Commento su Hullin 2:15

השוחט אחד בעוף – Because in that ab initio, it was necessary to slaughter two organs (i.e, both the windpipe and the esophagus) even with fowl, the Mishnah teaches "השוחט" –” he who ritually slaughters”, which implies that [only] one organ, for fowl [is required] de facto, but not ab initio. But two [organs are required] for cattle, ab initio, for how far does one go to slaughter [ritually]. Alternatively, because it was necessary to teach most of one [organ must be ritually slaughtered] like it, specifically de facto, for ab initio one must intend to slaughter the entire organ. And one [organ] in regard to fowl, fulfills one’s duty that it is fit, is from a Biblical verse, as it is written (Leviticus chapter 11, verse 46): “These are the instruction concerning animals, birds, all living creatures that move in the water [and all creatures that swarm on the earth],” the Bible attached [the category of] fowl between cattle and fish, to obligate [the ritual slaughter of] two organs, it is impossible that there was [already] an analogy made with fish; to exempt him [from doing any slaughtering] was impossible, since it was already compared to cattle. How was this accomplished? They (the Rabbis) made it ritually valid (for fowl) with one organ. And the act of ritual slaughter from the neck and and with two organs. Five things invalidate the act of ritual slaughter: שהייה–pausing during the act of slaughtering, דרסה–pressing the knife (adding muscular force to the cutting capacity of the knife, instead of passing the latter to and back (Hullin 20b), חלדה–pressing the life under cover; הגרמה–cutting the animal’s throat in a slanting direction (letting the knife slide beyond the space ritually designated for cutting); and עיקור–tearing loose the windpipe and esophagus before cutting, all of them are derived in the Gemara, regarding the esophagus and the windpipe and on the majority of one organ for fowl and on the majority of two organs for cattle.

Introduction Our mishnah returns to the subject of slaughtering. Slaughtering involves cutting the trachea and the esophagus. Our mishnah deals with a case where the slaughterer did not fully cut both organs.

עד שישחוט את הוורידים – like kinds of sinews upon the two sides of the windpipe, and regarding the foul alone, Rabbi Yehuda speaks, in order to remove its blood, since he roasted it entirely as one. And ritual slaughter, as stated by Rabbi Yehuda, not exactly, but rather that he should perforate the jugular vein prior to a skin–cover–membrane forms over the blood. For further blood will not come out, even though salting; but the Halakha does not follow Rabbi Yehuda.

If one cut one [of the organs of the throat] in the case of a bird, or both organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid. There is a difference between slaughtering birds and slaughtering cattle (cows, sheep and goats). In order for the cattle to be valid both organs must be cut, whereas it is sufficient for one of the organs to be cut for a bird to be valid.

רוב איד בעוף וכו' – And even though it is taught at the beginning of the Mishnah that most of one organ is like it, the Mishnah retracted here by teaching that one organ [is required] for fowl, etc., whether one is speaking about non-sacred meat or with meat dedicated for sacrificial purposes., for if we would teach only about non-sacred meat, I might say that it is enough for most [of one organ] because it was not for the blood that he needed it, but for the Holy Things (i.e. Sacrifices) for which the blood was necessary, it would not suffice to slaughter most of the organ; hence it comes to teach us that this was not the case.

The greater part of an organ is equivalent to [the whole of] it. Rabbi Judah says: he must cut through the veins. If he cuts through most of the organ, the animal is valid. Rabbi Judah says that he must at least cut through the veins. The Talmud states that this applies only to the bird.

[If one cut] half of one organ in the case of a bird, or one and a half organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is invalid. Cutting through half of an organ is not sufficient. Therefore, if one cuts through half of one organ of a bird or one and a half organs of an animal, the slaughtering is not valid.

[If one man cut] the greater part of one organ in the case of a bird, or the greater part of each organ in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid. However, cutting through the greater part of the organ counts as cutting through the organ. Therefore, if he cuts through the greater part of one of the bird’s organs, or the greater part of both of the animal’s organs, the slaughtering is valid

שנים אוחזין בסכין ושוחטין – one animal

If one slaughtered two animals simultaneously, the slaughtering is valid. As long as the slaughtering is performed in a valid manner, if two animals are slaughtered together they are both valid.

אפילו אחד למעלה ואחד למטה – that one is holding at one edge of the knife and his fellow is holding at the other side.

If two persons held the knife and slaughtered, even if one cut higher up and the other cut lower down [in the neck], the slaughtering is valid. Similarly, if two people hold the knife, even if they hold different parts of the knife, the slaughtering is valid, as long as it was performed in a valid manner.

התיז את הראש – like a person who decapitates a reed or a gourd, when he pushes the [slaughtering] knife with force and divides it. And this is דרסה–cutting the throat of an animal by pressing (adding muscular force to the cutting capacity of the knife, instead of passing the latter to and back).

If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. Slaughtering must be done with a to and fro motion with the knife and not by chopping. Chopping the head off, which is called "derasah (pressing)," invalidates the animal.

היה שוחט – through pulling [the slaughtering knife] and he decapitated the head with [either] the drawing home [of the slaughtering knife] or the drawing of the slaughterer’s knife in a forward direction alone. But for the slaughter of the [two] organs in the appropriate measure, it is called severing the head.

He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. In this case, while slaughtering, which means bringing the knife back and forth, he pressed the knife into the neck, and cut the organs. If the part of the knife that has already passed through the neck is as long as the neck, then the slaughtering is valid. The reason is that we can assume that he has already slaughtered properly with the part of the neck that was already passed through the neck.

אם יש בסכין מלא צואר – other than neck of the animal or fowl that he is ritually slaughtering.

So too, if he slaughters two animals at the same time, and he presses down on one of them. If the length of one knife has already passed through both necks, the slaughtering is valid.

כשרה – if there is on the knife [the ability to slaughter] through pulling and not through cutting the throat through the use of muscular force, . But if the length of the knife is only as long as thickness of the neck, or just beyond the neck a bit, it is considered [as if] one had used muscular force, for the organs (i.e., the windpipe and esophagus) are not just through just this pulling, if not for the use of muscular force.

These limitations are necessary if he had passed the knife only in one direction. But if he had already passed the knife in both directions, it doesn’t matter how large the knife is, since we can assume that he slaughtered it before he chopped it.

אם יש בסכין מלוא צואר אחד – outside of these two necks, that is the measurement of three necks.

If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, "And you shall slaughter and eat," that which you slaughter, you may eat. Slaughtering must be performed by a person slicing the neck, not by a knife that somehow falls down and slices a neck without being held by a person. While this doesn't seem to be a real possibility, perhaps what it means to say is that there must be human involvement in the slaughtering process. It can't just happen on its own, even if it happens in a valid fashion.

איזמל – a very small, thin razor. And we don’t enact a prohibition regarding one that lacks hornlike projections as an ornament for the sake of a knife which does have hornlike projections as an ornament. For an איזמל–knife which has hornlike projections, for it normally [customary] to make hornlike projections as an ornaments on its back bending towards its head, and since it [the knife] is very small, it was detached from the neck, and when [the knife is] passed towards and back, there is a fear lest the hornlike projections will pass the slaughtering knife under cover (i.e. חלדה ) [which is forbidden].

If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering. The mishnah lists various reasons that a person might stop in the middle of slaughtering an animal. If he stops for any of these reasons, and doesn’t resume slaughtering for the amount of time it would take to slaughter an animal, then the slaughtering is invalid. In other words, the second half of the act of shechitah does not join with the first act and therefore the animal was not fully slaughtered in the correct manner. Stopping in the middle of slaughtering is called "shehiyah," delaying, and it is one of the things that renders slaughtering invalid.

נפלה סכין ושחטה – The reason that it [i.e., the knife] fell (then, the slaughtering is invalid); but if he threw it down [and it slaughtered the animal in an appropriate manner], it is valid, even though he did not intend to perform the act of ritual slaughtering, for we don’t require spiritual intention in the act of ritual slaughtering. And since it is necessary for the mentioning of the Biblical verse, regarding the ritual slaughtering of animals for the sacrificial purposes [of the Temple] (Leviticus 22:29): “[When you sacrifice a thanksgiving offering to the LORD, sacrifice it so that] it may be acceptable in your favor,” with your knowledge you shall sacrifice it, that is to say, with knowledge and spiritual intention (for purposes of the ritual sacrifices in the Temple). We learn from this that for חולין–non-consecrated animals (profane things), we do not require spiritual intentionality.

Rabbi Shimon says that if he delays the amount of time necessary for someone to check if the slaughtering was done properly, then it is invalid. This is a longer time than it would take to actually slaughter.

נפלה סכין והגביהה – and he paused during the act of slaughtering [which makes the animal so cut unfit to eat) while it was lifted up.

כליו – his clothing

או שהשחיז את הסכין – prior to [engaging in] the act of slaughtering.

ועף – he became tired and weary as a result of the sharpening–whetting of the knife, and when he began to ritually slaughter [the animal], he did not have the strength and stopped his slaughter, and his fellow came and slaughtered.

כדי שחיטה אחרת – in order that he would slaughter most of the two [organs] in another animal like it, while it is lying down, a large animal next to a large animal and a small animal next to a small animal. and it is also necessary that he lift it up and lie it down, and they did not practice in such a manner.

כדי בקור – For the interval that the ritual slaughterer checks and examines his knife (to determine its fitness). But the Halakha does not follow [the opinion] of Rabbi Shimon.

ופסק את הגרגרת – that is עיקור–tearing loose the windpipe before cutting; and we are referring to cattle.

Introduction In our mishnah Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yeshevav argue about whether an animal that has been improperly slaughtered is a “nevelah” or a “terefah” two terms that I explained in the introduction to Hullin. While neither animal can be eaten, the nevelah causes impurity while the terefah doesn’t. Thus there is some practical difference between the two. Today, since neither animal can be eaten, it doesn’t really matter whether an animal is a nevelah or a terefah.

תחת השני – under the second organ. When he inserted the knife between the organ and the neck.

If one first sliced the esophagus and then cut away the windpipe, or first cut away the windpipe and then sliced the esophagus; or if he sliced one of these organs and paused until the animal died; or if he thrust the knife underneath the second organ and cut it: [In all these cases] Rabbi Yeshevav says: the animal is nevelah; Rabbi Akiva says: it is terefah. “Slicing” is how I have translated “shachat” which means to validly slaughter. “Cut away” is my translation of the verb “pasak” and it is an invalid method of slaughter. So if one properly slices one of the two organs and then improperly slices the other one, or if he slices one of the organs and then doesn’t slice the other one and the animal dies, or if instead of slicing the organ he thrusts the knife under the organ and slices up (this is called haladah, burrowing), the animal cannot be eaten. The rabbis argue as to the status of the animal. According to Rabbi Yeshevav the animal is a nevelah. As we in section two, Rabbi Yeshevav says that whenever an animal cannot be eaten because it was slaughtered improperly, the animal has the status of nevelah. Rabbi Akiva says that it is a terefah.

החליד – he covered, which is the language of חלדה– passing the knife under cover (Hullin 27a); like a weasel–mole who lives in the foundations of the house in a concealed location].

Rabbi Yeshevav stated this general rule in the name of Rabbi Joshua: whenever an animal is rendered invalid by a fault in the slaughtering it is nevelah; whenever an animal has been duly slaughtered but is rendered invalid by some other defect it is terefah. And Rabbi Akiba [ultimately] agreed with him. Rabbi Yeshevav provides a general rule for determining what is a nevelah and what is a terefah. We have already explained nevelah above. A terefah is an animal that was slaughtered correctly but couldn’t be eaten because there was some other previously existing problem with it. We shall learn what causes an animal to be a terefah in chapter three. Ultimately, Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Yeshevav. My definitions of nevelah and terefah in the introduction to Hullin reflect this mishnah.

ופסקו – from below to above

נבלה – and which defiles through carrying it.

טריפה – which does not defile

ודבר אחר גרם לה להפסל – such as one of the animals torn by a beast of prey (or an animal afflicted with a fatal organic disease) which is taught in the [Mishnah of chapter 3} “Which are those who are considered torn?”

בידים מסואבות – without the ritual washing of the hands, for the Rabbis decreed that “hands” are [naturally considered] “second” degree of Levitical uncleanness and we are dealing with unconsecrated food that was made on the purification of food dedicated for sacred purposes for something that is “second” degree of Levitical uncleanness makes something else “third” degree of Levitical uncleanness, for had we been dealing with unconsecrated meat alone, if they had been made fit [ for Levitical uncleanness] by contact with blood, something that is second degree of Levitical uncleanness does not make something else third degree of Levitical uncleanness.

Introduction In order for food to become susceptible to impurity it must come into contact with one of seven liquids (see Leviticus 11:38). When an animal is slaughtered, assumedly blood will come out and render the meat susceptible to impurity. Our mishnah discusses a situation where an animal is slaughtered and blood does not come out.

לפי שלא הוכשרו בדם – since food does not receive susceptibility for ritual uncleanness until water comes upon it, or one of the seven liquids which are: water, wine, olive oil, milk and bees’ honey, blood and dew (see also Leviticus 11:34: “ As to any food that may be eaten, it shall become impure if it came in contact with water; as to any liquid that may be drunk, it shall become impure if it was inside any vessel.”).

If one slaughtered cattle or a wild beast or a bird and no blood came out, they are valid and may be eaten by him whose hands have not been washed, for they have not been rendered susceptible to impurity by blood. Although blood did not come out of the animal (be it wild or domesticated) or the bird, the animal can still be eaten. We don’t assume that the animal was already dead when it was slaughtered and therefore no blood came out. We also don’t prohibit the animal because of the blood inside the animal, because blood that is inside an animal is not prohibited. Since the meat cannot receive impurity, one who has impure hands because he has not washed them can eat the meat without fear of causing it to be impure. This would have important ramifications if the animal was sacred and was being eaten by priests. Alternatively, it would have ramifications if the person simply desired to eat his meat in a state of purity.

הוכשרו בשחיטה – for since ritual slaughter is permissible for this meat, anything like a limb from a living animal is also compared to food regarding defilement, but the Halakha does not follow Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Shimon says: they have been rendered susceptible to impurity by the slaughtering. Rabbi Shimon says that the very act of slaughtering renders the animal susceptible to impurity. Since the slaughtering causes the animal to become permitted for eating, it also causes the animal to become susceptible to impurity.

השוחט את המסוכנת – All the while that we stand it [the animal] up and she cannot stand as a result of her illness, she is considered מסוכנת–to be in danger; and even if she has strength in her teeth to eat the terminal buds of a palm (cabbage tree) or to bite wood from trees (Hullin 37b).

Introduction Our mishnah deals with slaughtering a dying animal. This would have been a very important issue because if the animal dies without having been slaughtered it becomes a nevelah and is inedible. Slaughtering a dying animal, therefore, would have been of utmost economic importance. However, for it to be edible it must be determined that the animal died from being slaughtered and not on its own.

עד שתפרכס – [See Mishnah Ohalot 1:6 for parallel about this situation.] if it [the animal] did not move convulsively, we suspect that its soul was taken before the completion of the ritual slaughtering.

One who slaughtered a dying animal: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked its foreleg and its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is enough if it spurted [the blood]. Rabbi Shimon said: even if one slaughtered [a dying animal] by night and the following morning he got up early and found the sides [of the throat] full of blood, the slaughtering is valid, for this proves that it spurted [the blood], as is Rabbi Eliezer's measure. The sages say: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked either its foreleg or its hind leg, or it moved its tail to and fro. There are basically two different opinions as to how to determine whether or not the animal died from the slaughtering or on its own. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel if the animal doesn’t jerk its foreleg and hind leg when slaughtered, it is a sign that the animal was already dead. The sages in section four add that wagging its tail is also a sign that it died from slaughtering. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon believe that the sign is the spurting of blood from the neck at the time of slaughtering. Rabbi Shimon adds that even if he slaughtered the dying animal at night, probably because he felt that he couldn’t wait until morning, and he didn’t see blood at the time of slaughtering, but the next morning he saw blood stains around the animal’s neck, the slaughtering was valid.

אם זינקה – in the manner that animals’ throats become swollen and (its) blood gushes forth and squirts with force (when its jugular arteries were cut – see Hullin 38a).

This is the test both with regard to large and small animals. This line seems to be a continuation of the sages’ opinion in the previous section. The same signs that validate large animals also validate small animals.

השוחט בלילה – it is necessary for an endangered animal to move convulsively, and he [the ritual slaughterer] does not know if it convulsed, and on the morrow when he arose early, he found that the walls of the cavity of the ritual slaughter of throat were filled with blood, it is fit (i.e., kosher) because the blood had squirted out, according to the approach of Rabbi Eliezer who validates blood squirting out (which proves that the animal did not expire prior to the ritual slaughtering); Rabbi Shimon said [that he who performs ritual slaughter at night – and in on the morrow rises early and finds that the walls of the throat are filled with blood, it is valid], and the Halakha is not like [the opinion of] Rabbi Eliezer.

If a small animal stretched out its foreleg [at the end of the slaughtering] but did not withdraw it, [the slaughtering] is invalid, for this was just an indication of the expiration of its life. However, if a small animal that was already dying merely stretched out its foreleg when slaughtered, this is not a sign of having died from the slaughtering. It is possible that this is just a result of dying before.

אחד בהמה דקה ואחד בהמה גסה – which requires the convulsion of the animal if it was endangered.

When do these rules apply? To case of an animal which was believed to be dying. But if it was believed to be sound, even though it did not show any of these signs, the slaughtering is valid. All of these signs are necessary only if the animal was known to be dying before it was slaughtered. However, if it was a healthy animal, these signs are not necessary because there is no reason to assume it died of a different cause.

שפשטה ידה – at the conclusion of the ritual slaughtering

ולא החזירה פסולה – if it (i.e., the animal) was endangered. For this is not considered moving convulsively but such is its manner at the time when its soul leaves it. But this is not the manner for large animal. But whether it extended its paw but did not bend it [back] or bent it back but did not extend it, it is [considered] valid–kosher [to be eaten].

ורבי אליעזר פוסל – if the animal belongs to a heathen. For even though it is a Jew who is performing the slaughtering, it benefits the thought-processes of the heathen, since the unexpressed thought of the heathen is directed to idolatry.

Introduction In our mishnah the sages debate whether an animal slaughtered on behalf of a non-Jew can be eaten by a Jew. The fear is that the animal was slaughtered as an idolatrous sacrifice and hence is prohibited.

חצר כבד – the large lobe of the liver

If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. The first opinion in the mishnah holds that an animal slaughtered for a non-Jew is valid. Rabbi Eliezer holds that even if the animal was slaughtered mostly for a Jew’s consumption and only a small part was meant for a non-Jew, the animal is still invalid because we can assume that the non-Jew intended to use it for idolatrous purposes. We see here that Rabbi Eliezer was very strict on relations between non-Jews and Jews because of the ever present fear of idolatry.

אמר רבי יוסי קל וחומר – Since there is no benefit for the thought-processes of its owner, since a Jew performs the slaughter.

Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters! Rabbi Yose makes a kal vehomer (a fortiori) argument that this animal should be permitted. When it comes to sacrificial animals, an invalid intention can render the animal invalid, as we learned in Zevahim, chapter two. For instance, if the priest slaughters the animal in order to eat it after the time when it may be eaten or outside of the place where it may be eaten, the sacrifice is invalid. Nevertheless, when it comes to sacrifices we only take into consideration the intention of the slaughterer, and not the owner of the sacrifice. The same therefore should be true when it comes to non-sacrificial animals, whose laws are less strict. We should only care about the intention of the slaughterer, in this case a Jew, and not the non-Jew for whom he was slaughtering the animal.

ומה במקום שמחשבה פוסלת – that is, with regard to Holy things, as it states (Leviticus 7:18): “[If any of the flesh of his sacrifice of well-being is eaten on the third day, it shall not be acceptable;] it shall not count for him who offered it. It is an offensive thing [and the person who eats of it shall bear his guilt”]. It [the Biblical verse] is read “he shall not think” -that is to say, he should not think about eating it outside of the appropriate time since it will be a rejected sacrifice in consequence of an improper intention in the mind of the officiating priest.

אין הכל הולך אלא אחר העובד – as it is written (Leviticus 7:18) “it shall not count for him who offered it” – but the owners are not invalidated by their thoughts for the individual who offers it is the priest.

מקום שאין המחשבה פוסלת – The Gemara (Hullin 39b) explains our Mishnah in that it should [understood] in this manner: just as thought-processes invalidate [something offered] in Holy matters through four forms of service, everything follows only [the thought-patterns of] the individual worshipper. Whereas concerning Hullin–ordinary meat, thought-processes only invalidate in two areas, does it not follow that everything follows after [the thought-processes of] the ritual slaughterer? In the place where thought-processes invalidate those sacrifices offered in the realm of the holy things with regard to four acts of divine worship: ritual slaughter, reception of the blood, sprinkling of the blood and the carrying of the portions of the sacrifice to the altar ascent, on which of these that he thought that on the condition that he would eat from the sacrifice at an inappropriate time, does it make the sacrifice rejected in consequence of an improper intention in the mind of the officiating priest? But even though there is this stringency, the thought-processes only follow after the individual worshipper. Regarding Hullin–ordinary meat, in the matter of idolatry, thought-processes do not invalidate in four aspects of worship but rather in only two: in slaughter and in sprinkling [of the blood]. And regarding these, it is written [in these verses] (Exodus chapter 22, verse 19): “Whoever sacrifices to a god [other than the LORD alone shall be proscribed]” [and] (Psalms 16 verse 4): “I will have no part of their bloody libations; [their names will not pass my lips].” But reception of the blood and the carrying of the portions of the sacrifice to the altar ascent are not written–mentioned in these verses. But burning on the altar, even though it is connected to idolatry, it is, however, not worship to lose an animal because of the burning of its fats on the altar for idolatrous worship where it is not slaughtered and where its blood is not sprinkled for idolatrous purposes, for even inside, the sacrifice is not invalidated if he thought about the eating of meat at the time of the burning of the fats, and since we found a leniency in thought-processes outside [the altar], it is the law that we can be lenient in this and that the matter will not be dependent upon anyone other than the actual slaughterer. And the Halakha follows [the opinion] of Rabbi Yosi.

השוחט לשם הרים וכו' שחיטתו פסולה – an idolatrous offering does not prohibit one from deriving benefit from it, since all of these [things] are not done for idolatrous [purposes], as it is written (Deuteronomy chapter 12, verse 2): “[You must destroy all the sites at which the nations you are to dispossess worshiped] their gods, whether on lofty mountains [and on hills or under any luxuriant tree],” and not on the mountains of their gods. But however, it is prohibited to eat it, because it is similar to slaughter for the sake of idolatrous [purposes] by exchanging something [of their own in its place]. And specifically if he said: לשם הרים, לשם גבעות–in honor of mountains, in honor of hills (which is the language used in the Mishnah), but if he [the person making the offering] said: to the angel appointed on the mountains and on the hills, this is considered the sacrifices of the dead and it is prohibited to derive benefit [from them].

Introduction Our mishnah deals with a person who slaughters an animal for idolatrous purposes.

If one slaughtered [an animal] as a sacrifice to mountains, hills, seas, rivers, or deserts, the slaughtering is invalid. If a person slaughtered an animal as a sacrifice to a natural phenomenon, such as a mountain, body of water or desert, the animal is invalid, even though it was slaughtered properly. Note that worship of mountains and hills was also referred to in Mishnah Avodah Zarah 3:5 and seems to be based on Deuteronomy 12:2.

If two persons held a knife and slaughtered [an animal], one intending it as a sacrifice to one of these things and the other for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid. We learned in mishnah two of this chapter that if two people jointly slaughter, the slaughtering is valid. Both are participating in the slaughtering. Therefore, if one of them intends to slaughter the animal as an idolatrous sacrifice, the animal is invalid.

אין שוחטין לתוך ימים – that he [who is performing the act of ritual slaughter] should not say, that to the Prince of the Sea he is performing the act of ritual slaughter.

Introduction Our mishnah deals with various prohibitions concerning where one lets the blood flow from the animal’s neck when he slaughters. The point of the mishnah is to ensure that the way that Jews slaughter their animals does not look like the way that idolaters slaughter their animals. It is interesting that with regard to this specific issue it was deemed important to distinguish between Jews and idolaters. Since slaughtering an animal is such an important moment in society, both economically and socially, it probably very frequently had religious significance. As a moment fraught with such meaning, the rabbis felt it crucial to distinguish Jewish practice from the practices of others.

ולא לתוך הכלים – that they should not say that he is sprinkling its blood for idolatrous purposes that he is worshiping.

One may not slaughter [so that the blood runs] into the sea or into rivers, or into vessels, If one slaughters and lets the blood flow into the sea or a river, it may look as if the person is using the animal’s blood to worship the sea or river. If he slaughters into a vessel it may look as if he is collecting the blood to use it in worship. Alternatively, this may look as if he is performing a Jewish sacrifice outside of the Temple. Therefore, all of these practices are prohibited.

But one may slaughter into a pool (or of water. The correct reading of this mishnah is probably not “pool of water” but “vessel with water.” While one cannot slaughter into a vessel, lest it look as if he is going to use the blood for a sacrifice, if there is water mixed in, it doesn’t look like he is going to use the blood, because that is not how sacrificial blood is collected.

עוגה של מים – and specifically murky waters, but not in clear waters, lest people say that he is performing the act of ritual slaughter to the full face that appears in the water.

And when on board a ship on to vessels. When he is on a ship, he can let the blood drain into a vessel, and even one without water. On the ship it would be clear to all witnessing the slaughter that the reason he uses a vessel is to avoid a mess. Furthermore, he wouldn’t want to use the water which has to be preserved for drinking.

ובספינה – He may perform the act of ritual slaughter on the utensils and the blood will flow gently and descend into the sea. For he who sees it would say that he did it, in order to not soil the ship.

One may not slaughter at all into a hole, but one may dig a hole in his own house for the blood to run into. In the street, however, he should not do so as not to follow the ways of the heretics. As we can see at the end of the section, it seems that the heretics, who here refer to idolaters (and not heretical Jews), used to slaughter into holes dug into the ground. Therefore, a Jew should not do so. However, in his own house he can dig a hole and slaughter so that the blood flows into the hole, but not directly into the hole. In the streets, one shouldn’t even do this.

אין שוחטין לגומא כל עיקר – and even in the house, and the reason that in a hole [it is not permitted], is because it is seen as an imitation of the sectarians.

אבל עושה גומא – The Gemara explains that this is how it should read: One does not perform an act of ritual slaughter in a hole at all. But if one desires to bore into his courtyard, how would he do it. He would create a space outside of the hole and he would perform the act of ritual slaughter and the blood would gently flow and descend into its hole.

יחקה את המינים – He would strengthen their hands in their customs; יחקה–imitate is from the word חק– custom

השוחט – [He who does ritual slaughter] on unconsecrated animals outside [of the Temple]

Introduction Today’s mishnah is, in a sense, the mirror image of mishnah eight. Whereas yesterday we learned about one who slaughtered an animal for it to be an idolatrous sacrifice, in today’s mishnah we learn about one who slaughters an animal for it to be a Jewish sacrifice, but does so outside of the Temple. While his intentions may have been good, this is still a no-no. The question is: is the slaughtering valid?

לשם עולה – because a burnt-offering comes from a vow and–or a voluntary donation, he who sees it states;: Now he is sanctifying [it] and performing ritual slaughter [on it] for a burnt offering, and sacred things outside [the Temple], are permitted [to do so]. Therefore, the Rabbis decreed on it that it is invalid, and similarly, peace-offerings, etc.

If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be an olah or a shelamim or an asham for a doubtful sin or as a Pesah or a todah, the slaughtering is invalid. But Rabbi Shimon declares it valid. An olah (whole-burnt offering), a shelamim (wellbeing offering) and a todah (thanksgiving offering) can be offered as voluntary offerings. Therefore, if one slaughters an animal with the intent of it being an olah or a shelamim but does so outside of the Temple, it looks as if he is now sanctifying the animal to be a sacrifice and slaughtering it outside of the Temple. Note that the animal is not actually invalid, because he did not sanctify it before he slaughtered it, and for an animal to be a sacrifice it must first be sanctified. However, the rabbis prohibited it lest it look like he is slaughtering and eating sanctified meat outside of the Temple. Our mishnah thinks that an asham (guilt-offering) brought for a doubtful sin (meaning one is not even sure if one sinned) can also be brought voluntarily. Therefore, it too is invalid if slaughtered for this purpose outside of the Temple. With regard to the pesah, since it can be set aside at any time during the year, someone might think that by slaughtering it now outside of the Temple, he is sanctifying it. Therefore, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon holds that the slaughtering is valid because that is not the way that one offers a sacrifice. One doesn’t voluntarily offer a sacrifice in order to slaughter it outside of the Temple. Since his sanctifying the animal is obviously invalid, everyone will understand that he has not performed a sacrifice. Therefore, the slaughtering is invalid. For case in which Rabbi Shimon uses similar reasoning see Menahot 12:3.

אשם תלוי – which comes on a doubtful liability for extirpation, such as two pieces [of meat] (one of which is forbidden and one allowed) – of abdominal fat of cattle (which is forbidden) and the permitted fat of animals (that is permitted to consume) and it is not known which of them ate or [the case] of his wife or his sister with him in bed and he has sexual relations with one of them and he doesn’t know which of them he had sexual relations, he brings a guilt-offering offered when in doubt [as to the commission of a sinful act] to protect [himself] against suffering until it becomes known to him if he committed an undoubtful offense [for which] he brings his sin-offering. And our Mishnah is [according to] Rabbi Eliezer who stated {Keritut 25a) that a person brings a guilt-offering when in doubt [as to the commission of a sinful act] every day, for every day, he stands in the doubt of sin and his heart smites him lest I sinned, and it is found that it relates to something he either vowed or voluntarily donated.

If two persons held one knife and slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court], one declaring it to be one of the above and the other intending it for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid. As we learned in mishnah eight, when two people jointly slaughter an animal and only one of them has an intention that would render the slaughtering invalid, the one person’s intention invalidates the animal. So too here, the fact that one of them intends for the animal to be a sacrifice renders it invalid.

לשם פסח – The Passover sacrifice is also called something that is vowed or freely donated, since it can be separated out all the days of the year and set aside until its appropriate time; they say that he ritually slaughters peace-offerings outside of the Temple and consumes them.

If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be a hatat or an asham or a first-born or the tithe [of cattle] or a substitute offering, the slaughtering is valid. The sacrifices in this section can not be voluntarily donated to the Temple. They are only brought by those who incur an obligation to bring them. Since everyone knows that the person sacrificing them was not obligated to bring such a sacrifice, they will know that he is not really sacrificing an animal outside of the Temple. Therefore, the meat is valid. We will learn more about what exactly a “substitute sacrifice” is in tractate Temurah.

ורבי שמעון מכשיר – And he is not concerned with avoiding the semblance of wrong-doing (i.e., appearance-sake).

This is the general rule: if one slaughtered an animal declaring it to be a sacrifice which can be brought either as a voluntary or a freewill-offering it is invalid, but if he declares it to be a sacrifice which cannot be brought either as a votive or a freewill-offering it is valid. This section provides the general rule that is the basis for my explanation above.

אשם ודאי – such as the guilt-offering brought for theft, (or) someone who lied when taking an oath on denying money (owed), and the guilt-offering for misappropriation of sacred property and the guilt-offering for a maidservant designated to become the wife of one selected by her master (Gittin 43a), and on account that the guilt-offering for doubtful liability for having sexual relationships is referred to as the guilt offering for the undoubted commission of certain offenses.

לשם בכור לשם מעשר – people surely know that it is a lie, for the First born offerings and tithes have a voice and people know before this, for if that time is not appropriate for their being set aside, that one would say that now is the time sanctifies them..

זה הכלל – to include if a person said: Behold I am ritually slaughtering for the sake of burnt-offering of a Nazirite, which is invalid. For you might say that one should not be concerned for waste, for it is known that he did not make a vow, which comes to teach us that people will surely say that perhaps he made a vow in private [during] these thirty days which is the undefined [shortest period for being] a Nazirite, and on the thirtieth day, the matter is not known to his neighbors.

ושאינו נידר ונידב – including the burnt-offering of a woman who gave birth, for he said, [this offering is made] explicitly for the purpose of a woman who gave birth, it is valid, even if he said that it was for the sake of a woman is not obligated to bring a sacrifice after giving birth, For you might have thought since that particular woman was not liable [to bring] a sacrifice upon giving birth, it [the sacrifice] was only a free-will donation, it comes to teach us that lest she miscarried, for a miscarriage has no voice and it is found that this sacrifice is obligatory and not a donation, and therefore, his ritual slaughter is valid.