uncleanness. The milk of a mammal and the eggs of a bird are not considered part of the animal in respect of sacrificial laws. Therefore, the laws of piggul, remnant and uncleanness do not apply to them see yesterday’s mishnah for a discussion of these three laws.

חלב המוקדשין וביצי תורין אין חייבין עליהן משום פיגול – if he had an inappropriate intention with a sacrifice and consumed from the milk that was in its breasts, he is not liable for it because of an inappropriate intention, for it is not the main part of the sacrifice.

להניח את דמו או את אמוריו למחר – not that he would offer them up as incense on the morrow, for this intention is outside of its [appropriate] time and is it an offering completely disqualified by improper intention, but rather, on the condition that he would leave over everything for the morrow and not offer them up as incense.

Introduction In this mishnah we learn that usually only two types of illegitimate intentions can invalidate a sacrifice the intention of eating it outside the prescribed place of after the prescribed time. Other illegitimate intentions do not render the sacrifice invalid.

ר' יהודה פוסל – since he would invalidate it by taking it outside and by leaving I, he would invalidate it also by the intention of removing it outside and leaving it, and just as if he left them for the morrow it is invalid, that the blood is invalidated with the setting of the sun, so also if he intended regarding them to leave them for the morrow, he has invalidated it.

If he slaughtered it with the intention of leaving its blood or its innards for the next day, or of carrying them outside of their place: Rabbi Judah disqualifies [it], But the sages declare it valid. The person sacrificing had the intention of leaving the blood or the innards that must be burned on the altar for the next day, but he was not thinking that he would sprinkle the blood on the next day or burn the innards on the next day. Alternatively, he had the intention of taking the blood or innards to a place outside of where they must be spilled or burned, but not of offering them up there. According to Rabbi Judah this is sufficient to disqualify the sacrifice. Just as leaving them over for the next day or taking them out of their prescribed place disqualifies them, so too does thinking about doing such a thing. The rabbis however disagree. Since he did not have the intention of burning or eating after the prescribed time or outside the prescribed place, the sacrifice is not invalid.

וחכמים מכשירין – since he did not intend either to offer up incense nor to sprinkle/toss [the blood] nor to consume it outside of its [appropriate] time. And similarly, if he did not intend neither to offer up nor to toss nor to consume it outside of its [appropriate] place, he did not invalidate it. And the Halakha is according to the Sages. But surely, Rabbi Yehuda did not invalidate by intention of tossing blood that should be tossed below [the red line] by tossing them above, for since, if he did this, he invalidated it, because Rabbi Yehuda holds that a person who intends to toss the blood on the Altar, even if it is not in its [appropriate] place, it is as if he intended to toss it in is [appropriate] place, as long has he did not intend to toss it outside of the Temple courtyard.

[If he slaughtered it] with the intention of sprinkling [the blood] on the ascent, [or on the altar] but not against its base; or of applying below [the scarlet line] what should be applied above, or above what should be applied below, or without what should be applied within, or within what should be applied without; The mishnah now brings a long list of cases where a person has the intention of doing an action that will render the sacrifice invalid, but his intention is not to burn or eat the sacrifice after the prescribed time or outside the prescribed place. Section seven will state that in only of these cases the sacrifice is valid. The first list is the same as that found in 2:1 spilling the blood in the wrong place.

[Or with the intention] that unclean [persons] should eat it, [or] that unclean [priests] should offer it; The second wrong intention is giving it to an impure person, who cannot eat sacrificial meat.

[Or] that uncircumcised [persons] should eat it, [or] that uncircumcised persons should offer it; Uncircumcised men cannot eat sacrifices.

[Or with the intention] of breaking the bones of the pesah, or eating of it before it is roasted; The bones of the pesah cannot be broken and it must be eaten wholly roasted. See Exodus 12:9, 46.

Or of mingling its blood with the blood of invalid [sacrifices]; If the blood of a valid sacrifice is mixed with the blood of an invalid sacrifice, the sacrifice cannot be eaten.

[In all of these cases] it is valid, because an [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [a sacrifice] except when it refers to after its time or outside its prescribed place, and [in the case of] a pesah and a hatat, [the intention to slaughter them] for the sake of their being a different sacrifice. In all of these cases the sacrifice is valid because his improper intention was not connected with eating or burning it outside the prescribed place or after the prescribed time, the improper intention that does render a sacrifice invalid. The only other improper intention that can render a sacrifice invalid is if the sacrifice is a pesah or a hatat and the person offering it sacrifices it thinking that they are other sacrifices (see 1:4).