Talmud do Gittin 7:12

It was stated¹⁹A similar statement is in Tosephta Terumot 1:1, quoted in Babli Giṭṭin 71a. This and the following paragraphs are also in Giṭṭin 7:1 (fol. 48c). Cf. also Mishnah and Halakhah 2.: “If a deaf-mute person gave heave, it is not heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, when was this said? If he was born deaf-mute. But if he was normal and became deaf and dumb, he writes and others confirm his signature. ²⁰In the Tosephta (1:2) and the Babli, the formulation is: “If he hears but does not speak, he is mute; if he speaks but cannot hear, he is deaf; both have the status of normal persons.” The sentence is missing in the Rome ms. If he hears but cannot speak, he is like a normal person.”

HALAKHAH: “If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred,” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai⁴⁰The paradigm of the know-all; he was ready to answer any question about religious law on the spot. The Babli knows of a number of famous rabbis who tried to imitate him but quickly were confronted with a question they could not answer. He never was ordained; therefore he could not have been part of the Court, but as an outsider he could have pointed out the Court’s error. was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he removed⁶⁷In general, the Piel form סַלֵּק, from the root סלק “to raise, lift”, means “to remove (from office)”, comparable to German entheben. Here it must mean, “to silence the opposing party” either by a convincing argument of the single opponent, or by a formal judgment of the High Court. them, their instruction would be invalid. If they removed him, his instruction would be invalid. But we hold in the case that each side stands by its answer. For him, their instruction is no instruction, for they did not remove him⁶⁸Since they could not convince him, he does not have to follow them against his better knowledge; cf. Note 43.. For others it is an instruction, for he did not remove them. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum, since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously³⁶The ruling triggers the obligation of a purification sacrifice only if it was unanimous, including the opinions of the law students sitting before the 72 members of the Court. Mishnah 4 requires in addition that the president of the court be present and voting [Babli 4b, Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah 4(4).]? One explains it, that he was not present⁶⁹At the vote.. Does this invalidate⁷⁰The text of B is more intelligible: If he was not present, does this invalidate the vote?? He explains it following Rebbi, since Rebbi said, no one invalidates but the distinguished member of the Court (at Lydda) [only]⁷¹The ms. text, בלוד, “at Lydda” makes no sense since the High Court must sit in the ashlar hall on the Temple Mount. One has to read with B בלבד “only”. The president of the Court is the only one for whom no substitute can be found.. Since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously; is it the same in retraction or by majority? If it is obvious for you⁷²Read כַּד “if it is” for כַּת “group” in the text. The reading of B, צַייְתֵי “they obey” might be acceptable; since everywhere a majority opinion of religious authorities is to be followed, it is obvious that a retraction by a majority has to be followed. The original instruction also would have had to be followed if rendered by a majority of the Court; it is only the obligation of a sacrifice which is triggered by a unanimous vote. by majority, what kind of majority? The majority of those who instructed or the majority of those remaining? How is this? If there were a hundred but ten of them had died. If you say, a majority of those who instructed, 51. If you say, a majority of those remaining, 46.

¹³⁹Qiddušin 3:3, Notes 133–136. Rebbi Jehudah ben Shalom, Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazy in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan. They formulated the symphon^139AGreek συμφώνημα, -ατος, τό, “agreement”; cf. Qiddušin 3:2, Note 69 for details and legal standing of this marriage contract. according to Rebbi Meïr in Qiddušin. Rebbi Jeremiah: Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, asked: Why does it have to follow Rebbi Meïr but not also the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” Why can he not say “on condition” but not double his stipulation? If he did not double his stipulation, could this eliminate the preliminary marriage? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everywhere Rebbi Meïr holds that from “no” you infer “yes”, except here? Rebbi Mattaniah said, one is more restrictive in matters of incest and adultery.

If someone said, field X I gave to Y, it is given to him, it should be his, Y should inherit my property, Y should take possession of my property, he did not say anything¹⁷¹Title to property cannot be transferred by simple declaration; cf. Mishnah Qiddušin 1:5. The Tosephta disagrees, 9:12. The Tosephta text is explained away by the Babli, Giṭṭin40b.. It should be given to him as a gift, Rebbi says, he acquired¹⁷²If this was a death-bed declaration., but the Sages say, he did not acquire; but one forces the heirs to fulfill the deceased’s words.¹⁷³Babli Giṭṭin 14b,15a,40a; Ketubot 70a. It was stated¹⁷⁴Tosephta 9:14.: Rebbi Simeon ben Gamliel says, also if one writes διέθεμεν¹⁷⁵“I disposed by will”, from Greek “to dispose” (H. M. Pineles). A. Gulak, Tarbiz 1 fasc. 4 (1931) 144–146 has noted that the expression τάδε διεθέμην is used in Egyptian Greek deeds; also cf. R. Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri, New York 1944, p. 143. Since the expression is a legal Greek term, its use characterizes a valid deed even though the corresponding use of the past in Hebrew was declared invalid as statement of a deed. (S. Lieberman, Tosefta kiFshutah Bava batra p. 441, wants to infer that Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel validates also the Hebrew נָתַתִּי; this seems unjustified.) in Greek it is a gift. Rebbi Ḥanin in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: I turned to all linguists to know what is διέθεμεν and nobody told me anything¹⁷⁶They were not acquainted with Greek legalese..