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ורבי אליעזר פוסל – if the animal belongs to a heathen. For even though it is a Jew who is performing the slaughtering, it benefits the thought-processes of the heathen, since the unexpressed thought of the heathen is directed to idolatry.

Introduction In our mishnah the sages debate whether an animal slaughtered on behalf of a non-Jew can be eaten by a Jew. The fear is that the animal was slaughtered as an idolatrous sacrifice and hence is prohibited.

חצר כבד – the large lobe of the liver

If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. The first opinion in the mishnah holds that an animal slaughtered for a non-Jew is valid. Rabbi Eliezer holds that even if the animal was slaughtered mostly for a Jew’s consumption and only a small part was meant for a non-Jew, the animal is still invalid because we can assume that the non-Jew intended to use it for idolatrous purposes. We see here that Rabbi Eliezer was very strict on relations between non-Jews and Jews because of the ever present fear of idolatry.

אמר רבי יוסי קל וחומר – Since there is no benefit for the thought-processes of its owner, since a Jew performs the slaughter.

Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters! Rabbi Yose makes a kal vehomer (a fortiori) argument that this animal should be permitted. When it comes to sacrificial animals, an invalid intention can render the animal invalid, as we learned in Zevahim, chapter two. For instance, if the priest slaughters the animal in order to eat it after the time when it may be eaten or outside of the place where it may be eaten, the sacrifice is invalid. Nevertheless, when it comes to sacrifices we only take into consideration the intention of the slaughterer, and not the owner of the sacrifice. The same therefore should be true when it comes to non-sacrificial animals, whose laws are less strict. We should only care about the intention of the slaughterer, in this case a Jew, and not the non-Jew for whom he was slaughtering the animal.

ומה במקום שמחשבה פוסלת – that is, with regard to Holy things, as it states (Leviticus 7:18): “[If any of the flesh of his sacrifice of well-being is eaten on the third day, it shall not be acceptable;] it shall not count for him who offered it. It is an offensive thing [and the person who eats of it shall bear his guilt”]. It [the Biblical verse] is read “he shall not think” -that is to say, he should not think about eating it outside of the appropriate time since it will be a rejected sacrifice in consequence of an improper intention in the mind of the officiating priest.

אין הכל הולך אלא אחר העובד – as it is written (Leviticus 7:18) “it shall not count for him who offered it” – but the owners are not invalidated by their thoughts for the individual who offers it is the priest.

מקום שאין המחשבה פוסלת – The Gemara (Hullin 39b) explains our Mishnah in that it should [understood] in this manner: just as thought-processes invalidate [something offered] in Holy matters through four forms of service, everything follows only [the thought-patterns of] the individual worshipper. Whereas concerning Hullin–ordinary meat, thought-processes only invalidate in two areas, does it not follow that everything follows after [the thought-processes of] the ritual slaughterer? In the place where thought-processes invalidate those sacrifices offered in the realm of the holy things with regard to four acts of divine worship: ritual slaughter, reception of the blood, sprinkling of the blood and the carrying of the portions of the sacrifice to the altar ascent, on which of these that he thought that on the condition that he would eat from the sacrifice at an inappropriate time, does it make the sacrifice rejected in consequence of an improper intention in the mind of the officiating priest? But even though there is this stringency, the thought-processes only follow after the individual worshipper. Regarding Hullin–ordinary meat, in the matter of idolatry, thought-processes do not invalidate in four aspects of worship but rather in only two: in slaughter and in sprinkling [of the blood]. And regarding these, it is written [in these verses] (Exodus chapter 22, verse 19): “Whoever sacrifices to a god [other than the LORD alone shall be proscribed]” [and] (Psalms 16 verse 4): “I will have no part of their bloody libations; [their names will not pass my lips].” But reception of the blood and the carrying of the portions of the sacrifice to the altar ascent are not written–mentioned in these verses. But burning on the altar, even though it is connected to idolatry, it is, however, not worship to lose an animal because of the burning of its fats on the altar for idolatrous worship where it is not slaughtered and where its blood is not sprinkled for idolatrous purposes, for even inside, the sacrifice is not invalidated if he thought about the eating of meat at the time of the burning of the fats, and since we found a leniency in thought-processes outside [the altar], it is the law that we can be lenient in this and that the matter will not be dependent upon anyone other than the actual slaughterer. And the Halakha follows [the opinion] of Rabbi Yosi.