פירוש על שבועות 3:5

ואחד דברם של אחרים – as he explains that I will give [something] to so-and-so.

Introduction Our mishnah teaches that a person can swear with regards to things that concern himself or others. He also may swear about things whether or not they have substance. The second half of the mishnah contains an important debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael with regards to the validity of oaths taken about the past.

שאין בהן ממש – it implies two ways, as, for example, he changed and implies that he changed it and it implies that there is no benefit in them, as for example, “that I will throw a stone into the sea.”

It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”, or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.] An oath of utterance is valid, according to the mishnah, whether or not it was taken with respect to himself or with respect to his involvement with others. It is also valid even if the oath is made on a non-substantive thing. The mishnah now gives example of all of these categories.

מרבוי הכתוב (from an extension supplied by Scripture) – (Leviticus 5:4): “whatever a man may utter in an oath [- and, though he has known it, the fact has escaped him].” But there is a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael, for Rabbi Akiva expounds throughout the Torah extensions [of the scope of Biblical texts] and limitations of Biblical texts, but Rabbi Yishmael expounds general rules/principles and specifications; Rabbi Akiva expounds (Leviticus 5:4): “Or when a person utters an oath” is an extension, “to a bad or good purpose” is a limitation. What is an extension. What is an extension of scope? An extension are all words of what he did in the past like what will take place in the future; and what is a limitation? He limits the matter of a commandment. But Rabbi Yishmael expounds (Leviticus 5:4): “Or when a man utters an oath,” is a generalization; “to a bad or good purpose” (Leviticus 5:4) is a specification; “whatever a man may utter by an oath” (Leviticus 5:4), he once again states a generalization: “a generalization and a specification and [followed by] a generalization, one is guided by what the specification implies; just as the specification is interpreted for what happens in the future, so also everything regarding what will happen in the future. But the Halakha is according to Rabbi Akiva.

It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”, or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.] One who takes an oath with regards to giving things to others has taken a valid oath, whether it was to give, not to give, that he had given or that he had not given. This is an example of an oath with regards to others. If he breaks any of these oaths, or any of them turn out to be false, he will be obligated to bring a sliding scale sacrifice.

It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”, or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.] Oaths regarding sleeping are also valid even though sleep is not a substantive thing.

It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”, or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.] Throwing a pebble into the sea is a useless action that has no value to a human being. For this reason the mishnah considers it a type of action that has no substance. Nevertheless, if one takes an oath regarding throwing a pebble into the sea, the oath is valid.

Rabbi Ishmael says: “He is liable only for [an oath with regards to] the future, for it says, “To do bad or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). Rabbi Akiva said to him: “If so, we would know only such cases where doing evil and doing good are applicable; but how do we know such cases where doing evil and doing good are not applicable? He said to him: “From the amplification of the verse.” He said to him: “If the verse amplifies for that, it amplifies for this also.” Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree with regards to the validity of oaths taken about the past, such as “I swear that I did eat” or “I swear that I did not eat”. Up until now, we have assumed that such oaths were valid (see mishnah one, and the first half of this mishnah). Rabbi Yishmael disagrees. According to Rabbi Yishmael oaths taken with regards to the future, i.e. “I swear that I will eat”, or “I swear that I will not eat” are valid. Oaths taken with regards to the past are not valid. Rabbi Yishmael learns this from Leviticus 5:4, which states “to do bad or to do good”. The simple meaning of this verse is that the person is swearing to do or not do something in the future. Rabbi Akiva responds to Rabbi Yishmael by pointing out that we cannot take the verse literally. If we were to do so, we would rule that oaths are only valid if they are about doing something good or something evil. However, we know that oaths can involve neutral activities as well, such as eating or drinking, which are neither “good” nor “evil”. Rabbi Yishmael responds that the second half of the aforementioned verse in Leviticus which states, “whatever a man may utter in an oath” expands the category of oaths, thereby making neutral oaths also valid. Rabbi Akiva argues that if the second half of the verse expands the validity of oaths to include neutral oaths, it also expands the category of oaths to include oaths with regards to past actions. To summarize: for Rabbi Yishmael the first half of the verse refers to oaths for the future involving “good or bad” while the second half of the verse expands the category of oaths to include all oaths about the future. To Rabbi Akiva, the second half of the verse expands the category of oaths to include even oaths about the past.

Questions for Further Thought:
• Section two: Whose opinion seems to be closer to the literal reading of the verse in Leviticus, Rabbi Yishmael’s or Rabbi Akiva’s?