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השג יד-בנודר (the law regulating the payment of certain vows according to one’s means – Leviticus 27:8) -the teaching of the law regulating the payment of certain vows according to one’s means, that the poor person is judged in Valuation according to his means/wealth, for we follow after the person making the vow, and not after the person about whom the vow is taken, as will be explained further on (see Mishnah 4 of this chapter) and as we learned in Tractate Arakhin, Chapter 2, Mishnah 1, the valuation is no less than a Sela).

The sufficiency of means is according to the ability of the vower.
And the age is according to the subject of the vow.
The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation.
And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.
The sufficiency of means is according to the ability of the vower. How so? If a poor man evaluated a rich man, he pays only the valuation of a poor man. But if a rich man evaluated a poor man, he must pay the valuation of a rich man.
Our chapter provides several central rules as to how the amount paid for evaluations is determined. We should note that the literary structure of this chapter is the same as that of the previous chapter the first mishnah gives brief headlines that are further explicated in the rest of the chapter. Therefore, I will again leave the explanation of these headlines for subsequent mishnayot.
Section five: Leviticus 27:8 states, “But if one cannot afford the evaluation, he shall be presented before the priest and the priest shall assess him; the priest shall assess him according to what the vower can afford.” Our mishnah teaches that this is an assessment of the means of the person who made the vow, and not the person whose value was vowed. So if a poor person vows to give the value of a rich person he only pays the amount that a poor person could afford to pay. This estimate has nothing to do with the fact that the person being evaluated was rich. Conversely, if a rich person vows the value of a poor person, he must pay the full amount because he is rich. It does not matter at all that the person whose value he vowed is poor.

והשנים בנידר – a young child that made a valuation of the value of an old person gives the valuation of the old person, and we don’t follow after the years of the person who is making the vow. And the Tanna/teacher who calls the one dedicating the value of the person [or of an animal unfit for the altar] the one making a vow, as he took the language of Scripture, as it is written (Leviticus 27:8): “and the priest shall assess hm according to what the vower can afford.” And since it (i.e., the Mishnah) stated, “[the estimate of] ability to pay [is made in accordance with the status of] the one who vows, it (i.e., the Mishnah) also stated, [the estimate of the] the years [of age is made in accord with the status of] the one [whose Valuation] is vowed.

והערכים בנערך (the vows of value are regulated by the condition of the person whose value is vowed) - the determination of the valuation of a male and a female, we follow after that of the one who is the subject of Valuation, as it will be explained further on (see Mishnah 4 of this chapter).

והערך בזמן הערך – as it is explained further on (Mishnah 2), for if he made a valuation of himself when he was less than twenty-years of age, which is the valuation of a minor, and prior to his giving it, he was twenty-years of age, he does not give other than at the time of the valuation.

אומר אני אף בערכין כן – if it happens by chance, even with Valuations is similar to sacrifices, then it is like sacrifices, But it was stated [in this Mishnah] that Valuations are not like Sacrifices, because they are not similar one with the other, and for what reason does a poor person who dedicated the value of a rich person, gives the value of a poor person because of the law regarding the payment of certain vows according to one’s [own] means, because the rich person is not liable for anything, and not the monetary value of the Metzorah/leper. But this [individual] who spoke regarding the rich person, did not intend other than according to the measurement of the years of the rich individual which are less or more than his own years. Therefore, he is judged according to his own means/wealth, but the rich person who said: “My value is upon me,” that he is liable for a complete/full value, similar to the [wealthy] leper and the poor person heard it and said, “What that person that this upon me,” he gives the value of a rich person. This is the reading.

Introduction Our mishnah draws a distinction between one who makes a vow of evaluation and one who undertakes to bring someone else’s sacrifices. Whereas in the case of the former, the priest estimates the ability of the vower to pay his vow, in the case of sacrifices the priest estimates the financial ability of the person who was originally obligated to bring the sacrifice, and not the one who took on his obligation.

היה עני והעשיר או עשיר והעני משלם ערך עשיר – if he was poor and became rich prior to giving [the valuation money], he pays the value of a rich person, for the All-Merciful one said (Leviticus 27:8): “according to what the vower can afford,” for it is in regard to one’s wealth/means. Rich and the poor [alike] also according to one’s means of the person who vows, is written (see the verse mentioned above), for he had the means at the time that he made the vow.

But it is not so with sacrifices. The law with regard to one who vows to bring someone else’s sacrifice is different from the law regarding someone who vows to give someone else’s worth. The mishnah will now explain.

רבי יהודה אומר אפילו עני והעשיר וחזר והעני נותן ערך עשיר – as it is written (Leviticus 27:8): “But if one cannot afford the equivalent,” until it will be that he must have remained in his impoverished condition from the beginning to the end of the proceedings (see Talmud Arakhin 17b). But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Yehuda.

If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. The sacrifices that a metzora, one afflicted with skin disease, brings at the end of his affliction depend upon his financial means. If he is rich he brings the full array of sacrifices (see Leviticus 13) but if he is poor, he can bring fewer sacrifices. In this case, one person vowed to bring the sacrifices of another person who was becoming pure from being a metzora. The vower must bring whatever the metzora was obligated to bring. If the metzora was poor, the vower brings a poor person’s sacrifice, even if the vower himself was rich. Conversely, if the metzora was rich and the vower poor, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich person. In both cases, the obligation goes according to the metzora and not the one making the vow.

Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi says that he can find a situation involving evaluations where we go according to the one being evaluated. First of all, he notes that if a poor man vows the value of a rich man we of course have to go according to the poor man’s means, because the rich man didn’t do anything at all. It would make no sense to do otherwise. But if a rich man vowed his own value, and the poor man said that he wanted to vow what the rich man had already vowed, he must pay the same amount that the rich main vowed. Thus Rabbi has found a case where we go according to the one being evaluated, and not the vower.

If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If the person who made the vow was rich at the moment he vowed and then he became poor before he paid his debt, we estimate his financial ability as if he were rich, because his liability cannot go down over time. If he made the vow when he was poor and then became rich before he paid his vow, he again pays according to the means of a rich man. This is because at the time he pays his debt he is already of means, and why should he be allowed to pay any less. Rabbi Judah goes even further. Even if he was poor, then became rich and then became poor again (perhaps he jumped onto the dot-com bubble?) he pays according to the means of a rich person. Again we see that once the obligation is set, it can never be reduced, even though it can be increased.

אפילו אביו מת – at the time when this person is obligated for a sacrifice, his father is on his deathbed and about to die, and he (i.e., the father) died and he inherited from him ten-thousand before he brought his sacrifice, he does not bring anything other than the sacrifice of an impoverished person, just as he was at the time that he became obligated for a sacrifice.

Introduction In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that when a person vows another person’s value, whether he was rich at the time of the vow or at the time that he comes to pay his debt, he pays as a rich man. Our mishnah contrasts this with the laws of bringing a sacrifice.

ספינתו בים – not that his ship was lade from his business-dealings with ten-thousand, for if so, he is rich. But rather, that his ship was rented out to others with ten-thousand as payment, and he lacks anything in his hand other than that ship. But because of the payment, he is not rich, for the rent is not completely paid other than at the end, and it is found that now he is a poor person. But, because of the ship itself, he is a poor person, for this Tanna/teacher [of the Mishnah] holds like one who says further on (see Talmud Arakhin 17b-18a) that if the person making the Valuation was a donkey-driver, the Kohen gives him his donkey and he doesn’t give it to be dedicated to the Temple, but if he was a farmer, he leaves for him the yoke/pair of working animals tied to the yoke which is his income. And so too, he leaves him his ship.

But it is not so with sacrifices. When it comes to sacrifices, whether he was rich and became poor, or poor and became rich, he always brings the sacrifices according to his financial means at the time he is actually bringing them.

Even if his father was dying [when a man vowed] and left him ten thousand, or if he had a ship on the sea and it brought to him ten thousand, the sanctuary has no claim at all on them. This section relates a halakhah common to both evaluations and sacrifices. If a person has money coming to him, whether through an inheritance or from a boat that is bringing him a large delivery, we ignore his future imminent income and determine his means according to his current financial situation. So if a person is about to become rich, but is still technically poor, he pays his evaluation debt or brings his sacrifices as a poor man.

ילד – (who pledged the valuation of an elder) from age twenty until age sixty, for his value is fifty Shekel.

Introduction Today’s mishnah, the final mishnah of chapter four, explains the sections of mishnah one that have not yet been explained.

נותן כזמן הערך – as it is written (Leviticus 27:17): “[If he consecrates his land as of the jubilee year,] its assessment stands,” he does not give other than according to the time of the valuation.

“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The amount owed is reckoned according to the person whose value was vowed, and not according to the age of the vower.

יום שלשים כלמטה – if he stated that the valuation of so-and-so a minor child is upon me, and that minor was on that day was thirty [days old], it is like it is below that, and he did not say anything, for there is no valuation for less than a month [old], and thus it is written (Leviticus 27:6): “If the age is from one month [to five years, the equivalent for a male is five shekels of silver, and the equivalent for a female is three shekels of silver].”

The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. Similarly, the gender is determined by the one whose value is being vowed and not the gender of the vower.

מבן ששים שנה ומעלה – implying that the sixtieth year was completed, and then he is judged like someone sixty [years old], but in the sixtieth year, he is judged as a child.

“And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The value of a person is determined partly by age (and partly by gender). When we determine his age we determine it according to his/her age at the time the vow was made, and not at the time that the vow is paid off.

הן אם עשינו – in astonishment. Meaning to say, and if this the case, if we made the sixtieth [year] like it is lower than this to be stringent for a valuation of an adult one should lessen from athe age of sixty for fifty Sela, but for someone older than age sixty, it is not other than fifteen [Sela].

The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. The rest of the mishnah states that the day that someone reaches a certain age, thirty days, five years, twenty years or sixty years, is not yet counted with the older age. Thus a kid who just turns thirty days does not yet have any value (value begins at thirty days). A kid who just turned five, still counts as a kid between the age of thirty days and five years.

כלמטה ממנה להקל – that the valuation is more for someone who is twenty years old, an adult who is a less than twenty years, old, and similarly, with someone who is five [years old]. As it is written in Biblical verses.

For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. The mishnah proves that the day of the birthday counts with the lower age by quoting the verse concerning the sixty year old. Since the Torah says that he is above sixty years, the implication is that one who is exactly sixty years still pays the higher amount of a person from 20-60.

רבי אליעזר אומר (the foregoing applies so long as they are a month and a day more than the years [which are prescribed]) - Always the fifth year and the twentieth year and the sixtieth year are like less than that age. That we derive from an analogy comparing from the usage of the word "למעלה" and "למעלה". It is stated here (Leviticus 27:7): “If the age is sixty years or over/מבן-ששים שנה ומעלה, [the equivalent is fifteen shekels in the case of a male and ten shekels for a female],” and it is stated (Numbers 18:16): “Take as their redemption price from the age of one month up/ופדויו מבן חודש ומעלה [the money equivalent of five shekels by the sanctuary weight which is twenty gerahs],” just as there it is it is one month and one day, for a firstling is not redeemed any younger than from one month and one day, so even here, until he adds on to the sixty months and one day. And the fifth year and the twentieth year we derive from an analogy – שנה שנה /a year, a year (see the Mishnah), from the sixtieth year, as the first Tanna/teacher derives above, but the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Eliezer.

Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? The mishnah now critiques its own midrash. Treating a sixty year old as still belonging to the younger category creates a stringency his value is 50 and not 15. But treating a 5 year old or a 20 year in the younger category creates a leniency since the younger ages have lower values. The mishnah says that just because we treat a sixty year old as being in the younger category does not mean that we would necessarily treat 5 and 20 year olds as being in the younger category.

Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. The mishnah now brings another midrash to defend the halakhah that we always treat a person on the day of the birthday as if he still belongs to the previous age category. This is done with a technique called a “gezerah shavah”. What this technique consists of is taking a law from one situation and applying it to another because the Torah uses the same word in both situations. In our case the word is “years” and it is used in connection to one who turns 60 and one who turns 5 and 20. Since it is used in both connections, the same halakhah applies to both.

Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year. Rabbi Elazar extends the halakhah even further. A person doesn’t enter the new category until he is one month and one day into that category. For instance, one who is 60 doesn’t go down in value to 15 shekels until he is 60, one month and one day.