Komentarz do Zewachim 13:13

השוחט –[He who ritually slaughters] Holy Things outside [of the Temple courtyard] and offered them up outside [the Temple courtyard]. In one act of forgetfulness [inadvertently]. He is liable [for a sin-offering] for the ritual slaughtering and he is liable [for a sin-offering] on the offering up, for they are two essential parts of the sin for both of them are written [in the Torah] (Leviticus 17:3): “[if anyone of the house of Israel] אשר ישחט/slaughters [an ox or sheep of goat in the camp, or does so outside the camp],” and (Leviticus 17:8): “[If anyone of the house of Israel or of the strangers who reside among them] אשר – יעלה /offers [a burnt offering or a sacrifice].”

Introduction Chapter thirteen deals with the prohibition of slaughtering and offering sacrifices outside of the Temple. This prohibition is found in Leviticus 17 which reads: Leviticus 17:2-9 2 Speak to Aaron and his sons and to all the Israelite people and say to them: This is what the LORD has commanded: 3 if anyone of the house of Israel slaughters an ox or sheep or goat in the camp, or does so outside the camp, 4 and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to present it as an offering to the LORD, before the LORD's Tabernacle, bloodguilt shall be imputed to that man: he has shed blood; that man shall be cut off from among his people... 8 Say to them further: If anyone of the house of Israel or of the strangers who reside among them offers a burnt offering or a sacrifice, 9 and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it to the LORD, that person shall be cut off from his people. Note that the verses prohibit slaughtering (verse 3) and offering (verse 9). The punishment for intentionally transgressing either of these prohibitions is karet, which is translated here as “cut off from his people.” According to the rabbis, any sin which is punished with karet when done intentionally, is atoned for with a sin-offering, a hatat, when done unwittingly. Our mishnah deals with how many hatats a person would be liable for if he unwittingly slaughters and offers a sacrifice outside of the Temple.

כיון שהוציאו פסלו –[because he took it outside, he has invalidated it] but nevertheless, he is liable. And the same law applies to the individual who slaughters it outside [the Temple courtyard] and offers it up outside [the Temple courtyard]. And Rabbi Yossi Haglili said to you, just as the person who slaughters it inside [the Temple courtyard] and offered up outside [the Temple courtyard] for he had a period of time when it was fit for use, shall you say to the person who slaughters it outside [the Temple courtyard] and offers it up outside [the Temple courtyard] that he didn’t have a period of time when it was fit for use? But the Halakah is not according to Rabbi Yossi Haglili.

He who slaughters and offers up outside [the Temple courtyard] is liable in respect of slaughtering and in respect of offering. If one unwittingly slaughters and then offers a sacrifice outside of the Temple courtyard he is liable to bring two hatats one for slaughtering and one for offering it up.

Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: if he slaughtered inside and offered up outside, [he is liable]; if he slaughtered outside and offered up outside, he is not liable [for offering up], because he offered up only that which was unfit. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says that one is liable for offering outside the Temple only if he slaughtered it inside. If he slaughtered the animal outside and then offered it up outside he would be liable for only one hatat, since by the time he offered it up, it was already unfit by having been slaughtered outside. Rabbi Yose would read verse 3 as prohibiting slaughtering outside the Temple and verse 9 as saying that even if he slaughtered inside, where one is allowed to slaughter, he is punished for offering outside. Verse 9’s punishment for offering up does not apply if verse 3’s prohibition of slaughtering outside was already transgressed.

They said to him: even when one slaughters inside and offers up outside, since he carries it out, he renders it unfit. The rabbis reject his argument, claiming that even if he slaughters it inside and then carries it outside, he is still offering up something that is unfit. In other words, there is no way to offer up a fit sacrifice outside the Temple because as soon as it leaves the Temple it is unfit. Nevertheless, verse 9 punishes one who offers a sacrifice outside the Temple. The only conclusion is that this verse is applicable even if the sacrifice was already disqualified. Thus he must bring two hatats one for slaughtering and one for offering.

טמא שאכל כו' – because Rabbi Yossi Haglili and the Rabbis disagree on both of them and these two disputes are similar to each other, they taught them [in the Mishnah] together.

Introduction Our mishnah contains a debate between the sages and Rabbi Yose the Galilean similar in structure to the debate in yesterday’s mishnah. Here the topic is an unclean person who eats sacrifices. This is prohibited in Leviticus 7:20.

רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר וכו' – when the body became ritually defiled and afterwards the meat became ritually defiled, no one disagrees that he is liable for extirpation. What they do dispute is when the meat [first] becomes ritually defiled and afterwards the body becomes defiled. The Rabbis have an inclusive prohibition (i.e., an exception to the principle that one prohibition does not take effect upon another; the second prohibition takes effect if it is a more comprehensive prohibition), for since the prohibition of the Levitical uncleanness of the body occurs upon it, it also prohibits the pure meat that was permitted from the outside, it also occurs even on the ritually impure meat, and even though it was continually prohibited, in order to make him liable even because of the Levitical uncleanness of the body. But Rabbi Yossi Haglili does not hold that one prohibition can take a legal hold where another prohibition already exists (i.e., you can punish, or impose sacrificial expiation only for the first one) with a comprehensive prohibition, and the prohibition of ritual defilement of the body does not occur on the prohibition of the ritual defilement of the meat. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Yossi Haglili.

An unclean [person] who eats [of sacrifices], whether unclean sacrifices or clean sacrifices, is liable. Leviticus 7:20 says that an unclean person who intentionally eats a sacrifice is punished with karet. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, this prohibition applies whether the sacrifice was clean and therefore permitted, or unclean and was prohibited.

והטהור שאכל טמא פטור – from extirpation. But he endures forty [minus one] lashes because of (Leviticus 7:19): “Flesh that touches anything impure shall not be eaten; [it shall be consumed in fire. As for other flesh, only he who is pure may eat such flesh].”

Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: an unclean person who eats clean [sacrifices] is liable, but an unclean person who eats unclean [sacrifices] is not liable because he ate only that which is unclean. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says that an unclean person is liable for eating a sacrifice that he would otherwise have been allowed to eat, i.e a clean sacrifice. If he ate an unclean sacrifice he is not liable because he couldn’t have eaten it even if he was clean. This is similar to Rabbi Yose’s reasoning in yesterday’s mishnah, where he stated that one is liable for offering up a sacrifice outside of the Temple only if the sacrifice was slaughtered in the Temple.

שאינו חייב אלא על טומאת הגוף – as it is written (Leviticus 7:20): “ [But the person who], in a state of impurity, [eats flesh from the LOD’s sacrifice of well-being,] that person shall be cut off from his kin,” This verse is speaking of Levitical uncleanness of the body.

They said to him: even when an unclean person eats clean [sacrifices], when he touches it, he defiles it. As in yesterday’s mishnah, the sages respond to Rabbi Yose the Galilean by saying that an unclean person cannot eat a clean sacrifice, because as soon as he touches it, he renders it unclean. Therefore, when the Torah states that it is a transgression for an unclean person to eat a sacrifice, it doesn’t make a difference whether the sacrifice was clean (before he began to eat it) or unclean in both cases he is liable.

A clean person who eats unclean [sacrifices] is not liable, because one is liable only on account of bodily uncleanness. The mishnah now limits the punishment in Leviticus 7:20 to a case of an unclean person who eats a clean sacrifice. While it is forbidden for a clean person to eat an unclean sacrifice, he is not liable for karet or a hatat if he does so.

שהשוחט להדיוט כו' - a person who ritually slaughters Holy Things outside [the Temple courtyard] for consumption by an ordinary person [as opposed to for God alone], is liable.

Introduction This mishnah deals with various differences between the laws governing the prohibition of slaughtering a sacrifice outside of the Temple and those prohibiting offering a sacrifice outside of the Temple.

המעלה בחוץ – for the needs of an ordinary person, is exempt because of offering it up outside [the Temple courtyard]. For regarding ritual slaughter, it is written (Leviticus 17:4): “[And does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to present it as an offering to the LORD, before the LORD’s Tabernacle,] bloodguilt shall be imputed to that man, [he has shed blood; that man shall be cut off from among his people],” even a person who does ritual slaughter for a person. And regarding offering it up, it is written (Leviticus 17:9): “[and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting] to offer it to the LORD, [that person shall be cut off from his people],” he is not liable when he offers it up outside [the Temple courtyard] until he should intend it to be for God.

Slaughtering [outside the Temple] is more stringent than offering up [outside], and offering up [is more stringent] than slaughtering. This is a classic style of introduction in the Mishnah. The rabbis seem to have been fascinated by these types of situations, sometimes the laws of x (here slaughtering) are stricter than those of the related prohibition y (here offering) whereas sometimes the situation is opposite and the laws governing y are more stringent than x.

ושחטו פטורים – as it is written (Leviticus 17:4): “ דם יחשב לאיש ההוא/bloodguilt shall be imputed to that man – האיש ההוא" ,” one person and not two.

Slaughtering is more stringent, for he who slaughters [a sacrifice] to a man is liable, whereas he who offers up to a man is not liable. The laws governing slaughtering are more stringent, for he who slaughters an animal to a man, in worship of that man, is liable. However, one who offers up a sacrifice in worship of a man is not liable. This distinction is derived midrashically from the verses in Leviticus 7.

והעלוהו חייבין – as it is written (Leviticus 17:8): “[Say to them further:] If anyone/איש איש of the house of Israel ]or of the strangers who reside among them[ אשר יעלה/offers a burnt offering or sacrifice,” for the inference does not teach us "איש איש"/if anyone – other than to include two who took hold of a limb and offered it up, that they are liable.

Offering up is more stringent: two who hold a knife and slaughter are not liable, [whereas] if two take hold of a limb and offer it up, they are liable. If two people together hold a knife and slaughter an animal then neither is liable. This is because each could have done the act on his own, and often when an act that could be done by one person is performed jointly by two, both are exempt. However, we would not say about offering that it is an act that could be performed by one person. It could be performed by as many people who wish to do so. Therefore, each person who offers up a limb of the animal outside of the Temple is liable for karet or a hatat.

העלה – and it became known to him.

If one offered up, then offered up again, then offered up again, he is liable in respect of each [act of] offering up, the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yose says: he is liable for only one. According to Rabbi Shimon, if one offers up the limb of an animal multiple times, he is liable for each and every act. Rabbi Shimon looks at each act as being separate and therefore each carries its own culpability. Rabbi Yose says that one cannot really offer up the same animal (or piece thereof) twice. Thus he is liable for only one hatat, even though he offered it up multiple times.

וחזר והעלה – from the same animal itself, he is liable [for a sin offering] for each and every time.

He is liable only when he offers up on the top of an altar. Rabbi Shimon says: he is liable even if he offers up on the top of a rock or a stone. According to the first opinion he is liable only if he offers up the sacrifice on an altar which he built outside the Temple. Without an altar, something is not really a sacrifice. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that even if he offers it on a rock or a stone, which are not properly built altars, he is still liable for offering a sacrifice outside of the Temple.

עד שיעלה לראש המזבח – as it is written (Genesis 8:20): “Then Noah built an altar to the LORD [and, taking of every pure animal and of every pure bird, he offered burnt offerings on the altar],” so we see even the temporary altar of an individual that is outside is not offering up without an altar.

אפילו העלה על הסלע – as it is written (Leviticus 17:6): “that the priest may dash the blood against the altar of the LORD at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting [to offer it to the LORD, that person shall be cut off from his people],” but not at the altar of a temporary personal altar. And it is written in the portion of one offering outside [the Temple courtyard]. But the Halakha is according is according to Rabbi Yossi.

שהיה פסולן בקדש – as for example (see Tractate Zevakhim, Chapter 9, Mishnah 2), a sacrifice kept overnight or goes forth [from its proper bounds or it was slaughtered [with the intention to burn the sacrificial parts or to eat the flesh] outside of its proper time or outside of its proper place, since inside , if they were inside [the Temple courtyard], if it went up, it should not go down, we call it that that has been accepted inside but he is liable for it outside, as it is written (Leviticus 17:9): “[And does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting] to offer it to the LORD/לעשות אתו לה', [that person shall be cut off from his people],”all that is offered/done for God, we are liable for outside [of the Temple courtyard], but all that is not offered/done for God, we are not liable for it outside [the Temple courtyard].

Introduction This mishnah continues to deal with the prohibition of offering a sacrifice outside of the Temple.

המעלה כזין מן העולה ומאימורין – half an olive’s bulk from this (i.e., the burnt offering) and half an olive’s bulk from that (i.e., the sacrificial parts offered on the altar).

In regard to both valid sacrifices or invalid sacrifices which had become unfit within [the Temple]: if one offers them outside, he is liable. One is liable for offering up outside of the Temple either a valid sacrifice or an invalid sacrifice that had been invalidated while it was in the Temple. The rule with regard to such sacrifices is that if they are put on the altar they do not come down (see 9:2). However, if one offers up a sacrifice that had been disqualified outside of the Temple, one that if put up on the altar would have to be taken down, he is not liable.

חייב – for all of it is a sacrifice burned entirely.

If one offers up outside [the Temple] as much as an olive’s worth of an olah and its innards [combined], he is liable. In order to be liable for offering up a sacrifice outside the Temple, one must offer up at least an olive’s worth of flesh. The mishnah rules that when offering an olah, a sacrifice that is wholly burned, the flesh and the innards, which are always burned for every sacrifice, add up together. Assumedly, in a sacrifice that is partially eaten, the parts that are eaten would not be combined with the parts that are normally burned, in order to add up to the requisite olive’s worth.

הלבונה – of the meal-offering of the free-will offering.

As for the fistful [of flour], the frankincense, the incense, the priests’ meal-offering, the anointed priest’s meal-offering, and the meal offering of libations, if [one] offered up as much as an olive of one of these outside, he is liable. But Rabbi Elazar exempts him unless he offers up the whole of them. All of the types of sacrifices listed in this section were explained in 4:3. They are all completely burned on the altar, without any of their parts being eaten by priests or non-priests. According to the first opinion, even though they are completely burned, if one offers up even a part of them outside of the Temple, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar disagrees and holds that just as they must be completely burned on the altar if done properly, so too in order for one to be liable for offering them outside the Temple, they must be completely offered.

והקטורת – of each day, half of it in the morning and half of it at twilight.

In all of these cases, if they offered them within, and left over an olive’s worth and one offered it outside, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar, however, agrees that if most of one of the above-mentioned things is offered on the altar, and then an olive’s worth is left over and offered outside the Temple, that one is liable. Since this olive’s worth completes the offering of the sacrifice, one is liable for offering it up outside.

ומנחת כהנים – a sacrifice which is burned entirely and appropriate for offering up like a fistful of the meal-offering of an Israelite. But the remnants of the meal-offering of an Israelite are not liable on their being brought up outside [the Temple courtyard].

In all of these cases, if they became lacking something, and one offered them outside, he is not liable. The sacrifices in section three must be completely offered for them to be valid. Therefore, if even the smallest part of them is missing and one offers it up outside the Temple, he is not liable. In other words, since this would not have been valid had it been offered on the altar, it doesn’t make one liable if offered outside.

מנחת כהן משיח – one-tenth of an Ephah which he brings on each day.

כזית – which is the measurement of the incense.

עד שיקריב את כולו – because he (i.e., Rabbi Eliezer) holds that all which make the sacrifice permissible for enjoyment invalidate that which is lacking/wanting, and all the time that all of them were not offered the incense does not fulfill their owners’ spiritual obligation. But according to the Rabbis, these also is their burning on the altar/rising in smoke with an olive’s bulk, where all of it exists and they were not lacking prior to the burning on the altar.

ושייר מהן וכו' חייב – for behold through this the burning on the altar/letting rise in smoke is completed/

שחסרו כל שהן – prior to the burning on the altar through loss or burning, they were invalidated by their missing parts, as it is written (Leviticus 2:3): “And the remainder of the grain offering [shall be for Aaron and his sons, a most holy portion from the LORD’s gifts],” except for that which was missing, or that a handful was missing prior to the burning on the altar.

המקריב קדשים ואימוריהן – that he sacrificed the meat and those [unsevered] portions of the sacrifice offered on the altar attached to it, he is liable because of the portions of the sacrifice offered on the altar. But we don’t say that the meat interposes between the portions of the sacrifice offered on the altar and the fire, and that what he intended to be inside is not offering on the altar, for he All-Merciful stated (Leviticus 1:8): “[And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall lay out the sections, with the head and the suet,] on the wood that is on the fire,” and the person who offers it outside [the Temple courtyard] would not be liable. We did not say this because something that is one type mixed with something of the same type does not interpose.

One who offers sacrifices together with the innards outside the Temple, is liable. In this case one offers parts of sacrifices that are eaten, together with the innards that are burned on the altar. Had he offered up just the edible parts outside the Temple, he would not be liable, because these parts did not need to be put on the altar. He is liable for offering the innards, because one is liable for offering up outside the Temple anything that should have been burned on the altar. This is true even if the sacrifices that are to be eaten were directly on the fire and the innards were on top, and not directly upon the fire. The edible parts of the sacrifices don’t cause a separation between the fire and the innards because they are of the same type, and things that are of the same type don’t cause separation.

מנחה שלא נקמצה – is not appropriate inside. Therefore, the person who offers it up outside is exempt.

If a minhah had not had its fistful removed and one offered it outside, he is exempt. When a minhah, a meal-offering, is sacrificed, a fistful is removed and burned on the altar and then the remainder of the minhah can be eaten. Since part of the minhah is burned and part is eaten one is liable for offering up only the part that is supposed to be burned, as we saw in section one. If one offered up a minhah outside of the Temple before its fistful has been removed he is exempt because it has not yet been determined what part of the minhah was supposed to have been burned.

קמצה וחזר קומצה לתוכה. והקריבה בחוץ חייב – and in a similar manner to it inside, it is fit/appropriate, as it is taught in [the chapter] “He who takes a handful of meal-offering/הקומץ את המנחה” (i.e., Tractate Menahot, Chapter 3, Mishnah 3): “[If] the handful was mixed up with residue, or with the residue of his fellow, he should not offer it up/נתערב קומצה בשיריה לא יקטיר,” but if he did offer it up, it is acceptable.

If one took out the fistful, and then the fistful went back into the minhah, and he offered it outside, he is liable. However, if the fistful is removed and thereby determined, and then it falls back into the remainder of the minhah, and he offers up the whole minhah outside the Temple, in this case he is liable because the fistful was determined, even though we now cannot tell what part was the fistful and what part was the remainder.

הקומץ והלבונה – of the free-will meal offering. Both of them (i.e., the fistful of the meal offering and the frankincense) permit the residue for consumption, therefore Rabbi Eleazar exempts for he requires the burning on the altar everything that is permitted.

As for the fistful and the frankincense, if one offered one of them [without the other] outside [the Temple], he is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: he is exempt unless he offers the second too. [If one offered] one inside and the other outside, he is liable. In order for the non-sacrificed parts of the minhah (meal) offering to be eaten, the fistful of the minhah and the frankincense must both be burned on the altar (see Leviticus 2:2-3). If one offers one of these outside of the Temple, he is still liable, according to the first opinion, even though he didn’t offer the other one. Rabbi Elazar says that he is exempt until he offers both the fistful and the frankincense, because one is not effective without the other. This matches his opinion in mishnah four. Rabbi Elazar agrees with the sages that if he offers one of them inside and then the other outside, he is liable. This is similar to the case in mishnah four where he offered most of a certain type of sacrifice inside the Temple, but left over an olive’s worth which he offered outside the Temple. Since this completes the offering, all agree that he is liable.

אחד בפנים – first and afterwards the second outside, he is liable, for this completed it, and through it everything was dependent.

As for the two dishes of frankincense, if one offered one of them outside, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: he is exempt unless he offers the second too. [If one offered] one inside and the other outside, he is liable. Burning the two dishes of frankincense allows the priests to eat the showbread. Both dishes must be burned. Again, the first opinion holds that if he offers one of them outside the Temple he is liable, whereas Rabbi Elazar holds that he is not liable unless he offers both. As above, if he offers one inside the Temple and the other outside, Rabbi Elazar agrees that he is liable.

שני בזיכי לבונה – permits the [twelve] shewbread [loaves].

If one sprinkles part of the blood outside, he is liable. Every sprinkling of the blood is considered its own separate entity. Therefore, if one offers even one sprinkling of blood outside the Temple, he is liable, even if he didn’t perform the requisite two or four sprinklings. In this case Rabbi Elazar would agree.

מי החג – that were filled for the sake of the water libations on the holiday of Sukkot, if he offered up the libation outside, he is liable for he (i.e., Rabbi Eleazar) holds that the water libations on the Festival [of Sukkot] is according to the Torah, therefore, he is liable by making the offering outside, but the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Eleazar in this entire Mishnah and the water libation on the Festival [of Sukkot] is not from the Torah, but rather it is a usage dating from Moses as delivered from Sinai (i.e., a traditional interpretation of a written law).

Rabbi Elazar says: also one who makes a libation of the water of the Festival [of Sukkot] on the festival, outside is liable. On Sukkot there is a water libation. If one performs this water libation outside the Temple he is liable.

שירי הדם שהקריבן בחוץ חייב (of sin-offerings of the inner altar) – we are speaking of the residue of the blood of the inside, and he (i.e., Rabbi Nehemiah) holds that the residue of the blood prevent them, therefore, it is an act of Divine service that one is liable for outside [the Temple courtyard], but with the residue of the blood of the outer altar, Rabbi Nehemiah agrees that there are no other than for the Mitzvah, but not to be indispensable, therefore, he who sprinkles them outside is certainly exempt. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Nehemiah.

Rabbi Nehemiah says: if one offered the residue of the blood outside, he is liable. The remainder of the blood after some of it has been sprinkled is poured onto the base of the altar. If one offers this blood outside the Temple, he is liable.

מלק בחוץ – it is an un-slaughtered animal carcass, for there is no pinching of the head other than inside [the Temple courtyard], therefore he exempt on his offering/bringing it up on the altar outside, and if you should say, but aren’t all that are offered up outside are disqualified through their being taken outside, and similar a person who performs a ritual slaughter outside [of the Temple courtyard] is invalid and they are liable on its being offered on the altar, there the All-Merciful includes it but regarding the matter of the rest of invalid things, we require that it is accepted inside.

Introduction This mishnah deals with a person who “nips,” or slaughters a bird inside or outside the Temple and offers it up outside. As a reminder “nipping,” plucking off the head from the back of the neck, was the way that bird sacrifices were slaughtered inside the Temple, whereas slaughtering, slicing the neck with a knife, was how they were slaughtered outside the Temple, to be eaten not as a sacrifice.

שחט בחוץ והעלה בחוץ חייב – even on the bringing up/offering on the altar. For all who are liable on its ritual slaughter outside [of the Temple courtyard] if he went back in and he or someone else brought them up/offered them, he is liable [on the ritual slaughter and on offering it up].

If one nips a bird [offering] inside and offers it up outside, he is liable; Inside the Temple a bird is slaughtered by nipping. Therefore, if he nips it inside the Temple he has slaughtered it correctly. When he then brings it outside the Temple and offers it up there, he is liable because he has offered a valid sacrifice outside of the Temple.

נמצא דרך הכשרו בפנים – In the Gemara it states (i.e., Tractate Zevakhim 111b, that it teaches that the manner of his liability by performing it inside [i.e., the Temple courtyard] exempts him outside [the Temple courtyard], and the manner of his liability by performing it outside, exempts him inside [the Temple courtyard. As for example, if he slaughtered the bird/fowl inside [the Temple courtyard] and offered it up outside [the Temple courtyard], he is exempt. If he slaughtered it outside [the Temple courtyard] and offered it up outside [the Temple courtyard], he is liable. If he pinched the head [of the bird] inside [the Temple courtyard] and offered it up outside, he is liable. If he pinched the head [of the bird] outside [the Temple courtyard] and offered it up inside [the Temple courtyard], he is exempt. It is found, that the place where he is made liable on his offering it up, if the first Divine service was performed in side, as for example with the pinching of the head that was done inside [the Temple courtyard], he is exempt for his offering it up, if the pinching of the head was done outside [the Temple courtyard]. But a person who becomes liable on his offering up, if the first Divine service was performed outside, like with the ritual slaughtering, he is exempted inside, if the animal was slaughtered inside and offered up outside.

If one nips it outside and offers it up outside, he is exempt. However, if he nips it outside, he has disqualified it from being a valid sacrifice and when he offers it up outside he is not liable.

רבי שמעון אומר כו' – the matter of the first Tanna/teacher is deficient and should be read as follows: And similarly, a person who slaughters an animal at night inside [the Temple courtyard] and offers it up outside [the Temple courtyard] is exempt, that it is not accepted inside, as it is written (Leviticus 19:6): “It shall be eaten on the day you sacrifice/ביום זבחכם,” but not at night, and it is found that the animal offering is invalid, and therefore he is not liable for his offering it up But if he did not slaughter outside [the Temple courtyard] at night but offered it up outside at night, he is liable, because since the ritual slaughter was at night outside the Temple courtyard, it was kosher/fit, therefore, he is liable for two things – on the ritual slaughter and on the offering up. But Rabbi Shimon disputes this and states: “Any act for which they are liable [when it is done] outside, for the like act are they liable [when it is done] inside and when one offered it up outside, except for him who slaughters inside and offers up [the bird offering] outside.” כל שחייבין עליו בחוץ חייבין על כיוצא בו בפנים שהעלהו בחוץ – that is to say, just as when the person who performs the ritual slaughter outside at night and the one who offers it up outside is liable, so also if he performed the ritual slaughter inside at night and offered it up outside, he is liable for the offering up [of the sacrifice], except for one who slaughters the bird/fowl inside and offered it up outside [the Temple courtyard] that he is exempt even though that if he performed the ritual slaughter and offered it up outside [the Temple courtyard], he is liable. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Shimon.

If one slaughters a bird inside and offers it up outside, he is exempt. Slaughtering it inside the Temple also disqualifies it from being a sacrifice and thus when he offers it up outside he is exempt.

If one slaughters [it] outside and offers [it] up outside, he is liable. Slaughtering is the proper way to kill the bird outside the Temple. So if he slaughters it and then offers it outside the Temple he is liable.

Thus its prescribed rite inside exempts him [if he does it] outside, while its prescribed rite outside exempts him [if he does it] inside. We now get a summary, which may also serve as a type of mnemonic device. If one kills the bird outside the Temple with the rite prescribed for inside, that is nipping, he is exempt. Similarly, if one kills the bird inside the Temple with the rite prescribed for outside, that is slaughtering with the knife, he is exempt.

Rabbi Shimon says: whatever he is liable for outside, he is liable in similar circumstances inside when one [subsequently] offers it up outside; except when one slaughters [a bird] inside and offers [it] up outside. Rabbi Shimon holds that one who nips outside the Temple and then offers it up outside the Temple is liable. He then adds a rule that any time one is liable for an act when done outside the Temple, he is also liable if done inside and then offered up outside the Temple. The one exception is one who slaughters an animal inside and then offers it up outside. One who does this is exempt even though if he slaughtered it outside and offered it up there he would be liable. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with Rabbi Yose the Galilean in mishnah one of our chapter, who holds that one who slaughters outside the Temple and offers it up outside the Temple is exempt, whereas one who slaughters inside the Temple and offers it up outside is liable. Rabbi Shimon holds that since he is exempt when done outside, he is also exempt when done inside. I should note that Rabbi Shimon’s words are exceedingly difficult. I have explained them according to Albeck’s commentary.

נתן בחוץ וחזר ונתן בפני חייב – it is a simple matter, and because of the concluding clause [of the Mishnah], it brought it, if he [first] placed it outside [the Temple courtyard] and then in return placed it inside [the Temple courtyard], he does not place outside [the Temple courtyard] anything other than the residue of the blood, he is liable. But our Mishnah is according to Rabbi Nehemiah who holds that the residue is indispensable/invalidates an act by omission. But it is not the Halakha.

As for a hatat whose blood was received in one goblet: If one [first] sprinkled [the blood] outside and then sprinkled [it] inside; [Or] inside and then outside, he is liable, because the whole of it was eligible inside. The first scenario is one in which the priest received the blood of the hatat in one goblet. All of this blood should be poured out on the altar inside the Temple. Therefore, it doesn’t matter if he first pours some blood inside the Temple and then some outside, or some outside and then some inside, he is always liable. This matches Rabbi Nehemiah’s opinion in mishnah six, who held that even if one offers up the remainder of the blood outside the Temple he is liable. Once he pours out the blood inside the Temple, he still is liable for pouring the remainder outside.

שניהן בחוץ חייב – the first, if he didn’t have any knowledge of it in the meantime [by fact that he sprinkled the blood from two cups from outside the Temple courtyard], he is liable for two [violations].

If the blood was received in two goblets: If he sprinkled both inside, he is exempt; Both outside, he is liable. One inside and one outside, he is exempt; One outside and one inside, he is liable on account of the one outside, while the one inside makes atonement. The situation is now more complex. The priest receives the blood in two goblets. A) If he sprinkled both inside he is obviously exempt, since he has not offered anything outside the Temple. The mishnah did not need to state this; it only did so in order to exhaust all of the possibilities. B) If he sprinkled both outside, he is liable. Again, this seems obvious. C) Once he sprinkles one inside the other cannot be sprinkled on the altar and is to be poured out into the aqueduct which cleans out the Temple. Therefore, if he offers up this one outside the Temple he is exempt. D) If he first offers up one of the goblets of blood outside, he is liable, for this one should have been offered up inside. If he then offers the other goblet inside, it is valid and it effects atonement, as the sprinkling of the blood always does. The fact that the other goblet was spilled outside does not render invalid the goblet to be spilled inside.

אחד בפנים – and afterwards, the second [sprinkling] was done outside, he is exempt. For even according to Rabbi Nehemiah who held that one cup removes its fellow consecrated cup from its purpose to be spilled a cubit, therefore, even that is not residue.

To what may this be compared? To one who set aside [an animal for] a hatat, then it was lost, and he set aside another in its place; then the first was found, and [so] both are present. If he slaughtered both of them inside, he is exempt; Both of them outside, he is liable. [If he slaughtered] one inside and one outside, he is exempt; One outside and one inside, he is liable on account of the one outside, while the one inside makes atonement. The mishnah compares this situation to a person who set aside an animal to be a hatat, lost the animal, then set aside another animal and then found the first one. The two animals are now both hatats, but only one can effect atonement. The mishnah now runs through all of the possible scenarios, as it did above. A) Obviously, if he slaughters both inside he is exempt. B) Similarly, if he slaughters both outside, he is liable. C) If he first slaughters one inside and then the second one outside he is exempt, because the first animal already effected atonement. In this case the rule with the second one is that it cannot be a valid sacrifice and therefore he is not liable for offering it outside the Temple. D) When he slaughters the first one outside the Temple he is liable for slaughtering outside the Temple. However, the second one can still effect atonement when it is slaughtered inside because the first one does not affect its status.

הפנימי מכפר – to make the animal sacrifice fit. For the blood that is sprinkled outside [the Temple courtyard] first did not make what had remained something similar to it.

Just as the blood exempts its own flesh, so does it exempt the flesh of its companion [the other animal]. The mishnah now makes a final note with regard to the situation of the two hatats. This section is not really connected to the issue of slaughtering outside the Temple. In this situation if one was to slaughter both hatats inside the Temple and then pour the blood of one of them on the altar, the pouring of the blood exempts one who benefits from the flesh of that animal from being punished for illicit benefit from Temple property. The flesh is exempt from this prohibition because after the blood is spilled the animal can be eaten by the priest. The mishnah teaches that just as the pouring of the blood exempts the flesh of the animal whose blood was poured, so too it exempts one who benefits from the other animal. The second animal cannot be a sacrifice and it is forbidden to derive benefit from it. However, since it is no longer in the category of sacrifice, the laws of illegal use of Temple property no longer apply to it.

שתיהן בחוץ חייב – on each of them, for at the time of the ritual slaughter, each one was appropriate [to be offered] inside [the Temple courtyard].

אחת בפנים – and the second afterwards outside [the Temple courtyard], he is exempt, for this is a sin-offering where its owners had been expiated , but for death it (i.e., the second one) goes and is not accepted inside [the Temple courtyard].

חייב על החיצונה – for it is appropriate [only] inside [the Temple courtyard] and he offers up whichever of them that he wishes.

כשם שדמה פוטר את כשרה – from [the law of] religious sacrilege, [for the sprinkling/tossing of the blood removes the meat of the Holy of Holies from religious sacrilege that gave it] a time of permission for the Kohanim [to consume it].

כך הוא פוטר את בשר חברתה (so it renders the meat of its fellow free) – and even though it is invalidated [and it refers to when I slaughter both of them inside the Temple courtyard]. And it comes to ell us here that where both of them are placed, and someone comes first and sprinkles the blood of the first one, he renders the meat of its fellow free because of the sin-offering through which its owners were expiated, for we hold that the sin-offerings left to die we don’t benefit from nor commit religious sacrilege.