Komentarz do Makkot 1:11

When do witnesses become zomemin. This is what it means to say, those witnesses that were found zomemin and we don't do to them the law of hazama, meaning that we don't fulfill in them "And do to them as they planned to do to their brother", how are they made zomemin.

Introduction The first six mishnayoth of Makkoth deal with perjuring witnesses, who according to Deuteronomy 20:18-19 are to receive the same punishment that they tried to impose upon the accused. For instance if they testified that a person was guilty of murder and therefore should be executed and then were found to have perjured themselves, they are themselves to be executed. The first mishnah points out cases where this punishment upon the witnesses cannot be carried out, at least not in a simple fashion.

We testify about this man so-and-so. Kohen.

Although this mishnah begins with the question, how do witnesses become perjurers, we will not learn the mishnaic definition of perjury until mishnah four. This mishnah will instead discuss the punishment of perjuring witnesses who do not, for various, reasons, simply receive the punishment they tried to impose upon the accused.

That he is the son of a divorced woman. In front of us his mother was divorced before she gave birth and behold he is unfit for the Temple service.

How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers?
[If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. According to Jewish law a kohen (a priest) is not allowed to marry a divorcee or a woman who had undergone the process known as “halitzah”, the refusal of the levirate marriage (marriage to the husband’s brother upon the husband’s death when he had no children, see Deuteronomy 25:5-10). A child born of the union of a priest and a divorcee or a halutzah loses his priestly status. If witnesses falsely testify that a priest is really the son of a divorcee or a halutzah, they are attempting to cause him to forfeit his status. Although in general a perjuring witness is punished with the punishment which he tried to impose, in this case it is impossible to do so. Rather he is punished by being lashed forty times (Deuteronomy 25:3).

We don't say. If they were made zomemin and they are Kohanim we make them into the son of a divorced woman to fulfill "like they planned", as it is written (Deuteronomy 19:19) "Do to them as they planned", to them and not their children. If we made them unfit for the Temple service, and they are Kohanim, we make their children unfit forever. If you'll say let us invalidate them alone and not their children, we need to fulfill "as they planned", and this wouldn't be doing that, since they planned to invalidate the accused and his children.

[If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. If witnesses falsely testify that another person committed a crime which entails exile (we will learn which crimes entail exile in chapter two), the perjuring witnesses are not themselves exiled. Rather they received forty lashes.

Rather they are lashed 40 times. As the verse states (Deuteronomy 25:1-2) "They vindicated the righteous one and convicted the wicked one then it will be if the wicked one deserves to be beaten", [Just] because they convicted the wicked one it will be that he deserves to be beaten? Rather, [it is referring to] witnesses that made wicked a righteous one and came another set of witnesses and they vindicated the original righteous one and changed these [first witnesses] into wicked ones, if that will be then beat the wicked one [with lashes].

[If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. If a person falsely testifies that a man divorced his wife and did not pay her kethubah (marriage settlement) it does not make sense to punish him with a fine equal to the kethubah. Since if the husband should in the future divorce his wife or die and then have to pay the kethubah in any case, by falsely testifying now the perjuring witness didn’t necessarily cause the husband the loss of the kethubah. Rather we assess how much a person would want to pay to take a risk on buying the woman’s kethubah, on condition that if she would be divorced or widowed he would get the kethubah but if she should die before her husband he would not get the kethubah (since the husband inherits his wife). This is what he kethubah is worth at the present moment, while she and her husband are still alive, and this is what the perjuring witnesses therefore have to pay.

We don't say this one goes to exile. Since it is written regarding a murderer (Deuteronomy 19:5) "He shall flee", he [the murdeer] and not zommemin.

[If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years. In this scenario the witnesses falsely testify that a certain person borrowed a thousand zuz and must pay them back within thirty days. The accused does owe the thousand zuz but must pay them back only within ten years and not thirty days. Again, in this case we cannot merely fine the perjurers one thousand zuz since in the end the accused will have to pay back the zuz. Rather the witnesses tried to cause him to lose ten years minus thirty days use of the money, and they are therefore fined whatever a person would pay to use one thousand zuz for ten years minus thirty days.

That he divorced his wife. in front of us such and such a day, and this one [the accused] says "I did not divorce her and I am not obligated to pay her ketubah.

Is it not that either today or tomorrow. Meaning what do they [the zomemin] pay to him [the accused]? If you say the entire ketubah, perhaps he will die or perhaps he will divorce her today or tomorrow and in the end pay her anyways, and then it comes out that they weren't making him lose anything.

We assess how much a person would be willing to pay for this one's ketubah. due to an uncertainty. Since if she is widowed or divorced the one who purchased the ketubah will take [the whole value], and if she dies her husband inherits her and [the purchaser] loses the money he gave [for the ketubah], and this is what the [zomemin] witnesses stipulate to the husband.

For the title that brings upon him lashes. The verse that makes one liable for lashes is not the one that makes one liable to pay. Lashes [are learnt] from "Don't bear false witness". Paying [is learnt] from "And do to them as they planned".

[If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend two hundred zuz”, and they are found to be perjurers, they are flogged and ordered to make restitution, because the count which brings upon them the flogging is not the count that brings upon them the necessity to make restitution, these are the words of Rabbi Meir.
But the Sages say: “Anyone who makes restitution is not flogged.”
This mishnah discusses the punishment for a perjuring witness in a financial case.
There is a principle in Jewish law that one cannot receive two penalties for one crime. By testifying falsely a person is committing two crimes that theoretically carry with them two different penalties: 1) flogging for transgressing the commandment against false testimony (Exodus 20:13); 2) compensation for whatever financial loss he tried to impose upon his fellow (Deuteronomy 19:18-19). According to Rabbi Meir, since these are two different crimes categorized in two different Biblical verses, a person can be punished by both being flogged and having to make financial restitution, in this case 200 zuz. However, according to the Sages, anyone who makes restitution cannot be flogged. In this case the perjuring witnesses would pay the 200 zuz and would not be flogged.

All who pay don't get lashed. Since it is written "According to his wickedness", you make him liable [for lashes] because of his one act wickedness, and you don't make him liable for two acts of wickedness. And from the fact that the Rabbis say he [the zommemin] pays and doesn't get lashed and they didn't say he gets lashed and doesn't pay, we learn from this that all instances of liability for both lashes and paying, we don't say he'll get lashed and not pay, rather he pays and doesn't get lashed. This is the halacha.

Because you shall not bear false witness. Since behold when it is impossible to [punish] the witnesses with "do to them as they planned", for example [they say] "We testify about a certain person [kohen] that he is the son of a divorced woman, the witnesses are lashed due to "you shall not bear false witness". Here [in this case], where there is warning against "you shall not bear false witness" and also "as they planned", they are lashed 80 [times]. The halacha is not like Rabbi Meir.

Introduction Mishnayoth three continues to discuss the laws of perjuring witnesses.

They pay with money. The zommemin that are obligated in with [their attempt] to cause payment, pay the money according to the number of the witnesses. If it was three witnesses and they were made zommemin, each one pay a third of the [total] money that they wanted to cause him [the person they are testifying about] to lose.

[If they say:] “We testify that so and so is liable to a flogging of forty lashes, and they are found to be perjurers, they receive eighty lashes, because of, “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13) and “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” (Deuternomy 19:19), these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, “They receive only forty lashes.” This section is actually a continuation of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages begun in mishnah two. According to Rabbi Meir one can receive eighty lashes for one false testimony, forty for violating the commandment in Exodus and forty for trying to impose forty lashes upon the accused, the violation mentioned in Deuteronomy. According to the Sages, since this was only one act he can receive only one punishment, namely forty lashes, as he tried to impose upon the accused.

Lashes are not divided. It's not that each of the witnesses are lashed a portion of the [total number of] lashes, rather each one is lashed 40 [times]. This is because we need "do to them as they planned", and each one sought to have the accused lashed a full amount. [However] money is combined [after being divided], when each of the witnesses gives their portion, behold he [the accused] receives what they sought to make him lose, however lashes are not combined.

Monetary impositions are shared among the offenders, but the lashes are not shared among the offenders. How so? If they testified that he owed his friend one hundred zuz, and they were found to be perjurers, they divide the corresponding damages proportionately between them. But if they testified that he was liable to a flogging of forty lashes and were found to be perjurers, each one receives forty lashes. Witnesses who perjure themselves in a monetary case are punished by a fine equal to the financial loss they tried to impose upon the accused. In this type of case the witnesses may share the burden of the financial penalty. For instance if they lied with regards to two hundred zuz, each witness will compensate the accused one hundred zuz. If, however, they lied in a case involving lashes, the witnesses do not share the lashes. Rather each witness receives the number of lashes that they attempted to impose upon the accused.

Questions for Further Thought:
• Section one: What is the connection between the dispute in mishnah three and the dispute that we learned yesterday in mishnah two?
• Section two: Why do you think that the witnesses may share the financial penalty but not share the lashes?

Until they themselves are zommemized. That you zommemize them regarding their own [testimony] matters, and not the matters regarding the murderer and the murdered one, as it will go to explain. We derive this from the verse as it is written (Deuteronomy 19:18) "And behold the witness is a false witness", [this teaches us that they are not zommemized] until you falsify their status as witnesses.

Introduction Mishnah four continues to discuss the laws of perjuring witnesses.

Witnesses are not condemned as perjurers until they themselves are incriminated; How so? If they said: “We testify that so and so killed a person” and others said to them: “How could you testify to that, as that murdered person or that [alleged] murderer was with us on that very day, at such and such a place?” [then] the witnesses are not condemned as perjurers. But, if these [other] witnesses said: “How could you testify to that, as on that very day, you were with us at such and such a place?’ [then] the former are condemned as perjurers, and are executed by their [the other witnesses] word. This mishnah contains the Rabbinic definition of the type of perjuring witnesses referred to in the Torah. According to the Rabbis witnesses who are contradicted in their testimony are not always to receive the punishment that they tried to impose upon the accused. If other witnesses come and merely contradict the first witnesses’ testimony, while the testimony of the first witnesses may be invalidated, they do not receive the punishment that they tried to impose. After all, why should the court believe the testimony of the last witnesses more than it believes the testimony of the first witnesses? Rather, only if the second set of witnesses testify that the first set of witnesses could not have even seen that which they purport to have seen are the first witnesses punished as perjurers. This is what the mishnah means when it states that the witnesses themselves must be incriminated. In other words the form of perjury referred to in the Torah is only a case where the witnesses lie about their own whereabouts at the time of the crime. If they lie about the crime itself, while they may be punished with lashes for false testimony, they do not receive the punishment they attempted to impose.

Even if there were a hundred. pairs that testified one after the other with one testimony and one pair zommemizes all of them, all of them are killed.

If other witnesses came, and they charged them [with perjury]: then [again] others came, and they [again] charged them [with perjury], even a hundred, they are all to be executed.
Rabbi Judah says: “This is a conspiracy and the first set alone is [to be] executed.”
Mishnah five deals with multiple sets of perjuring witnesses.
According to the opinion in the first section of the mishnah every set of witnesses that perjures themselves with regards to a certain crime can be executed for perjury (if the case was a capital case). If, for instance, Reuven and Shimon testify that Jacob committed a crime which entails the death penalty and then Levi and Judah come and state that at the time of the alleged crime Reuven and Shimon were with them and not at the scene of the crime, Reuven and Shimon are executed. If afterwards Zevulun and Issachar come and testify to the same crime and again Levi and Judah claim that they were with them at the time of the crime, then Zevulun and Issachar are to be executed as well. Levi and Judah can testify against as many witnesses as they want, and even one hundred witnesses, all saying the same thing, could be executed for perjury.
Rabbi Judah claims that in this scenario there is a conspiracy between the accused and those who contradict everyone else’s testimony, namely, Levi and Judah. While we do accept their testimony, only the first set of witnesses are executed.

This is a conspiracy. This [word istetit] means that this group has strayed and are on the wrong path, as they schemed between themselves to zommemize all the witnesses that come to testify in this case. Another explanation of "this is an istetit", is these witnesses are shooters of istis, that it colors all that touch it.

Only the first group is killed. Since Rabbi Yehudah holds that after the first group is zommemized, the testimony of a second group that comes is no longer accepted, and if [a second group does in fact] testify and is zommemized, they are not killed, since we don't apply [the verse] "do to them", since we would not kill based off their [the second group's] testimony. The halacha is not like Rabbi Yehudah.

Until the judgement is finished. [The judgement] of the accused. Since he will be killed by their testimony, and afterwards they are zommemized.

Perjuring witnesses are not to be put to death until [after] the end of the trial.
Because the Sadducees say: “[Perjurers were put to death] only after the accused had [actually] been executed, as it says, “ A life for a life” (Deuteronomy 19:21).
The [Pharisaic] Sages said to them: “But has not it already been said “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” (Deuteronomy 19:19) which implies when his brother is still alive?
If so, why does it say “A life for life”?
For it might have been that perjurers are liable to be put to death from the moment their testimony had been taken, therefore the Torah states “A life for a life” that is to say that they are not executed until [after] the termination of the trial.
Mishnah six discusses at one point in the judicial process the witnesses are proven to be perjurers in order for them to receive the penalty that they tried to impose upon the accused.
This mishnah contains a dispute between the Pharisees and Sadducees, two of the main Jewish sects that competed during the Second Temple period (until 70 C.E.). The issue at hand is when are the perjuring witnesses to be executed: after the trial or only after the accused has been himself executed. The Sadducees claim that perjuring witnesses are only executed if they have been successful in having the accused actually executed. In other words, the witnesses are executed not for intending to unjustly execute the accused but for actually doing so. Just as in a case of murder of person the guilty can be convicted and executed as a murderer only if he actually succeeds and murders the victim, so too in this case, the witnesses are only executed if they succeed and have the accused wrongfully executed. The Sadducees learn this from the verse that states “A life for a life”. The witnesses have their lives taken away only if the accused already lost his life.
The Sages, who assumedly are Pharisees, the predecessors of the Rabbis of the Mishnah, state that the perjurers are executed once the verdict has been delivered, meaning the wrongful verdict that they attempted to impose upon the accused. If their testimony is contradicted beforehand then they are not executed because they were not even successful in getting a verdict pronounced against the accused. The Sages arrive at this conclusion by finding the middle ground between two seemingly contradictory verses. Verse 19 says that “you shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” which sounds like “his fellow” is still alive when the perjurers are executed. From this verse alone we might have concluded that the perjuring witnesses are executed as soon as their testimony is found to be false, even if the accused has not been convicted. However, verse 21, “a life for a life” seems to imply that the perjurers are executed only if the accused actually loses his life, as the Sadducees said. The middle ground is that the perjurers are not executed immediately after they give their testimony (and they are found to be perjuring themselves) nor must the accused have been actually executed for the perjurers to be executed. Rather they are executed if the trial was completed, the accused found guilty and then the witnesses proven to be perjurers.

Where do we know that this is the case for even a hundred. That two can zommemize one hundred that testify together.

Introduction Both mishnah seven and mishnah eight which we will learn tomorrow contain midrashim, exegeses, of the verse in Deuteronomy 17:6 which states that a person may be executed by the testimony of “two or three witnesses”. This statement is not a precise legal statement. If two witnesses are sufficient than the Torah should have stated two. If three witnesses are necessary the Torah should not have stated two. Since all of the Sages held that two witnesses were sufficient, they must answer why the Torah also stated three.

Just as two aren't killed until you zommemize the both of them. As it is written (Deuteronomy 19:18) "And behold, the witness is a false witness", and the master said, any place it says "witness" behold here it refers to two, unless the verse specifies it's one.

This mishnah contains three opinions with regards to a perceived problem in the Biblical verse mentioned in the beginning of the mishnah.

Until all three are zommemized. This [refers to the case] where they each testified within a few seconds of the previous speaker finishing. However, if two testified and at a later time others testified, behold they are [considered] two groups in all aspects.

“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6).
If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. The first solution is that the Torah teaches that a set of three witnesses can be made into perjurers even by a set of two witnesses. If the Torah had only taught “two witnesses” we might have thought that two was sufficient to incriminate two other witnesses but not three, since they are more numerous. Therefore, the Torah teaches that no matter how large the group of witnesses, even one hundred, they do not have more power than a contradictory set of two. If, therefore, three witnesses were to testify to a capital crime and the person was found guilty and condemned to die and then two witnesses claimed that the three prior witnesses were not present at the time of the alleged crime and rather were with them, the first three are executed as perjurers.

Rabbi Akiva says: The third witness in the group only makes the case stricter. So you don't say, since without the third [witness] the testimony would have stood, don't apply to him the rule of hazama, the verse teaches you that even he is judged.

Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon’s opinion is that just as when a pair of witnesses testify neither can be executed until both are proven to be perjurers, so too when three witnesses testify, none may be executed until all are proven to be perjurers. Without the word “three” in the Torah we might have thought that if three or more testify and two are found to be perjurers they may be executed, even if the third was not a perjurer. After all, the two would have been sufficient to have the accused executed. Therefore the Torah teaches “three” and “witnesses” to teach that none are executed as perjurers until all are proven to be so.

All the more so. Since [G-d's] attribute of good is greater than [his] attribute of punishment.

Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!” According to Rabbi Akiva, if three witnesses testify and two are incriminated as perjurers, the third witness is executed even if he was not a perjurer. He is punished not for his false testimony but for joining in with other perjurers/evildoers. Although this is a harsh sentence, Rabbi Akiva finds in it a ray of hope. If those who merely join with evildoers are punished so harshly all the more so will those who join with those who perform commandments be greatly rewarded.

Questions for Further Thought:
• What would be the practical result of the various interpretations on the procedures of the court? What type of psychological effect would they have on the witnesses?

What case are we talking about? Capital cases. Since it is written (Numbers 35:25) "And the congregration shall save him.", and we return him to his vindicated status....

Introduction Mishnah Eight continues to expound upon the verse in Deuteronomy 17:6 which states that a person may be executed by the testimony of “two or three witnesses”.

Whether monetary cases. The testimony is also nullified.

Just as in the case of two witnesses, if one of them was found to be a relative or [otherwise] disqualified, their whole evidence is rendered void, so it is with three, if one of them was found to be a relative or [otherwise] disqualified, the whole evidence is void. How do we know that this is the case even with a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. This section is a continuation of the previous mishnah’s discussion of the verse in Deuteronomy which stated “two or three witnesses”. Another reason why the Torah states “two or three” is to teach that if one witness is invalidated (for reasons why witnesses may be invalidated see Sanhedrin 3:4), the entire grouping of witnesses is invalid. This is obvious when there are two witnesses, for if one is invalidated, obviously the other one’s singular testimony will be invalidated due to its insufficiency. However, even if there are three or more witnesses, and only one’s testimony is invalidated, and their remain two or more valid witnesses, nevertheless all of their testimony is invalidated.

At a time that they warned him. We're dealing with capital cases. This is to say, when do we say [the testimony] is nullified? When the close relative or invalid [witness] joins in at the beginning, becoming one of the warners against the transgressor. However, if they didn't warn them and they didn't intend to become a witness in the event, the testimony of the others is not nullified just because they saw it. The halacha is like Rebbi.

Rabbi Yose said: “When is this true? With regards to capital cases; but in monetary suits, the evidence may be established by the rest. Rabbis says: “It is one and the same rule, be it in monetary suits or capital cases.” Rabbi Yose limits this ruling to capital crimes. In civil/monetary suits if one witness’s testimony is invalidated the other witnesses’ testimony can still stand. Rabbi Akiva disagrees and claims that there is no difference between monetary and capital cases.

This is the rule when both [disqualified] witnesses warned the trasngressor, but when they did not warn him, what could two brothers do that saw someone killing a person? The mishnah now again limits the ruling in section one. In order to convict someone of a capital crime he must be warned before he commits the crime. If a person warns him before he commits the crime and then he commits it anyway, the person who warned him may testify against him. If a relative warned the person before he committed the crime, he will become one of the witnesses, thereby invalidating all of the testimony due to his being a relative or otherwise invalid. If, however, the witness did not warn the potential offender, he does not necessarily become a witness and he will therefore not invalidate the others’ testimony. The mishnah points out that if merely by witnessing a crime relatives can invalidate everyone’s testimony, neither of two brothers who saw a murder would be able to testify against the murderer. If two brothers and a third person saw a murder and the law was that relatives may not join together to testify, and just by seeing the crime they become witnesses, the murderer would not be able to be convicted. Rather, the mishnah teaches that the third person can join his testimony with one of the brothers and thereby convict the accused.

And one warns in the middle. The warner joins with the group of witnesses, he sees them and they see him at the time of warning. Therefore, if the two groups that are in the two windows see him, they all join together and their testimony becomes one.

Introduction Mishnah nine continues to discuss the laws of witnessing capital crimes. It deals with the question when are witnesses consider two groups and when are they considered one group. Furthermore this mishnah deals with the requirement of the witnesses to warn the transgressor before he commits his crime.

He and them are killed. He is killed since there is one group that wasn't zommemized, and those that were zommemized are killed.

If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. If a murder is witnessed by two sets of witnesses from two different angles we need to know if they are legally considered one set of witnesses or two sets. If they constitute one set of witnesses then if any one of the four is caught as a perjurer, or is otherwise invalidated, all of their testimony is invalid, and none of the witnesses can be executed, unless they were all caught as perjurers . If they are two sets of witnesses, then if one set is caught as a perjurers or otherwise disqualified, there remains a set of valid witnesses, and the transgessor is executed upon their testimony. According to the mishnah the two sets of witnesses’ testimony is joined only under two conditions: 1) the two sets can see each other; 2) the person warning the transgessor stands between the two sets of witnesses such that all may see him. If the witnesses cannot see each other or the person warning was not seen by all of the witnesses, then they are two different sets.

That the Sanhedrin shouldn't hear through a interpreter. The judges need to understand the language, and not need to place an interpreter between them. And thus this is the halacha.

Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Rabbi Yose states that two must warn the transgessor before he commits the crime in order to convict him afterwards. He learns this from the verse in Deut. 17:6, which literally translates, “by the mouth of two witnesses” (which is just idiomatic for “by two witnesses”). Rabbi Yose understands that not only the verbal testimony but the verbal warning as well must come from two witnesses.

Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter. Another interpretation of the phrase “by the mouth of” is that testimony may not be given through a translator. A translator would cause the testimony to come from someone else’s mouth. If the witness does not speak a language that the sanhedrin understands, his testimony does not count.

Sanhendrin. that have smicha in the land of Israel. They have permission to judge cases of fines and capital cases, whether in the land or outside, as long as the Grand Court is in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. As it is written (Deuteronomy 17:12) "in not listening to the priest...or the judge", as long as there is a priest offering sacrifices on the altar, there is a judge that rules capital cases. When there is no priest, there is no judge.

Introduction Mishnah ten discusses a criminal who flees after being convicted. The final part of mishnah ten contains the famous discussion regarding how often the sanhedrins actually carried out executions.

The Sanhedrin that kills once in seven. Once in seven years.

If one fled after having been convicted at a court and again comes up before the same court, the [first] judgment is not set aside. Wherever two witnesses stand up and declare, “We testify that so and so was tried and convicted at a certain court and that so and so were the witnesses” the accused is executed. If the convicted felon fled and was returned before the same court, he is executed without another trial. If he was caught and brought before a different court two witnesses must state that this person was already convicted by another court. They must also name the court and name those who testified against the felon. If they do so he may be executed by the new court without a full trial.

is called destructive. They need to be deliberate in judgment, and judge capital cases to vindication.

[Trials before] a sanhedrin are customary both in the land [of Israel] and outside it. The sanhedrin of twenty three is a communal structure that is functional both in the Land of Israel and outside of it.

No one would ever be killed. They would interrogate the witnesses about things that they would be unable to respond. Regarding a murder, [they'll be asked] "What did you see, was he a treifah or healthy?". And they'll say he was healthy, perhaps the place he was stabbed already had a [deathly] puncture. Regarding sexual immorality, [they'll be asked] "Did you see the makeup applicator inserted into the tube?".

A sanhedrin that executes once in seven years, is called murderous. Rabbi Eliezer b. Azariah Says: once in seventy years. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: “Had we been members of a sanhedrin, no person would ever be put to death. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel remarked: “They would also multiply murderers in Israel.” This famous piece of mishnah testifies to some of the Rabbis’ deep hesitations with regards to the death penalty. As we have seen throughout tractate Sanhedrin and tractate Makkoth, convicting a person of a capital crime is no easy matter. The person must be warned beforehand and then the crime has to be explicitly witnessed by two valid witnesses. Therefore, the first opinion in our mishnah, concludes that a court that executes once every seven years is a murderous court. Since the laws of testimony are so strict, any court that executes more often than this is assumed to be illegally suspending the laws and is therefore, in a sense, engaging in murder itself. Rabbi Elezar ben Azariah says that once in seventy years already makes a court murderous. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva brag that had they been on a sanhedrin no one would have ever been executed. At the end of the mishnah Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, the political leader of the Jews at the time, notes a sound of caution. The Rabbinic tendency to be overly lenient on executing murderers can take its toll on society. In his opinion the attitudes of the other Rabbis cause the numbers of murderers to rise.

They're even increasing murder. Due to this we aren't destroying wicked people and are increasing the spilling of blood.

Questions for Further Thought:
• Section two: Why might one have thought that the sanhedrin was not functional outside of the Land of Israel?
• Section three: Why do the Rabbis feel the need to state how infrequently a court should execute? What is Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel’s argument with the others?