Комментарий к Иевамот 15:11

האשה. שלום בינו לבינה – for if there had been a dispute between him and her, perhaps on account of hatred, she intended to prohibit herself with him.

Introduction Chapters fifteen and sixteen deal with the acceptability of testimony concerning a woman’s husband’s death in a case where the death occurred abroad. The consequence of accepting such testimony is that she is allowed to remarry; in cases where the husband had no children she would be allowed to have yibbum with her husband’s brother. The first few mishnayoth of this chapter deal with the wife’s own testimony as to her husband’s death. Generally speaking a woman’s testimony is unacceptable and a person cannot testify concerning their own matters. Nevertheless, in this case the wife’s testimony about her own husband’s death is acceptable because the rabbis did not want the woman to be unable to remarry. We should note that even in our days it is often difficult to ascertain whether someone died. This was a problem during the Shoah (the Holocaust) when nearly all witnesses to a person’s death were also dead. Recently, we witnessed this phenomenon in the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. Verifying victim’s deaths took months and to a large degree relied on the testimony of those who saw them in the building or those who knew they should have been there that day. Imagine how much more difficult this must have been in the ancient world.

ושלום בעולם – for if there had been a time of an interdiction of travel, perhaps when she saw that he delayed a long time and did not return, she said; “certainly thugs killed him.” Alternatively, if she saw that he was wounded in war and she thought that the certainly would die, but when there is peace in the world, if she did not see that he died, certainly there is suspicion of disgrace lest he come after she marries married, and she will be disgraced by immorality.

If a woman and her husband went to a country beyond the sea [at a time when there was] peace between him and her and [when there was also] peace in the world, and she came back and said, “My husband is dead”, she may marry again; and if she said, “My husband is dead [and he had no children]” she may contract yibbum. If at the time the couple traveled abroad there was no discord between the two of them and there were no wars being waged in the area to which they might have traveled, then she is believed to say that he died. The rabbis are suspicious that she might lie if there was discord, because by receiving permission to remarry when the husband was still alive, she would be causing herself to be prohibited to him when he returns. In such a way she could force him to divorce her. In other words, she might have a motive to lie. The reason that the rabbis are suspicious in a case where there is war, is that he might have been taken captive and she mistakenly assumed that he was dead. Therefore, if there was either discord between them or war in the world, she is not believed.

רבי יהודה אומר כו' – and the Halakha is not according to his view.

If there was peace between him and her, but war in the world, [or if there was] discord between him and her, but peace in the world, and she came back and said, ‘My husband is dead”, she is not believed. Rabbi Judah says: she is never believed unless she comes weeping and her garments are rent. They said to him: she may marry in either case. This section contains the opposites of those in section one. Rabbi Judah disagrees with the first opinion. He holds that unless she exhibits physical signs of mourning, she is never believed, even if there was peace between her and her husband and peace in the world. The sages respond to Rabbi Judah and state that whether or not she is crying and she shows physical signs of mourning she is believed. Such external signs would be easy to fake in any case and are therefore not material to the verity of her words.

אמרו לו – to Rabbi Yehuda, he should marry a bright/smart woman, an imbecile woman, he should not marry, but rather, all are the same.

בבאה מן הקציר – like a case that took place where the people of the city went to reap wheat and a snake bit one of them and he died, and she came and announced it to the Jewish court and they sent forth and found that it (i.e., the case that took place) was like her words. But the Sages did not permit [her to get remarried] but rather it was an illustration that the matter should be something nearby. But she is not believed regarding something taking place abroad.

Bet Hillel says: we heard [such a tradition] only in respect of a woman who came from the harvest and [whose husband died] in the same country, and in a case similar to the one that happened.
Bet Shammai said to them: [the law is] the same whether the woman came from the harvest or from olive picking, or from grape picking, or from one country to another--the Sages spoke of the harvest only [because the incident to which they referred] occurred then.
Bet Hillel changed their view to rule in accordance with Bet Shammai.
This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. It contains a debate between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai over when a woman is believed to say that her husband died.
Section one: Bet Hillel limits the instances in which a woman is believed to say that her husband died. The only time she is believed is when she returned from working together with him at harvest time, and they were not returning from abroad but from the same country. This is similar to “the case that was” mentioned at the end of this section. The case to which the mishnah refers to is explained in the talmud as being a case where ten men went to work in a field and one was bitten by a snake and died. When the woman returned and said that her husband was dead, the court believed her and declared that women are believed when they testify that their husband had died. According to Bet Hillel, they are only believed in such a case because in such a case the husband’s death is so easily verifiable that it can be assumed that the woman would not lie.
Section two: Bet Shammai responds to Bet Hillel that although the law that a woman is believed to say that her husband died was connected to a certain case, it is not limited to that case or those like it. Rather a woman is believed to say that her husband died no matter where she returns from.

אלא בהוה – the case that took place, such it was and the same law applies to other places.

שאין האחים נכנסים – to the inheritance of her husband as the All-Merciful said (Deuteronomy 17:6): “[A person shall be put to death] only on the testimony of two [or more] witnesses,” and it is concerning her marriage that the Rabbis were lenient because of the deserted/chained wife.

Introduction In the previous mishnah Bet Hillel agreed with Bet Shammai that a woman who states that her husband died is to be believed, at least in most cases. In our mishnah, Bet Hillel states that her testimony allows her to remarry but not to receive her ketubah payment, the amount that a man owes a woman upon death or divorce. Bet Shammai holds that she also receives her ketubah payment. As in the previous mishnah, in the end Bet Hillel changes their opinion and agrees with Bet Hillel.

מספר כתובתה – from the formulaic language that is written in the document of the Ketubah , that when she will marry to another, and she is considered married, and if so, she takes her Ketubah settlement.

Bet Shammai says: she may marry and she receives her ketubah. Bet Hillel says: she may marry but she does not receive her ketubah. This section delineates the dispute between the two houses, as explained in the introduction above.

Bet Shammai said to them: you have permitted [what might be] the serious consequence of illicit intercourse, why should you not permit [the taking of her husband’s] money which is of less consequence! Bet Hillel said to them: we find that based on her testimony, the brothers may not receive their inheritance. Bet Shammai said to them: do we not learn this from her ketubah scroll wherein [her husband] writes to her “if you are married to another man, you will receive what is prescribed for you”! Bet Shammai reasons that if she was not telling the truth about her husband dying (either by intentionally lying or by having made a mistake) the consequences of her remarrying are graver than the consequences of her illegitimately taking money from her husband. Remarrying while still married is adultery, and if done with intention can be a capital offense. The monetary crime of taking her ketubah while her husband is still alive is at worst fraud, and the money can always be rightfully restored. Since the Sages allow her to remarry, despite the potential severity of the crime, they must allow her to recover her ketubah payment. Bet Hillel responds by citing a precedent. According to the accepted halakhah, a halakhah to which Bet Shammai agrees, when a woman testifies that her husband has died, his brothers do not inherit his money. This is because in monetary cases two witnesses are required. [Note: a man’s brothers inherit him if he did not have children.] Therefore, just as the brothers do not collect their inheritance, so too the woman does not collect her ketubah. Bet Shammai responds by citing the actual ketubah wording which states that if she marries another man she may collect the payment. Therefore, according to Bet Shammai, as soon as she is permitted to marry someone else, she may collect her ketubah. We should note that this is an interesting source of halakhah: the wording of the ketubah. Generally we would think that the halakhah would dictate the wording of the ketubah, but here we find the opposite. The ketubah, a secular document, becomes the source of Jewish law. This is not a common phenomenon in rabbinic literature but is found in several other places.

Bet Hillel changed their view to rule in accordance with Bet Shammai. Bet Hillel again changed their minds and ruled as did Bet Shammai. Therefore, even though the brothers do not receive their inheritance, the wife may collect her ketubah.

חוץ מחמותה – the reason for all of them is because they hate her and that she intends to disgrace herself. Her mother-in-law hates her for she says in her heart (i.e., to herself): “this one will consume all of my labor.” The daughter of her mother-in-law states that this one will inherit all the fruit of the labor/achievements of my mother and father. Her sister-in-law will view her that perhaps she will end up being her co-wife. The daughter of her husband states, this comes in place of my mother and will consume all the fruits of her labor.

Introduction This mishnah contains two mishnayoth, each dealing with a different topic. The first mishnah lists a few women who are not believed to testify that a woman’s husband has died. The second mishnah discusses cases of contradictory testimony regarding the husband’s death.

מה בין גט למיתה – for we say that even the women who are not believed to state that her husband died are believed to bring her Jewish bill of divorce.

All are believed to testify for her [concerning her husband’s death] except for her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law and her husband’s daughter. Why is [the bringing of] a letter of divorce different [from testifying regarding] death?
The written document provides the proof. Although women are generally not allowed to testify in a court of law, in order to make it easier for women to remarry, women are allowed to testify that men have died. Even a woman’s own relatives can testify that her husband has died. The only exceptions are certain relatives who are not allowed to testify for fear that they will lie in order to entrap the woman in an illegal marriage, which will cause her current marriage to be terminated. These women might hate the wife for various reasons. The mother-in-law might hate her daughter-in-law because she thinks that she is not good enough for her son. The daughter of her mother-in-law might hate her because she might eventually take away her inheritance. The rival wife might hate her because they compete for the husband’s affections. Her sister-in-law might hate her, because if the husband dies without children, this wife could end up as her rival wife. The husband’s daughter might hate her because she sees this wife as trying to take her own mother’s place. Although these women are not allowed to testify that a woman has died, they are allowed to bring her get to her (we will learn this halakhah in Gittin 2:7). The mishnah asks, why are they allowed to bring the get but not allowed to testify that the husband has died. After all, both divorce and death end the marriage. The answer is that with a get, the document itself is what proves that the marriage is ended. The one who brings the document is not testifying as to the divorce, but is merely a messenger. However, testifying as to his death is actually testimony, not verifiable in another way.

שהכתב מוכיח – For we rely upon the essence of the Jewish bill of divorce. And even though that it is upon them also that we rely that they must state “in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.”

If one witness stated, “he is dead”, and his wife married again, and another came and stated “he is not dead”, she need not leave [her new husband]. If one witness testifies that her husband died, and then she was remarried, and then another witness testifies that he did not die, she need not leave her new husband. However, if she did not marry before the second witness comes, she cannot remarry because there is now contradictory testimony.

עד אחד אומר מת ונשאת – not exactly that she got married, but rather that they permitted her to get married even though she didn’t get married. But after that, one witness came and staed that he did not die, she does not go forth from the first legal permission.

If one witness said “he is dead” and two witnesses said “he is not dead”, even if she married again, she must leave him. If one witness testified that her husband died, and then she remarried, and then two testified that he is still alive, she must leave the second marriage. This is because we now have full testimony that her husband is alive and that the second marriage is illegitimate. The testimony of the one is nullified by the testimony of the two.

עד אחד אומר מת ושנים אומרים לא מת – as for example that they are disqualified for testimony, and we teach that since the Torah believed one witness, there is no legal testimony here, for just as one [witness] is considered disqualified for testimony, they are also considered [disqualified for testimony]. Therefore, he followed after the majority of opinions, whether legal or disqualified.

If two witnesses stated, “he is dead”, and one witness stated, “he is not dead”, even if she had not married, she may do so. If two testify that her husband is dead, she can remarry, even if one other person testifies that he is alive. Again, the testimony of the one is nullified by the testimony of the two.

שנים אומרים מת ואחד אומר לא מת וכו' – this comes to tell us that we follow after the majority of opinions of those disqualified for testimony, whether for leniency or for stringency.

אחת אומרת מת – two co-wives/rival wives who come from abroad; one says my husband died, and the other says, he didn’t die.

Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss contradictory testimony with regard to the husband’s death.

ר"מ אומר הואיל ומכחישות כו' – but the Halakha is not according to his view.

If one wife said “he is dead’ and the other wife said, “he is not dead” , the one who said, “he is dead” may marry again and she also receives her ketubah, while the one who said, “he is not dead”, may neither marry again nor does she receive her ketubah. This section and the following section deal with situations in which a man is married to more than one wife. If one wife says that he is dead and the other says he is not, the wife that says he is dead is treated like a widow, and the wife who says that he is not, is treated like she is still married to him. The reason why the first wife is allowed to remarry and collects her ketubah is that her rival wife is not allowed to testify about her, as we learned in the previous mishnah. The wife who says that he is alive, cannot obviously be allowed to remarry or collect her ketubah because she believes that he is alive.

If one wife said, “he is dead” and the other stated “he was killed”: Rabbi Meir says: since they contradict one another they may not marry again. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: since both admit that he is not alive, both may marry again. In this case, both wives agree that the husband is dead, but they disagree over whether he merely died or was killed. Rabbi Meir holds that since they contradict each other, neither may remarry. The Talmud teaches that Rabbi Meir also disagrees with the previous clause, where the wives also contradicted each other. While the previous opinion held that the wife who says that he is dead may remarry, Rabbi Meir holds that she may not. Rabbi Meir’s words are taught on this case, because here there is even a greater innovation: even though both agree that he is dead, since they disagree over the details they may not remarry. Rabbis Judah and Shimon hold that since they both agree that he is no longer alive, they may remarry.

If one witness says, “he is dead”, and another witness says “he is not dead’, Or if one woman says “he is dead”, and another woman says, “he is not dead’, she may not marry again. If two witnesses disagree over whether or not he is dead, she may not remarry. However, as we learned in the previous mishnah, if she remarried before the second witness said that he was alive, she need not leave the second marriage.

היתה בת ישראל לכהן – if her co-wife/rival wife was the daughter of an Israelite married to a Kohen, she can partake of Terumah/priest’s due on the assumption that her husband is alive and she does not take into consideration the testimony of her co-wife/rival wife for since she is not believed to cause her to be married, she is not believed to disqualify her and such is the Halakha.

If a woman and her husband went to a country beyond the sea, and she returned and stated, “my husband is dead”, she may be married again and she also receives her ketubah. However, her rival wife is forbidden to remarry.
If [her rival wife] was the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, she is permitted to eat terumah, the words of Rabbi Tarfon.
Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead her away from transgression, unless [it be enacted that] she shall be forbidden both to marry and to eat terumah.
This mishnah discusses a case where a man was married to more than one wife, and one wife claimed that he had died and the other wife was not able to know whether this was true.
In mishnah four we learned that a rival wife may not testify that a woman’s husband is dead. Therefore, in the situation in our mishnah, although one wife’s testimony is believed and she is allowed to remarry and collect her ketubah, the rival wife may not remarry. Unlike the previous mishnah, where the rival wife explicitly stated that he was not dead, in our situation, since the husband and the other wife were overseas, the wife who remained behind cannot know whether or not he is still alive.
Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree over whether or not the rival wife may eat terumah after the other wife has stated that the husband is dead. This debate is only critical if she was from an Israelite family, she was married to a priest, and she had no children. In such a case, if her husband dies she is not allowed to eat terumah. According to Rabbi Tarfon, the halakhah is consistent: just as she is treated as if she is still married and not allowed to remarry, so too she may eat terumah, as if her husband was still alive.
Rabbi Akiva holds that allowing her to continue to eat terumah might lead her to transgress, because her husband might very well be dead. Rather, Rabbi Akiva is strict on both counts: she may not remarry lest her husband be alive but she may not eat terumah lest her husband is dead.

אמרה מת בעלי ואח"כ מת חמי – her mother-in-law is prohibited [from remarrying] for a bride does not testify [against] her mother-in-law and even though she stated in the first segment [of the Mishnah]: “my husband has died,” and furthermore, she is no longer her daughter-in-law and she was a stranger, nevertheless, she is not believed.

Introduction This mishnah contains three more debates between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva, all somewhat similar to the one we learned yesterday.

היתה בת ישראל לכהן תאכל בתרומה – in this also, the Halakha is according to Rabbi Tarfon but if he betrothed one of the five women (see Tractate Yevamot, Chapter 15, Mishnah 4), and he doesn’t know which of them he betrothed, and similarly if he stole from one of the five and doesn’t know which of them he stole from, and in both of those, the Halakha is according to Rabbi Akiva.

If she stated, “my husband died first and my father-in-law died after him”, she may marry again and she also receives her ketubah, but her mother-in-law is forbidden [to remarry]. If [her mother-in-law] was the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, she is permitted to eat terumah, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead her away from transgression, unless [it be enacted that] she shall be forbidden both to marry and to eat terumah. This section contains more or less the same debate that we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. The only innovation is that in this case, when the woman states that her father-in-law is dead, she has already stated that her own husband is dead, and therefore she is no longer her mother-in-law’s daughter-in-law. Therefore, we might have thought that in this case she is believed, and the mother-in-law may remarry. In order to prevent one from making this assumption, the debate between Rabbis Tarfon and Akiva is repeated here.

If a man betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he has betrothed, and each states, “he has betrothed me”, he gives a letter of divorce to every one of them, and he leaves one ketubah [sum] for them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead him away from transgression, unless he gives to each of them both a get and a ketubah. In this case, each woman claims to be married to one man, but the man admits to marrying only one of them. According to Rabbi Tarfon we treat each woman as if she might be married to him and he must give a get to each. However, since he will only admit to marrying one woman, he must pay only one ketubah sum. The sum is left in court, until it is clarified who he married. Rabbi Akiva argues that the solution to this problem needs to punish the man for having put these women into this predicament. In order to penalize him for his actions, he must pay a ketubah payment to each and every one.

If a man robbed one of five persons and does not know which of them he has robbed, and each one states, “he has robbed me”, he leaves the [amount of] the robbery among them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead them away from transgression, unless one pays [the full amount of the robbery] to every one [of the persons involved]. In this case, a man stole from one of five other people, but does not remember from whom he stole. Each person claims that he stole from him. Again, Rabbi Tarfon rules that the thief pays the sum he stole and gives it to the court until it can be clarified from whom he stole. Rabbi Akiva again wishes to punish the thief, and therefore obligates him to pay the amount stolen to each of the five. Note that in both cases Rabbi Akiva is not concerned that he is rewarding the four out of the five women or people from whom something has been stolen who are definitely lying. Perhaps this is because it is unclear (at least to us) which is lying, whereas it is clear that this person has stolen money, or betrothed a woman without bothering to remember whom he betrothed.

מת בעלי ואח"כ מת בני נאמנת – since she had a son, and was not in the legal status/presumption of being chained to the levir when she departed, now also when she said: “my husband died,” and afterwards [said]: “my son died,” when she has no interdependence of a childless widow and her late husband’s brothers (i.e., to the levirate relation), she is believed. But if she said, “my son died” and afterwards [said]: “my husband died,” and she wants to be married by the levir, she is not believed. But if she came to be married to anyone in the world, we suspect her words for she compares herself as a piece (of meat) that is forbidden forever, and she removes the shoe of her brother-in-law who refuses to marry her and does not marry her levir.

Introduction Our mishnah deals with a situation where a woman goes abroad with a husband and a son and then returns claiming that both have died. The question is: is she liable for yibbum.

A woman who went with her husband to a country beyond the sea, and her son was with her, and who came back and stated, “my husband died and afterwards my son died”, is believed. If her husband died before the son died, then at the point of death she was not liable for yibbum (for her husband died at a point when he had kids). Since she went abroad under the assumption that she is not liable for yibbum, and she now returns claiming that this is still true, she is believed. This mishnah works according to a well-known principle whereby a person is believed if he does not change the status quo, but not necessarily believed if he does change it.

[If she stated] “my son died and afterwards my husband died”, she is not believed, but we are concerned that her words [might be true] and she must, therefore, perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum. In this case, she claims that the son died first and therefore when her husband died he had no children, leaving her liable for yibbum. Since she is changing the status quo that existed when she left, and now claiming that she is liable for yibbum, she is not entirely believed and she is not allowed to contract yibbum with her dead husband’s brother. However, since she might be telling the truth, and really be liable for yibbum, she first must perform halitzah and only then is she allowed to remarry.

ניתן לה בן במדינת הים – and my son died and after[wards], my husband died, we don’t remove her from the original legal presumption that she says that she still needs to marry the levir, she is believed and permitted to be married by the levir.

Introduction This mishnah continues to deal with a woman who returns from overseas and states that both her husband and son have died. The difference between this case and that found in the previous mishnah is that here her son was born abroad.

אינה נאמנת – to marry anyone in the world without removal of her brother-in-law’s shoe, for the Rabbis believed her as a wife, concerning her husband she is believed, because of evidence by implication and she is allowed to marry, but to free herself from the levir, she is not believed because sometimes she is hated by him and we suspect her words for she frees herself from the levir, and removes her levir’s shoe and does not marry the levir.

[If a woman states], “A son was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea” and she also states, “my son died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. In this mishnah she leaves to travel abroad under the assumption that she is liable for yibbum should her husband die, because he has no children. If she comes back and states that she had a son, she has changed that status quo. However, if she says that the son died before the husband, then she reverts to the status quo of being liable for yibbum. Since she is ultimately maintaining the status quo, she is believed.

[If she states], “my husband died and afterwards my son died”, she is not believed, but we are concerned that her words [might be true] and she must, therefore, perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum. However, if she states that her husband died before her son died, she is changing the status quo because she is exempting herself from yibbum. Therefore, she is not believed, and she is not allowed to remarry without first having halitzah. She cannot have yibbum because she claims that her husband died before her son and therefore she is not liable for yibbum. In summary both this mishnah and yesterday’s mishnah teach that a woman is believed to retain the status quo but not to modify it. However, even though she cannot change status quo, she must have halitzah before she can remarry.

ניתן לי יבם במדינת הים – that her mother-in-law gave birth to abroad, and she went in the legal presumption that she has no levir.

Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss women who return from being abroad and come back and testify that their husbands and in this case brothers-in-law have died.

מת בעלי ואח"כ מת יבמי וכו' – in both cases she is permitted to anyone in the world and is believed and permitted to anyone in the marketplace [of the world] in her original presumptive legal status that the mouth that forbids is the one that permits.

[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. As we stated in the previous two mishnayoth, a woman is believed if she make a statement which does not change the status quo established when she left to travel abroad. If when she left she did not have a brother-in-law, and then she returns and states that her husband had a brother, but he died (in this case it doesn’t matter whether her husband died first or his brother) she is allowed to remarry without yibbum. After all, if she hadn’t stated that she had a brother-in-law, we would never have thought to make her wait until she had halitzah or yibbum to remarry.

If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. In this case, the status quo when she left is that she had a brother-in-law. The mishnah teaches that a woman is never believed to state that her brother-in-law died. A woman is only believed to state that her husband died. The reason is that we assume a woman will make sure her husband is dead before she remarries. There is an assumption that she will not lie. Furthermore, if she was lying and he returns, the consequences for her are serious. However, there is no such assumption that a woman will not lie concerning her brother-in-law. She is also not believed to state that her sister died, so that she could marry her sister’s husband. Since even if her sister was alive, she would not cause serious consequences to herself by having relations with her sister’s husband, she might lie. We can see here a general pattern emerging: a person is less likely to lie if there are serious consequences awaiting him/her if he does lie. Therefore, in these types of situations, s/he is believed.

A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister. Finally, a man is not believed to state that his brother has died, so that he might marry his brother’s wife, for the same reason we wrote above. Since there are no serious consequences for him if he is lying (and only serious consequences for her) he is not deemed trustworthy. So too a man is not believed to state that his wife has died in order to marry her sister for even if he was lying there are no serious consequences for him