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השולח גט והגיע בשליח – for he had not intended to pursue after him to overtake him, but rather, when the agent got detained along the way and he [the husband] was on the path to there and saw him and nullified the Jewish bill of divorce, even so, it is nullified. And we don’t say that he intended to merely cause suffering, for if he had intended to nullify it, he (the husband) would have pursued after him.

Introduction The fourth chapter of Gittin begins by discussing a husband who sends a get to his wife and then attempts to annul the get. The general rule is that as long as the get has not yet gotten to her hand, he may annul the get.

אינו יכול לבטלו – that comes to teach us that even though we saw him that he ran after him to nullify it, we don’t say that this matter was revealed retroactively that he (i.e., the husband) had revoked the Jewish bill of divorce. For where a person gives a Jewish bill of divorce to his wife for a time or on condition, or says to her, “Behold this is your Jewish bill of divorce from now or from this [particular] time”; or if the specific condition had been fulfilled, and if he did not say to her “from now” – even if after her Jewish bill of divorce had reached her hand, he can annul it.

If man sends a get to his wife and then catches up with the messenger, or sends a messenger after the original messenger, and says to him, “The get which I gave you is annulled”, then it is annulled. In this case after sending the get to his wife with a messenger, the husband either catches up with the original messenger or sends a second messenger to catch up with the first and one of them tells the original messenger that the get is cancelled. The mishnah rules that the get is cancelled. Since the woman is not divorced until she receives the get, the husband may cancel it any time until this point.

If the husband arrives at his wife before [the messenger] or sends a messenger to her and says, “The get which I sent to you is annulled”, then it is annulled. In this case, the husband or his agent does not chase after the original messenger but rather the husband or his agent arrives at the wife before the messenger does. Again, since she has not yet received the get, the get is annulled. In both of these cases, even if the messenger should subsequently give her the get she is not divorced.

Once the get has reached her hand, he cannot annul it. However, once she has received the get she is no longer his wife and there isn’t anything he can do about it.

בראשונה – He would not nullify it in the presence of the woman nor in the presence of the agent, but in the place where he is standing, he would nullify it in the presence of three [judges].

Introduction The first section of our mishnah continues to discuss a husband who attempts to cancel his get after he has already sent it to his wife. In this section, a “takkanah” of Rabban Gamaliel is mentioned. “Takkanah” literally means “a fixing”, and it refers to a rabbinic decree which remedies a problematic situation. The remainder of this chapter and the next chapter contain lists of “takkanot”, made because of “tikkun olam” fixing the world or other related reasons. Today this concept has come to mean good deeds such as charity done in order to make the world a better place. In the Mishnah its meaning was more specific and it usually refers to correct either problems created because of marital laws or economic injustices. Throughout the Mishnah I will leave the term “tikkun olam” untranslated, as there is no word that precisely captures its meaning. I also think that the best way to understand the mishnaic meaning of “tikkun olam” is through the examples used by the Mishnah itself.

מפני תקון העולם – that the agent who does not know of the matter would bring it to her and she would [as a result] marry [again] through it. And on the strength of the ordinance of Rabban Gamaliel, we flog whomever nullifies the Jewish bill of divorce [in a Jewish court in another place] or issues a protest/ declaration before witnesses against a forced or unduly influenced action concerning the Jewish bill of divorce.

Originally, a husband would bring together a court wherever he was and annul the get. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that this should not be done, because of “tikkun olam”. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if a husband catches up with someone delivering a get to his wife or arrives at his wife before the messenger gets there and delivers the get, he may annul the get. Today we learn that in older times the husband could gather together a court and in front of them annul the get i without getting to his messenger or his wife. This would be extremely problematic for the wife because she might not know that her husband had annulled the get. If she were to assume that the get was valid and that she was divorced, she might remarry and have children. In such a scenario, her second marriage would be illegitimate and her children with her new husband would be mamzerim, because she is still married. Another problem would be that women receiving gittin by messenger would not know if the get was valid, because their husbands may have annulled it. To avoid problems they wouldn’t remarry. To prevent these complications Rabban Gamaliel the Elder who lived during the time of the Second Temple established that people should not do this.

בראשונה היה משנה שמו ושמה – when he (i.e. the husband) had two names – one here (in the land of Israel) and another abroad, he would divorce her with the name common used in the place where the Jewish bill of divorce was written, and he would not be exacting to write both [names].

Originally the husband would change his name, or his wife’s name, or the name of his town or of his wife’s town. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that he should write, “The man so-and-so or any name that he has,”; “the woman so-and-so or any name that she has,” because of “tikkun olam.” In mishnaic times people evidently would have several different names, names which may have been used in different regions or perhaps by speakers of different languages (i.e. a Greek name and a Hebrew name). The problem arose in identifying the get who was the husband or who was the wife. This is what the mishnah means “change his name” etc. The husband would write only one of his names, or his wife’s names or his town’s name and then he would claim that the get was not his and thereby annul it. Rabban Gamaliel established that the husband should write “The man so-and-so or any name that he has” so that annulling the get after the wife has received it would be impossible. Some commentators interpret this to mean that this formula itself should be written in the get, whereas other commentators hold this to mean that inside the get the husband must list all of the names that he goes by.

מפני תיקון העולם – so as to not cast aspersion on [the legitimacy of] her children from the second [name of her] husband, to say, that her husband didn’t divorce her for that is not his name. And a person who is known by two names in two [different] places, one in the place where [the Jewish bill of divorce] was written and another in the place where it is delivered/given, she is not divorced until the name of the place where [the Jewish bill of divorce] is delivered/given, and the name of the place where it was written with it. But, if he was known by two names in one place and he wrote [in the Jewish bill of divorce] (only) one of those names, post facto, the Jewish bill of divorce is valid. However, ab initio, one must write both of [the names] and where he changed his name or her name in the Jewish bill of divorce, even though he wrote after it, “and every name that he has,” the Jewish bill of divorce is null and void.

אין אלמנה נפרעת – Her Ketubah/Jewish marriage contract

Introduction Today’s mishnah contains three different “takkanot”, decrees meant to remedy situations. The first was made by Rabban Gamaliel the Elder, as were those in yesterday’s mishnah. The second is anonymous and the third was made by Hillel.

מנכסי יתומים, אלא בשבועה – she had not been made the recipient of anything

A widow is paid back [her kethubah] from the property of orphans only by taking an oath. [When the court] refrained from imposing an oath on her, Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that she could take any vow which the orphans wanted and collect her kethubah. We learned this law in Ketuboth 9:7-8. If a widow wants to collect her ketubah money from her husband’s orphans, she must take an oath that she has not already collected. In our mishnah we learn that at some point courts began to refrain from imposing an oath upon her, for fear that she would swear falsely. It is not that she would lie but that she would think that the money she had collected from her husband’s estate was not really her ketubah but payment for helping take care of her husband’s children. If the court would not impose an oath upon her then she could not collect the ketubah and she would be left without any money. In order to fix this problem the rabbis said that the widow could circumvent the court by taking any vow that the orphans so choose. The vow would be something like, “Let such and such an object become forbidden to me if I have already collected my ketubah.” This change in the law also kept the court from being involved in potentially false oaths.

נמנעו מלהשביע – because she is preoccupied before the orphans, she provides herself with a legal permission to take an oath that she had not taken anything. But even though she took a small amount, she believes that she is taking it as payment for her trouble [involved], but it is not for the paying off of the obligations [owed her] from her Jewish marriage contract.

Witnesses sign their names on a get because of tikkun olam. According to the letter of the law (contrasted with “takkanot”), a get is valid even if the witnesses had not signed on it. As long as they saw that it was written by the directive of the husband and given to the wife, the get is valid. However, without witnesses written on the get it will be more difficult to validate. Therefore the rabbis established that the get should be signed. We can see that the “tikkun olam” here was done in order to make it easier to validate a get, something that would have been in the best interests of the woman.

התקין רבן גמליאל שתהא נודרת ליתומים כל מה שירצו – such as קונם/taking upon myself a vow of abstinence from kinds of food if I have derived benefit from my Jewish marriage contract.

Hillel instituted the prosbul because of tikkun olam. The third takkanah of our mishnah is the famous takkanah of the prozbul. I shall explain this takkanah briefly. According to the Torah all debts are remitted in the seventh year. While this may be thought of as a benefit for the borrower (and in a perfect society perhaps it would be), in reality it could work against him. If lenders see that their loans will be erased in the seventh year they might not lend money, thereby making it difficult for those in need to take out loans. In order to remedy this problem Hillel established that a creditor could write out a document through which he transmits all debts to the court. According to the rabbis’ interpretation of the Torah, debts to the court are not remitted in the seventh year. In this way the creditor’s loans are not erased and the interests of those who need to borrow money (i.e. farmers) are also served.

וגובה כתובתה – but if she married to another [man] prior to being made by the orphans to take a vow, and if they made her take a vow after she got married, lest her husband makes her take a vow, How should do this? They make her take an oath imposed by the Rabbis outside of the court for which her punishment would not be great, and she collects her Ketubah/Jewish marriage contract after she has married. But, if she comes to collect [the value of] her Ketubah before she marries another [man], it is up to the orphans [as to what to do]: if they want, they have her take an oath outside of the court or make her take a vow in court.

העדים חותמים על הגט מפני תיקון העולם – It refers to both [the witnesses signing on the Jewish bill of divorce as well as the widow taking a vow before the orphans before collecting the value of her Jewish marriage contract], concerning a widow who takes a vow to the orphans on whatever they want, for the sake of the social order, so that women can marry their husbands without worrying about losing the value of their Ketubah. But concerning the witnesses who sign the Jewish bill of divorce for the sake of the social order, for since it is the witnesses to the delivery [of the Jewish bill of divorce] that effect the divorce, for the witnesses in whose presence the Jewish bill of divorce is delivered to the woman are the essential [aspect] of the divorce. It would not have been necessary for witnesses to sign the Jewish bill of divorce, other than for the sake of the social order, for we are concerned lest one of the witnesses before whom the Jewish bill of divorce was delivered would die, and that the bill of divorce in her hand without witnesses would be like a mere potsherd.

הלל התקין פרוזבול – for he [Hillel] saw that the people were prevented from making loans to one another and they violated what is written in the Torah (Deuteronomy 15:9): “Beware lest you harbor the base thought, [the seventh year, the year of remission is approaching…’],” he [Hillel] ordained the Prozbul. And this is the body of the Prozbul: “I hand over to you, so-and-so and so-and-so, the judges that every debt obligation that I have with so-and-so, I will collect it whenever I want.”

עבד שנשבה ופדאוהו – Other Israelites [redeemed him] after his master had despaired of recovering him [of getting him back from captivity].

Introduction These two mishnayoth discuss the emancipation of slaves.

אם לשום עבד ישתעבד – to his second master.

A [non-Jewish] slave [of a Jew] was taken captive and then ransomed [by a third party]: If [he is ransomed] to be a slave he goes back to slavery, If [he is ransomed] as a free man he does not go back to slavery. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: in either case he goes back to slavery. If a non-Jewish slave is taken captive and held for ransom and then his ransom is paid, according to the first opinion in the mishnah his return to slavery depends upon the intent of the one who paid his ransom. Since the original master didn’t offer up the ransom himself, he loses the ability to decide whether the slave remains a slave. According to another source, if the person who paid the ransom decides that he should remain a slave to his former master, the master must pay back the ransom money. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that in any case the slave returns to his previous owner. The Yerushalmi explains that this is in order to prevent the slave from running away. Another explanation is that the first opinion in the mishnah holds that there is no commandment to redeem slaves. Therefore, by paying his ransom the redeemer has in essence purchased the slave and may do with him as he wishes. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that there is a commandment to redeem slaves owned by Jews. Since the redeemer fulfilled a commandment he did not acquire the slave and the slave returns to his owner. We should note that there are several other explanations of this mishnah.

לשום בן חורין לא ישתעבד – No to his first master nor to his second master. Not to his second master, that behold for the sake of become a free person, he would be redeemed; not to his first master either so that everyone would subject himself to the army and remove himself from his master.

If a man makes his slave a pledge [for a debt] to another man and then he emancipates him, according to the “letter of the law” the slave is not liable to do anything. But because of tikkun olam we force his [second] master to emancipate him and he [the slave] writes a document for his purchase price. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the slave does not write the document but rather the one who emancipates him. In this case Reuven loans Shimon money, and as a pledge (like pawning) for his loan, Reuven takes Shimon’s slave. Shimon still owns the slave and therefore can free the slave despite the loan. In such a case, according to the letter of the law the slave is totally free and need not do anything. However, to protect the slave from an angry Reuven, the court forces Reuven to write out an emancipation document, as if he too has freed the slave. The slave then writes out a document stating how much he is worth, and with this document Reuven can try to recover his loan from Shimon. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the original owner (Shimon) writes out the document for he is the one who damaged the lender’s lien on his assets by freeing the pledged slave. If the debtor writes the document, the creditor is more likely to recoup his loss.

אפותיקי – Here you would stand. From this, you will collect your lien and not from another place.

ושחררו – his first master

שורת הדין אין העבד חייב כלום – to his second master, for the manumission that the first master freed him removes him from enslavement.

אלא מפני תקון העולם – lest his second master would find him in the market and say to him: “you are my servant and cast aspersion on the purity of his children.

כופין את רבו – The second [master], and make him (i.e., the slave) a free man. And the slave should write a document of liability regarding his worth, that is to say, according to what he would be worth to be sold in the marketplace, not according to the liability if the liability was greater than his monetary worth.

רשב"ג אמר אין העבד כותב – [the slave does not write] a document of liability, for he is not liable for anything., but the first master who damaged his servitude, he is the one who must pay his worth, for the one who damages the servitude of his fellow is liable and the Halakha is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel.

מי שחציו עבד וחציו בן חורין – such as a slave of two partners, who was freed by one of them. Alternatively, his master received from him half of his financial worth, and freed that half on account of those funds.

Introduction This mishnah deals with a person who is half a slave and half free. This could happen if he was owned jointly by two masters and one of his masters freed him but not the other.

תקנתם את רבו – who is not lacking for anything

One who is half a slave and half free works for his master one day and for himself one day, the words of Beth Hillel. Beth Hillel seems to make a reasonable suggestion for what to do in this situation. The half-slave splits his time between working for his master and working for himself.

לישא שפחה אינו יכול – because of the side of “freedom” within him.

Beth Shammai said to them: you have set things right for the master but you have not set things right for the slave. He cannot marry a female slave because he is already half free, and he cannot marry a free woman because he is half a slave. Shall he then decease [from having children]? But wasn’t the world only made to be populated, as it says, “He did not create it as a waste, he formed it to be inhabited” (Isaiah 45:18)? Rather because of tikkun olam we compel his master to emancipate him and he writes a document for half his purchase price. Beth Shammai responds in what is in my opinion one of the more remarkable statements in the Mishnah. Beth Hillel’s solution for the half slave is beneficial to his master but leaves the half slave in an untenable position. Slaves and free people cannot marry. Since this person is a half slave, he can marry neither a slave nor a free woman. However, the commandment of having children “be fruitful and multiply” applies to everyone, even slaves and half slaves. The halakhah cannot allow a situation where a person has no one to marry. The world, after all, was formed by God for it to be inhabited, and not for it to lay desolate of human beings. Therefore, because of tikkun olam, his master is forced to free him, thereby allowing him to marry a free woman. The slave merely writes a document for half of his value and owes that amount to the owner.

בת חורין אינו יכול – because of the side of enslavement within him.

Beth Hillel retracted [their opinion and] ruled like Beth Shammai. Indeed, Beth Shammai’s argument was so compelling that Beth Hillel changed their opinion and ruled like Beth Shammai.

כופין את רבו ועושהו בן חורין – And the same law applies if he was the slave of one-hundred partners and one of them freed him; we force all of them to free him.

בן חורין – if he fled from the heathen, or the or the court fined him [i.e., the original owner] to redeem him from the heathens, as we said – we force him to redeem him and after he has redeemed him, he does not free him, and this is a fine of the Sages, because he releases him from the commandments. And similarly, if he [i.e., the master], sold him outside of the Land [of Israel], he [i.e., the slave] goes free, since he took him outside of the Land of Israel.

Introduction There are four sections to our mishnah. The first deals with selling slaves to Gentiles or to an owner who lives outside the land of Israel. The last three clauses deal with redeeming captives or sacred objects taken captive. Unfortunately, I should note that as I write these lines (many months before you read them) the issue of captives and the price we pay to redeem them is terribly relevant, both in Israel and in the entire world. Muslim extremists are regularly taking captives (often innocent bystanders and not soldiers) and threatening them with beheading in order to force the political hands of countries with whom they are at war. In Israel a hotly debated topic is whether to exchange live prisoners for the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed in battle or even for knowledge of the whereabouts of their bodies. While the mishnah seems to have simple answers for the question of how to deal with these situations, we should note that real life situations are complex, involve people’s families and political forces that differ from situation to situation. One thing which I think all can agree upon is to pray that our leaders have the wisdom to deal with these situations as best as possible, to when possible redeem captured soldiers, journalists and others, to prevent others from being taken captive in the future, and to put a stop to the terrible people who commit these crimes.

מפני תקון העולם – they would not surrender the heathens themselves [to the authorities] to increase and bring captives when we see that they are selling them for more than their worth.

If a man sells his slave to a Gentile or [to someone living] outside the land [of Israel] the slave goes free. According to halakhah, a slave owned by a Jew is obligated to observe most of the commandments. If a slave-owner sells a slave to a non-Jew he has put a person obligated in the commandments into a position where he will not be able to observe the commandments. Therefore, the halakhah demands that such a slave go free. Whether or not the non-Jew will observe the halakhah is a different question. The mishnah seems to be presuming a situation of Jewish political sovereignty. Secondly, we learned in Ketuboth 13:11 that a husband cannot force his wife to leave the land of Israel (neither can a wife force her husband). Here we see that a master cannot force even his slave to be sold to someone living outside of the land.

אין מבריחין את השבויין מפני תקון העולם – lest they arouse to anger the captives who will eventually come into their hands and place them in chains and put them on the splints of his legs.

Captives should not be redeemed for more than their value, because of tikkun olam. Redeeming captives for more than their price will obviously encourage captors to continue to take and ransom innocent people and to charge exorbitant prices for their return. Therefore this practice is forbidden. Note that the rabbis do not forbid redeeming captives and paying ransoms, but those ransoms must not be exorbitant. It seems to me that the rabbis are searching for the middle road, somewhere between respect for the life of the person taken captive and fear that paying a ransom will encourage further capturing.

רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר מפני תקנת השבויין – Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel has not been concerned about the future as a captive, other than with those who are currently in captivity with him. If there is no other captive than him alone, we force him [to free him] and we are not concerned here about the decree of other captives when there are no others with him. And the Halakha is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel.

Captives should not be helped to escape, because of tikkun olam. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says [that the reason is] to prevent the ill-treatment of fellow captives. According to the first opinion, rescuing captives, while effective in the present, may encourage future captors to take more drastic measures to keep their captives under lock. Saving one person now may cause many others in the future to be treated in a very harsh manner. Therefore, they should not be rescued. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says we are not concerned about future captives but rather about those currently being held. If we rescue some captives, those that remain in captivity will be ill-treated, and perhaps even killed. However, if there are no other captives and we can successfully rescue all those that are currently under captivity, we should make such an attempt. Again, we should note exactly what the rabbis were trying to accomplish the safe return of current captives while at the same time the prevention of harm to future captives. While their means may not be directly applicable today, their goals seem to me to be the same as ours should be.

Torah scrolls of the law, tefillin and mezuzoth are not bought from Gentiles at more than their value, because of tikkun olam. Evidently, Gentiles knew well what was valuable to Jews. From the mishnah it seems that they would capture religious items and ransom them back. Again, the mishnah forbids paying more than they are worth. At least with things it is easier to establish a value than with human beings. After all, how much is a human being worth.

משום שם רע – talk casting aspersion against her [on account of] unchastity

Introduction This mishnah deals with a man who divorces his wife either because a rumor went out that she had committed adultery or because of a vow that she took.

משום נדר – that she took an vow and he [i.e., her husband] said: It is impossible for me [to be married] to a woman who takes vows.

If a man divorces his wife because of ill-repute, he cannot remarry her. If a man divorces his wife because he believes that she committed adultery he may not remarry her. The fear is that after he divorces her he may find out that the rumor was false. When he discovers that the rumor was false he may regret divorcing her and say, “Had I known that the rumor was false, I would never have divorced her.” Since the divorce was based on a false assumption, the get is invalidated and any children which she had from a subsequent marriage are considered mamzerim. To prevent this problematic situation (in other words for tikkun olam), when the husband divorces they say to him that he must know that his divorce is final and irrevocable, even if the rumor for which he divorces her proves to be false. In this way, he will in his mind divorce her completely and he cannot later claim that the divorce was mistaken.

לא יחזיר – And even if it were found that the words [against her] were false, or that the vow was released by a Sage, lest she go and marry another and it is found that the words of aspersion against her [on account of] unchastity were found to be false, and that her vow would be released by a Sage, and she would not be considered unrestrained in taking vows, and he [i.e. the husband] would say: If I had known that this was the case, even if they gave me one-hundred Maneh, I would not divorce her, and the Jewish bill of divorce would be considered void and her children would be illegitimate. Therefore, we say to him: Note that one who dismisses his wife because of an evil name or because of a vow cannot remarry [her] ever. And because of these words, he completes her divorce’ and no one is able to further disgrace her through immorality.

If because of a vow, he cannot remarry her. The same holds true for a husband who divorces his wife because she took a vow that disrupted their marriage in some way. In such a case he may later discover that he could have had the vow released and then regret divorcing her, thereby annulling the get. To prevent this he is told that if he divorces her because of a vow, he can never remarry her.

רבי יהודה אומר: כל נדר שידעו בו רבים לא יחזיר – Rabbi Yehuda thinks that the reason that what the Rabbis said – that a person who dismisses {i.e, divorce) his wife because of a bad name or because of a vow, should not remarry her in order that Jewish women should not be loose in moral conduct or in vows (Gittin 46a), and because of this, it is stated that a vow that the public knew about – ten or more Israelites [involved], there is greater licentiousness, and they fine her and he cannot remarry her. But, if the public did not know about it, there is no licentiousness at all and they do not fine her.

Rabbi Judah says: [if he divorces her] for vows which she made in front of many people, he may not remarry her, but if for vows which she did not make in front of many people, he may remarry her. The following sages argue over which types of vows the previous section was referring to. According to Rabbi Judah, if the vow was public he cannot remarry her, but if the vow was not public he may remarry her. The Talmud explains that Rabbi Judah believes that the rule husbands may not remarry their wives if they divorced them because of a rumor of adultery or because of a vow is a punishment for the wife. Therefore, if she vows privately such that others don’t know that she took a vow, then she is not punished and her husband may remarry her.

לא יחזיר – since Rabbi Meir thinks that the reason is because of moral corruption. Therefore, a vow which cannot be annulled but that a Sage can release it, he [i.e., the husband] can corrupt the Jewish bill of divorce after she has married another [man] and say: If had known that a Sage can release it [the vow, I would not have divorced her.

Rabbi Meir says: [if he divorces her] for a vow which requires the investigation of a sage, he may not remarry her, but if for one which does not require the investigation of a sage, he may remarry her. Rabbi Eliezer says: they only forbid that one because of that one . Rabbi Meir makes a different distinction. According to Rabbi Meir he cannot remarry her if the vow required the investigation of a sage in order to release the vow. If it did not require even the investigation of the sage for the vow to be released then it must have been a mistaken vow. Such a vow can obviously be released and everyone should know this. Therefore, he cannot later claim, “Had I known that the vow could be released I would not have divorced her.” Since he cannot make this claim, we do not need to prevent him from remarrying her. Rabbi Elazar reasons completely opposite. The reason that they made it forbidden for him to remarry her for a vow that does require the investigation of a sage is because he may regret divorcing her for making a vow that does not require the investigation of a sage.

ושאינו צריך חקירת חכם – but rather he can annul it [the vow] and there would be no need for the Sages to prohibit him from remarrying her, because he is not able to damage her and say, “If I had known etc.,” for it is an open vow and he can either annul it or not annul it.

Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah said: a case happened in Sidon of a man who said to his wife, “Konam, if I do not divorce you”, and he did divorce her, and the Sages permitted him to remarry her because of tikkun olam. The final section deals with a case where a husband vowed to divorce his wife. In this case, we might have thought that in order to encourage men not to hastily vow to divorce their wives the law would have been that if he does so he cannot remarry her. However, the Sages ruled that he can nevertheless remarry her. The only reason that in other cases they prohibited him from remarrying her was lest he state “Had I known that the vow could be broken I would not have divorced her.” This prohibition was made because of tikkun olam protecting the wife from a husband who makes such a statement. However, if the husband vows there is no reason to prevent him from remarrying her.

לא אסרו זה – that requires the study of a Sage [to find the means of absolving the vow to permit him] to remarry [her].

אלא מפני זה – that it is not necessary, for had it been necessary, we would not have to worry about disgracing her by immorality, since he would not be able to say: Had I known that a Sage can release it [i.e., the vow] , I would not have divorced [her], for we testify that even though this is the case, he would divorce her, and a man does not want to have his wife despised/humbled in the Jewish court in front of a Sage where she would go to the court and make petition about her vow, but because a vow that does not require a Sage [to release her] and the husband can annul it, they forbade all of them so that he would not say: “If I had known that I could annul it, it would not have divorced her.”

א"ר יוסי ברבי יהודה כו' In the Gemara it explains that the Mishnah is deficient (i.e., missing something) and it should be taught as follows: What are we speaking about: When she made the vow, but if he made the vow that he would divorce her and he divorced her, he may remarry her and we don’t worry about her degeneracy.

ואמר ר' יוסי ברבי יהודה: מעשה נמי בצידן באחד שאמר לאשתו קונם אם איני מגרשך – that is to say, that all the fruit that is in the world will be forbidden to me if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, but the Sages ruled leniently to him that he may remarry her.

מפני תקון העולם – that is to say, that the Sages did not say that a man who divorces his wife because of a vow should not remarry her other than because of the sake of the social order for we fear for moral degeneracy, but that does not belong other than on account of a vow she took , but if he took a vow, and there is nothing here [concerning] the sake of the social order, they permitted him to remarry her. And the Halakha is according to Rabbi Yehuda.

רבי יהודה אומר לא יחזיר – Lest she marry [another man] and give birth [to a child] and he (i.e., the first husband] would say: had I known that this is the case, even if they would have given me one-hundred Maneh, I would not divorce you.

Introduction This mishnah discusses a husband who divorces his wife because she turns out to be an “aylonit.” An aylonit is a female who does not develop physical signs of sexual maturity, but is clearly a female. By definition, she cannot have children. If later on she has children then it turns out that she is not an aylonit.

וחכמים אומרים: יחזיר – for they were not concerned for her degeneracy, and in the Gemara, it explains who the Sages are: Rabbi Meir – who stated that we require a double condition and this is what we are dealing with – that he did not make a double condition, for he [i.e., the husband] did not say to her: “You should know that since you are incapable of conception, I am releasing you [from being my wife], and if you are not incapable of conception, it is not a Jewish bill of divorce, and now it is a Jewish bill of divorce even if she is not incapable of conception.

A man divorces his wife because she is an aylonit: Rabbi Judah says he may not remarry her, But the sages say that he may remarry her. The reason that Rabbi Judah says that he may not remarry a wife that he divorced because she was an “aylonit” is similar to the reasons we learned in yesterday’s mishnah why men who divorce for certain reasons may not remarry their wives. If he divorces her because she is an “aylonit” and then she remarries and has children from her next husband the first husband might say, “Had I known that she was not an aylonit, I would not have divorced her.” This statement would annul the divorce and her children would become mamzerim. To prevent this, Rabbi Judah rules that we tell him when he divorces her that he will never be able to remarry her, and in that way he will divorce her with complete conviction. However, in this case the Sages do not agree, for they are not concerned lest such a scenario arise. Perhaps they thought it unlikely for a woman who was assumed to be an aylonit to later have children.

והיא תובעת כתובתה – a woman incapable of conception has no [rights regarding her] Ketubah/Jewish marriage contract , and now that she was found to not be incapable of conception, she is demanding [payment of] her Ketubah.

She marries someone else and has children from him and then demands her ketubah settlement [from her first husband]: Rabbi Judah said, they say to her, “Your silence is better than your speaking.” When a woman is divorced because she is an aylonit, her husband does not have to pay her ketubah (see Ketuboth 11:6). When this woman who was divorced because she was thought to be an aylonit has children in her subsequent marriage, it turns out that she wasn’t really an aylonit. Hence she could make a valid claim that her first husband owes her a ketubah. However, Rabbi Judah says that she would do better not to make such a claim, for if she does her husband might attempt to annul the divorce and thereby make her children mamzerim and forbid her to her new husband because she is an adulteress (albeit an unintentional one.)

שתיקותיך יפה ליך מדבוריך – that he would say: If I had known that in the end, I would have to give you your Ketubah [payment], I would not have divorced you, and it is found that the Jewish bill of divorce is voided and her children are illegitimate.

אין פודין אותו – and he is accustomed to it, such as the case where he sold and resold and sold a third time.

Introduction The two sections of this mishnah deal with a person who sold either himself, his children or his fields to a Gentile.

לוקח ומביא ביכורים – In each year, one must purchase from the heathen the first of its fruits with money and bring them to Jerusalem.

If a man sells himself and his children to a Gentile, he is not to be redeemed but his children are to be redeemed after the death of their father. If the Jewish community were to redeem a man who sold himself to a Gentile, others in the future would be encouraged to do so in order to raise money, and eventually it would become a serious financial burden. Therefore, the community is not allowed to redeem such a person. However, his children were sold through no fault of their own. In order to prevent them from being lost to the Jewish community they are redeemed after their father’s death. However, while he is still alive even they are not redeemed so that the father will not be encouraged to sell them again.

מפני תקון העולם – so that he not be accustomed to sell land in the Land of Israel to heathens, and if he sold it, he work to return and redeem them.

If a man sells his field to a Gentile, and an Israelite bought it back, he has to bring, the purchaser must bring first fruits from it, because of tikkun olam. There are two versions to this section, the one that I translated above, and another version which Rashi used. I will explain both. When a Gentile acquires land in Israel, the land still retains its holiness and therefore the first fruits (bikkurim) which grow from this land must be brought to Jerusalem, as is the rule with all first fruits. However, the person who buys the land from the Gentile might think that since the fruits grew while owned by the Gentile, he need not bring first fruits. To prevent this situation, the rabbis stated that the one who bought the land from the Gentile must bring first fruits. Note that according to this interpretation something done because of tikkun olam is also a “toraitic” law (deoraita). This is unusual and hence makes this interpretation tentative. The Talmud adds further complicated wrinkles to this mishnah to solve this problem. Rashi’s version reads, “If one sells his land to a Gentile, he must buy the first fruits and bring them.” This is easier to understand. The Gentile will obviously not do so himself and therefore if the Jew doesn’t go back and buy the first fruits, they will not be brought. Furthermore, this is a penalty on the person for selling his land to a Gentile.