Comentário sobre Shevuot 4:15

שבועות העדות נוהגת באנשים ולא בנשים – as it is written (Leviticus 5:1): “[If a person incurs guilt—when he heard a public imprecation and -] although able to testify [as one who has either seen or learned of the matter- he does not give information, so that he is subject to punishment],” the Biblical verse speaks of one who is fit to give testimony, as it is written (Deuteronomy 19:17): “the two parties to the dispute/ועמדו שני האנשים (literally, the two men)[shall appear before the LORD],” men and not women. And this Biblical verse is written [concerning] witnesses; It is stated here, “two” and it is stated above “two” (Deuteronomy 17:6): “[A person shall be put to death only on] the testimony of two or [more] witnesses; he must not be put to death on the testimony of a single witness].”

Introduction Leviticus 5:1 states, “If a person incurs guilt, when he has heard a public imprecation and although able to testify as one who has seen or learned of the matter he does not give information, so that he is subject to punishment.” In simple English this verse refers to one who has sworn that he does not know information regarding another person’s case in court. The Mishnah refers to this as an oath of testimony. Our entire chapter discusses the rules and regulations of this type of oath. The mishnah which we learn today and the one we will learn tomorrow serve as a contrast to the last two mishnayoth of chapter three, which discussed oaths of utterance and vain oaths.

ולא בקרובין – for they are unfit/disqualified to provide testimony , as it is written (Deuteronomy 24:16): “Parents shall not be put to death for children, [nor children be put to death for parents],” with the testimony of children, and the same law applies to other relatives.

The oath of testimony applies to men and not to women, to non-relatives and not to relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and not to those unqualified. And it applies only to those eligible to bear witness. The oath of testimony only applies to those who are allowed to testify. In other words, if a person adjures another person to testify on his behalf, and they know testimony, and they are qualified to testify, and they swear that they do not know any information, then these witnesses have made a false oath of testimony. If they were not qualified to testify then they have not made a false oath of testimony, even if they knew information. Therefore the rules of oaths of testimony do not apply to women, to relatives or to otherwise unqualified individuals (see Sanhedrin 3:3-4). In the last clause of this mishnah it is not entirely clear to whom the mishnah refers when it states that the oath of testimony applies only to those qualified to testify. The Talmud interprets this clause to mean the King, who according to Sanhedrin 2:2 does not testify.

ולא בפסולים – as, for example, those who are liable for death and/or liable for stripes and the thief, for they are called wicked, and the Torah stated (Exodus 23:1): “you shall not join hands with the guilty [to act as a malicious witness].”

Whether [uttered] in front of the court or not in front of the court, if [uttered] with his own mouth; [but if adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “Whether [uttered] with his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court.” According to Rabbi Meir, when an oath of testimony is sworn by the witness himself it can be done either before or not before a court However, if the litigant adjures the witness to take an oath, then the witness is not obligated for making a false oath of testimony unless he denies knowing information while in front of the court. The Sages say that in both the case of a witness swearing on his own and the case of the litigant adjuring the witness, the witness is not liable until he denies knowing information in front of a court. One who swears a false testimony while not in front of the court is not liable.

ואינה נוהגת אלא בראויין להעיד – to exclude the king who does not testify (see Tractate Sanhedrin, Chapter 2, Mishnah 2) , and those who are unfit/disqualified from giving testimony according to the Rabbis such as those who are dice players and pigeon racers (see Tractate Sanhedrin, Chapter 3, Mishnah 3 and Tractate Rosh Hashanah, Chapter 1, Mishnah 8).

Questions for Further Thought:
• Why does Rabbi Meir require denial in front of the court in a case where the litigant adjured the witness but not in a case where the witness himself swore? Why do the Sages always require denial in front of a court?

בפני בית דין ושלא בפני בית דין מפי עצמו (out of his own mouth)- if it is from his own mouth that he swore an oath that I don’t know any testimony concerning you, he is liable, whether he took at oath before a court or not before a court.

ומפי אחרים (or from the mouth of others) – as, for example, I adjure you that you should come and testify against me , and they said to him: We don’t know any testimony in your case.

אינם חייבין עד שיכפרו בית דין (when they have denied -their knowledge – in court) – as it is written (Leviticus 5:1): “he does not give information, so that he is subject o punishment,” in a place where he would state it would have effect, but the Biblical verse is written concerning one who is sworn on other people’s demands (as a supposed witness that claims ignorance).

וחייבין – a sliding-scale offering (this offering is made when there are one of three transgressions where the financial situation of the sinner is taken into account in determining the nature of the sin-offering that he brings: violating an oath, taking a false oath to avoid giving testimony and entering the Temple or partaking of sacrifices while ritually impure. The sinner generally brings a sin-offering of a female lamb or goat, but if he cannot afford it, he may instead bring a pair of doves, one as burnt offering and the other as a sin-offering or a if he cannot afford even that, he may instead bring a meal-offering).

And they are liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of knowledge of] testimony, but they are not liable for unintentional transgression.
And what are they liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A sliding scale sacrifice.
This mishnah continues the lists we have seen in the previous three mishnayoth.
There are two elements to the false oath of testimony: 1) knowing information and intentionally withholding it; 2) intentionally swearing falsely that one does not know the information. The mishnah teaches that if the witnesses intentionally deny knowledge of the testimony, even if they don’t realize that swearing falsely is forbidden, they are liable for intentionally swearing falsely. However, if they don’t realize that they know information then they are not liable, since this was a totally unintentional transgression. In other words, there punishment hinges upon their intentional denial of knowledge of information. If they intentionally withheld information and swore to it, then they are liable to bring a sliding scale sacrifice, as described in Leviticus 5:5-13.

על זדון השבועה – for it did not state concerning it "ונעלם" /that he concealed or hid one’s self.

ועל שגגתה עם זדון העדות – that they known that the this oath was forbidden but they did not know that they are liable for a sacrifice for it.

ואין חייבים על שגגתה – if they are completely in error inadvertently, for they were forced, we don’t call them "ונשבע על השקר"/that they swore falsely.

ובאו לבית דין והודו פטורים – and even if they denied [that they had testimony about so-and-so] outside of the Jewish court on each oath for no denial outside the Jewish court is considered denial.

Introduction The first half of mishnah three explains how an oath of testimony is done. The second half of the mishnah discusses a witness who falsely swears five times that he had no knowledge of testimony.

כפרו בב"ד חייבין על כל אחת ואחת – as the Biblical verse states (Leviticus 5:5): “When he realizes his guilt in any of these matters,[he shall confess that wherein he has sinned],” to be liable for each and every one.

The oath of testimony: How is it done? If he said to two [persons]: “Come and bear testimony for me”; [and they replied:] “We swear we know no testimony for you”; Or they said to him: “We know no testimony for you”, [and he said:] “I adjure you” and they said, “Amen! “, they are liable. An oath of testimony can be done in one of two ways. The first way is for the litigant to ask the witnesses to come and testify on his behalf and for them to swear that they have no knowledge of testimony. Alternatively the witnesses can state that they know no testimony and the litigant can adjure them that they know no testimony. If they answer amen, they have sworn an oath of testimony. If they have sworn falsely they are liable.

מה טעם – that they are not liable other than for one [sacrifice] even if they were silent and denied [their knowing anything] at the end, and we don’t say that a denial exists for all of them to make them liable for each and every one (i.e., testimony).

If he adjured them five times outside the court, and the they came to the court and admitted [knowledge of testimony], they are exempt. If they denied, they are liable for each [oath]. If he adjured them five times before the court, and they denied [knowledge of testimony], they are liable only once. Said Rabbi Shimon: “What is the reason? Because they cannot afterwards admit [knowledge]. This section discusses a case where a litigant adjured the witnesses five times. The mishnah asks the question, in what case will they be liable for having sworn falsely five times, in what case they will be liable for having sworn falsely once and in what case will they be exempt. If, he adjured them outside of the court, and then when they came to court they admitted that they knew testimony, they are not liable. As we learned in mishnah one, the denial of knowledge must occur in front of the court. If, after having adjured them five times they come to court and continue to deny knowledge, then they are liable for having sworn five false oaths of testimony. The denial at court makes each oath outside of court a potentially effective oath, and therefore if it was false, it causes them to be liable. If he adjured them five times in front of the court and they denied knowledge each time, they will be liable for having sworn only one false oath. Rabbi Shimon explains that since after the first denial in front of the court they will not be able to change their minds, the subsequent oaths were meaningless. Once a person has in court denied knowing testimony he cannot change his mind and testify. Since, except for the first oath, the other oaths were meaningless, he can only be liable for one false oath.

הואיל – but whereas if they denied in the Jewish court the first time, they would not be able to retract and confess, for they already stated that they don’t know any testimony about him, and furthermore, they do not retract and state [testimony]; therefore, even though that they didn’t deny [knowing anything about so-and-so] until the end, all of the oaths were abrogated, except for the first one. For he fact that they were silent initially is denial, they are not worthy to be made to take an oath and if it is not denial, they are sworn in as standing witnesses. And what is an oath upon an oath? By force, when it is written (in Leviticus 5:5): “in any of these matters” – to be liable for each and every one, referring to an oath taken outside the Jewish court and they denied it in the Jewish court as it is written [in Scripture] that he would administer an oath to them when they would come to the Jewish court and they would testify and they would not leave in idleness, and it is appropriate for them to divide if they denied there at first, it would be appropriate to retract and to administer to them an oath.

כפרו שניהם כאחת – in an interval equivalent to the time of speaking (“Greetings to you, My teacher.”).

Introduction Mishnah four discusses how many of the witnesses deny knowledge such that they become liable for swearing a false oath of testimony.

בזה אחר זה – that there was between [the testimony of] this one and [the testimony of] that one more than an interval equivalent to the time of speaking.

In order to understand this mishnah it is important to remember that in Jewish law two witnesses are needed to prove a case. A single witness’s testimony is not acceptable in court.

הראשון חייב – but the second is exempt, for since the first one denied, the second one is furthermore not appropriate to testify because he is an individual (and testimony requires two or more individuals).

If both [persons] denied [knowledge] together, they are both liable. If both witnesses deny knowledge at the same time then they are both liable for false oaths. Since they both equally have caused the litigant to lose his case, they are both liable.

שתיהן חייבות – in the Gemara (Tractate Shevuot 32b-33a) raises the objection – why is the first [set of witnesses] liable, for the second set [of witnesses] exists? For what have the first [set of witnesses] lost through their denial? And it answers that that the our Mishnah is speaking about q case where the witnesses of the second group were related through their wives (see Rashi’s comment: they married two sisters and are not valid as a singular testimony, and they were not valid to testify when the first set [of witnesses] denied [that they knew anything to testify] and their wives were on their deathbeds, for you might have thought that we hold that most people on their deathbeds will die, it was for them as if they [i.e., their wives) had died and the first set [of witnesses] were exempt but the second set exists. It comes to tell us now however that he is not dead. But it is found that only the first set [of witnesses] alone was there at the time of the denial, and therefore, they are liable.

If one after another, the first is liable, and the second exempt. If one denies knowing testimony and then the second witness also denies, the first witness is liable and the second is not. Since, when the second witness was asked to testify, the only other witness had already sworn that he had no knowledge, the second person’s testimony would not have been accepted in any case. In other words, by denying knowledge he did not cause any loss to the litigant, and he is therefore not liable.

If one denied, and the other admitted, the one who denied is liable. If one person denies knowledge and the other person admits to knowing testimony, the first person is liable since he caused the litigant to lose his case. If he had admitted, there would have been the sufficient two to prove the case.

If there were two sets of witnesses, and the first denied, and then the second denied, they are both liable, because the testimony could be upheld by [either of] the two. If two sets of two witnesses deny knowledge, one after the other, both sets, meaning all four witnesses, are liable. Since the testimony could have been established by either set of witnesses, they have all caused a loss to the litigant by denying knowledge, and they are therefore, all liable.

Questions for Further Thought:
• What is the difference between the scenario in section two and the scenario in section four?

תשומת יד – a loan, that he placed money in his hand.

Introduction Mishnah five discusses combining several oaths into one oath or separating one oath into several oaths.

“I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that there are of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know not that there are of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”, they are liable for each one. In the scenario in this section a person adjures witnesses to testify that another person has in his possession a deposit, a loan, a stolen object and a lost object that belong to him (the first person). If the witnesses swear falsely that they know no testimony, they are only obligated for having sworn one false oath of testimony. Since they made only one oath they can be obligated only once. If however, they swear four different oaths, by separately mentioning the deposit, loan, stolen object and lost object, then they are obligated for four false oaths. Since they separated their response into four details they have sworn four oaths and they are obligated for each one.

חטין ושעורין וכוסמין – the first clause [of the Mishnah] teaches us of one species and disputed claims, and the concluding clause [of the Mishnah] teaches us of one claim all of them are deposits, and disputed species.

“I adjure you that you bear testimony for me that there is of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know no testimony for you that there is of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”, they are liable for each one. The scenario in this section is similar to the scenario in the previous section. The only difference is that here at issue are three different kinds of grain. Again, if the witnesses combine their denial into one oath, then they are obligated only once. If they separate the oath into three different details they will be obligated for each detail.

Questions for Further Thought:
Why does the mishnah need to teach section two after having already taught section one? Would you have been able to learn the ruling with regards to section two from having known only section one?

נזק וחצי נזק – with one-half indirect damages [caused by an animal: e.g., inadvertently kicking up pebbles or clods of earth in the course of walking causing damage) that is a due indemnity but not a fine/penalty, for we state in testimony of a fine/penalty that we don’t obligate.

Introduction Mishnah six defines a false oath of testimony as denying testimony that would have aided the litigant in a monetary suit.

תשלומי כפל ושומי ארבעה וחמשה – because of the principal.

All of the cases mentioned in our mishnah are cases where a person is adjuring witnesses to testify for him in a monetary suit. In mishnah seven we will learn examples of testimony in non-monetary suits. Together these two mishnayoth teach that if a person swears a false oath of testimony in a monetary suit he is liable, but if he swears a false oath of testimony in a non-monetary suit he is not liable.

ושאנס איש פלוני ופיתה את בתי – because of humiliation and deterioration, that is monetary.

“I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that so-and-so owes me full damages, or half damages, or double payment, or four or five payment; Half-damages are paid in cases where an animal damages in an unusual fashion, and it has not previously done so three times. Full damages are paid in all other cases. Double payment refers to a thief’s obligation to pay back double the theft. Four and five times payment is what a thief must restore if he sold or slaughtered the stolen animal.

ושהכני בני – a striking/beating which causes no wound for which he is not liable of the death [penalty] for it, and because there isn’t death, there is a monetary [fine].

Or that so-and-so raped my daughter, or seduced my daughter; One of the penalties for rape and seduction of a virgin is a fine to the father of the girl.

ושחבל בי חברי ביוה"כ – [and the Mishnah] took that [example] for even though it is punishable with extirpation, he is liable for a monetary [paymenbt].

Or that my son struck me; Striking one’s parent and not causing a wound is punishable by a financial penalty, as are all cases of personal injury. In mishnah seven this will be contrasted with striking one’s parent and causing a wound, which is punishable by death.

Or that my neighbor injured me, or set fire to my haystack on the Day of Atonement”; [And they deny knowledge of testimony] they are liable. Injuring another person and causing a wound or burning their haystack on the Day of Atonement is punishable by kareth (excommunication) and a financial penalty. In mishnah seven we will learn that doing either of these two things on the Sabbath is punishable by death. As we shall learn there, there is a general rule in Jewish law that if a person does one action for which he is liable to pay money and to be executed he is executed and does not owe money (see Bava Kamma 8:5). However, if by one action he is liable for kareth and to pay money, he gets kareth and still has to pay the money (see Bava Kamma 8:3).

שאני כהן – they are exempt, for witnesses are not liable other than when they denied in a mater where there is the claim of money.

Introduction Mishnah seven lists cases where although the person falsely testifies, since the case did not concern money, he is not guilty of a false oath of testimony.

שאנס איש פלוני או פיתה בתו של פלוני – “and his daughter” is taught, regarding a certain individual who is a Kohen who is referred to above, [that is taught above this in the Mishnah that it refers to that a certain individual is a Kohen or a Levite, or is not the son of a divorced woman], or that he made them take an oath that a certain individual raped his daughter of that that same individual that they were speaking of him until now, they are exempt, for we require that they should hear from the mouth of the one making the claim. And in the Gemara (Tractate Shevuot 33b) it establishes it when he comes before the court with a power of attorney, for if it is the monetary claim of another [person], they would be liable, and I comes to tell us that it is not considered the inheritance of the litigant in this like the rest of money [matters], for since it is a monetary [matter] that he is asking about, it never reached his hand at all, he is not able to write a power of attorney upon it.

This mishnah is a contrast to mishnah six. In it a person adjures witnesses to testify in non-monetary cases, or at least in cases in which the one adjuring does not stand to gain money by the testimony.

ושחבל בי בני – injury/mayhem is wounding, they are exempt, for if they testified against him, he would be liable for death and not monetary [restitution].

"I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that I am a priest, or, that I am a levite, or, that I am not the son of a divorced woman, or, that I am not the son of a halutzah; That so-and-so is a priest, or, that so-and-so is a levite, or, that he is not the son of a divorced woman, or, that he is not the son of a halutzah; In all of these cases the testimony is about the status of either the person who adjures the witnesses or about a third party. There is no monetary suit. The son of priest and divorcee or a priest and a halutzah (one rejected by the levir) are considered disqualified priests and they do not retain their priestly status.

ושחבל בי חברי ושהדלק את גדישי בשבת – for both of them are liable for death, and exempt from monetary [restitution].

That so-and-so violated his daughter, or seduced his daughter; A person who rapes or seduces his own daughter is liable for the death penalty and not for a fine, as is one who rapes or seduces another person's daughter.

That my son injured me; A child who strikes his parent and inflicts a wound is liable for the death penalty. Since he will be executed he is exempt from paying a financial penalty, and therefore this case is not a monetary suit.

That my neighbor injured me, or set fire to my haystack on the Sabbath" [And they deny knowledge of testimony] they are exempt. One who injures another person on the Sabbath or burns a haystack is liable for the death penalty. Although these cases also involve financial damage, since a person cannot be obligated for death and payment for the same act, the criminal would be liable for death and not payment. This is not, therefore, a monetary suit.

Questions for Further Thought: Why might you have thought that these cases were monetary suits?

שאמר איש פלוני ליתן לי וכו' פטורים – as it is written regarding an oath of testimony (Leviticus 5:1): “[If a person] incurs guilt,” and it is written regarding the oath of a deposit (Leviticus 5:21): “When a person sins [and commits a trespass against the LORD by dealing deceiptfully with his fellow in the matter of a deposit or a pledge],” just as the oath of a deposit is on the claim of money that he has against his neighbor, also the oath of testimony – there must be on the claim of money that he has has of his, and the individual who claims that a certain person said to give me two-hundred zuz is not a monetary claim that he has against his fellow, for even if it is according to his words that his fellow said to him to give him two hundred zuz, his fellow is not liable to him athing on account of this statement.

Introduction This mishnah discusses one who gives falsely swears about money that one person promised to give to another.

[If a man said,] “I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that so-and-so promised to give me two hundred zuz, and did not give me”, they are exempt, for they are liable only for a money claim as [in the case of] deposit. The oath of testimony is discussed in Leviticus 5:1. Leviticus 5:21 discusses an oath a person makes to deny having received a deposit, a loan, found a lost object or a stolen an object. The similarity in the language between these two verses led the Rabbis to conclude that although not mentioned specifically in verse 5:1 it is similar to 5:21 as it also concerns things similar to deposit. Therefore, in order for the witnesses to be liable for a false oath of testimony they must deny knowledge of a case that is similar to the case of a deposit, where one person claims he deposited money with another. If the case is one of a monetary promise, such as our mishnah, the false oath does not make the witnesses liable.

מפני שקדמה שבועה לדעות – for the All-Merciful (I.e., God) said (Leviticus 5:1): “When he has heard a public imprecation (against one who withholds testimony) and- although able to testify as one who has either seen or heard of he matter – [he does not give information, so that he is subject to punishment],” for the testimony preceded the oath and the oath did not precede the testimony.

Introduction The mishnah continues to discuss cases that are not technically considered false oaths of testimony.

“I adjure you that, when you know any testimony for me, you should come and bear testimony for me,” they are exempt, because the oath preceded the testimony. This mishnah teaches that the testimony must precede the oath. A person may not in advance adjure witnesses that if they, in the future know any testimony for him, that they must come and testify. The order of the verbs in Leviticus 5:1 also points to the fact that the testimony must precede the oath.

/אם יודעים לי עדות וכו' פטורין – as it is written (Leviticus 5:1): “although able to testify” util he specifies his witnesses.

[If] he stood in the synagogue and said, “I adjure you that if you know any testimony for me you should come and bear testimony for me”, they are exempt unless he directs himself to them. If the litigant stood in a public place and adjured a large, unspecified crowd of people that they should testify for him, and they all swore that they knew no testimony, the ones who did in fact know testimony are nevertheless exempt. The mishnah teaches that the litigant must specify exactly who he is adjuring. When learning this mishnah we must remember that people who witness an event have a religious duty to testify, regardless of whether the litigant adjures them or not. Our mishnah merely teaches that they have not sworn a false oath unless specifically adjured.

הם יודים לו דות ד מפי ד וכו' פטורים – for if they testified about him, their testimony would not be worth him anything.

If he said to two [persons]: “I adjure you, so-and-so and so-and-so, that if you know any testimony for me you should come and bear testimony for me”: [And they replied,] “We swear we know no testimony for you”, and they did know testimony for him, [but it was evidence of] one witness from the mouth of another witness; or if one of them was a relative or [otherwise] ineligible [as a witness], they are exempt. This mishnah teaches that if the witnesses who swore that they do not know testimony did know testimony but that the testimony would not have been accepted in the court, they are exempt for having sworn falsely. The reasons that their testimony might not have been accepted are: 1) the testimony was hearsay (see Sanhedrin 4:5); 2) they were related to one of the litigants (see mishnah one of this chapter); 3) they were otherwise unfit to testify (ibid.). Since their testimony would not have been sufficient to render a verdict in any case, they are not liable for having sworn falsely.

עד שישמעו מפי התובע – as it is written (Leviticus 5:1): “he does not give information/"אם – לוא יגיד" [written] fully with a VAV and and ALEPH is expounded upon thusly: if to hi he will not tell, meaning to say, the plaintiff, "ונשא עונו"/”so that he is subject to punishment (Leviticus 5:1), but if he said it to another,-“ he does not give information,” he is exempt [from punishment].

Introduction Mishnah twelve teaches that the claimant must be the one who recites the adjuration.

If he sent by the hand of his servant, or if the defendant said to them: “I adjure you that if you know any testimony for him you should come and bear testimony for him”, they are exempt, until they hear [the adjuration] direct from the claimant. If the claimant (the plaintiff) sends a servant to adjure potential witnesses to testify on his or if defendant the adjures the witnesses to testify in his defense, and the witnesses swear falsely they are not liable. The claimant must be the one who adjures them directly.

מצוה אני עליכם וכו' - and he when he says, “I command you,” in an oath.

Introduction Mishnah thirteen discusses different possibilities for the language of the adjuration.

המקלל בכולם – when he blasphemes God with one of them.

[If he said]: "I adjure you"; "I command you"; "I bind you"; they are liable. "By heaven and earth!", they are exempt. "By Alef Daleth"; "By Yod He"; "By God Almighty"; "By The Lord of Hosts; "By the Merciful and Gracious one"; "By the Long Suffering One"; "By the One Abounding in Kindness"; or by any of the substitutes [for the name], they are liable. The first section of our mishnah establishes which words are valid as words of adjuration. If we look at Leviticus 5:1, the Biblical verse that discusses the oath of testimony, we will notice that the word “shevuah”, oath, is not used. Rather the Torah uses the word “allah” which can mean a curse but can also mean an oath. The Rabbis did not limit adjuration to the use of the word “allah” but extended it to included either a “shevuah”, or something similar. We will learn what an “allah” is in section five. This section discusses words that are similar to “shevuah” and therefore may be used in adjuration.

ר' מאיר מחייב – [the punishment of] stoning.

Sections 1a and 1b contain invalid and valid substitutes for God’s name. “Heaven and Earth” are not substitutes for God’s name and therefore may not be used in adjuration. Heaven and earth were created by God but they are not potential substitutes for His name. However, the letters of his name, and various substitutes used frequently in the Torah are valid. "Aleph Dalet" are the first two letters of Adonay, which means "My Lord" and is a name frequently used for God. "Yod He" are the first two letters of God's unpronounceable four letter name, YHWH. The rest are names for God used in the Torah or attributes of God.

וחכמים פוטרין – for specifically on the unique name [of God], with stoning, as it written (Leviticus 24:16): “if he pronounces the name LORD [he shall be put to death. The whole community shall stone him.], and on the euphemisms, with the explicit prohibition in the Torah [required for punishing trespassers] of (Exodus 22:27):”You shall not revile God [nor put a curse upon a chieftain among your people].” But with the oath of testimony, the Sages agree with Rabbi Meir that he is liable on the euphemisms like he is liable on the explicit name [God] for in the oath [of testimony] it is written (Leviticus 5:1): “When he has heard a public imprecation (against one who withholds testimony).

He who blasphemes by any of them is liable, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses his father or mother by any of them is liable according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses himself or his neighbor by any of them transgresses a negative precept. There are three different types of blasphemies mentioned in this section: blaspheming God, blaspheming one's parents and blaspheming oneself or another person. Blaspheming God or one's parents is punishable by death. We learned in Sanhedrin 7:5 that one is not liable for having blasphemed unless he uses God's name. According to Rabbi Meir, one who blasphemes using one of the aforementioned substitutes for God's name is liable for the death penalty. According to the Sages he must use God's specific name, meaning the full four letter name.

המקלל עצמו – as it written (Deuteronomy 4:9): “[But] take utmost care and watch yourselves scrupulously” and all "השמר לך" /”take utmost care” and "פן" /lest or "אל"/do not (see Talmud Zevahim 106a) introduces nothing other than a prohibitory law.

As an aside the mishnah mentions that blaspheming others and even blaspheming oneself violates a negative commandment. The commandment referred to is in Leviticus 19:14, "Do not curse a deaf person". The Rabbis reason that if it is forbidden to curse a deaf person it is also forbidden to curse any other person. The Torah means to say, "Don't curse even a deaf person, who cannot hear."

והמקלל חבירו – as it is written (Leviticus 19:14): “You shall not insult (literally, “curse”) the deaf [or place a stumbling block before the blind],” even a deaf person (the Rabbis understand this as “deaf and mute”- see Tractate Terumot, Chapter 1, Mishnah 2) who does not hear [only], and he is not strict with his insult/curse of “you shall not insult (literally curse)” , and all the more so, all other people who heard and he is strict about.

[If he said,] "May God smite you"; or "Yea, may God smite you"; this is the curse written in the Torah. "May [God] not smite you"; or "May he bless you"; Or "May he do good unto you [if you bear testimony for me]": Rabbi Meir makes [them] liable, and the Sages exempt [them]. The mishnah now explains that the "alla"”, the curse mentioned in Leviticus 5:1 is saying "May God smite you [if you know testimony for me and do not testify]". According to Rabbi Meir the "allah" may be phrased in the positive. Instead of saying "May God smite you", the claimant may say something like, "May God be good to you if you testify for me". According to Rabbi Meir from the positive statement you can conclude that the claimant means to say that if you do not testify may God not be good to you. According to the other Sages the "allah" must be stated in the negative, as a curse. Stating the adjuration in the positive does not allow one to conclude the negative.

יככה אלהים וכן יככה אלהים – if he said to witnesses, “may God smite you if you do not testify on my behalf. Or that he heard a person who was reading the curses that are in the Torah (see Deuteronomy 28:27-28,35): “May the LORD strike you with the Egyptian inflammation:” “The LORD will strike you with madness, blindness and dismay;” “The LORD will afflict you at the knees and thighs with a severe inflammation,” and he said to the witnesses, “”May God strike you if you do not testify on my behalf” or he said, “May God not strike you if you testify on my behalf,” or “May God bless you if you testify on my behalf,” or “May it go well with you if you testify on my behalf,” in all of these, Rabbi Meir declares liable, [by implication] “from ‘no’ you understand ‘yes’” (see Tractate Nedarim 11a), “”God should not strike you down if you testify o my behalf”, but if you don’t testify on my behalf, God will strike you. And similarly, “God will bless you if you testify on my behalf,” but if you you will not testify on my behalf, He will curse you. But in all of these, the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Meir.

Questions for Further Thought: Why don’t the Sages hold that one could phrase the "allah" in the positive?