Talmud su Hullin 2:7
הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְנָכְרִי, שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְשֵׁרָה. וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אֲפִלּוּ שְׁחָטָהּ שֶׁיֹּאכַל הַנָּכְרִי מֵחֲצַר כָּבֵד שֶׁלָּהּ, פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁסְּתָם מַחֲשֶׁבֶת נָכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, קַל וָחֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים, וּמַה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהַמַּחֲשָׁבָה פוֹסֶלֶת, בְּמֻקְדָּשִׁין, אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחֲשָׁבָה פוֹסֶלֶת, בְּחֻלִּין, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט:
Quando una persona ha massacrato un animale per un pagano, è Cashér; ma R. Eleazar decide che si tratta di Pasool. R. Eleazar insegna: "Se lo massacrava con l'intenzione che i pagani mangiassero solo il fegato dell'animale, sarebbe Pasool, perché l'intenzione tacita dei pagani è di usarlo per scopi idolatrici". R. Joshua ha contestato questo, e ha dimostrato la sua opinione con un sillogismo da minore a maggiore [קל וחומר], "Se dove l'intenzione rende Pasool, come nel caso delle cose consacrate, la questione è determinata dall'intenzione del sacerdote facente funzione, non ne consegue che nella presente istanza, che si riferisce a cose non consacrate, e dove l'intenzione non le rende Pasool, dovrebbe essere determinata dall'intenzione di lui che ha massacrato? "
Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah
“Meat brought into a pagan Temple is permitted.” Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said, to exclude the statement of Rebbi Eliezer, since Rebbi Eliezer says that the thoughts of a Non-Jew are about pagan worship218Mishnah Ḥulin 2:7. He holds that even if a Jew correctly slaughters an animal for a Gentile the meat is forbidden since the Gentile owner in his mind dedicates the slaughter to his god. Practice follows R. Yose who holds that only the slaughterer’s intentions have any influence on the process of slaughtering. Babli 32b..
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Jerusalem Talmud Gittin
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry128Any idolatrous sacrifice is forbidden for any use; Deut. 13:18., Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates129If the slaughter were for idolatry, everybody would agree that the meat is forbidden for consumption. But here the slaughter is not intended for idolatry, only that later part of the blood and fat would be used for idolatrous purposes, for instance, if the animal is a Gentile’s property; cf. Note 131., Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate130Only an action can trigger the prohibition. If the Gentile takes part of the animal for himself for idolatrous purposes after he had sold most of the meat to Jews, there is no reason why the meat should be forbidden to Jews.. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state131Mishnah Ḥulin 2:7: “If somebody slaughters for a Gentile, his slaughtering is valid, but Rebbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rebbi Eliezer said: Even if he slaughtered it only for the Gentile to eat the appendage of its liver, it is invalid since the Gentile’s thoughts are always for idolatry. Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, everything is determined by the person who officiates; in the case of profane food which cannot become invalidated by thought, it is only logical that everything depend on the slaughterer.”
It is forbidden to eat from a sacrifice after its appointed time (piggul) or outside the appropriate sacred precinct. If the slaughterer intends the sacrifice to be eaten at the wrong time or place, the entire sacrifice becomes invalid. But if the owners had the same idea, their intentions are irrelevant; they could invalidate the sacrifice only by actually using it at the wrong time and at the wrong place. R. Yose argues that profane slaughter cannot have rules more strict than sacrificial slaughter. If the owner’s intentions are irrelevant for sacrificial slaughter, they must be irrelevant also for profane slaughter.: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover132A sacrifice not eaten during its appointed time becomes forbidden as leftover even if it was not intended from the start to be eaten out of its time.. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate133He holds that only for Jewish sacrifices does the wrong thought at slaughter invalidate the act; for all others the wrong thought invalidates the act but is not transferable to others. If the slaughter was for idolatry, the entire meat is forbidden. If the slaughter was for using part of the blood or fat for idolatry, that blood or fat becomes forbidden by being used; it has no influence on the other parts. (Babli Ḥulin 39a/b).. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite134In the Babli (Ḥulin 39b): It was slaughtered and after that [the slaughterer] expressed an intention [of idolatry]., there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive135In the Babli, the reference is to the opinion of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel in the Mishnah, who holds that a later action indicates a prior thought. If suicide can validate a prior bill of divorce then idolatrous practice can invalidate a prior slaughter. Since this also explains the insertion of the paragraph here, it has to be accepted as explanation.. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case136A rabbi could have dismissed the case without bringing it to the attention of the full court. But what they really said was that the scrupulous should not eat from the meat; those who did eat did not sin..
It is forbidden to eat from a sacrifice after its appointed time (piggul) or outside the appropriate sacred precinct. If the slaughterer intends the sacrifice to be eaten at the wrong time or place, the entire sacrifice becomes invalid. But if the owners had the same idea, their intentions are irrelevant; they could invalidate the sacrifice only by actually using it at the wrong time and at the wrong place. R. Yose argues that profane slaughter cannot have rules more strict than sacrificial slaughter. If the owner’s intentions are irrelevant for sacrificial slaughter, they must be irrelevant also for profane slaughter.: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover132A sacrifice not eaten during its appointed time becomes forbidden as leftover even if it was not intended from the start to be eaten out of its time.. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate133He holds that only for Jewish sacrifices does the wrong thought at slaughter invalidate the act; for all others the wrong thought invalidates the act but is not transferable to others. If the slaughter was for idolatry, the entire meat is forbidden. If the slaughter was for using part of the blood or fat for idolatry, that blood or fat becomes forbidden by being used; it has no influence on the other parts. (Babli Ḥulin 39a/b).. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite134In the Babli (Ḥulin 39b): It was slaughtered and after that [the slaughterer] expressed an intention [of idolatry]., there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive135In the Babli, the reference is to the opinion of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel in the Mishnah, who holds that a later action indicates a prior thought. If suicide can validate a prior bill of divorce then idolatrous practice can invalidate a prior slaughter. Since this also explains the insertion of the paragraph here, it has to be accepted as explanation.. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case136A rabbi could have dismissed the case without bringing it to the attention of the full court. But what they really said was that the scrupulous should not eat from the meat; those who did eat did not sin..
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