Komentarz do Ketuwot 7:15

המדיר את אשתו מליהנות לו – on the benefit of sexual relations, this vow does not take effect because he is subjugated to her and he doesn’t have the power to cancel his obligation of his subjugation and on the benefit of food, even though he is subjugated to her, we find that the vow exists such as we supply her handiwork for her food. And in the Gemara (Talmud Ketubot 70b), it raises a question: if so, why should he appoint an administrator? And it answers – such as the case that we don’t supply the things that she was accustomed to in her father’s house and for this alone, he should appoint an administrator who will provide for her and not that he sill appoint an agent to support her, for the agent of a person is like that person, but rather, he says, all who support does not cause loss.

Introduction The first six mishnayoth of chapter seven discuss vows that a husband might take to prohibit his wife from doing something. If the husband takes such a vow and thereby deprives the woman of a right that she has, he must divorce her and pay her her ketubah. However, he does not necessarily have to divorce her immediately. Rather we give him a cooling off period, in the hopes that he will change his mind, and find someone to release him from his vow (we will learn about how vows are released in tractate Nedarim).

יתר מכן יוציא ויתן כתובה – for up to thirty days, people don’t listen and there is no disgrace. More than thirty days, people here and there is disgrace.

If a man forbade his wife by vow to have any benefit from him, for thirty days, he may appoint a provider, but if for a longer period he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. If a man takes a vow thereby forbidding anything he owns to his wife, he has broken one of the guarantees of the ketubah, namely that he must provide her with food and clothing. Therefore he must divorce her. The first opinion in the mishnah gives him thirty days to “cool off”. After that time he must divorce her and give her her ketubah. Furthermore, even during these thirty days he is not allowed to abrogate his duties to her. Rather he must appoint someone to provide for her during this time period. According to the Talmud, this “provider” is not a direct agent of the husband, for that would be as if he himself was providing for her, and he cannot due to his vow. Therefore, the Talmud explains that the husband states, “Anyone who provides for my wife will not lose out”. When someone else provides for her, the husband may pay him back and this is not consider an abrogation of the vow.

בישראל – if he is an Israelite (as opposed to being a Kohen), he can restore his divorced wife.

Rabbi Judah ruled: if he was an Israelite he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for one month, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] two months. If he was a priest he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for two months, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] three. According to Rabbi Judah, the husband is given a slightly longer period in which to “cool off” and have his vow released. If he is an Israelite and he takes a vow that she should not benefit from his property for one month, he may provide for her with a “provider”. However, if he takes a vow for two months, he must divorce her and give her her ketubah. If he is a priest, if his vow is for two months he may provide for her with a provider, but if for three months he must divorce her. The reason that Rabbi Judah gives more time to a priest is that a priest cannot remarry his own divorcee. A regular Israelite can remarry his divorcee provided that she has not remarried someone else first.

ובכהנת – for if he disvorces her, he is not able to restore her [as his wife], the Rabbis hive him more time, but the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Yehuda.

אחד מכל הפירות – such as for example, she said, “I take a vow against consuming this produce,” and it is fulfilled for her.

Introduction Whereas in yesterday’s mishnah the husband tried to prevent his wife from benefiting from his property, in today’s mishnah he takes a to try to prevent her from eating any produce whatsoever. This is obviously a much more expansive vow. We should note that the Talmud explains this mishnah as a case where the wife took the vow not to eat a certain fruit and the husband did not annul the vow, as is his right (see Numbers 30:11-15). The reason why the Talmud explains the mishnah in this way is that a person can never take a vow to forbid another person to do something if it has nothing to do with his (the one who vowed) property. In other words while Reuven can take a vow that Shimon can’t eat any of Reuven’s bread, Reuven cannot take a vow that Shimon can’t eat bread. Therefore, our mishnah must deal with a case where the woman vowed and the man did not break the vow. I will explain the mishnah more according to its words than its explanation in the Talmud. If we understand the mishnah without the Talmud’s explanation, we will need to conclude that a husband can take a vow to forbid his wife from doing anything; however, if he does so he will need to divorce her immediately.

ר' יהודה אומר כו' – and the Halakha is not according to him.

If a man forbade his wife by vow from tasting any kind of produce he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, if a man vows that his wife cannot eat any type of produce, he must divorce her immediately. In this case he is not given any cooling off period, because his vow was so damaging.

Rabbi Judah ruled: if he was an Israelite he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for one day, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] two days. If he was a priest he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for two days, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] three. Rabbi Judah gives the man a day to cool off (and two for a priest, who cannot remarry his divorcee) but no more. Again, since the vow was so inclusive, and she can only go for so long without eating produce, he must divorce her quite quickly.

שלא תתקשט באחד מכל המינים – [for she said]: “I take a vow that this shame be upon me and he fulfilled it for her.

Introduction This mishnah discusses a husband who vows that his wife should not adorn herself. According to the mishnah, a woman has a right to adorn herself and therefore a husband who takes such a vow must divorce her. As in yesterday’s mishnah, the Talmud interprets the mishnah to refer to a situation where the wife vowed and the husband upheld the vow. However, I will again explain the mishnah according to its words and not according to its Talmudic interpretation.

בעניות שלא נתן קצבה לדבר – until when/how long was it prohibited to her, he should divorce her and give her the Ketubah settlement, but if he set a limit, she should wait until that time, and what is that limit? Twelve months.

If a man forbade his wife by vow that she should not adorn herself with any type of adornment he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. If the husband vows that his wife not adorn herself with jewelry or with perfume, he must divorce her immediately.

ובעשירות שלשים יום – for it is the case that an important woman benefits from the scent of her adornments for thirty days and this one will benefit from the scent of the adornments that she was adorned with prior to the vow thirty days, and the Halakha is according to Rabbi Yosi.

Rabbi Yose says: [this refers] to poor women if no time limit is given, and to rich women [if the time limit is] thirty days. Rabbi Yose explains that there is a distinction between rich and poor wives in this matter. If the wife was poor and he took an open-ended vow, he must divorce her immediately. However, if he set a time limit on the vow, he need not divorce her. Because she is poor, she is accustomed to not adorning herself and a limited vow will not be so damaging. According to the Talmud, the maximum time of the vow is 12 months. However, were she rich, he could not take such a long vow, for she is accustomed to adorning herself frequently. Therefore, the maximum time is thirty days; if he takes a vow of a longer duration, he must divorce her immediately.

רגל אחד יקיים שלשה יוציא ויתן כתובה – This Mishnah, we explain it in the Gemara (Talmud Ketubot 71b) as such: [one] Festival he should uphold the marriage. When is this said? With an Israelite woman but with the daughter of a Kohen, two months he should uphold the marriage and three [months], he should divorce her and grant her the Ketubah settlement but our Mishnah is according to Rabbi Yehuda who disputes [regarding the marriage] of an Israelite to a daughter of a Kohen, but the Halakha is not according to him.

Introduction This mishnah deals with a husband who attempts to prohibit his wife from seeing her father.

If a man forbade his wife by vow that she may not go to her father’s house: --When the father lives with her in the same town, the husband may retain [her as his wife, if the prohibition was for] one month; but if for two months he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. --When the father lives in another town, the husband may retain [her as his wife, if the prohibition was for] one festival, but if for three festivals, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. In the scenario in this mishnah, a husband makes a vow that prohibits his wife from visiting her father. You can imagine that this situation arose out of some tension between the two. The mishnah rules that if the father is in the same town, he can prohibit her for only one month. More than that, and he has to divorce her and give her the ketubah. Since they live in the same town, more than a month without seeing each other would be too long of an absence for her or perhaps her father to bear. If the father lives in another town, the daughter assumedly sees him less frequently, and therefore the husband’s prohibition is allowed to stand slightly longer. If he prohibits her for one festival (until the next festival), he may retain her as a wife. According to the Talmud, in order to understand this section of the mishnah we must add into the mishnah that if he prohibits her for two festivals (until two festivals have past), he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. If the husband was a priest, he may retain her if the prohibition was for two festivals, but must divorce her if for three. The Talmud adds this extra clause into the mishnah, for otherwise it doesn’t deal with a prohibition of two festivals.

שנועל בפניה – the door of joy and the removal of sorrow, and to the house of mourning, he locks it (i.e., the door) in her face, for tomorrow she may die, and no one will eulogize her.

Introduction Mishnah five continues to discuss husbands who attempt to prevent their wives from doing certain things.

דבר אחר מחמת – as for example, that under the presumption that lawless human beings are found there.

If a man forbade his wife by vow from visiting a house of mourning or a house of feasting, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah, because he has closed [peoples doors] against her. A husband cannot prohibit his wife from paying a condolence call to a house of mourning or from celebrating at a wedding. The mishnah reasons that he cannot do so for by preventing her from participating in others’ sorrows or joy, they will in return not visit her when she is mourning or celebrating one of her children’s weddings. However, if he claims that his vow had a “cause”, which in the mishnah usually is a euphemism for sexual licentiousness, he may prohibit her from going. In other words, if he fears that there will be illicit goings-on at the house of mourning, or more likely at the house of feasting, he may prohibit her from going there.

שתאמרי לפלוני וכו' – things of degradation/disgrace.

If he claims [that his vow] was due to some other cause he is permitted [to forbid her]. If he said to her: “[There shall be no prohibition] provided you tell so-and-so what you have told me” or “what I have told you” or “that you will fill and pour out in the garbage”, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. A husband cannot use a vow to force his wife to engage in behavior that will embarrass her. He cannot force her to tell others secret things that he has told her or that she has told him. The last phrase of this mishnah “fill and pour out in the garbage” is interpreted in two ways in the Talmud. One interpretation is that it literally means that she should fill up jugs with water and then pour the water out into the garbage, an act that others will (rightfully) interpret as crazy. Alternatively, it may be a euphemism for “spilling seed” (the man’s interrupting his intercourse with her). A husband cannot force his wife to allow him to engage in such an act. If he does so, she may demand a divorce and receive her ketubah.

שתהא ממלאה ומערה לאשפה – there are those who interpret that after she has sexual intercourse and her womb is filled with semen, it would shake it out in order that the seed won’t be absorbed and she will become pregnant. And there are those who interpret that she will fill ten pitches of water and she will pour them out to the ground, because she appears as a women suspected of infidelity by her husband.

מאכילתו שאינו מעושר – and it was not known to him until after she fed him, such as for example, tat she said to him: So-and-so, a Kohen prepared for me the heap [of grain] and left; he asked him and it was found to be a lie.

Introduction The first five mishnayoth of this chapter referred to situations in which a husband must divorce his wife and pay her the ketubah. In this mishnah we learn situations in which a husband has grounds for divorcing his wife and not paying her ketubah. These situations refer to cases in which the woman has not behaved in a proper manner, either directly with her husband or with outside society.

ומשמשתו נדה – as for example, when she was presumed to be a menstruant woman/Niddah in his neighborhood when they saw her dress in the clothing of menstruant woman and to her husband she said, “I am ritually pure.”

These leave [their marriage] without their ketubah: A wife who transgresses the law of Moses or Jewish law. The mishnah describes two categories of women whose husbands may divorce them without paying their ketubah: the one who transgresses the Law of Moses, which is interpreted to mean she causes her husband to transgress the Law of Moses, and the second is the one who transgresses Jewish law, which means she engages in immodest behavior.

ולא קוצה לה חלה – that she said to him: So-and-so prepared for me the dough and they asked him and it was found that to be a lie.

And what is the law of Moses? Feeding her husband with untithed food, having intercourse with him while in the period of her menstruation, not separating dough offering, or making vows and not fulfilling them. The mishnah now lists four ways in which a wife might cause her husband to transgress. If she does not separate the tithes or the dough-offering (hallah) her husband will eat forbidden food. She has a responsibility to tell her husband when she is in her period of menstruation and if she does not and he has relations with her, he too is a transgressor. The fourth category is somewhat less clear, for we would not imagine that the husband transgresses if his wife does not keep her vows. The Talmud explains that children die as a result of broken vows and therefore she is injuring him as well. A simpler explanation may be that since the husband has the right to annul his wife’s vows, he too is held responsible if she doesn’t keep them.

וטווה בשור – and she shows her arms to people.

And what is Jewish practice? Going out with her head uncovered, spinning wool in the marketplace or conversing with every man. This section lists certain immodest actions that are grounds for divorce. In Talmudic times women did not go out without their heads covered (for that matter, men also usually covered their heads). Spinning in public was also considered unbecoming, perhaps because the woman would uncover her arms while spinning. Talking with many strange men was also considered improper behavior for a married woman. Since the woman engaged in one of these behaviors, her husband may divorce and not pay her ketubah. I might add my personal opinion that what was improper behavior must have been determined by norms in the larger society, at least to a large degree. Since it was normal for women to cover their heads, Jewish women who did not were immodest. I do not think that this implies that not covering one’s head is inherently immodest. However, other Jews might disagree with me.

ומדברת עם בני אדם – playing with the boys.

Abba Shaul says: also one who curses her husband’s parents in his presence. Abba Shaul adds that a woman’s cursing her husband’s parents in front of him is also grounds for divorce.

ומקללת יולדיו בפניו – she curses and blasphemes the father of her husband in the presence of her husband.

Rabbi Tarfon says: also one who has a loud voice. And who is regarded as one who has a loud voice? A woman whose voice can be heard by her neighbors when she speaks inside her house. Rabbi Tarfon adds that a woman whose voice is too loud, that is she can be heard by her neighbors from inside her home, may also be divorced without a ketubah. The Talmud teaches that this refers to a woman who talks about sex too loudly.

הקולנית – she claims sexual intercourse in a loud voice until her neighbors hear her, and all of these require witnesses and warning to cause them to lose their Ketubah settlements, and they don’t have neither the Ketubah nor the supplement and they don’t take anything other than their outworn garments that exist alone.

שאין עליה נדרים ונמצאו עליה נדרים – on which vows did they say that she should not eat meat and not drink wine and not adorn herself in colorful clothing, but in the rest of the vows, she is betrothed/sanctified.

Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss cases where a woman is divorced and does not receive her ketubah. The cases in our mishnah are when a woman did not disclose to her husband things that he should have known before marrying her. We should note here that the mishnah will talk about physical defects found on both the woman and the man. I think we should note here that these mishnayoth discuss the matters on a very legal plane. That is to say the mishnayoth ask whether or not these defects can form the grounds for divorce. These mishnayoth can be read as not implying that such flaws make a person “worth less”, but merely as a recognizing that there are those in society who, unfortunately, do think so

כל המומין הפוסלין בכהנים – with regard to first-born he counts them, and they added to them with regard to women: sweat, and bad breath or bad smell in another place in body. And warts that have in them hair, whether small or large when it is corresponding to her face or in the case where it is underneath the covering that on her head, for sometimes it is seen and sometimes it is not seen for if she is in a revealed place at all times, he sees it and is appeased, but if the wart has no hair, it is not a blemish until it as a large as an Issar. And her voice is thick and different from the voice of other women, and the dog bit her and made in the place of the bite became scarred (see Talmud Ketubot 75a), meaning to say, causing it to shrink like wounds by fire. And her breasts are larger than her neighbors by a handbreadth and just as the breasts are distant from one another until there is a and-breadth between each breast. These are blemishes in women and even though they are not [viewed as] blemishes in Kohanim.

If a man betrothed a woman on condition that she was under no vows and she was found to be under vows, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to be under vows, she leaves without her ketubah. It can be assumed that a husband does not want his wife to be subject to vows that will prevent her from engaging in certain activities, such as eating meat or drinking wine. Such vows would certainly disrupt the normal functioning of a marriage. If he betroths her on the specific condition that she is not subject to any vows, and after betrothal it is found out that she is subject to vows, she is not betrothed. Since the betrothal was made under false pretenses it is invalid and she does not need a get to remarry, nor does she receive her ketubah. However, if he did not make such a condition, and then later finds out that she is subject to vows, the marriage is valid. Nevertheless, since she should have told him that she had vows, he may divorce her without paying her the ketubah. In other words, the marriage was not exactly made under a false assumption and therefore she needs a get in order to remarry, but she still was dishonest with him and therefore she loses the ketubah.

[If a woman was betrothed] on condition that she has no bodily defects, and she was found to have defects, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to have defects, she leaves without her ketubah. All defects which disqualify priests also disqualify women. The same rule concerning a woman subject to vows is also true with regard to a woman who has physical defects. If he specifically stipulated that she not have any physical defects (assumedly ones that he could not detect when she was clothed), and she does, the betrothal is invalid. If he did not make a stipulation, the betrothal is valid but he may divorce her without paying the ketubah. With regard to physical defects, it is essential for us to know what physical defects are significant enough that they invalidate the betrothal or allow the husband to divorce her without paying the ketubah. The answer is that any defect that disqualifies a priest from serving at the altar (see Lev 21:17), also disqualifies a woman. These defects are listed in the seventh chapter of tractate Bekhorot.

האב צריך להביא ראיה – if he comes to claim her Ketubah from the betrothal, from this that he (i.e., the husband) refuses to take her, he (i.e., the father) needs to bring proof that after she became betrothed, she had blemishes. And even though there is for a woman a presumption regarding her body, for since, these blemishes were found in the domain of her father. And one can say here that they were prior to betrothal, and therefore, if he didn’t bring proof, the husband is believed.

Introduction Mishnah eight continues to discuss rules concerning bodily defects found on the woman that might cause her to lose her ketubah. Again, she loses her ketubah because she had the responsibility to tell her husband about her defects before he married her.

נכנסה לרשות הבעל – she married and now comes to divorce her without a Ketubah on account of the blemishes in her. It is upon him to bring proof that prior to her becoming betrothed she had these blemishes, for since these blemishes were not found other than in his domain (i.e., of the husband), we say that here they were found, here they were. But after she got married, they came to her and his field was flooded (see Mishnah Ketubot, Chapter 1, Mishnah 6).

If she had bodily defects while she was still in her father’s house, her father must produce proof that these defects arose after she had been betrothed and that [consequently] it was the husband’s field that was flooded. If she was brought into her husband’s domain, [and the defects were discovered there] the husband must produce proof that these defects existed before she had been betrothed and [that consequently] his bargain was made in error the words of Rabbi Meir. The question in this section is when did she develop these defects, before or after the betrothal. If they did not exist before the betrothal, and then he discovered them at marriage, she does not lose her ketubah, because she could not have told him about the defects before the betrothal. She loses the ketubah only if she had the defects at the time of betrothal and she withheld from him the fact that she had them. Note that this argument, according to our mishnah, is between the father of the betrothed girl and the husband. Clearly, the mishnah reflects a social reality whereby girls were married young, and their fathers decided whom they married and dealt with the economic aspects of the marriage. According to Rabbi Meir, if the defect was discovered while the girl was still in her father’s house, in other words after the betrothal but before she had moved to her husband’s house as the final step towards marriage, the legal assumption made is that the defects developed before she was betrothed. Therefore, if the father wants his daughter to receive her ketubah, he must prove that the defects developed afterwards. In contrast, if the defects are discovered when the wife comes to her husband’s home, it is assumed that they developed there. Therefore the husband loses out and cannot divorce her without paying her the ketubah, unless he can prove that the defects existed before betrothal. The mishnah again uses the graphic language “his field was flooded” to describe a woman who has been somehow damaged but whose husband cannot do anything about it (see above 1:6).

אינו יכול לטון – for he knew and was appeased.

The Sages say: To what does this apply? Only to concealed defects; but with regard to defects that are exposed he cannot make any claim. And if there was a bath-house in the town he cannot make any claim even about concealed defects, because he [is assumed to have had her] examined by his female relatives. The Sages disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that the distinction that Rabbi Meir made between defects discovered while in her father’s home and those discovered while in her husband’s home is not valid. Rather, the germane distinction is between concealed and revealed defects. The husband can claim that he didn’t know about the defects only if they are concealed. If they were revealed, and he married her in any case, he cannot later claim that had he known about them, he would not have married her. Furthermore, if there is a bath-house in the city, it is assumed that his female relatives knew about even the concealed defects. In such a case he can not make any claim.

שנולדו בו מומין – from when he married her.

Introduction Up until now the mishnah has been discussing physical flaws found in a wife, which cause the marriage to either be annulled or her husband to be allowed to divorce her without paying the ketubah. Just in case you thought that men were physically perfect, the last two mishnayoth of our chapter discuss physical flaws found in a man, that force him to divorce his wife and pay her the ketubah.

מומין גדולים – his eye became blinded, his hand was mutilated, his leg was broken, but the Halakha is not according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel and even with large blemishes, we don’t force him to divorce [her].

A man in whom defects have arisen [after marriage] cannot be forced to divorce [his wife]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: To what does this apply: to minor defects, but with regard to major defects he can be forced to divorce her. If a woman marries a man and she finds that he has physical flaws that existed before the marriage and that he did not tell her about them, she can compel him to divorce her and pay her the ketubah. If she knew about them (or they were clearly noticeable and therefore should have known about them), and she married him in any case, she cannot later complain about them and use them as grounds for divorce. Furthermore, if new defects arise after the marriage, she cannot force him to divorce her. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the above is only true if the defect is small. If the defect which arises after marriage is large, he must divorce her. According to the Talmud’s explanation of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, if the defects are significant, she can force a divorce even if she knew about them before the marriage, for she can say that she thought that they wouldn’t disturb her but now they do.

מוכה שחין – a leper/Metzora.

Introduction This mishnah lists defects in a husband (either physical defects or ones related to his profession) that allow the woman to demand a divorce and receive her ketubah.

בעל פוליפוס – the smell of the nose.

These are the ones who are forced to divorce [their wives]: one who is afflicted with boils, one who has a polypus, a gatherer [of dog feces for the treatment of hides], a coppersmith or a tanner whether they were [in such a condition] before they married or whether they arose after they had married. The wife of any husband who has one of the below-listed defects can demand a divorce, whether or not he had them before he was married. Clearly if they only developed after marriage, she can claim that she cannot remain with him and that she didn’t know he would be this way when she accepted his offer of betrothal. The mishnah emphasizes that these defects are so physically revolting to a woman, that she has the right to be divorced even if she noticed them before he betrothal. The defects are: 1. One who has boils. 2. One who has a polypus. This is a Greek word for someone who has a protrusion on his nose that complicates breathing. According to the Talmud he smells bad. 3. One who gathers dog feces, which was used in the processing of hides. 4. A coppersmith. Assumedly, he too smells bad. 5. A tanner, who will carry an awful odor. Note that the effect of this mishnah is that a husband cannot work in such a profession without his wife’s profession.

והמקמץ – who collects the feces of dogs.

And concerning all these Rabbi Meir said: although the man made a condition with her [that she accept him despite these defects] she may nevertheless say, “I thought I could accept him, but now I cannot accept him.” Rabbi Meir says that these defects are so repulsive to a woman that even if she explicitly stated that she could accept a husband in such a condition, she may retract her word and demand a divorce.

והמצרף נחשת – cuts off the copper from the place where he finds it from the land and it smells badly.

The Sages say: she must accept [such a person] against her will, the only exception being a man afflicted with boils, because she [by her intercourse] will enervate him. The Sages disagree with Rabbi Meir. They hold that in most such cases, if the woman accepted upon herself to marry a man in such a condition, she cannot later say that he disgusts her and therefore demand a divorce. The only case in which a woman can later demand a divorce is the case of a man who has boils because she “enervates” him. This means that when they have intercourse, she actually wears down his flesh and this is dangerous for him. Since he will refuse to have relations with her, she may demand a divorce. After all, she is guaranteed her conjugal rights.

והבורסי – dresses hides.

It once happened at Sidon that a tanner died, and he had a brother who was also a tanner. The Sages said: she may say, “I was able to accept your brother but I cannot accept you.” This chapter of mishnah concludes with a story that happened in Sidon, on the coast of modern Lebanon. There a woman was married to a tanner who died, leaving her liable for yibbum with his brother, who also worked as a tanner. She claimed that she didn’t want to have yibbum because living with a tanner is revolting and unbearable. The brother, assumedly claimed, that if she could endure his brother the tanner, she could endure him. The Sages ruled that the woman has the right to say that she could endure her original husband but not his brother. Perhaps she liked her original husband enough that she was willing to put up with his smell. She will not necessarily like his brother this much. Therefore, he must perform halitzah and she receives her ketubah.

מפני שממיקתו – makes it loathsome. It is the language of (Zechariah 14:12): “Their flesh shall rot away,” and the Halakha is according to the Sages.