Комментарий к Кетубот 2:14

האשה שנתארמלה או נתגרשה – and she claims her Ketubah.

Introduction This mishnah discusses a dispute between a husband and wife over whether the woman was a virgin or a widow when he married her. Evidently, the written ketubah from their marriage is not available as evidence (perhaps it was never written). Therefore this is again a question of whether or not the woman is believed. We can further learn from this mishnah that the woman may collect her ketubah payment even if she does not have the document. This is because the ketubah payment is a court-imposed obligation upon every husband. The loss of the ketubah document does not mean that the woman will not be able to collect her ketubah payment.

הוא אומר – it refers to [her stating] “when I was divorced,” for if [it was] “when I was a widow,” the heirs would say, ‘our father married you when you were a widow,” and you have only a Maneh [as the payment for the Ketubah for a non-virgin].

A woman became a widow or was divorced. She says, “I was a virgin when you married me” and he says, “Not so, rather you were a widow when I married you”, If there are witnesses that she went out with a hinuma, and with her head uncovered, her ketubah is two hundred [zuz.] Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: the distribution of roasted ears of corn is also evidence. In this the husband and wife come before the court at the time of their divorce. The woman claims that she was a virgin when her husband married her, while he claims that she was a widow. The mishnah rules that we check the evidence, and if there is evidence that her wedding was a virgin’s wedding, then she receives her full ketubah. In the absence of hard evidence, she can only receive a ketubah of 100 zuz. There are three pieces of evidence described in our mishnah. The first is the “hinuma”. It is uncertain what this word exactly means, and several explanations have been offered. Albeck explains the word as being a “hymn” sung at virgin’s weddings. Based on the Talmud’s explanation, Kehati explains a “hinuma” to be a special veil worn only by virgins. The second piece of evidence is that her hair hung down to her shoulders. This is the manner in which women wore their hair during the procession that led them away from their father’s house. The third sign, mentioned by Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka is parched corn, which were distributed at virgin’s weddings. We should explain why in this mishnah the woman is not believed and therefore needs to bring evidence that she was a virgin, whereas in the mishnayoth at the end of the last chapter, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer believed the woman without any corroborating evidence. The answer is that in this case both the man and woman can claim to be certain of the facts. He is just as certain that he married a widow as she is certain that she was a virgin. Therefore neither is believed more than the other. Since the woman wishes to extract money from the man, the burden of proof is upon her, as is the rule in all monetary claims.

הינומא – there are those who say that it is a canopy of myrtles that they make for virgins and there are those who say that it is a veil that they place on the eyes and she is drowsy in it (see Talmud Ketubot 17b).

וראשה פרוע – her hair is on her shoulder; such was how they would practice to remove the virgins from the home of their fathers to the wedding chamber.

אף חלוק קליות – in the place of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka they had the practice to distribute parched corn at the nuptials of virgins and if there weren’t witnesses that they did so at her wedding according to the custom of the nuptials of virgins and the Ketubah/marriage contract was lost, the husband is believed and she doesn’t collect anything other than a Maneh.

ומודה רבי יהושע – even though that above in the first chapter (Mishnah 6), regarding what she says: “after you betrothed me, I was raped,” Rabbi Yehoshua disputes Rabban Gamaliel and states, “we do not believe the woman.” In what she said: “after you betrothed me, I was raped,” and she disqualifies herself from [being able to marry into] the priesthood through “Miggo”-the legal rule according to which the deponent’s statement is accepted as true on the ground that, if he (or she) had intended to tell a lie, he/she might have invented one more advantageous to his/her case (see Talmud Ketubot 16a), for if she had wanted, she could have stated, “I was one who lost my hymen through an accidental lesion and was fit [to being able to marry into] the priesthood. These words [apply] where there is [a case] of prohibition or permission to prohibit [her to marry into] the priesthood or to validate it – in this Rabbi Yehoshua disputes Rabban Gamaliel and states that we don’t believe her through “Miggo,” but where there isn’t a case of prohibition and permission other than money at stake/eventual loss (see Talmud Ketubot 23b) such as, for example, where a person says to his fellow: “this field was your father’s, and I purchased it from him,” Rabbi Yehoshua agrees with Rabban Gamaliel that in a case like this, we believe him through “Miggo,” for if he had wanted, he could have said, “it is mine,” and when he said, “this field was your father’s, and I purchased it from him,” he Is believed.

Introduction At the end of the last chapter there was a series of debates in which Rabbi Joshua consistently did not believe the woman and Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer did. Our mishnah contains a case where Rabbi Joshua does believe the claim made (this time by a man). The reason why he believes the man in this case is that he invokes a principle called, “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted”. This halakhic principle means that if a person says something which makes something forbidden to him he is also believed when he says something to make that very same thing permitted to him. The next few mishnayoth will illustrate this principle and limit its applicability.

ואם יש עדים שהיא של אביו אינו נאמן – In the Gemara (Talmud Ketubot 17b) it explains that this Mishnah comes to inform us as for example, that he did not consume other than two years in the presence of the father and one year in the presence of the son, since he did not pay him three years of legal claim of undisturbed possession during a legally fixed period in the lifetime of the father, the year that he ate in the presence of the son does not count for him for the count of the years of presumptive ownership.

In this case Reuven approaches Shimon and tells him that the field that is currently in Reuven’s possession was purchased from Shimon’s father. Shimon did not approach Reuven first claiming the field, nor is there any other evidence that the field once belonged to Shimon’s father. Indeed, without Reuven having told Shimon that the field once belonged to Shimon’s father, we would have thought that the field was always Reuven’s. In this case Reuven is the “mouth that forbade” when he said that the field once belonged to Shimon’s father. He made a statement that was detrimental to himself. Since he is the “mouth that forbade”, he is believed to be the “mouth that permits” and state that he purchased the field from Shimon’s father. Reuven is believed even if he produces no evidence that he bought the field. Had Reuven kept his mouth shut, Shimon would never have known that the field once belonged to his father. Therefore, Reuven is believed when he says that it used to belong to Shimon’s father but he bought it from him.

But if there are witnesses that it belonged to his father and he says, “I bought it from him”, he is not believed. In contrast, if witnesses come and state that the field was once Shimon’s father’s field, then Reuven is not “the mouth that forbade”. He is only the “mouth that permits”, and he is therefore not believed. After all, had he kept his mouth shut, the field would have been taken over by Shimon. In order to retain possession of the field he will need to bring proof that he bought it.

אנוסים היינו – compulsion at the pain of death lest he kill him, but compulsion of money, lest he take his money [from him] and all the more so, if he said to him: “for most of the money that he gave us,” they are not believed, for no one incriminates himself (i.e., his testimony against himself has no legal effect), for a person is close to himself, and is not believed about himself, neither for acquittal nor for conviction. And similarly, those who are ineligible for testimony, which is on account of nearness but on account of transgression, they are not believed.

Introduction This mishnah contains another case illustrating the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits”.

יוצא ממקום אחר – inscribed in another document that is in the possession of the Jewish court , and this same document came before us with this one and the writing of the signatories are similar one to the other.

If witnesses said, “This is our handwriting, but we were forced, [or] we were minors, [or] we were disqualified witnesses” they are believed. In this scenario, a person comes to court with a document signed by witnesses. When his opponent claims that the document is a forgery, the witnesses are summoned to the court to testify to their signatures. The witnesses state that the signatures are indeed their signatures, but that nevertheless the document should not be upheld. This is for one of three reasons: they were forced to sign, they were minors when they signed, or they were disqualified witnesses (see Sanhedrin 3:4). In this case they are believed, and the document is invalid. This is because of the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits”. Without the witnesses admission that they signed the document, the document would have been invalid. When they admit that they signed, they are in fact “the mouth that forbade”. When they say they were forced, or that they were minors or otherwise disqualified, they are the mouth that permits, and they are believed. To state this another way, if they had wanted to lie they could have said that this was not their handwriting.

But if there are witnesses that it is their handwriting, or their handwriting comes out from another place, they are not believed. If their signature can be validated in another way, for instance by other witnesses testifying that they recognize the signatures, or by another document that contains their signatures, then the witnesses are not believed when they say that they were forced, or they were minors or otherwise disqualified. This is not a situation where “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted”. Since they are not believed to say that they were invalid, their signatures are validated and the document is upheld.

הרי אלו נאמנים – for surely there are two witnesses on all of the handwritings.

Introduction The previous mishnah discussed witnesses testifying about their signatures. This mishnah continues to discuss the subject.

צריכים לצרף עמהם אחר – that on their own signatures they testify, not on the Maneh/monetary portion (the weight of gold or silver equal to one hundred common or fifty sacred shekels) in the document , and they require two witnesses for each handwriting.

[If] one witness says, “This is my handwriting and that is the handwriting of my fellow”, and the other [witness] says, “This is my handwriting and that is the handwriting of my fellow”, they are believed. [If] one says, “This is my handwriting” and the other says, “This is my handwriting” they must join to themselves another [person], the words of Rabbi [Judah Hanasi]. But the Sages say: they need not join to themselves another [person], rather a person is believed to say, “this is my handwriting. [If] one witness says, “This is my handwriting and that is the handwriting of my fellow”, and the other [witness] says, “This is my handwriting and that is the handwriting of my fellow”, they are believed. [If] one says, “This is my handwriting” and the other says, “This is my handwriting” they must join to themselves another [person], the words of Rabbi [Judah Hanasi]. But the Sages say: they need not join to themselves another [person], rather a person is believed to say, “this is my handwriting. Generally, two witnesses are required to create valid testimony in Jewish law. In order to validate a signature two witnesses are needed about each signature on the document. If each witness affirms his own signature and the other person’s signature, then both signatures on the document have been affirmed by two people, and the document has been validated. However, if each person cannot affirm the other signature on the document, they must find another person to affirm the signature. Note that one person can affirm both signatures, so long as he recognizes them. All of this is Rabbi Judah Hanasi’s opinion. He holds that the witnesses are actually testifying about their signatures and therefore we need two witnesses on each signature. The Sages hold that a person is believed when he affirms his signature. Therefore, neither needs to bring someone else to join his affirmation. The Sages reason that the witnesses are actually testifying as to the contents of the document. Hence the two are in and of themselves sufficient.

וחכ"א אומרים אינם צריכין לצרף עמהם חר – that on the Maneh/monetary portion in the document they are testifying and when this one says, “this is my signature,” and the other [witness] says, “this is my signature,” it is found that there are two witnesses for the monetary amount in the document and the Halakha is according to the Sages.

אם שנשאת – she did not actually get married, but rather, when they permitted her to get married, witnesses came that she had been taken captive,

Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss cases that illustrate the principle “the mouth that forbade was the mouth that permitted”.

she should not go forth (i.e., leave through divorce) from her first permission [to marry] and she should marry ab initio, but if witnesses came that she had been defiled, even if she had several children, she should go forth (i.e., leave the marriage).

If a woman says, “I was married and I am divorced”, she is believed, for the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. But if there are witnesses that she was married, and she says, “I am divorced”, she is not believed. If the woman herself provides the information that she was married, but then says she is now single because she was divorced, she is believed, because the same mouth that permitted, forbade. However, if other witnesses testify that she was married, she is not believed when she says she is divorced. In order to remarry, she will need to bring proof, either with a document or witnesses.

If she says, “I was taken captive but I have remained clean”, she is believed, for the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. But if there are witnesses that she was taken captive and she says, “I have remained clean” she is not believed. But if the witnesses came after she had married, she shall not go out. If a woman is taken captive by a non-Jew, she is assumed to have been raped and is subsequently forbidden to marry a priest. This is because she has had forbidden sexual relations, and priests cannot marry anyone who has had relations with some forbidden to them, even if the relations were against her will. If the woman says that she was taken captive, and that information is not otherwise known, she is now “the mouth that forbade”. Hence, when she says that she remained clean, i.e. she was not raped, she is believed and she can marry a priest. However, if other witnesses testify that she was taken captive, she is no longer the “mouth that forbade”. Therefore, she is not believed to permit herself to a priest. If before the witnesses come and state that she was taken captive, she marries a priest, he is not obligated to divorce her. This is because it is not certain that she was raped. The Talmud says that even if she received permission to remarry before the witnesses came, she may marry a priest. According to the Talmud, what is essential is that at the point when she was “the mouth that permitted” there was not an earlier “mouth that forbade”. Therefore, as long as she makes her statement before the witnesses come, she will be allowed to marry a priest.

שתי נשים שנשבו – that there are witnesses that they were taken captive.

Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss the believability of women who were taken captive and claim that they were not raped.

שמעידות זו את זו – each one of them says, “my companion is pure.”

Two women were taken captive: one says, “I was taken captive and I am pure”, and the other one says, “I was taken captive and I am pure”-- they are not believed. This mishnah discusses a case in which it is certain that the women were taken captive and hence they are not automatically believed according to the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits”. The mishnah teaches that the woman herself is not believed to state that she was not raped, and therefore in this case she will not be able to marry a kohen.

הרי אלו נאמנות – for with a captive woman, they were lenient to declare fit one witness, and even a slave and even a woman and even a minor who makes a statement in ignorance of its legal bearing, and as long as the witness testifies that he did not leave from her from the time that she was taken captive until the time that she left from the domain of the heathens (see also Tractate Yevamot, Chapter 16, Mishnah 7 and more crucially, the earliest of Mishnah texts, Tractate Eduyot, Chapter 6, Mishnah 1, especially the words of Rabbi Yehuda ben Baba).

But when they testify regarding one another, they are believed. However, if each woman testifies that the other woman was not raped, each is believed. This is true even though generally one witness is not sufficient and generally women cannot testify. The rabbis relaxed some of the laws of testimony in this case because there is no certainty that the woman was raped, it is only a likelihood. Furthermore, these women are believed even though there is a fear that each might be covering up the other’s having been raped. The rabbis were lenient in the case of captives and accepted certain types of testimony that would not have been accepted in other types of cases.

אינן נאמנים – to give to them Terumah/priest’s due.

Introduction This mishnah illustrates the same principle employed in yesterday’s mishnah, but uses the example of men who claim to be priests.

ובזמן שהן מעידין זה על זה – for each one says, “I and my colleague is a Kohen.”

And likewise two men, [if] one says, “I am a priest”, and the other says, “I am a priest”, they are not believed. When each man claims to be a priest, neither is believed and neither will receive terumah. Just as in yesterday’s mishnah, where a woman could not testify with regard to her own personal status, so too in today’s mishnah a man cannot testify with regard to his own status.

But when they testify about one another, they are believed. However, if both men corroborate the other’s testimony they are believed.

ר' יהודה אומר אין מעלין לכהונה ע"פ עד אחד – even where there are not [witnesses] repaying each other (with mutual recommendations), and all the more so here, where one can be suspicious of repaying each other: “you testify about me and I [will testify] about you.”

Introduction In this mishnah three tannaim debate whether the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to confirm that an unknown person is a priest.

עוררין – that they call upon him a name of disqualification, but there is no contesting the legitimacy of a person with less than two [people].

Rabbi Judah says: one does not raise [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness. Rabbi Judah disagrees with yesterday’s mishnah in which we learned that one person is believed to testify that another person is a priest.

מעלין – where there aren’t [witnesses] repaying each other (with mutual recommendations), which is exactly what is between Rabbi Eliezer and the first Tanna/teacher of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Elazar says: When is this true? When there are people who object; but when there are no people who object, one raises [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness. Rabbi Elazar limits Rabbi Judah’s statement to a case in which other people protest that so-and-so is not a kohen. In that type of situation two witnesses are necessary to raise someone to the priesthood. However, in the absence of others’ protesting, one witness is believed to say that someone else is a kohen.

רשב"ג אומר מעלין לכהונה – In the Gemara (Tractate Ketubot 26a-26b) an objection is raised: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel is identical with Rabbi Eliezer and brings up that they disagree on whether they combine for testimony, such as the example that we treat here a case where the father of this [person] is a Kohen, and a rumor came out concerning him that he is the son of a divorced woman or a the son of a halutzah (where she removed the shoe of her dead husband’s brother who refused to leviratical marriage, and they put him down (from the status of priesthood) and one witness came and testified, “I know that he is a Kohen,” and they raised him [again] and [then] came two [other witnesses] and said [that] “he is the son of a divorced woman or the son of halutzah,” and they put him down [again] and [then] one witness came and said: “I know that he is a Kohen,” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that they raise him to the priesthood on [the testimony] of this last witness because they combine him with the first witness whose “voice” was voided, and who stated: “I know that he is a Kohen,” and even though they did not make their testimonies at the same time, their testimony combines and we state, we establish these two [witnesses] who stated that he is a Kohen with those two [witnesses] who stated that he is a the son of a divorced woman or the son of a halutzah, and we establish a person with his legal presumption, but for Rabbi Eliezer, we don’t raise him up until two witnesses will testify at the same time that he is a Kohen, but the Halakah is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel that the witnesses combine, even though they did not testify as one.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon the son of the assistant chief of priests: one raises [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel agree with the opinion in the previous mishnah according to which a person is always believed to say that a person is a priest. We should note that determining whether a person was a priest must have been an issue of importance and difficulty after the destruction of the Temple. When the Temple stood, everyone pretty much knew who the priests were, because they were descendents of those who served regularly in the Temple. Furthermore, when the Temple was destroyed, the records kept in the Temple were probably lost. Hence testimony about a person’s being a priest became scarcer and hence more essential.

ע"י ממון מותרת לבעלה – for they are afraid of losing their money and don’t make it ownerless, and especially when the hand of the Israelites is strong over the idolaters, then she is permitted [to return] to her husband, even if her husband is a Kohen and it is not similar to a woman taken captive because they are frightened to lose their money, but when the hand of the idolaters is stronger, even through the case of money, she is prohibited to her husband if her husband is a Kohen, but if her husband is an Israelite, she is permitted in all matters, for the wife of an Israelite who meets with an accident is permitted to her husband.

Introduction As we have mentioned before, if a married woman was raped she may return to her husband but only if he is an Israelite. If he is a priest, she is forbidden from returning to her husband. If she willingly had sexual relations with another man, the she is forbidden to her husband, even if he is only an Israelite.

A woman was imprisoned by non-Jews: if for the sake of money, she is permitted to her husband, and if in order to take her life, she is forbidden to her husband.
Rabbi Zechariah ben Ha-katzav said: “By this temple! Her hand did not move out of my hand from the time that the non-Jews entered Jerusalem until they departed.” When a woman is imprisoned by non-Jewish authorities, there may be a fear that she had relations with one of them. According to our mishnah, if she was taken in order to collect money, the captors assumedly did not have relations with her, because they would fear that if they rape her they will not get the money they want. In this case, she is not prohibited to her husband, even if he is a priest. However, if they took her and intended to execute her, and then she somehow escapes or is let free, she is prohibited to her husband, even if he is an Israelite. The concern is that in order to endear herself to her captors, she willingly had sexual relations with them. Others explain this clause to refer only to the wife of a priest. If she was taken for monetary gain, they did not rape her and she may return to her priestly husband. However, if she was seized for execution, the captors would not hesitate to rape her and she is forbidden to her husband the priest. According to this explanation, there is no concern that she willingly had relations with her captor(s) and therefore, if her husband was an Israelite she is in all cases permitted to him.

כרכום – Aramaic translation is works of siege.

A town that has been conquered by siege-troops: all the priests’ wives who are in it are prohibited [from their husbands]. If they have witnesses, even a slave, even a female slave, they are believed. However, no one is believed as to himself.
They said to him: “No one may testify concerning himself.” If a city has been captured by foreign soldiers, there is concern that the women of the city were raped. Therefore, all of the women married to priests are forbidden to their husbands. However, if a woman has a witness who can testify that she was not raped, even if that witness is a slave or a female slave, the witness is believed and the woman is not prohibited to her husband. What is not allowed, is for a woman to testify about herself or for a husband to testify about his own wife. This is illustrated by the story of Rabbi Zechariah ben Hakatzav, who swore an oath by the Temple that his wife was with him the entire time that the city was occupied by the foreign troops. The other Sages responded to him that a person cannot testify about himself, and since this testimony effects him personally, he is not believed. The Talmud notes that if in the city there was a hiding place, all of the women are permitted to their priestly husbands, even if the hiding place could only fit one person. This is because each woman could claim that she was in the hiding place. Therefore, even if she says is “I wasn’t raped” she is believed because she could have said, “I hid”.

פסולות – they are prohibited to [marry] a Kohen for the wife of a Kohen is prohibited when she meets with an accident and if there is in the city a hiding place (see Tractate Ketubot 27a) that one woman can hide there, each one of the women of that city are believe to state, “I was hidden and I was not defiled,” and since she is able to say, “I was hidden,” she is believed; also when she stated: “I was not hidden and I was not defiled.”

המעון הזה – it is an oath.

אין אדם מעיד ע"י עצמו – and if a man testified about a woman taken captive that she is ritually pure, he should not marry her if he is a Kohen because of the suspicion and if he redeemed her from prison with his money, he may testify on her behalf and marries her for a person does not throw money at random (unless sure that there is no legal impediment to marrying the woman whom he is about to redeem)and if he did not known that she is pure, he would not give his money for her.

validating a document is all verbal, and the mitzvah of validating a document is from the rabbis and we are more lenient

Introduction The entire first two chapters of Ketuboth have dealt with the issue of believability in the absence of evidence or two witnesses. Our mishnah discusses in which situations a person is believed to testify about things he saw when he was a minor. That is to say, although minors are not allowed to testify, there are certain things that a minor can see about which he may testify upon reaching adulthood.

שיצתה בהינומא וראשה פרוע – and she takes her Ketubah of two hundred [zuz] and even though they do not release money other than through clear testimony, it is different here, for most of the women are married as virgins, it is revealed as something general.

The following are believed to testifying when they are grown-up about what they saw when they were minors:
A person is believed to say “This is the handwriting of my father”, “This is the handwriting of my teacher”, “This is the handwriting of my brother”; A person is believed to say that the signature on a document is similar to the handwriting of a person with whom they were close in childhood. The assumption is that a person would remember this well. Furthermore, this is not really “testifying” but just verifying someone else’s testimony, and therefore there is more room to be lenient in accepting such testimony.

ושהיה איש פלוני יוצא מבית הספר – when we were studying as school children,

“I remember that that woman went out with a hinuma and an uncovered head”; A person is believed to say that he was at a wedding and the bride wore the signs of a virgin (see mishnah one of this chapter). The Talmud explains that he is believed because most marriages are first marriages.

to eat Terumah and through this testimony, we feed Terumah of the Rabbis to him, such as for example Terumah/priest’s due that we remove from a pot without holes and things similar to it, but Terumah, according to the Torah, we don’t feed him through testimony such as this, and we do not suspect lest he ws the servant of a Kohen, for it is prohibited to teach the slave Torah.

“That that man used to go out from school to immerse in order to eat terumah”; A priest must immerse before he eats terumah. The time of immersion is right before evening. A person is believed to say that he saw one of his classmates leave school early to immerse in the mikveh, and that hence he is a priest.

ושהיה חולק עמנו על הגורן – and we do not suspect lest he was the servant of Kohen, for we do not distribute Terumah to a slave other than if his master is with him.

“That he used to take a share with us at the threshing floor”; The priests collect their terumah at the threshing floor. By this person testifying that so-and-so collected terumah, he is saying that he is a priest. Note that again the mishnah is concerned with verifying the status of priests.

ושהמקום הזה בית הפרס – A person who plows the grave makes a a field of a square P’ras, declared unclean on account of crushed bones carried over it from a ploughed grave which is one hundred cubits for this is what they measured that the plough drags the bones of the dead and the defilement of the field of a square P’ras according to the Rabbis.

“That this place was a bet ha-peras”; A bet ha-peras is a field adjacent to a field that used to serve as a cemetery but has been plowed over. The adjacent field may have small pieces of bones there, and therefore a priest may not enter. A person is believed to identify such a field, even if he only saw it in his childhood.

ועד כאן היינו באין בשבת – the Rabbinic Sabbath limits.

“That up to here we used to go on Shabbat”; On Shabbat a person may leave his town only 2000 amot. This is called the “tehum shabbat” or shabbat limit. A person is believed when he reaches majority age to say that when they were children they would go this far out of the city. The reason he is believed is that this is a matter that can be verified.

מעמד ומספד – a place which he had herei. to eulogize his dead and to make the “standing up and sitting down” (i.e., the halting of the funeral escort on returning from burial for lamentation or consolation) which they would do for the dead, in this he Is not believed, which is a monetary matter, and which requires complete testimony.

But a man is not believed when he says: “So-and-so had a path in this place”; “That man had a place of standing up and eulogy in this place”. The mishnah lists two things a person cannot testify that he saw as a minor. First of all he may not testify that a certain person owned a path through someone else’s field. Second of all, he may not testify that a person owned a place where they used to stand and give eulogies. Such places were owned on the paths that lead from the cemeteries to the cities. It would have been like a small, private funeral home. In both of these cases, the testimony involves the ownership of land. For a person to prove that he owns a piece of land, he will need to bring firmer testimony than this.