Commento su 'Eduyyot 7:10

העיד רבי יהושע. פדיון פטר חמור שמת– a lamb which was set aside/dedicated for the redemption of the first-born of an ass and it died.

Introduction According to Exodus 13:13, the first born of a donkey must be “redeemed” with a sheep. Since donkeys are not fit to be sacrificed, their firstborn cannot be offered on the altar as are the firstborn of “pure” animals. Therefore they are redeemed with a sheep, which is then given to the priests (see Numbers 18:15). In our mishnah the Rabbis dispute the responsibility that the owner of the donkey has over the sheep which he has used to redeem the first born of his donkey. The question is, if the sheep dies after it has been used to redeem the donkey but before he gives it to the priest, must he replace it with a new sheep?

כחמש סלעים – [like the five Sela’im] of the redemption of the first-born son [if lost] is liable to make it up.

Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok testified concerning the redemption ( of a firstborn donkey, that if it died, the priest receives nothing, According to Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok, if the sheep used to redeem the first-born donkey should die before it is given to the priest, the owner is not responsible to provide the priest with a new sheep. According to these Sages, once he has “redeemed” the first-born donkey with the sheep he has fulfilled his religious duty. True the sheep belongs to the priest, but the owner has no responsibility to protect the sheep on behalf of the priest. Therefore if something happens to it, it is the priest’s loss.

כפדיון מעשר שני – for if it was lost, he is not liable to make it for that money the All-Merciful obligated to teat in Jerusalem, but surely it was lost to him, and the reason of Rabbi Eliezer for we have surely found that the Biblical verse made a comparison by juxtaposition between the first born of the ass and the first born of a human being, as it states (Exodus 34:20): “But the firstling of an ass you shall redeem with a sheep; [if you do not redeem it, you must break its neck.] And you must redeem every first-born among your sons.”

Whereas Rabbi Eliezer says: the owner must bear the responsibility as with the five selas [in the case] of a [firstborn] son. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees. He compares this sheep to the five selas that a father owes the priest to redeem his own first-born (pidyon ha-ben). In that case all the Rabbis agree that if the coins are lost before the father gives them over to the priest, the father must give the priest five new selas. Rabbi Eliezer says that just as in that case the father is responsible, so too in this case the owner of the donkey is responsible if the sheep should die before being presented to the priest.

וחכמים אומרים – The Biblical verse states (Numbers 18:15): “…but you shall have the first-born of man redeemed, and you shall also have the firstling of impure animals redeemed.” To redemption the Torah made a comparison [by juxtaposition] but not to anything else.

But the Sages say: he bears no responsibility any more than in the case of the redemption of second tithes. The Sages, who in this case agree with Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok, compare this situation to that of lost coins of second tithe. These coins were used to redeem second tithe produce. The coins were then meant to be brought to Jerusalem and used there to buy food. If the owner of the coins should lose them before he arrives in Jerusalem, he is not obligated to replace them. According to the Sages, the same is true for the sheep.

Questions for Further Thought:
• Why would the Sages not agree with Rabbi Eliezer’s analogy of the sheep to the five selas given for the redemption of the human first born?
• Why would Rabbi Eliezer not agree with the Sages’ analogy to second tithe?

לא פסלו את צירן – for they were lenient with the brine of unclean locusts that he doesn’t prohibit their [mixture], because they lack blood and it is only mere moistness, and this was an early version of the Mishnah. But the testimony of Rabbi Tzadok added on to the words of the early version of the Mishnah to state that it is pure, for it was needless to say that he does not forbid this mixture, but rather even this itself is pure.

Introduction According to Leviticus 11:22, it is permitted to eat certain types of locusts. However, there are some types of locusts that are forbidden to eat. In the time of the mishnah people were able to distinguish between permitted and forbidden locusts. Nowadays, we do not know the difference and therefore Jews do not eat locusts. I’m sure we are all deeply disappointed. Our mishnah discusses the liquid that comes out of locusts when they have been preserved through salting.

Rabbi Zadok testified concerning brine of unclean locusts that it is clean, Rabbi Zadok teaches that the liquid that oozes out of unclean locusts when they have been salted is not considered a liquid that makes that with which it comes into contact receptive to impurities. (See Leviticus 11:38). The only liquids that do so are dew, water, wine, oil, blood, milk and bee’s honey (see tractate Makhshirin 6:4). Likewise, it is permitted to drink this liquid, since it is not considered to be the blood of the locust.

Whereas the first mishnah [said]: unclean locusts that have been preserved together with clean locusts do not make their brine unfit. The earlier mishnah, which existed before Rabbi Zadok taught something slightly different. It taught that if unclean locusts were preserved, meaning pickled, with clean (edible) locusts, the it is permitted to drink the brine. Rabbi Zadok has added that even the liquid that oozes out of just unclean locusts, and not a mixture, is permitted to drink.

Questions for Further Thought:
What is the relationship of Rabbi Zadok to the “first mishnah”?

על הזוחלין שרבו על הנוטפים – they are running waters like rivers that are waters in channels or stored up on the ground, based upon the language of (Deuteronomy 32:24): “with venomous creepers in dust,” and their law is like that of a spring which purifies running water and whatever is in it, and they are valid to sanctify through them the waters of purification and for the immersion of individuals with a flux.

Rabbi Zadok testified concerning flowing water which exceeded in quantity dripping water; that it was valid.
There was such a case at Birath Hapilya, and when the case came before the Sages they declared it valid.
This mishnah discusses water which is used for a mikveh, the bath used by Jews to achieve ritual purification. This mishnah also appears in tractate Mikvaoth, where it is preceded by a distinction between running water and dripping water. Water which is flowing on the ground, such as a stream, creek or river, is valid for a mikveh even if there are less than 40 seahs in one place. However, dripping water, such as rain, must reach a minimum measure of 40 seahs in one defined place in order to be valid as a mikveh. [Note that water drawn to the mikveh is invalid in any case].
Our mishnah discusses a potential mikveh that has some flowing water and some dripping water. The question is, does this mikveh need to have 40 seahs?
According to Rabbi Zadok, as long as the quantity of flowing water exceeded the quantity of dripping water, the mikveh is valid, even if there are not 40 seahs in the place where the person immerses. If, however, there was more dripping water, then the mikveh would need to have 40 seahs of water in order to be valid. The mishnah then brings in an actual case where such a question arose and the Sages declared the mikveh to be valid.

נוטפים – [they drip] like rain water, and their law is like a Mikveh of forty Seah to purify, and in a cavity for the reception of water, and they are invalid for the waters of a sin-offering and for the immersion of those with a flux, but they purify in running waters and with anything in them.

בבירת דלפיא – the name of a place.

עלי אגוז – the outer shell of a nut, which is the green shell when it is moist. If he made it like a spout/tube so that the running water enters through it and causes gushing forth by interposing an object (i.e., dam it in and causing an overflow), it has the law of running waters for the waters that are dammed in and causing an overflow from it, and they are valid for the waters of purification and for the immersion of individuals with a flux, etc. And we don’t say that since they entered into this shell, which has a receptacle and from there, are dammed in causing an overflow from it, they would not have the law of running waters, since that shell is not considered a utensil.

Introduction This mishnah contains additional testimony of Rabbi Zadok concerning the validity of water for use in a mikveh. In the introduction to the previous mishnah we mentioned that flowing water such as a stream need not contain 40 seahs in any one place in order to be valid to be used as a mikveh. However, if the flowing water is directed by vessels, then it must contain 40 seahs in one place to be used as a mikveh.

לפני לשכת הגזית – the Great Sanhedrin that would sit in the Chamber of the Hewn Stones.

Rabbi Zadok testified concerning flowing water which was made to run in a stream through nut-leaves, that it was valid. In the scenario under discussion a person has used nut-leaves to direct a stream of water. The question is, are these nut-leaves to be considered like a vessel? If they are then the stream would require 40 seahs in one place in order to be used as a mikveh. Rabbi Zadok testifies that these nut-leaves are not to be considered like vessels, even though the person who set them up may have used them in a similar fashion. Therefore the stream is valid as a mikveh even without 40 seahs in one place.

There was such a case at Ahaliyya, and when the case came before [the Sages in] the Chamber of Hewn Stone they declared it valid. This section brings additional support for Rabbi Zadok’s testimony. A case such as this actually happened in a place called Ahaliyya, and the Sages who sat in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, which was located in the Temple in Jerusalem (Sanhedrin 11:2) ruled that the water was valid without 40 seahs. Note the similar structure between this mishnah and the previous mishnah.

קלל של חטאת (this part of the Mishnah is also taught in Tractate Parah, Chapter 10, Mishnah 3) - an earthenware vessel that the ashes of the heifer are placed in it. The Aramaic translation of (Genesis 24:15): “…came out with her jar on her shoulder,” her jar on her shoulder.

Introduction The first section of mishnah five contains a testimony regarding the purity of a jar of red heifer ashes that had been placed on an impure creeping thing. The second section contains a testimony regarding a person who took two nazirite vows.

שנתנו על גבי השרץ – an the utensil that the ashes of the heifer is inside is not defiled. For the earthenware vessel is not defiled from the outside, nevertheless, the ashes are impure, because it is placed in an impure place. And the Torah stated (Numbers 19:9): “[A man who is pure shall gather up the ashes of the cow] and deposit them outside the camp in a pure place, [to be kept for water of lustration for the Israelite community].”

Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Yakim, a man of Hadar, testified concerning a jar of ashes of a red heifer which was put over a creeping thing, that they were unclean. Whereas Rabbi Eliezer had pronounced them clean. In the case under discussion a person has a jar which contains the ashes of a red heifer, which are used in the purification process. The jar itself cannot receive impurity, for it is made out of stone which can never become impure. If the jar is placed over an impure creeping thing, the ashes inside the jar are impure, even though the jar itself remains pure. This is due to an interpretation of Numbers 19:9 which states, “A man who is clean shall gather up the ashes of the cow and deposit them outside the camp in a clean place.” Since these ashes were not put in a “clean place”, they become impure. This law is in contrast to that which Rabbi Eliezer stated, namely that since the jar remains pure, the ashes remain pure as well.

שר' אליעזר מטהר – for he holds that since the utensil and the ashes within it are pure, it is better to call it a pure place. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Eliezer.

Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who had vowed two naziriteships, that if he cut his hair after the first one on the thirtieth day, he could cut his hair after the second one on the sixtieth day; and if he cut his hair on the fifty-ninth day he has also fulfilled his duty, for the thirtieth day counts towards the required number. The testimony of Rabbi Papias concerns the length of a naziriteship. One who takes an oath to be a nazirite without specifying the length of the vow, is a nazirite for thirty days. During this time it is forbidden for him to cut his hair. On the thirty-first day, when the naziriteship was over he would cut his hair. If he were to cut his hair on the thirtieth day, he has fulfilled his naziriteship, since the observance of the vow for part of the day counts as if he observed it for the full day. If he were to take two nazirite vows, he should really cut his hair on the thirty-first day, and then begin to count that same day the second nazirite vow and then cut his hair again on the sixty-first day. However, if he cut his hair on the thirtieth day, he should cut his hair a second time on the sixtieth day. Furthermore, if he cut his hair for the second time on the fifty-ninth day, he has fulfilled his obligation. This is because the thirtieth day when he cut his hair the first time, counts both as the last day of his first naziriteship and the first day of his second naziriteship. In this manner one who takes two nazirite vows can “get away” with completing his second vow after only 59 days.

על מי שנזר שתי נזירות (this part of the Mishnah is also taught in Tractate Nazir, Chapter 3, Mishnah 2) –mere/plain [Nazirite-ship]. And all plain Nazirite vows are thirty days.

Questions for Further Thought:
• Section one: What is the basis for the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the testimony of Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Yakim?

שאם גלה את הראשונה יום שלשים – for ab initio, it was not needed for him to shave other than the thirty-first [day], in order that that his Nazirite-ship would be thirty complete days. But if he shaved on the thirtieth day, his Nazirite-ship was counted for him, for we say that part of a day is like a full day.

ואם גלה יום ששים חסר אחד יצא – for the thirtieth day of the first Nazirite-ship counts both for here (i.e., the first) and for there (i.e., the second), and since the thirtieth day of the first is also counted from the second Nazirite-ship, it is found that thirty days of the second Nazirite-ship end on the sixtieth-day minus one (i.e., on the fifty-ninth day).

ולד שלמים לא יקרב שלמים – but one puts it into the prison and it dies. It is because a decree, for if we you were to say that the offspring of a peace-offering has a remedy, one can wait for the mother until she gives birth and the flock would grow from the offspring and it would provide wool and labor.

Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias testified concerning the offspring of a peace-offering, that it can be brought as a peace-offering, whereas Rabbi Eliezer says that the offspring of a peace-offering cannot be brought as a peace-offering.
But the sages say: it can be brought.
Rabbi Papias said: “I testify that we had a cow, which was a peace-offering, and we ate it at Passover, and its offspring we ate as a peace-offering at the [next] festival.
This mishnah discusses the offspring of a peace-offering. A peace-offering (shelamim) was a sacrifice that was usually brought either as a voluntary offering, or on festivals. The breast and the right hand leg would go to the priests and the remainder of the animal could be eaten by those who had brought it. The issue in our mishnah is the status of the offspring of an animal that had already been set aside to become a peace-offering. In other words, after the owner declared that he was going to bring the animal to the Temple as a peace-offering, it gave birth.
According to Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias, the offspring of a peace-offering can be brought as a peace-offering. Rabbi Eliezer ruled that it may not be brought as an peace-offering. The Talmud explains that according to Rabbi Eliezer the animal is put into a pen and let to die through starvation. The reason is that if the halakhah were to allow the owner to bring it as a peace-offering he would have incentive to delay bringing the mother , who has already been declared a peace-offering, to the Temple. The owner might wait until she gives birth, perhaps several times, in order that he would be able to bring more peace-offerings (after all he benefits as well by having more meat to eat). This delay in bringing the animal to the Temple would violate a rule in Deuteronomy 23:22 which states that when you offer a voluntary sacrifice, do not delay in bringing it.
The Sages side in this dispute with the testimony of Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias. At the end of the mishnah Rabbi Papias brings his own personal experience of having eaten a peace-offering at one festival and its offspring at the next.

ואכלנו ולדה שלמים בחג – on the holiday of Shavuot, for if he would wait and look forward to the holiday of Sukkot, it is found that he would violate a positive commandment, as it states (Deuteronomy 12:5,6): “There you are to go, and there you are to bring [your burnt offerings and other sacrifices, your tithes and contributions, your votive and freewill offerings, and the firstlings of your herds and flocks],” that implies on the first Festival that you would go there, bring all your vows that are upon you. However, the negative commandment of “[When you make a vow to the LORD your God] do not put off fulfilling it,” he does not transgress until three festivals have passed by.

ארוכות של נחתומים (this section of the Mishnah is also taught in Tractate Kelim, Chapter 15, Mishnah 2) – flat wooden utensils that bakers arrange there loaves of bread at the time when they make bread. Long-ranging boards like to work the dough.

Introduction This mishnah contains four more testimonies given by Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias. Note that on the first two Rabbi Eliezer expresses a dissenting opinion, the same format we saw in the previous two mishnayoth.

שהן טמאות – According to the Rabbis, for assuming that from the Torah, flat wooden utensils do not receive defilement,, the Rabbis decreed upon them, as is brought in Tractate Kelim, Chapter 2 (Mishnah 1).

They testified concerning the boards of bakers, that they are impure (they can receive, whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares them pure (unable to receive. The “boards of bakers” under discussion in this section are planks upon which the baker organizes his dough and puts it into the shape of loaves. If these planks are considered “vessels” than they can receive impurity, as can all “vessels”. If however, they are considered closer to raw material, less-shaped, then they cannot receive impurity. According to Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias since these boards are specially made to have dough put on them, they can receive impurity. Rabbi Eliezer holds that they cannot.

שר' אליעזר מטהר (see Tractate Kelim, Chapter 10, Mishnah 5) – that he held that they are not considered utensils at all, and even if they are not like flat wooden utensils. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Eliezer.

They testified concerning an oven which was cut into rings and sand was put between the rings that it is impure (can receive, whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares it pure (unable to receive. The oven under discussion is one made of bricks. Sand has been placed between each brick and then a layer of plaster was put on the outside to seal the oven. The sand would prevent the bricks from being stuck together and therefore make this oven easy to take apart. According to Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias, since the oven was plastered from the outside, it is considered a proper oven and can receive impurity. Rabbi Eliezer holds that since each part is separate, it is not considered an oven, but a broken oven. Since broken vessels cannot receive impurity, this oven cannot be made impure.

שחתכו חוליות – they cut up the burned clay of the oven by its width into tiles and placed one tile on top of another, and placed sand in-between each tile, and plastered it with plaster/mud and made of it a paste of plaster surrounding its matting to guard its heat in the manner that people do for ovens.

They testified that the year may be intercalated throughout the whole of Adar, whereas they used to say: only until Purim. The Jewish year is based on both a lunar and solar model. It is lunar in that the length of a month is determined by the moon. It is solar in that the year is occasionally adjusted so that months and holidays will fall consistently in the same season. (The concept of a year exists only in a solar calendar; the concept of a month exists only in a lunar calendar). In today’s fixed calendar the year receives an extra month seven out of nineteen years. The extra month comes after Adar, the month in which we celebrate Purim. This extra month is called Adar Bet (second Adar). During the time of the Mishnah they did not have a fixed calendar. Each year a court would have to decide whether or not to “intercalate” the year, meaning add another month. They would do so depending on the weather outside. According to Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias, the court has until the end of Adar to intercalate the year. This means that they can do so at the last possible moment. The older halakhah was that it could only be intercalated before Purim, which falls on the 14th of Adar.

שרבי אליעזר מטהר – for since there is sand between the cracks, it is similar to as if it’s broken. And the Sages defile it for the plaster makes it all as one, and attaches the slits, even though there is sand between each tile. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Eliezer (Note: This dispute is the source text for the famous debate of the Oven of Akhnai found in Tractate Bava Metzia 59a).

They testified that the year may be intercalated conditionally. There was such a case with Rabban Gamaliel who went to receive permission from the governor in Syria and he delayed in coming back; and they intercalated the year on condition that rabban gamaliel should approve; and when he came back he said: I approve, and the year was intercalated. The final testimony of Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias is about conditionally intercalating the year. As we can see from the example in the story, this means that a court would decide to intercalate the year in the absence of the Patriarch, in this case Rabban Gamaliel, who evidently had the ultimate decision in whether or not to intercalate. When the Patriarch returned and agreed to the intercalation it becomes retroactively valid.

שמעברין את השנה בכל אדר – until the twenty-ninth of Adar, there is time for the Jewish court to state that it is a leap year, and that the next month is the Second Adar, but on the thirtieth day of Adar, one cannot intercalate the year, since it is appropriate to establish [the month of] Nisan, in the chapter of Tractate Pesahim 56a – “In the place where the practice existed” (chapter 4).

על תנאי – if the President [of the Sanhedrin} wishes that it would be intercalated and if not, it would not be intercalated.

מוסף היורה של שולקי זיתים – it is the manner of those who seethe olives and dyers who have large boilers and make for them additional plaster on their rims so that they will bring forth water at the time of their boiling. That of those who seethe olives is ritually impure, because that supplement is necessary for the utensil and it is used, and the Torah stated concerning the oven and portable stoves on feet (Leviticus 11:35): “an oven or stove shall be smashed. They are unclean and unclean they shall remain for you.” And they (i.e., the Rabbis) expound upon the word לכם/”for you,” everything that they need, that is a substance from the utensil that one you need it for and use it – that it receives defilement.

Introduction Olive-boilers and dyers would both use large metal cauldrons for boiling. In order to prevent the water from spilling out they would put a plaster ledge around the sides of the cauldron. The question in our mishnah is: are these plaster ledges receptive to impurity? In other words, are they considered “vessels” which receive impurity or raw material which does not.

ושל צבעים טהור – for dyers do not use the same supplement since they are fearful lest they lose their color.

Menahem ben Signai testified concerning the ledge attached to an olive-boiler’s cauldron, that it is [liable to become] impure; and concerning that of dyers, that it is not [liable to become] impure, whereas they used to say the reverse. According to Menahem ben Signai, the ledge attached to the olive-boiler’s cauldron can become impure. This is because it is necessary for the proper use of the cauldron; it allows the olive-boiler to fill the entire cauldron with water. The ledge that the dyer uses cannot become impure because the dyer is careful not to fill the cauldron up to the top with water so that it might boil over. Previously people reasoned the opposite. Evidently they thought that the dyer’s made more use of the ledge than did the olive-boilers. The principle, however, remains the same. If the ledge is normally used to keep the water in, than it receives impurity. Unfortunately, I must admit, never having boiled olives or dye, that I cannot fully understand the reason why people would change their minds about which is a “vessel” and which is not.

על החרשת שהשיאה אבות (this section of the Mishnah is also taught in Tractate Gittin, Chapter 4, Mishnah 5; this part of the Mishnah is also taught in Tractate Yevamot, Chapter 14, Mishnah 2) – even though she is a completely married woman, for her father received her betrothal when she was a small girl/minor, even so, she is divorced with a Jewish bill of divorce, and she receives her Jewish bill of divorce when she is a deaf-mute, and even though she lacks knowledge, because a woman can be divorced against her will. Therefore, we do not require her knowledge.

Introduction The final mishnah of chapter nine contains four testimonies given by Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada.

ועל קטנה בת ישראל שנשאת לכהן – and she is an orphan and her marriage was not other than from the Rabbis, and she eats priest’s due from the Rabbis and we don’t make the decree regarding priest’s due of the Rabbis because of the priest’s due of the Torah.

Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada testified concerning a deaf-mute whose father had given her in marriage, that she could be sent away with a bill of divorcement; As we have learned in other places, the Rabbis considered a deaf-mute to lack intelligence, probably because in their time the deaf-mute had little way of communicating with the outside world. Usually a person who lacks intelligence, such a deaf-mute, minor or insane person, cannot enter into legally binding contracts, because they don’t understand their ramifications. However, as Rabbi Nehunia testifies, a deaf-mute can be divorced. (She was married off by her father). The reason is that divorce is not dependent upon the woman’s acquiescence; she can be divorced against her will. Since her will is irrelevant, even one who lacks awareness can be divorced. Although this might sound harsh, as if the Rabbis are going out of their way to allow a deaf-mute to be divorced, it may have also worked in her benefit. If men couldn’t divorce deaf-mutes, perhaps they might refrain from marrying them. By allowing a “way out” the Rabbis might actually be encouraging their marriage.

מריש – beam

And concerning a minor, daughter of an Israelite who married a priest, that she could eat terumah, and if she died her husband inherited from her; This section deals with an orphaned minor girl of a non-priestly, Israelite family, who marries a priest. Generally this type of marriage is considered to be valid only rabbinically (derabanan) and not valid through Torah law (deoraita). Deoraita a minor can only be married off by her father. Only when she reaches majority she can marry herself off without her father’s aid. Despite the fact that this is really only a “derabanan” marriage, Rabbi Nehunya testifies that it is sufficient for her to be allowed to eat terumah and for her husband to inherit her, should she die. Even though these are usually rights only given to a valid “deoraita” marriage, Rabbi Nehunya testifies that the husband does receive these rights.

בירה – large house

And concerning a stolen beam that had been built into a palace, that it might be restored by the payment of its value; Usually one who steals an item must return the actual stolen item, as long as the item still exists. If one stole a beam and then used it in the foundation of a castle, legally he is bound to take down the castle and return the beam. Obviously this will discourage people from admitting that they stole, an essential part of making atonement for their crime. To allow people to more easily make atonement, the robber is allowed to pay back the value of the beam.

מפני תקנת השבים – for if we would require him to take down the entire group of buildings and to return the beam itself, he might be prevented from repenting.

And concerning a sin-offering that had been stolen, and this was not known to many, that it caused atonement because of the welfare of the altar. If it were forbidden to use animals that might have been stolen as sacrifices, the priests would never sacrifice an animal, lest it be stolen. Therefore, the mishnah rules that stolen animals can be used as sin-offerings, and that they do procure atonement for the one bringing them, as long as the theft is not publicly known. This mishnah is not permission to steal an animal and bring it as a sacrifice. Rather it is permission to use an animal without being concerned that it is stolen property. The mishnah teaches that if it was stolen property and the person who brought it did not know that it was stolen, that it is effective in bringing atonement.

שלא נודעה לרבים – which is stolen

Questions for Further Thought:
• Is there any common denominator to these four testimonies of Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada?

שהיא מכפרת – and there is no need to bring another.

מפני תיקון מזבח – the there would not be sad Kohanim when they ate non-sacred food that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. And it is found that the altar is void for they are prevented from performing the Divine Worship.