Halakhah su Ketubbot 4:17
Gray Matter III
The husband is heir to his wife’s estate and takes precedence over all other heirs. There is considerable debate as to whether this Halachah is a Torah law or a rabbinic enactment.3See Bava Batra 109b; also see Rambam, Hilchot Nachalot 1:8 and the comments of the Ra’avad, Maggid Mishneh, and Kesef Mishneh there. The wife, in contrast, does not inherit her husband’s estate (Bava Batra 111b). She is entitled to be supported out of the husband’s estate only until she remarries or demands payment of her ketubah (Ketubot 4:12).
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Gray Matter III
Although a daughter does not inherit if there are sons, each unmarried daughter is entitled to ten percent4Attorney Martin Shenkman suggests that this distribution is determined net of any estate tax because of dina d’malchuta dina (the obligation to follow the laws of the country in which we reside), as the tax money effectively belongs to the government from the start. of the estate to be used for her dowry (Ketubot 6:6, ibid. 68a, and Shulchan Aruch E.H. 113:1). In addition, a daughter has the right to be supported by the estate until she is betrothed or reaches the age of bat mitzvah (Ketubot 4:11).
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Arukh HaShulchan
From these things it is clear that the term “nisuin” and the term “ḥupah” are two different things, and thus one can infer from the wording of the Mishna, where it is taught: “Always, she is under the authority of the father until she enters the authority of the husband through marriage.” (Ketubot 4:5) And it is also taught (in the Mishnah): The woman may not eat of the heave-offering until she has entered the ‘ḥupah’”. (ibid. 5:3) (Therefore) since there is a difference in wording, (we) learn from this that they (“nisuin” and “ḥupah”) are two different things.
But, we have not heard this (opinion) from any of the Halakhic authorities, and in the words of the Rambam which we (have already) brought, it is written: “This ‘yiḥud’ is called entrance into the ‘ḥupah’, and is (also) called (it constitutes) marriage universally.” Behold, this proves that it (“nisuin” and “ḥupah”) in (only) one thing. Thus it is in the Mishnah: “until she enters the authority of the husband for ‘nisuin’ ”. This definition means “ḥupah” because this has reference to the heave-offering; thus Rashi’s comment: “That is to say she enters the ‘ḥupah’ for the sake of marriage.”
There are those who read that this is the true meaning of “until she enters the ‘ḥupah’ ”, but we have found in the Gemera[illegible] in a Baraita where it is taught: “One who has intercourse with a married woman - (with her being defined as a married woman) as soon as she had entered under the authority of her husband in marriage” (ibid. 49a). Behold, this is (a crime punishable) by strangulation. The inference is made here (that they are two different things), (for) even though (it is not stated) “she entered under the ‘ḥupah’ yet”, behold these are two (separate) things, so it is necessary to say (add) that the term “nisuin” is an inclusive term, and lasts from before the “ḥupah” until after the “ḥupah”; the beginning of the “nisuin” is not yet the “ḥupah”, rather, “ḥupah” is the end of the “nisuin”.
But, we have not heard this (opinion) from any of the Halakhic authorities, and in the words of the Rambam which we (have already) brought, it is written: “This ‘yiḥud’ is called entrance into the ‘ḥupah’, and is (also) called (it constitutes) marriage universally.” Behold, this proves that it (“nisuin” and “ḥupah”) in (only) one thing. Thus it is in the Mishnah: “until she enters the authority of the husband for ‘nisuin’ ”. This definition means “ḥupah” because this has reference to the heave-offering; thus Rashi’s comment: “That is to say she enters the ‘ḥupah’ for the sake of marriage.”
There are those who read that this is the true meaning of “until she enters the ‘ḥupah’ ”, but we have found in the Gemera[illegible] in a Baraita where it is taught: “One who has intercourse with a married woman - (with her being defined as a married woman) as soon as she had entered under the authority of her husband in marriage” (ibid. 49a). Behold, this is (a crime punishable) by strangulation. The inference is made here (that they are two different things), (for) even though (it is not stated) “she entered under the ‘ḥupah’ yet”, behold these are two (separate) things, so it is necessary to say (add) that the term “nisuin” is an inclusive term, and lasts from before the “ḥupah” until after the “ḥupah”; the beginning of the “nisuin” is not yet the “ḥupah”, rather, “ḥupah” is the end of the “nisuin”.
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