Komentarz do Arachin 5:8

האומר משקלי עלי כו', אם כסף כסף – if he specified silver, he gives his weight in silver, but if he specified gold, he gives his weight in gold. But surely it comes to tell us that if he didn’t specify, but rather stated merely, “my weight is upon me,” he exempted himself from anything, as long as there will be a thing that is similar to it that is ordinarily weighed in that place. And even pitch/tar and even onions and the people of the place are accustomed to sell them by weight, and one of the people of that place said merely: “my weight is incumbent on me [as a pledge to the Temple]” but did not specify, he gives his weight in pitch/tar or in onions and is further exempt.

Introduction Today’s mishnah deals with a person who dedicates his weight to the Temple.

ומעשה באמה של ירמטיה – It explains in the Gemara (Tractate Arakhin 19a) that our Mishnah is deficient and should be read as follows, and if he is a prominent person, even though he has not expressly stated, we estimate in accordance with his honor, and it happened with the mother of the Yirmatia, a woman whose name was such, that said, “I vow the weight of my daughter,” and she went up to Jerusalem and weighed her, and then she paid her weight in gold, because she was estimated in wealth.

One who said: “I vow my weight,” he must pay his weight, in silver [if he had said in] silver, or in gold [if he had said in] gold. If one vows his weight to the Temple, he must fulfill this vow by paying his weight, either in gold or in silver, depending on how he made his vow.

משקל ידי עלי – how does he weigh his hand, for if he wants he makes it heavy and if he wants, he makes it lighter?

It happened with the mother of Yirmatia, who said, “I vow my daughter's weight.” She went up to Jerusalem and weighed her and then paid her weight in gold. Now this is one of the best stories I’ve ever read in the Mishnah. I can just picture poor Yirmatia being absolutely mortified that her mother had the audacity to vow her weight to the Temple. And then, the poor girl has to get on the scale in front of all of those priests! I wonder if this was all a ruse by the mother to get her daughter on a diet.

ומכניסה עד מרפקו (pokes his hand in up to his elbow) – KUDO in the foreign tongue, because in vows one follows the language of human beings and at tht time, they would call the hand from the arm to the elbow, and when one places one’s hand into the jar filled with water, the water that is in the jar will spill out according to the place of the hand that one entered into it until the elbow (i.e., the water is displaced), and he goes back and places the flesh, sinews and bones of a donkey, for the weight of the flesh of a donkey is like the weight of the flesh of a human being, and there will be in that flesh sinews and bones according what is in the hand [of a human being] for the weight of the bones and sinews is not equivalent to the weight of the flesh, and he places into it until it returns and is filled up like it was, for now there is volume like the measurement of his hand, and he weighs the flesh and these sinews and this is the weight of his hand.

[If a man said: “I vow] the weight of my hand,” Rabbi Judah says: let him fill a barrel with water and put it [his hand] in up to the elbow. Then let him weigh the flesh, bones and sinews of a donkey and put it into the barrel until it is filled up again. Rabbi Yose said: “But how is it possible to account exactly one kind of flesh against another kind of flesh, and one kind of bones against another kind of bones? Rather: one estimates what the hand is likely to weigh. This mishnah address the Archimedean problem of how to weigh one’s hand. Rabbi Judah employs a system of water displacement, and then comparison of the weight of one’s hand with the weight of a donkey’s bones, sinews and flesh. Rabbi Yose criticizes him for assuming that donkey flesh weighs the same as human flesh. It seems, according to Rabbi Yose, that live human flesh cannot be weighed. The best one can do is just estimate how much the hand weighs. It is unclear how exactly one would do this.

היאך אפשר לכוין בשר כנגד בשר – for perhaps here is in the flesh of a donkey that place that he places into the jar more sinews and bones from what is in the hand [of a human being] or less, and it is found that the weight is not equivalent. And the Halakha is according to Rabbi Yossi.

וכמה הוא שוה בלא יד – it explains in the Gemara (Tractate Arakhin 19b – see Rashi, s.v. אומד של נזקין), that we don’t valuate/estimate how beautiful when his hand is cut off and how much he would be worth when his hands are whole. For a person whose hand was cut off, when they come to valuate him how much he would be worth at first, they don’t valuate him other than cheaply, because we view him as despised, for this person who says: “the price of my hand is incumbent upon me,” his hand was not cut off. Therefore, it (i.e., the Gemara) explains how much he is worth without a hand, as for example, if his master sold all of him except for his hand, for his one hands is recorded/levied to his first master and we estimate how much he is worth when his master sells all of him and does not leave anything of him to himself. And how much less he is worth if his master left his one hand without selling it, for now he is not despised. And such he gives to the sanctity of the Temple.

Introduction Today’s mishnah continues to deal with cases where a person dedicates the value or worth of a body part.

זה חומר בנדרם מבערכין – for whereas, if he said in valuation , that the value of my hand and/or my foot is upon me, he did not say anything, unless he said it with regard to which life depends.

[If one said] “The worth of my hand is upon me,” they estimate his worth with his hand and [what it would be] without his hand. In yesterday’s mishnah the vower dedicated the weight of his hand. In this section, he dedicates the “worth of his hand.” This is evaluated the same way that worth is always estimated by examining how much a person would be worth on the slave market. In this case, they first estimate his worth when complete (with his hand), and then how much he would be worth without his hand.

ערכי עלי ומת יתנו היורשים – the value of something that is determined/clearly defined. But specifically when he stood in judgment prior to his death, because he is not liable for a valuation until after he stands before the Kohen, as it is written (Leviticus 27:8): “he shall be pesented before the priest.” But my price is incumbent upon me, which is not other than what the Jewish court will estimate him, and behold he doesn’t come to that for he has died, even though he stood in judgment, he is lacking an approximate assessment, and the heirs do not pay it.

In this respect vows of worth are more stringent than vows of value. Later in this mishnah we will learn that if one says, “The value of my hand is upon me,” he is not liable to pay anything. Therefore, in this aspect, vows of “worth” are more stringent than vows of “value” for when one vows the worth of his hand, he must pay its worth.

נותן ערך כולו – for it is written (Leviticus 27:2): “the equivalent for human being.”

There is an aspect of vows of value that is more stringent than vows of worth. As is typical of the mishnah, once we note that vows of worth are in one way more stringent than vows of value, the mishnah now notes that sometimes the opposite is true.

זה הכלל – to include the rest of the limbs on which life depends.

How so? If one said: “My value is upon me” and then he dies, his heirs must pay it. [But if he said:] “My worth is upon me,” and then he dies, his heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth. If one vows his value and then dies, the heirs must pay his value. This is because his value is set by the Torah and is not dependent upon an evaluation. However, if he vows his worth and then dies before they can estimate his worth, his heir need not pay anything because a dead person has no worth. Note that the obligation to pay is only incurred when the estimate is made, and since he has no worth when the estimate is made, the heirs owe nothing.

[If he said,] “The value of my hand or foot is upon me,” he has said nothing, [But if he said,] “The value of my head is upon me,” he must pay his whole value. This is the general rule: Anything upon which his life depends, he must pay his full value. If one vows the value of his foot or hand he is not liable to pay anything because the foot and the hand are not synonymous with his life. Since one can only vow the “value” of his life, in this case he has not vowed anything. In contrast, if one vows the value of his head, he has dedicated his full value because one can’t live without a head. He will now have to pay his full value, dependent upon his gender and age. The general rule that ends this mishnah explains just that if one vows the value of an organ that one can’t live without, he is liable to pay his entire value.

חציי עלי – it would be like the valuation of my head and the valuation of my liver, for it is something upon which his life depends upon.

Introduction This mishnah deals with someone who dedicates half of his worth or value.

דמי חציי עלי נותן דמי כולו – as it is written (Leviticus 27:2): “explicitly vows [to the LORD] the equivalent for a human being,” an analogy is made between a vow and a valuation, just as regarding a valuation, if he said: “the valuation of half of me is incumbent on me,” he pays the whole of his valuation, so also that of a vow if he said: “the price of half of me is incumbent on me,” he pays the whole of his price.

[If one said:] “Half my value is upon me,” he must pay half his evaluation. In this case, he pays half of his value, which is what he intended when he made his vow.

זה הכלל – to include all of he limbs upon which his life depends, for if he said: “half of the price of that limb is upon me, as for example, that he said: “half of he price of my heart is upon me,” or the price of half of my liver is upon me, he gives the price of all of it.

[But if he said,] “The value of one half of me he is upon me,” he must pay his full value. Here he phrased his vow slightly differently. Saying “the value of one half of me is upon me,” is like saying “the value of my head is upon me” because no one can live without half of his body. Therefore, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, he must pay his full value.

[If he said] “Half of my worth is upon me,” he must pay half his worth. Similar to section one, in this case he pays only half of his worth.

[If he said,] “The worth of half of me is upon me,” he must pay his whole worth. Although one can estimate how much a slave missing a hand would be worth, there is no way to estimate how much a slave missing half his body would be worth, because he would be worth nothing. Therefore, the worth of half of his body is synonymous with the worth of his whole body and he must pay his entire worth.

This is the general rule: Anything on which his life depends, he must pay his whole worth. This is a similar rule to that which we saw in mishnah two concerning vows of value. If someone vows the worth of a body part that he can’t live without, he must pay his entire worth.

מת הנודר והנידר יתנו היורשים – and he that stood in judgement before he died, as was explained above, but the ending clause is necessary: “The price of so-and-so is incumbent upon me,” if the person taking the vow dies, the heirs will give the money, for you might have thought that even though that he stood in judgment, since the person making the vow died prior to making an estimate/valuation of the one whom the vow was about, his possessions are not mortgaged, for it comes to tell us that an approximate assessment/assessment by sight is a revealing a general thing, for since the person about whom the vow is taken lives, we assess him.

Introduction Today’s mishnah deals with a person who vows another person’s worth or value.

If he said: “The value of so-and-so is upon me,” if both the vower and the subject of the vow died, then the heirs must pay it. When the vower dies, the heirs of the vower incur the obligation to pay his vow. Even though the subject of the vow died they can pay his value, because the value is fixed and is not dependent upon an evaluation.

[If he said,] “The worth of so-and-so is upon me,” and the vower died, the heirs must pay it. But if the subject of the vow died, the heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth. Here the vower dedicated someone else’s worth, which does require an evaluation. If the vower dies before he pays off his debt, the heirs must pay his debt. But if the subject of the vow dies, then the heirs do not owe anything because a dead person has no worth. This is basically the same halakhah that we learned in mishnah two.

בית זה קרבן – for keeping the Temple in repair.

Introduction Since yesterday’s mishnah dealt with cases where a person dedicated the value of another person and then that person dies, today’s mishnah deals with a person who dedicated an animal or a house and then the animal dies or the house falls down.

ונפל הבית – prior to the treasurer [of the Temple] grabbed hold of him.

[If someone said:] “This ox shall be an olah [a whole burnt offering],” or “This house shall be an olah,” and the ox died or the house fell down, he is not obligated to pay. In this case, the person dedicated a specific ox or house to the Temple. If the ox dies or the house falls down he is exempt, because his only liability was to give to the Temple “this ox” or “this house.”

מת השור וכו' חייב לשלם – and we don’t say that there are no funds for the deed, other than for a human alone.

[But if he said:] “This ox is upon me as an olah” or “this house is upon me as an olah” and the ox died, or the house fell down, he is obligated to pay [their worth]. Here since he said the words, “upon me,” he is obligated to pay the value of the ox even if it dies or the house even if it falls down. “Upon me” means that he is responsible for making sure that the value of the object gets to the Temple

ממשכנין אותן (exact pledges from them) – the treasurer enters into their homes and takes it against their will.

With regard to those who made a vow of value: they take a pledge from them.
With regard to those obligated to bring a hatat or asham: they do not take a pledge.
With regard to those obligated to bring an olah or a shelamim: they do take a pledge.
And even though he is not atoned for unless he is willing [to pay his obligation], as it is said: “willingly” (Leviticus 1:3), they coerce him until he says: I agree.
The same is true in the case of divorce documents: they coerce him until he says: I agree.
This famous mishnah deals with how a court enforces a person to pay various obligations.
Section one: If someone makes a vow of value (or worth) and is late in paying his debt, the court can take a pledge (an object of value) from him in order to force him to pay his debt.
Section two: However, if someone has transgressed and is obligated to bring either a hatat (sin offering) or an asham (guilt offering) and he is late in bringing it, the court does not take a pledge from him. The general rule is that if the obligated item comes to atone for a sin, the court does not take a pledge.
Section three: If the person vowed to bring an olah (a burnt offering) or a shelamim (an offering of well-being) the court does take a pledge, because these are not sacrifices that atone for sin.
Section four: This and especially the next section are famous because they deal in general with the ability of the court to enforce obligations. The Torah states that an olah must be brought willingly. If so, how can the court force him to bring an olah or shelamim? The answer is that they force him to say that he agrees. Even though he clearly does not want to bring the sacrifice, the fact that he verbalizes his desire to do so is sufficient. Similarly, when it comes to divorce, the court can force him to write out a divorce document. As we know from other sources, a man can only divorce his wife willingly, but we know that under many circumstances the court forces him to divorce his wife (see for instance Ketubot 7:10; see also Gittin 9:8). Again, how can something be enforced and yet still be done willingly on the part of the person being coerced? The answer is that the court forces him to say that he agrees to the divorce. And as we learn in Gittin, this enforcing can be done even through physical coercion.
The Rambam, in his commentary on this mishnah, notes that although it seems that when the person says, “I agree” he doesn’t really mean it, we attribute to him that he does have the correct intention because he is doing what he should have done of his own free will. According to the Rambam, it is as if his evil urge not to perform the correct act overcame him, and by force the court makes him do what his good side really wanted to do in the first place. We should recognize that this is a dangerous principle and could be broadly applied to many categories. However, the Mishnah does not turn this into a blanket rule, but rather only mentions it in reference to these two categories sacrifices and divorce.

חייבי חטאות ואשמות – since it is for atonement that came, they do not procrastinate [in providing the sin-offering or guilt offering] , and they do not exact pledges from them. But the sin-offering of the Nazirite, since it does not come for atonement, and does not prevent him from drinking wine, for since the blood of one of the sacrifices was sprinkled, the Nazirite is permitted to drink wine and to become defiled to the dead, on occasion that he acted negligently and delayed, therefore we exact the pledge on his sin-offering.

חייבי עולות ושלמים – even though the burnt-offering atones for [violation of] a positive commandment and for a prohibition that after its violation is transformed into a positive commandment, since the negative commandment is not an obligation, it is not considered as an atonement and one can delay performing it, therefore, we exact a pledge from them. But there are those liable for burnt-offerings where we don’t exact a pledge from them, as for example the burnt-offering of a leper, because it delays his purification and it does not come to delay him.

כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני – where that the Jewish court exacts a pledge from him, he must state: “I want to do it.”

וכן אתה אומר בגטי נשים – whomever his judgement is that they force him to divorce [his wife], the Jewish court of Israel beats him until he says: “I want [to do it] (i.e., divorce his wife), and he gives [her] the Jewish bill of divorce and it is appropriate (see also Tractate Ketubot, Chapter 7, Mishnah 10).