Commento su Yevamot 3:13

ארבעה אחין. חולצות ולא מיבמות – since both of them are levirate relations one to the other. The first [brother] who undergoes levirate marriage came in contact with the sister of his levirate relation and is like his wife.

Introduction Mishnayoth one through four are all one long mishnah dealing with a case of four brothers, whom we will call, Reuven, Shimon, Levi and Judah, two of whom married two sisters, Rachel and Leah.

ב"ש אומרי יקיימו ובה"א יוציאו – In the Gemara (Talmud Yevamot 28a) reverses them that the School of Shammai states that they should be put away (i.e., divorced), and the School of Hillel states that they may remain wedded, for in every place, the School of Shammai is stringent and the School of Hillel is lenient except from those known places where the School of Shammai is more lenient and the School of Hillel is more stringent (see, for example, the first five Mishnayot in Tractate Eduyot, Chapter 5, of which this text is taken), and thus we say, that generally, the School of SHammai in the place of the Schol of Hillel is not a Mishnah, meaning to say, that wherever we find in the Mishnah that the School of Shammai are lenient and the School of Hillel, where it is their manner to be lenient, but and it is found now that the School of Shammai stands in the place of the School of Hillel, it is not a Mishnah and it is a corrupted text and it is necessary to reverse it unless it is from the known Mishnayot which are from the leniencies of the School of Shammai and the stringencies of the School of Hillel. And in Tractate Eduyot (Chapter 5, Mishnah 5), in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, it enumerates the leniencies of the School of Shammai and the stringencies of the School of Hillel.

Four brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters, if those who were married to the sisters died, behold these must perform halitzah but may not have yibbum. If they preemptively married them, they must divorce them. Rabbi Eliezer said: Beth Shammai holds that they may retain them, and Beth Hillel holds that they must divorce them. Reuven and Shimon marry Rachel and Leah and then both die. Rachel and Leah are technically liable for yibbum or halitzah with either Levi or Judah. The mishnah teaches that neither Levi nor Judah may have yibbum with either sister, because each sister is the sister of his z’kukah (a woman with whom he is liable to have either yibbum or halitzah). In other words Leah is liable to have yibbum or halitzah with each brother as is Rachel. They are both considered to be “z’kukah” to both brothers. If Levi or Judah were to have yibbum with either one, he would be having relations with the sister of his z’kukah, which is forbidden just as it is forbidden to have relations with one’s wife’s sister. Even after one sister has had halitzah with one of the other brothers, thereby ending her status as z’kukah, the other may not have yibbum because any one woman is forbidden to him at the time when she becomes liable for yibbum, remains forbidden forever.

If the brothers did marry the sisters, against the ruling in clause one, they must divorce them. Although the marriage is valid and therefore requires a divorce, it is forbidden and therefore a divorce is mandatory.

According to Rabbi Eliezer, the previous ruling is only according to Beth Hillel. Beth Shammai disagrees and rules that the marriage may be upheld.

איסור ערוה – such as, for example, his mother-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law.

Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss variations that could arise from the scenario brought up in mishnah one.

ומותר באחותה – for she is not the sister of his levirate relation for a woman forbidden to a man on account of consanguinity is not lying before him for levirate marriage.

If one of the sisters was forbidden to one [of the brothers] under the prohibition of incest, he is forbidden to marry her but may marry her sister, while the second brother is forbidden to marry either of them. [If one sister] was forbidden due to a commandment or due to holiness they both perform halitzah and may not be taken in yibbum. If one of the sister’s was forbidden to one of the remaining brothers because of one of the various incest laws, for instance he was already married to her daughter, she is not liable to have yibbum with him (as we learned in chapter one). Therefore he can marry the other sister, for she is not the sister of his z’kukah. Nevertheless, the other brother, to whom neither sister is forbidden, is still prohibited from marrying either sister, since each is the sister of his z’kukah.

איסור מצוה – lying before him from the Torah, therefore, he is forbidden to her sister, for she is the sister of his levirate relation.

In chapter two, mishnayoth two and three, we learned that there are two other categories of forbidden relationships besides primary incest prohibitions: secondary incest relationships prohibitions and prohibitions due to the inherent holiness of the priests (for instance divorcees are forbidden to priests) or of all of Israel (for instance the prohibition of a mamzer). If one of the sisters was forbidden to one of the remaining brothers due to one of these prohibitions, for instance he was a priest (and his paternal brothers were not), or he was a mamzer (and his paternal brothers were not) the two sisters must have halitzah and cannot have yibbum. This accords with what we learned in chapter two, that in any case where a woman becomes liable to have yibbum with a man prohibited to her due to a commandment or holiness, she must have halitzah and not yibbum.

אחותו כשהיא יבמתו – her sister of a woman forbidden to a man on account of consanguinity, when she is his sister-in-law, the wife of her husband’s brother when she falls [with her] for levirate marriage.

Introduction This is the final mishnah which deals with the subject raised in mishnah one.

או חולצת או מתיבמת – for she is not the sister of his levirate relation for there is no prohibition on account of consanguinity is not lying before him (see also Tractate Yevamot, Chapter 2, Mishnah 3).

If one of the sisters was forbidden to one brother under the prohibition of incest and the other sister was forbidden to the other under the prohibition of incest, she who is forbidden to the one is permitted to the other and she who is forbidden to the other is permitted to the first. This is what they said: when her sister is her sister-in-law she may either perform halizah or be taken in yibbum. If each sister is prohibited to one brother due to an incest prohibition, for instance Levi is married to Rachel’s daughter and Judah is married to Leah’s daughter, Levi may have yibbum with Leah and Judah may have yibbum with Rachel. This is because each sister is a z’kukah to only one brother. Rachel is a z’kukah only to Judah and Leah only to Levi. When yibbum is performed neither brother is having relations with the sister of his z’kukah.

This refers to the end of mishnah 2:3. Rachel and Leah are both sisters and were sisters-in-law before Reuven and Shimon died. The only time that both Rachel and Leah could have yibbum with a brother is when both are forbidden to one brother through a prohibition of incest, as our mishnah describes. Note that our mishnah is actually quoting an earlier mishnah and explaining it. This phenomenon of mishnah explaining an older mishnah does occasionally occur in the Mishnah.

ור"ש פוטר – (see Tractate Yevamot 28b) – the reason of Rabbi Shimon as it is written (Leviticus 18:18): “Do not marry a woman as a rival to her sister [and uncover her nakedness in the other’s lifetime],” at the time that they are made rival/co-wives to each other, such as the example of here, where both of them are levirate relations to him for levirate marriage. You should not have a legal acquisition neither to this one nor to that one, and the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Shimon.

Introduction This mishnah and the three that follow it, deal with situations in which there are three brothers, Reuven, Shimon and Levi, two of whom are married to two sisters, Rachel and Leah or a mother and her daughter, or a mother and her granddaughter. The commonality to all of these cases is that a man may not have relations with both of these women. Therefore, if both women should become liable for yibbum with the surviving brother, he may not have yibbum with either, because each one is the relative of his z’kukah (the other woman who becomes liable for yibbum). We have learned most of these rules above in mishnah two.

Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters, or to a woman and her daughter, or to a woman and her daughter’s daughter, or to a woman and her son’s daughter, behold, these must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. Rabbi Shimon exempts them. If one of them was forbidden to him by a prohibition of incest, he is forbidden to marry her but is permitted to marry her sister. If the prohibition is due to a commandment or to holiness, they must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. If Reuven marries Rachel and Shimon marries Leah, who are either sisters or a mother and her daughter or a mother and her granddaughter, and then Reuven and Shimon both die without children, Levi cannot have yibbum with either woman. This is because each woman is the immediate relative of the other woman who is his z’kukah. Just as we have learned before that one cannot marry the sister of a z’kukah, here we learn that one cannot marry the mother, daughter, grandmother or granddaughter of a z’kukah. Rabbi Shimon holds that since he cannot have yibbum with either one of them, neither are even obligated for yibbum.

If one of the two women was forbidden to him by a prohibition of incest, for instance if Leah’s daughter was married to Levi already, since Leah is not obligated for yibbum, Levi may have yibbum with Rachel (in this case Leah’s sister). We have already learned this rule in mishnah two.

If one of the two women was forbidden but only due to a prohibition of a commandment or a prohibition due to holiness, both women are technically liable for yibbum. Since he cannot have yibbum with either, he must do halitzah with both. Again, this law was learned above in mishnah two.

ואחד מופנה – without a wife (i.e., single, a bachelor).

Introduction This mishnah continues to deal with variants upon the situation where two of three brothers were married to two sisters.

אשתו עמו – for since the School of Shammai holds that she is [his] wife through statement of intention [of levirate marriage] is considered as married, and when her sister fell after this [through the death of her husband, the second brother], she was not forbidden because of her being the sister of his levirate relation.

Three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was unmarried: When one of the sisters’ husbands died, the unmarried brother performed for her ma’amar, and then his second brother died: Beth Shammai says: his wife [remains] with him while the other is exempt because she is his wife’s sister. Beth Hillel however says that he must divorce his wife with a get and by halitzah, and his brother’s wife by halitzah. This is the case in regard to which they said: “woe to him because of his wife, and woe to him because of his brother’s wife.” Reuven and Shimon were married to Rachel and Leah, and Levi was unmarried. When Reuven dies, Levi performed ma’amar with Rachel. Ma’amar, as we have learned before, is an act parallel to betrothal with a regular woman, and is only done in the case of yibbum. Ma’amar is performed by the man giving a symbolic amount of money to the woman. Rachel becomes his quasi-fiancee after having ma’amar, but she is not fully his wife until he performs yibbum (intercourse). Before Levi can have yibbum with Rachel, Shimon also dies, thereby making Leah liable for yibbum. The question is now asked, can Levi continue to stay married to Rachel, even though he is liable to have yibbum with Rachel’s sister. According to Beth Shammai, the first woman (Rachel) remains Levi’s wife and Leah is exempt from either yibbum or halitzah. In other words, Beth Shammai sees in ma’amar a full marital act, one which makes Rachel Levi’s full wife. Since he is already married to Rachel, he cannot have yibbum with Leah, Rachel’s sister, and she is completely exempt. According to Beth Hillel, ma’amar does not make Rachel into a full wife, such that it would be biblically forbidden for Levi to marry her sister. Therefore, when Leah becomes obligated for yibbum, it is the case of two sisters who are both liable to have yibbum with the same man. As we have learned previously, in such a case both must have halitzah, and neither may have yibbum, since a man cannot marry the sister of his z’kukah. In addition, Rachel requires a get, since she did have ma’amar, which is an act of betrothal. The final clause of the mishnah relates that it is about such a case that people say, woe to him for losing his wife and woe to him for losing his brother’s wife. For without having done anything wrong, both of these women are prohibited to him.

מוציא אשתו בגט – for the statement of intention of [eventual] levirate marriage is not strong to compare it to someone married, and this prohibits her because of her being the sister of his levirate relation, and it requires a Jewish bill of divorce because the statement of intention which is partial betrothal/Kiddushin and Kiddushin is not released without a Jewish bill of divorce. And she requires Halitzah for since the statement of intention is not complete Kiddushin/betrothal, she is still his levirate relation and requires Halitzah for her levirate connection. And in the opening clause [of the Mishnah], he gives her a Jewish bill of divorce, and then performs Halitzah to her, and such is the Halakha.

נכרית – she is not related neither to this [woman] nor to that one.

Introduction The key to understanding the laws in these mishnayoth is that ma’amar, the equivalent of betrothal in cases of yibbum, does not create a full marriage between the yavam and the yavamah but does create a tie. Often the solution in cases where a woman has had ma’amar and then her husband dies without having done yibbum thereby making her obligated for yibbum with the other brother, is that she has halitzah but not yibbum.

נכרית חולצת ולא מתיבמת – the same law applies even if he did not make a statement of intention [of levirate marriage], and he died, the non-related woman undergoes Halitzah, but she does not perform levirate marriage because she is the rival/co-wife of a married woman through levirate connection, and this that taught that one makes a statement of intention was in order to exclude this from the words of the School of Shammai who said that the statement of intention acquires a complete acquisition, and even Halitzah also is not requirement, which comes to teach us that she needs Halitzah.

Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger: If one of the sisters’ husbands died and the brother who was married to the stranger married his wife and then died himself, the first is exempt [from yibbum or halitzah] because she is his wife’s sister, and the second is exempt as her rival. If he had only had ma’amar with her and died, the stranger is to perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger: If the brother who was married to the stranger died, and one of the sisters’ husbands married his wife and then died himself, the first is exempt [from yibbum or halitzah] because she is his wife’s sister, and the second is exempt as her rival. If he had only had ma’amar with her and died, the stranger is to perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah. Levi is married to Tovah, who is not a sister of Rachel or Leah (she is a “stranger”). When Reuven dies, Levi has yibbum with Rachel his wife. Subsequently Levi dies and Rachel and Tovah become liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Shimon. Rachel is exempt because Shimon is married to Leah, her sister. Tovah is exempt because she is Rachel’s rival wife (see chapter one, mishnah one).

If Levi had ma’amar with Rachel instead of full yibbum, and then Levi died, Rachel was not truly his wife in order to exempt Tovah as a rival wife. Therefore, Tovah must have halitzah, but still cannot have yibbum since Levi did have ma’amar with Rachel.

In this case, Levi dies and Reuven has yibbum with Tovah. When Reuven subsequently dies, Rachel and Tovah become obligated to have yibbum with Shimon. Rachel is exempt because Shimon is married to Leah, her sister. Tovah is exempt because she is Rachel’s rival wife (see chapter one, mishnah one).

If Reuven had ma’amar with Tovah instead of yibbum, and then he died, Tovah was not truly his wife and therefore the fact that Rachel is Leah’s sister does not exempt her from yibbum. She still must have halitzah because Reuven did have ma’amar with her.

שעה אחת – through the falling of the first [wife] when she fell from his first brother [who had died] and for since his wife is alive, and this one is prohibited to him as the wife of his brother for he has children, but, regarding her non-related rival/co-wife, the law is not explained and seems logical that she performs Halitzah but does not engage in levirate marriage.

Introduction This mishnah continues to the discuss the situation of two brothers married to two sisters and a third brother married to a woman who is not a sister.

Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger: If one of the sisters’ husband died and the brother who was married to the stranger married his wife, and then the wife of the second brother died, and afterwards the brother who was married to the stranger died, behold she is forbidden to him forever, since she was forbidden to him for one moment. Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger. If one of the sisters’ husbands divorced his wife, and then the brother who was married to the stranger died, and he who had divorced his wife married her and then died,- this is a case concerning which they said: If any of them died or were divorced, their rivals are permitted. Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah and Levi is married to Tovah. Reuven dies and Levi has yibbum with Rachel, and then Leah dies and then Levi dies (sounds a bit like a Shakespeare tragedy, doesn’t it!). In this case both Tovah and Rachel should become liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Shimon. Note that this is the second time that Rachel has become potentially liable for yibbum with Shimon, the first time when Reuven died and now when her current husband, Levi died. Our mishnah teaches that since she was exempt from yibbum with Shimon the first time, for at the moment he was married to her sister, she is exempt from yibbum the second time, even though Leah, her sister, is no longer alive. The fact that she was once forbidden to have yibbum with Shimon, means that she will always be forbidden to have yibbum with him. Tovah is also exempt because she is the rival wife of a woman exempt from yibbum.

Again, Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah and Levi is married to Tovah. Reuven divorces Rachel, and then Levi dies, and Reuven has yibbum with Tovah, and then he dies. At this point Tovah becomes liable for yibbum with Shimon. The mishnah teaches that Tovah can have yibbum with Shimon even though Reuven was once married to the sister of Shimon’s wife. In other words, if Rachel had still been married to Reuven she would have been exempt from yibbum, and Tovah would have been exempt from yibbum, and hence forbidden to have yibbum (anyone exempt from yibbum may not have yibbum). Now that Rachel is no longer married to Reuven, Tovah can have yibbum. The mishnah refers to this law which has already been stated in chapter one, mishnah one.

וכולן – the fifteen [cases] of incest (see Tractate Yevamot, Chapter 1, Mishnah 1), of a woman forbidden to a man on account of consanguinity that they had with his brothers a doubtful betrothal/Kiddushin or doubtful Jewish divorce for there is a doubt of the rivals of a woman forbidden on account of consanguinity.

Introduction This mishnah refers back to the first mishnah of the tractate, which stated that if one of the wives was forbidden to the yavam, and therefore did not require yibbum or halitzah, the rival wife was also exempt from yibbum or halitzah. In that mishnah (and in the previous mishnah of our chapter) we learned that if the forbidden wife had been divorced, the rival wife was again liable for yibbum or halitzah. Our mishnah teaches what happens to the rival wife if the forbidden wife was doubtfully divorced or only doubtfully married in the first place.

חולצת – but it does not free her without anything for perhaps she is not the rival of a a woman forbidden on account of consanguinity.

[If in any of these cases] the betrothal or divorce was in doubt, behold, these rivals must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. What is a case of doubtful betrothal? If when he threw to her betrothal money it was uncertain whether it fell nearer to him or nearer to her – this is a case of doubtful betrothal. [What is a case of] doubtful divorce? If he wrote a get in his own handwriting and it bore no signatures of witnesses, or if it bore signatures of witnesses but was note dated, or if it was dated but had the signature of only one witness this is a case of doubtful divorce. If the forbidden wife was doubtfully betrothed, then there is a doubt whether or not the rival wife must or even can have yibbum. If the divorce was valid, then the rival wife can and must have yibbum; if the divorce was invalid then the rival wife is exempt. Similarly, if there was a doubt about whether or not the wife forbidden to the yavam was even married in the first place, there is a doubt whether or not the rival wife must or can have yibbum. If the betrothal was valid, then the rival wife is exempt; if the betrothal was not valid, then the rival wife was never even this woman’s true rival wife, and hence she is liable for yibbum or halitzah.

ספק קרוב לו – for there were eight exactly defined cubits between them in the public domain, and the four cubits of a person acquires for him there, and he threw it, doubtfully within his four cubits and doubtfully within her four cubits.

This section and the next define potential cases of doubtful divorce and betrothal. We should note that there are other cases of doubtful divorce and betrothal that we will learn when we learn tractates Gittin and Kiddushin. A man may betroth his wife by throwing the money used for betrothal at her (money is one of the means by which a woman is legally betrothed), as long as it is closer to her than to him. [Note that the woman must always consent to becoming his betrothed. A man cannot throw money at any woman he wishes and thereby betroth her against her will]. If it was doubtful whether the money landed closer to him or closer to her, she is doubtfully betrothed.

A normal get (divorce document) is written by a scribe, is signed by two witnesses and is dated. If the two witnesses are missing, but the husband wrote the get himself, or it has two witnesses but no date, or one witness but it has the date, the get is valid according to the Torah but the sages stated that it was invalid (see Gittin 8:2, 9:4). If a woman were to get remarried using one of these divorce documents, the children from the second marriage are not mamzers (as they would be if she remarried without ever being divorced). Our mishnah considers these divorce documents cases of “doubtful divorce” since they are on the one hand valid (from Torah law) and on the other hand invalid (due to a stringency of the rabbis).

זיקת שני יבמין – for as long as this living brother didn’t marry her, the levirate relation of first is upon him and the levirate relation of the second was added upon him because of the statement of intention he made [to perform a levirate marriage], and when he died, there remained upon her the levirate relation of two brothers-in-law.

Introduction This mishnah is quite complex so I recommend paying careful attention to the details. If you are beginning to despair, we are almost out of the most complex section of Yevamoth.

רש"א וכו' – since he holds that it is doubtful to us if the statement of intention [of performing levirate marriage] acquires completely or does not acquire at all, therefore, he performs levirate marriage on whichever of them that he desires, for if the statement of intention [to perform levirate marriage] acquires, he does not have anything other than the levirate relation of the second but if the statement of intention [of levirate marriage] does not acquire, he has nothing upon him other than the levirate relation of the first woman.

Three brothers were married to three women who were strangers [to one another] and one of them died and the second brother did ma’amar with her and then he died, behold, these must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum; for it is said “And one of them died…her husband’s brother shall unite with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5) only she who is bound due to one yavam but not she who is bound to due to two yavamim. R. Shimon says: he may have yibbum with whichever of these he wishes and then perform halitzah for the other. If two brothers were married to two sisters, and one of the brothers died, and afterwards the wife of the second brother died, behold, she is forbidden to him forever, since she was forbidden to him for one moment. Reuven, Shimon and Levi are married to Rachel, Tovah and Yael, none of whom are sisters. Reuven dies and Shimon does ma’amar with Rachel. When Shimon dies, Rachel and Tovah should, we would think, become liable for yibbum r halitzah with Levi. Our mishnah, using a midrash based on Deut. 25:5, states that neither woman may have yibbum with Levi. This is because Rachel is bound to Levi through her marriage to two of Levi’s brothers. She is still bound to him by force of her marriage with Reuven, because the ma’amar that Shimon did with her was not as strong as a full yibbum. [If Shimon had done yibbum, her ties to Reuven would have been fully severed.] She is bound to Levi through her marriage to Shimon because of the ma’amar she did do with him. In other words ma’amar is strong enough to create a relationship with the second brother, but not strong enough to sever the ties with the first brother. Therefore Rachel is bound to Levi through the force of her marriage to two brothers who are now deceased. The mishnah understands the words “And one of them died” to exclude a case where two brothers died. Since Rachel is exempt, her rival wife, Tovah, is also exempt. However, since ma’amar is not a biblical institution, and therefore the ties to Shimon are not complete, halitzah must be performed.

וחולץ לשניה – for one does not free him from [sexual intercourse] with the other, for perhaps the statement of intention [of levirate marriage] does not acquire, and there was two sisters-in-law that come from two homes. But there is no levirate marriage with both for perhaps the statement of intention [of levirate marriage] acquires, and there would be two sisters-in-law coming from one house. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Shimon, and even though we state in our Mishnah that the levirate relation of the two brothers-in-law is from the Torah from a Biblical verse (Deuteronomy 25:5): “Her brother’s husband shall unite with her: [he shall take her as his wife and perform the levir’s duty],” in the Gemara (Tractate Yevamot 31b) it proves hat the levirate relation of two brothers-in-law is Rabbinic as a decree, lest the people state that two sisters-in-law coming from the same house (i.e., widows of the same brother) may both be taken in levirate marriage.

Rabbi Shimon holds that ma’amar either completely acquires the woman for the man who does ma’amar, in other words it creates a complete and valid relationship according to the Torah, or it doesn’t create any legal relationship whatsoever, not even a rabbinicly ordained marriage. If it creates a complete betrothal, then Rachel’s ties to her first husband, Reuven, are ended by Shimon’s ma’amar. When Shimon dies, she becomes liable to yibbum with Levi only because of her marriage to Shimon. If it doesn’t create any tie, then she was never at all married to Shimon, and she is liable for yibbum with Levi only because of her marriage to Reuven. In either case, she does not fit the category of one who is liable to yibbum through two dead husbands at the same time. Therefore, either of these wives may have yibbum. The second wife must have halitzah, lest the ma’amar not have created a tie with Shimon, and therefore Rachel became obligated for yibbum because of her marriage with Reuven and Tovah became obligated because of her marriage with Shimon. He cannot have yibbum with the second one as well, lest the ma’amar did create a tie, and a yavam cannot have yibbum with two wives of one dead husband.

Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah. Reuven dies and Rachel then would become liable for yibbum with Shimon, except she is exempt because he is married to her sister. The mishnah teaches that even though Leah subsequently dies, and hence Rachel might be able to have yibbum with Shimon, she cannot because she was at one point forbidden to him. Note that this law was already explained in mishnah seven.

היו אחין – even because of [the prohibition of] marrying the wife of your brother, etc., and even though we hold that this prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition, this Tanna/teacher holds that an inclusive prohibition and a prohibition that adds and a simultaneous prohibition, like here, that a prohibition occurs on top of another prohibition and he is liable to bring a sacrifice on each and every prohibited act [performed] (i.e., a person may sometimes consume one piece of food and incur the penalty of four sin-offerings and one guilt offering - see Talmud Yevamot 34a).

Introduction Our mishnah discusses all of the potential violations that could occur in a case where two brothers betroth two women and the women are accidentally switched when the two couples enter the bridal chamber (huppah). In other words, Reuven has relations with Shimon’s wife and vice versa. Note that the mishnah is only discussing a situation where this occurred accidentally. Had the switch been intentional, they would all be intentional adulterers and the men would have to divorce their wives.

ומפרישין אותן – so that they will not return to their husbands.

If two men betrothed two women, and as they were entering into the bridal chamber, they exchanged the one for the other, behold, they are guilty of having relations with a married woman. If they were brothers they are guilty of having relations with a brother’s wife. If they were sisters, they are guilty of having relations with a wife’s sister. If they were menstruants [they are guilty] of having relations with a menstruant. They must be kept apart for three months, lest they are pregnant. If they were minors incapable of bearing children, they may be returned [to their rightful husband] at once. If the women were of priestly families they are disqualified from eating terumah. At the time of the mishnah, in typical situations a man would betroth a woman and only some time later marry her. The marriage was actualized by him bringing her into the huppah, which was a true bridal chamber, and not the symbolic huppah used today. In the huppah the couple would have sexual relations. Once the woman is betrothed, she is considered like a full wife with regard to adultery. Therefore, if the two brides were switched, each brother who has relations with the other’s wife has violated the prohibition of adultery.

שמא מעוברות הן – and the offspring will be illegitimate/Mamzerim and we need a probe to distinguish between kosher seed/offspring and disqualified seed/offspring (i.e., seed that was sewn in holiness and seed that was sown in unholiness) so that the fetuses will not be left in doubt with [regard to] their husbands.

He has also violated the prohibition of having relations with your brother’s wife. See Leviticus 18:16 and 20:21.

ואם היו כהנות – daughters of Kohanim.

If they were sisters he has also violated the prohibition of having relations with one’s wife’s sister. See Leviticus Leviticus 18:18.

נפסלו מתרומה – from eating heave-offering (i.e., Priest’s due) of the house of her father, even after the death of her husband, and even though she was a ravaged woman.

If they were menstruating, the brothers have violated the prohibition of having relations with a menstruant. See Leviticus 18:19.

Before each wife can return to having relations with her lawful husband, she must wait three months, lest she was impregnated on her wedding night. The three months allows us to recognize whether the child is from the wrong husband. If she was impregnated by the wrong husband, the child will be a mamzer. If she was a minor who could not become pregnant, the three month waiting period is unnecessary.

If these women were from priestly families, they will no longer be allowed to eat terumah, for any woman who has had relations with someone forbidden to her, can no longer marry a priest or eat terumah. If her husband should die without children, she does not return to her priestly family and resume eating terumah, as would a normal widow in such a situation (see Leviticus 22:13).