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אותו ואת בנו – the mother and the male offspring, or the mother and the female offspring, but the father with the male offspring or with the female offspring is not forbidden [to be slaughtered on the same day], for (Leviticus 22:28): “[However, no animal from the herd or from the flock shall be slaughtered] on the same day with its young,” implies whomever’s offspring is clinging, excluding the male (i.e., the father) whose male offspring is not clinging.

Introduction Leviticus 22:28 states, “When it comes to an ox or a sheep, it and its young you shall not slaughter on the same day.” Our chapter discusses this prohibition.

בין בארץ בין בחוצה לארץ –since it is necessary to teach, whether with unconsecrated things whether with consecrated things, it (i.e., the Mishnah) teaches also “whether in the Land of Israel” or “whether outside the Land of Israel,” even though it is not necessary, for it is the obligation of personal duty (as opposed to laws connected with the soil of the Land of Israel), for personal duty applies whether in the Land of Israel or whether outside the Land of Israel.

[The law of] “It and its young” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of both unconsecrated and consecrated animals. The prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its young on the same day applies in all times and all places and to both consecrated (dedicated to the Temple) and non-consecrated (hullin) animals.

בפני הבית – at the time when the Temple exists.

How so? The mishnah now explains various scenarios in which a person slaughters an animal and its young, and the various liabilities that can be occurred, depending on whether the animals were consecrated and where they were slaughtered.

ושלא בפני הבית – you might think I would say, for since it is written regarding the matter of Holy Things, that when the Temple exists, we will apply it, when the Temple doesn’t exist, we will not apply it. Therefore, it comes to tell us the opposite.

If a person slaughtered an animal and its young, both animals being unconsecrated, [and they slaughtered them] outside [the sanctuary], they are both valid, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes. In this case, both animals are hullin (unconsecrated) and both are slaughtered outside of the Temple, where they should be slaughtered. Both animals are valid and can be eaten. The fact that the second one should not have been slaughtered does not render its slaughtering to be invalid. The second person, the one who slaughters the second animal (whether or not this is the parent or offspring), is liable for the forty lashes for having transgressed a biblical commandment. The first person is not liable because when he slaughtered the animal, he did nothing wrong.

בחולין ובמוקדשים – whether both (i.e., the mother and the offspring) are unconsecrated or both are sanctified, and from where in the Torah do we learn that it applies to that which is sanctified? As it is written (Leviticus 22:27): “When an ox or a sheep or a goat is born,[it shall stay seven days with its mother, and from the eight day on] it shall be acceptable as a gift to the LORD,” and afterwards it is written (Leviticus 22:28): “However no animal from the herd or from the flock shall be slaughtered on the same day with its young.”

If both animals were consecrated [and they were slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet, both animals are invalid, and each incurs forty lashes. In this case both animals are consecrated and should have been slaughtered only in the Temple. The person who slaughters the first animal is liable for karet for having slaughtered a consecrated animal outside the Temple. The person who slaughters the second animal is not liable for karet because that animal could not have been offered as a sacrifice on that day since its parent/child had already been slaughtered. Since it could not have been a sacrifice, the one who slaughters it outside the Temple is exempt from karet. Both animals are invalid as sacrifices because they were slaughtered outside the Temple (see Zevahim 14:2). Both slaughterers are liable for lashes but for different reasons. The first is liable for having slaughtered a consecrated animal outside of the Temple and the second for slaughtering an animal on the same day that its parent/young was slaughtered.

בחוץ – outside of the Temple courtyard.

If both animals were unconsecrated [and they were slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], both animals are invalid, and [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes. In this case both animals were unconsecrated, and yet both were slaughtered inside the Temple. This makes them invalid and it is forbidden to derive benefit from either animal (see Kiddushin 2:9). There is no biblical punishment for slaughtering an unconsecrated animal inside the Temple, therefore the first slaughterer is not punished. The second slaughterer is liable for having slaughtered an animal on the same day that its parent/young was slaughtered.

שניהם כשרים – because it was necessary to teach in the concluding clause [of the Mishnah] that both of them are disqualified, the first clause [of the Mishnah] teaches that both are fit.

If both animals were consecrated [and they were slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not culpable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes, and it is invalid. In this case both were consecrated and both were slaughtered inside the Temple, as is required. The first animal is valid as a sacrifice and the one who slaughters it is exempt, for he has done nothing wrong. The second animal is invalid and the one who slaughters it is liable for having slaughtered an animal on the same day that its parent/young was slaughtered

והשני סופג את הארבעים – because of the negative commandment of “no animal…[shall be slaughtered on the same day] with its young” (Leviticus 22:28). And there is no difference whether he slaughtered the mother first, and makes no difference whether he slaughtered the offspring first. It makes no difference whether both were slaughtered by one person, and makes no difference if two people [slaughtered the mother and its young].

הראשון חייב כרת – because of slaughtering outside of the Temple. But the second [of the pair of the mother and its offspring] is exempt from extirpation, for since the mother was slaughtered, the offspring is further not worthy to be slaughtered today inside, for it is disqualified because of lacking time (i.e., an offering cannot be offered because its time to be offered has not yet arrived), for it is not appropriate to slaughter it and to offer it today, and he is not liable because of slaughtering outside [the Temple] unless it is appropriate inside, as it is written (Leviticus 17:4): “and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” that which is appropriate [to be brought] to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, he is liable for it outside, and if not, then not.

ושניהם סופגים את הארבעים – the first because of slaughtering outside, for all who are liable for violating laws of extirpation are flogged, and the second because of the negative commandment of “the mother and its young.”

חולין בפנים שנהים פסולין – because unconsecrated offerings which were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard.

והשני סופג – because of “the mother and its young.” But because of unconsecrated animals in the Temple courtyard, there is the warning of a positive commandment (Deuteronomy 12:21): “If the place [where there LORD has chosen to establish His name] is too far from you, you may slaughter [any of the cattle or sheep that the LORD gives you],” when there is a distance of place, you slaughter, but you do not slaughter when the place is close.

קדשים בפנים כו' והשני סופג – because of “the mother and its young.”

ופסול – because of lacking time.

חולין וקדשים בחוץ – specifically it [i.e., the Mishnah] took the first as unconsecrated produce and the second as Holy Things (i.e., belonging to the Temple). And similarly, all that is taught in the Mishnah, specifically it took them.

Introduction This mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.

והשני סופג – because of (Leviticus 22:28): “an animal…with its young.”

If [the first animal was] unconsecrated and [the second] consecrated [and they were both slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid. The first animal was unconsecrated and the second was consecrated, and both were slaughtered outside of the Temple. The first animal is valid and the person who slaughtered it is exempt for he has done nothing wrong (way to go!). The second animal should have been slaughtered in the Temple, so the fact that it was not renders it invalid. The person who slaughtered it is lashed for having slaughtered it on the same day as the parent/offspring had already been slaughtered. He does not receive karet because the animal was not valid to be a sacrifice on that day.

קדשים – at first, and afterwards, unconsecrated produce outside.

If [the first was] consecrated and [the second] unconsecrated [and they were both slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet and it is invalid, and the second [animal] is valid, and each incurs forty lashes. In this case the order is opposite, first the consecrated animal is slaughtered and then the unconsecrated animal. The first person is liable for karet for having slaughtered a consecrated animal outside the Temple. The animal is invalid. Both are liable for lashes, the first for slaughtering a consecrated animal outside the Temple, and the second for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”

והשני כשר – for consumption. But since it (i.e., the Mishnah) taught it was invalid, it taught, it was fit.

If [the first was] unconsecrated and [the second] consecrated [and they were both slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], they are both invalid, and [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes. Now we examine the scenarios if both are slaughtered inside the Temple. The first animal is unconsecrated and therefore it is invalid. The second is invalid because it could not be a sacrifice on that day. Only the second person is lashed because there are no lashes for slaughtering an unconsecrated animal inside the Temple.

ושניהם סופגים – the first because of slaughtering outside [the Temple courtyard], and the second because of “an animal with its young” (Leviticus 22:28)

If [the first was] consecrated and [the second] unconsecrated [and they were both slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], the first animal is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid. Now the order is reversed. The first animal was consecrated and slaughtered inside the Temple everything good so far! The second animal is invalid because it was an unconsecrated animal slaughtered in the Temple. The person who slaughters it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”

חולין וקדשים בפנים שניהם פסולים – the first because of unconsecrated animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, and the second because of lacking time (i.e., that the time to be offered has not yet arrived).

If both were unconsecrated and [the first was slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary] and [the second] inside, the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid. Now both animals are hullin, but they are slaughtered in different places. If the first is slaughtered outside the Temple, then “no problem”! If the second is slaughtered in the Temple, it is invalid for being slaughtered in the Temple and the person who slaughtered it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”

והשני סופג – because of “an animal with its young.”

If both were consecrated and [the first was slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary] and [the second] inside, [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet, each incurs forty lashes, and both animals are invalid. Now both are consecrated, but they are again slaughtered in different places. If the first is slaughtered outside the Temple, it is invalid and the person who slaughters it is liable for karet. The second is also invalid, because it was slaughtered outside of the Temple. Both are liable for lashes, the first for slaughtering a consecrated animal outside the Temple, and the second for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”

חולין בחוץ ובפנים – the first slaughtered outside [the Temple courtyard] and the second within [the Temple courtyard].

If both were unconsecrated and [the first was slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary] and [the second] outside, the first is invalid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is valid. This is the same as section five, but the order of where the animals are slaughtered is reversed. The first, which is slaughtered inside the Temple, is invalid, but the person who slaughtered it is exempt, because there is no punishment for slaughtering a non-consecrated animal inside the Temple. The second is valid and may be eaten, but the person who slaughtered it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”

קדשים בחוץ ובפנים הראשון בכרת – because of slaughtering outside[the Temple courtyard].

If both were consecrated and [the first was slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary] and [the second] outside, the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid. This the opposite order of section six. The first animal was consecrated and slaughtered inside the Temple good job! The second animal is invalid because it wasn’t slaughtered inside the Temple and the one who slaughters it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.” Summary of general principles that emerge from these two mishnayot: 1) The second slaughterer is always liable. However, the second animal can be eaten, if it was unconsecrated and was slaughtered outside the Temple. 2) One who slaughters a consecrated animal outside the Temple is liable for karet and lashes. 3) One who slaughters a non-consecrated animal inside the Temple is exempt. 4) An animal whose parent/offspring has already been slaughtered cannot be used as a sacrifice on that day. Therefore, if one slaughters such a consecrated animal outside the Temple he is not liable for karet. 5) No animal can be eaten if slaughtered in the wrong place.

ושניהם פסולים – the first because it was slaughtered outside [the Temple courtyard] and the second because of lacking time (i.e., that the time to be offered has not yet arrived).

ושניהם סופגים – the first because of slaughtering outside [the Temple courtyard], and the second because of “an animal with its young.”

קדשים בפנים ובחוץ – for the second, one receives [forty – actually, thirty nine] lashes] because of “an animal with its young,” but because of slaughtering outside [the Temple courtyard], one is not flogged, for because of lacking time (i.e., that the time to be offered has not yet arrived, and he it is not accepted inside [the Temple courtyard].

פרה חטאת – the red heifer, which is not for consumption.

If a person slaughtered [an animal] and it was found to be terefah, or if he slaughtered [it as an offering] to idols, or if he slaughtered the red cow, or an ox which was condemned to be stoned, or a heifer whose neck was to be broken: Rabbi Shimon exempts [him from having transgressed the law of “it and its young”]; But the sages make him liable. In all of these cases a person slaughters a parent and its offspring on the same day, but one of the animals was an animal that could not be eaten. There are five such categories: 1) A terefah, an animal that has a flaw that will cause it to eminently die. 2) An animal slaughtered for idolatry. 3) The red cow, used for purifying people with corpse impurity. 4) An ox condemned to die for either killing a person or for engaging in bestiality. It is forbidden to derive benefit from such an ox. 5) The heifer whose neck is broken to atone for an unsolved murder. Since these animals can not be eaten, even if they were slaughtered properly, Rabbi Shimon exempts the one who slaughters the second one from being liable for “it and its son.” Rabbi Shimon holds that slaughtering that would not make an animal fit for consumption even if done properly is not called “slaughtering.” The other rabbis disagree and say that he is liable, since he did indeed slaughter the second animal.

ושור הנסקל – after its verdict has been announced, for we hold hat it is prohibited to derive benefit even when slaughtering it.

If a person slaughtered [an animal] and it became nevelah under his hand, or if he stabbed it, or tore away [the organs of the throat], he does not thereby transgress the law of it and its young. In this case, the animal was valid before it was slaughtered, but then was invalidated by an improper method of slaughtering. Such a person is not liable for transgressing “it and its son” because this prohibition only applies to one who “slaughters,” the verb used in the verse. This person did not successfully slaughter.

ועגלה ערופה – for he holds that it is forbidden while alive, and even if e slaughtered it, it is forbidden. But in the Gemara (Tractate Hullin 82a) reaches the definitive conclusion that the red heifer and the heifer whose neck is to be broken are not taught in our Mishnah. For regarding both of them, their slaughter is appropriate, and one must remove them from the Mishnah and Rabbi Shimon did not exempt them (for slaughter that is not appropriate for eating is not called slaughter).

If two people bought a cow and its young, he who bought first can slaughter first; but if the second preceded him, he holds his advantage. If two people buy a cow and its young, they might end up arguing about who has the right to slaughter first. The mishnah says that the first person to buy has the right to slaughter first, and the second person should wait. But if the second person slaughters first, the other person will have to wait for the next day.

וחכמים מחייבין – this that the Sages make him liable when slaughtering for idolatrous purposes, they did not teach other than when he slaughtered the first for idolatrous purposes and the second [animal] came and he slaughtered it for his table to eat it, but if the first was for his table and the second was for idolatrous purposes, that through the latter slaughtering is what makes him liable because of “an animal and its young” (Leviticus 22:28), the law of killing comes upon him, and he is exempt from lashes–flogging because he who has committed two offenses simultaneously, must be held answerable for the severer penalty which is death (i.e., for slaughtering for idolatrous purposes, but he is exempt from flogging for the slaughtering of the animal and her young in one day – see Talmud Hullin 81b) for two [punishments] we don’t do to him. But sometimes, that even when he slaughtered the first for his table and the second for idolatrous purposes, he is liable, as, for example, when they (i.e., witnesses) warned him because of “an animal and its young” (Leviticus 22:28), but they didn’t warn him because of idolatrous purposes, for since they did not warn him regarding idolatrous purposes, he is not killed, but he is flogged because of “an animal and its young.” But the Halakha is according to the Sages.

If a person slaughtered a cow and then two of its calves, he is liable for eighty lashes. If he slaughtered its two calves and then the cow, he is liable for forty lashes. If he slaughtered it and then its calf and then the calf's offspring, he is liable for eighty lashes. If he slaughtered it and then its calf's offspring and then the calf, he is liable for forty lashes. Symmachos says in the name of r. Meir: he is liable for eighty lashes. This section attempts to delineate how many transgressions a person has transgressed when he slaughters multiple animals on the same day. We will take case by case. 1) Once he slaughters the mother, he will be liable for each of its offspring that he slaughters on that day. Therefore, when he slaughters two offspring, he is liable twice. 2) However, if he slaughters two offspring and then the mother, he has violated the prohibition only once, by slaughtering the mother. In other words, we don’t count his transgressions retroactively. 3) When he slaughters the mother, it is prohibited to slaughter its young. So when he slaughters the young, he is liable for forty lashes. When he slaughters the offspring of the young, he has violated the prohibition again, and is liable for another forty lashes (ouch!) 4) If after slaughtering the mother, he first slaughters the offspring of the mother’s offspring (the third generation), and then the mother’s own offspring, according to the first opinion, he has only transgressed once. Slaughtering the third generation was not prohibited at the time that he slaughtered it. And although slaughtering the second generation violated two prohibitions, for it is the mother of the third generation and the child of the first generation, one can be liable only once for each animal. Rabbi Meir holds that he is liable twice, even though he slaughtered only one prohibited animal, since that one animal was prohibited in two different ways.

ונתנבלה בידו – inadvertently–unknowingly.

At four periods in the year he who sells a beast to another must inform him, “I sold today its mother to be slaughtered,” or “I sold today its young to be slaughtered,” and these are they: on the eve of the last day of the feast [of Sukkot], on the eve of the first day of Pesah, on the eve of Shavuot, and on the eve of Rosh Hashanah. According to Rabbi Yose the Galilean, also on the eve of Yom Kippur, in the Galilee. Rabbi Judah says, this is so, only when there was no time in between the sales, but if there was time, he need not inform him. Rabbi Judah agrees that if he sold the mother to the bridegroom and the young to the bride, he must inform them of it, for it is certain that they will each slaughter on the same day. When a merchant sells an animal and then sells its mother/offspring to different customers there might be a concern that the two people will slaughter the animals on the same day and thereby unwittingly the prohibition of “it and its son.” This will only be a concern if it is anticipated that a person who buys an animal will slaughter it on that very day. The mishnah informs us that this is a strong possibility four times a year, the four times when people ate the most meat. The four times are as follows: 1) Before the last day of Sukkot, which we call Shemini Atzeret. Interestingly, people seem to have eaten more meat on the last day of Sukkot then on the first day. This might be connected with Simchat Bet Hashoevah, the celebration described in the end of tractate Sukkah. 2) Before the first day of Pesah. People would have eaten meat for the Pesah meal (the seder) both before and after the destruction of the Temple. 3) Before Shavuot. 4) Before Rosh Hashanah. Rabbi Yose the Galilean notes that in the Galilee the same rule would hold the day before Yom Kippur. In the Galilee they ate large meat meals before the onset of the fast. Rabbi Judah limits the law to a case where there was not a day separating the sale of the mother and its young. If there was a day separating the sales, then the seller need not inform him. According to Rabbi Judah, two different buyers buying on two different days are not likely to slaughter on the same day. There is a case where Rabbi Judah agrees that even if the sales occur on two different days, the seller must inform the purchasers. If a bride and bridegroom buy a mother and its young, he must inform them, because it is clear that they will be slaughtered on the same day.

והנוחר – inserting the knife in its nostrils and cuts [the windpipe].

והמעקר – tearing loose the windpipe and gullet from the place where they are attached and he doesn’t slaughter them.

פטור – and even according to the Rabbis. But it is not similar to ritual slaughter of above, for there, it is an appropriate ritual slaughter, and another things causes it to be invalidated, but here, there isn’t ritual slaughter at all.

איזה שלקח ראשון ישחוט ראשון – if they came to the Jewish court, he who came first to slaughter and his fellow detains him and says: “I need it more than you,” we say to them, that the first purchaser should סperson and he detained for himself, the [original] purchaser would slaughter it. For such we taught in the Tosefta (Hullin, Chapter 5, Halakha 5), that he who purposes it from the owner, he precedes the owner, for on that account, he purchased it.

ואם קדם השני זכה – that he advanced himself in order that he not come to a prohibition, and he has the interval that he eats meat today.

סופג שמונים – for on every male offspring that he slaughters, he transgresses a negative commandment.

סופג את ארבעים – for there isn’t here a forbidden slaughtering other than one.

שחטה ואת בתה ואח"כ את בת בתה – there are two [violations] of “an animal and its young.”

שחטה ואת בת בתה – there is [not] yet here a prohibition. ואח"כ שחט את בתה – and there is in this slaughtering two prohibitions, “an animal and its young” because of its mother,” and an offspring and it because of its female offspring of that which has already been slaughtered.

סופג ארבעים – it is one negative commandment ‘violated] and one warning and one deed.

סומכוס אומר סופג שמונים – for Sumachos holds that he is liable for one warning and with one negative commandment, two [punishments of] stripes. And the same law applies with the first clause [of the Mishnah] which teaches that if he slaughtered its two offspring and afterwards slaughtered her (i.e., the mother), he receives forty (actually thirty-nine) lashes. According to Sumachos, he receives eighty lashes. Such it is in the Tosefta (Hullin, Chapter 5, Halakha 7), if he slaughters her five offspring and afterwards slaughter it (i.e., the mother), Sumachos states in the name of Rabbi Meir that he is liable because of [the violation] of five negative commandments.

בארבעה פרים בשנה – it is the manner of Israel to make meals on these four seasons [of the year], for a person who simply purchases an animal does not purchase it other than to slaughter it immediately, therefore, a person who sells an animal to his fellow and he sells first its mother or its female offspring on that selfsame day, he must state to the second [person]: “Know for yourself that I sold its mother for slaughter” or “I sold its female offspring for slaughter” lest it was already slaughtered.

ביום טוב האחרון של חג – they would increase in joy because it is a festival of its own and was beloved to them. And this did not consider the eve of the first day of the Festival, because the entire world is preoccupied with [the building of] the Sukkah and [acquiring] a Lulav [and Etrog], and they don’t have free time to make a large slaughtering.

אף ערבי יום הכיפורים בגלילי – but not in Judea and not in the rest of the lands, for they would not eat on the Eve of Yom Kippur anything other than meat, children and–or fish as is proven in Bereshit Rabbah, regarding a particular tailor who sold a fish.

בזמן שאין לו ריוח – interruption between them, that he sold the mother [animal] today.

אבל יש לו ריוח – that he sold the first yesterday and the second today.

אין צריך להודיעו – for I say: “Yesterday, I slaughtered it first.” Another explanation: At the time when he doesn’t have space of time that he is in haste and hurries to purchase that shows that he wants to slaughter today. But if he has a space of time that he is not in haste to purchase it, he is not required to inform him, for lest it was for the need of another day that he purchases it. But Rabbi Yehuda, he comes to explain the matter of the first Tanna–teacher and not to dispute it.

ומודה ר' יהודה – even hough that he purchased this [animal] today and that [animal] on the morrow, And regarding the second explanation, even though he is not in haste and hurried to purchase.

את האם לחת ואת הבת לכלה – it is a usual incident, for it is the custom of the world to make a large meal at the house of the groom from the house of the bride; therefore, the mother fo the grow who is larger, and the offspring which is smaller to the bride.

He slaughters the meat against his will: That if he accepts a Dinar from the buyer, he gives him a Dinar's worth of meat.

Introduction This mishnah is a continuation of the end of yesterday’s mishnah, where we learned that there were four periods of the year when people ate more meat. This mishnah teaches us another ramification of the fact that there were four major times to eat meat during the year.

..

At these four periods a butcher can be compelled to slaughter against his will. Even if the ox was worth a thousand dinars and the purchaser has only [paid] a dinar, they can force the butcher to slaughter it. At these four times of the year (see yesterday’s mishnah for the list) a butcher can be compelled to slaughter an animal and sell the meat. This is so even if the ox to be slaughtered is worth a tremendous amount and there is only one person who wants to buy a small amount of meat. In other words, it is so important that there be meat available to celebrate these occasions, that the halakhah forces the butcher to slaughter and sell, even if he risks a loss.

לפיכך אם מת מת ללוקח – And he loses his Denar, for it died when it was in his domain–possession.

Therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the purchaser. At these four times, the butcher had no choice but to sell and once he agreed to sell the meat, he could not change his mind. Therefore, if the animal should die before the buyer receives his meat, the buyer loses his one denar.

אינו כן – for we require “pulling” and all the while that he didn’t “pull,” the butcher can retract.

At other times of the year it is not so, therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the seller. At other times of the year, the law is exactly the opposite. First of all, the butcher is not compelled to sell. Second, he can retract the sale so long as the purchaser has not received the meat (this is the typical law with regard to sales). If he sees that there are not enough people interested in buying the meat, he can simply decide not to slaughter. The animal is fully his until it is given over. Therefore, if someone has already paid for the meat, but the animal dies before it is slaughtered, the butcher must return the money.

יום אחד האמור באותו ואת בנו כו' – because the portion of “the animal and its young” (Leviticus 22:28) is adjacent to the sacrifice, and it is written (Leviticus 22:27): “[ad from the eighth day on] it shall be acceptable as a gift to [the LORD],” and adjacent to it, “the animal and its young” (Leviticus 22:28). But with Holy Things, the night follows after the day, as it is written (Leviticus 7:15): “[And the flesh of his thanksgiving sacrifice of well-being] shall be eaten on the day that it is offered; none of it shall be set aside until morning.” So we see that the night that is after it is called the “on the day...until morning.” It is possible that even this is the case [it is stated here, “one day”] and it is stated in the Creation story (Genesis 1:5): “[And there was evening and there was morning] the first day.”

The “one day” mentioned in connection with the law of “it and its young” means the day and the night preceding it.
This was how Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma expounded (: it says “one day” (Genesis 1:5) in connection with the creation and it also says “one day” (Leviticus 22:28) in connection with “it and its young” Just as the “one day” mentioned in connection with the creation means the day and the night preceding it, so too the “one day” mentioned in connection with “it and its young” means the day and the night preceding it.
This mishnah, which I shall explain here and not below, teaches that when we reckon the day on which an animal was slaughtered, the night goes with the day that follows it. Thus if he slaughtered one animal at night and then the following day he slaughtered its mother or offspring, he has violated the law of “it and its young.” But if he slaughters an animal during the day and then the following night he slaughters its mother or young, he has not violated the law.
The basis for this law are the verses from Genesis 1 that state, “and it was evening and it was morning, the first day,” and so on for each day. These verses imply, to the rabbis, that the day begins with the preceding night. And since the words “one day” are used in the context of creation and in the context of the law concerning “it and its young,” the day is reckoned in the same way for each.