R. Meir mówi: Każdy warunek, który nie jest podobny do stanu synów Gada i synów Reuvena [tj. Warunek i jego przeciwieństwo] nie jest (ważnym) warunkiem [a nawet jeśli warunek nie jest spełniony, zaangażowanie stoi], a mianowicie. (Lb 32: 29-30): „I rzekł do nich Mojżesz:„ Jeśli synowie Gada i synowie Reuvena przejdą… A jeśli nie przejdą uzbrojeni, (wtedy będą mieli z wami posiadłość w ziemia Kanaan ””). [A gdyby nie powiedział czegoś przeciwnego, dar utrzyma się i odziedziczą ziemię Gilead, nawet gdyby nie przeszli. I chociaż powiedział: „Jeśli przejdą z tobą”, nie zakładamy, że domniemana jest sytuacja odwrotna. Jesteśmy również powiadamiani niniejszym, że warunek musi poprzedzać zobowiązanie, a nie jest napisane: „Dajcie im je, jeśli przejdą”, z których wnioskujemy, że gdyby tak stwierdził, warunek nie wyprzedziłby poprzednie zobowiązanie. Jesteśmy również poinformowani, że pozytyw musi być umieszczony przed negatywem, a nie jest napisane: „Jeśli nie przejdą, nie dawaj ich, a jeśli przejdą, daj je”. R. Chanina ur. Gamliel mówi: Trzeba było to stwierdzić, bo gdyby tak nie było, wynikałoby z tego, że nie odziedziczyliby nawet ziemi Kanaan. [R. Chanina różni się od odwrotności, uważając, że samo stwierdzenie implikuje odwrotność. Jeśli chodzi o stwierdzenie przez Mojżesza odwrotnego, było to konieczne (w tym konkretnym przypadku). Co do halachy: jeśli ktoś mówi: „pod warunkiem”, nie jest konieczne stawianie czegoś odwrotnego, pozytywnego przed negatywem, ani zobowiązania przed warunkiem, ale warunek pozostaje. A jeśli nie powie: „pod warunkiem”, musi stwierdzić wszystkie powyższe, a jeśli tego nie zrobi, warunek jest nieważny i zobowiązanie pozostaje. I nie ma znaczenia, czy będzie to warunek w kontekście prawa pieniężnego, czy w kontekście rozwodu i zaręczyn— pod tym względem wszystkie są takie same.]
Bartenura on Mishnah Kiddushin
כל תנאי – which is not a double [stipulation] (stating both alternatives) is not a [valid] condition, for even if the condition was not fulfilled, the words/matters were fulfilled.
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English Explanation of Mishnah Kiddushin
Introduction
This mishnah contains a general principle of Rabbi Meir: any stipulation must be a double stipulation. This means that if I make a stipulation I must state both the consequences of the condition being fulfilled and the consequences of its not being fulfilled. For instance, if I want to say that I will come to your house if you give me chocolate cake (and I would), I must say, “I will come to your house if you give me chocolate cake, and I will not come to your house if you don’t give me chocolate cake.” Otherwise the stipulation is not legally binding, and even if you give me chocolate cake, I am not legally bound to come to your house (but I would never do such a thing).
Rabbi Meir derives this principle from Moses’s words to the children of Gad and Reuben, as we shall explain below.
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Bartenura on Mishnah Kiddushin
אם יעברו ואם לא יעברו – and if he did not double the words, his condition would be fulfilled and they (i.e., Reuben, Gad, and one-half of the tribe of Manasseh would inherit the land of Gilead, even though they would not cross [the Jordan River to fight the battles in Canaan with their brethren]. And even though he (i.e., Moses) said, “If every shock-fighter among the Gadites and Reubenites crosses the Jordan with you…” we don’t have that it follows from the affirmation, we derive the negative by implication. And we learn from it also, that we require the condition before the action, for since he did not say, “give it to them if they will cross [the Jordan]” implies that if he had said such, its condition would not come and void the action of the gift that preceded it, and we also learn from it that we require the affirmative prior to the negative, for he (i.e., Moses) did not say, “if you will not cross, don’t give them, but if they do cross, give them.”
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English Explanation of Mishnah Kiddushin
Rabbi Meir says: every stipulation which is not like that of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben is not a [valid] stipulation, as it say, “And Moses said to them, ‘If the children of Gad and the children of Reuben will pass [with you over the Jordan, then you shall give them the land of Gilead for a possession].” and it is also written, “But if they will not pass over with you armed, [then they shall have possessions among you in the land of Canaan]” (Numbers 32:29-30). Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: the matter had to be stated, for had it not been stated it would have implied that even in Canaan they should not inherit. The children of Gad and Reuven did not want to inherit on the west side of the Jordan river; they wished to remain on the east side, in a place good for their cattle. Moses responded to them that if they cross to help fight in the conquering of Canaan, then they may inherit on the east side of the Jordan. He also added that if they did not cross and fight with the rest of Israel, then they would only be able to inherit in Canaan. From the fact that Moses “doubled” his stipulation, Rabbi Meir derives that all stipulations must be doubled. Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel responds that Moses had to state the second half of his statement. Had he not done so, he might have implied that if they didn’t fight for Canaan they wouldn’t even get an inheritance in Canaan. Since the second half is a necessary statement, we cannot learn that stipulations that don’t need a “negative” side do not need to be doubled. The mishnah ends with Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel’s response to Rabbi Meir. Had Rabbi Meir responded he might have said that it is obvious that the children of Gad and Reuven would inherit in the land of Canaan, since all of the tribes inherited there irregardless of their participation in the conquest. Since the second half of his stipulation was unnecessary, we can learn that the only reason Moses added it in was because all stipulations must be thusly doubled.
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Bartenura on Mishnah Kiddushin
ר' חנינא כו' – He disputes the double condition, that there is no need to double, for it follows from the affirmation that we derive the negative by implication, and this is what Moses doubled, there was a need for that matter. And regarding the Halakhic decision, if he said, “on condition,” there is no need for the double stipulation, and neither the affirmation prior to the negative, nor the condition prior to the ac, but the condition stands. But, if he did not say, “on the condition,” he would need all of these things that we mentioned, “and if not,” the condition is void and the action is valid, and it doesn’t make a difference whether the condition was made in monetary matters or in [the realms] of Jewish divorce and betrothal – everything is equivalent in this matter.
