פירוש על שבועות 3:4

ואכל נבלות חייב – that they are appropriate for eating, for if not, for the All-Merciful forbad them.

Introduction Mishnah four continues to discuss how many oaths one is liable for when he takes an oath not to eat. This mishnah talks about one who violates the oath by eating things that are either not fit to be eaten or forbidden.

ר"ש פור – that was subjected to an oath and he stands over them, and the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the first Tanna/teacher [concerns] including things that are permitted with things that are forbidden, as for example when one states an oath “that I will not eat slaughtered and meat of animals torn, the First Teacher holds that since the oath takes effect with that which is slaughtered, it also takes effect on that of torn animals, for the prohibition can take legal hold where another prohibition already exists regarding a more comprehensive prohibition (i.e., having a wider range of prohibited objects), but Rabbi Shimon holds that one prohibition can take no legal hold where another prohibition already exists (i.e., you can punish, or impose sacrificial expiation only for the first one) But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Shimon.

“I swear I shall not eat,” and he ate foods which are not fit to be eaten, and drank liquids which are not fit to be drunk, he is exempt. Again this mishnah discusses a person who swears not to eat. In this case after having sworn not to eat he eats food which are not fit to be eaten, for example rotten fruit, or drinks liquids not fit to drink. The mishnah teaches that in such a case he is exempt from having to bring a sacrifice. The assumption is that when a person swears not to eat his intention is not to eat food that is fit for consumption. Therefore, by eating food not fit for consumption he has not in actuality broken his oath.

אשתו אסורה – for he ate food, and even according to Rabbi Shimon. For the reason that he is exempt in the first [oath] is not because they are not things eaten, but rather, that the oath doesn’t take effect on something that is forbidden.

“I swear I shall not eat,” and he ate carrion, trefot, and reptiles and creepy things, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts him. In this case the person who swore not to eat, ate foods which are forbidden to a Jew. Carrion are animals that died either a natural death or died as a result of an improperly carried out act of ritual slaughter. Trefot are animals that were either torn by beasts of prey or afflicted with severe diseases or defects that would have caused them to die within 12 months. They are both forbidden to eat, as are reptiles and creepy things. If one swears not to eat them and does eat them, according to the first opinion he is liable to bring a sacrifice. Even though he is forbidden to eat them, they are still considered edible food, which other people eat, and therefore he has broken his oath. Rabbi Shimon disagrees. According to his opinion, at Mount Sinai the Jewish people took an oath not to break the commandments. This oath was binding for all future generations as well. Therefore, one cannot add another oath to that which he has already sworn not to do. One who does so has not done anything legally significant, and is therefore not obligated to bring a sacrifice.

He said, “I vow that my wife shall not benefit from me, if I have eaten today,” and he had eaten carrion, trefot, forbidden animals, or reptiles, his wife is prohibited to him. This section discusses vows (nedarim) which are halachically different from oaths (shevuoth). If a man took a vow that if he had already eaten today his wife would be forbidden to benefit from him or his property, and he had in fact eaten a forbidden thing, she is forbidden to benefit from him. This law is agreed upon by all of the Sages, even Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Shimon in essence does consider eating forbidden food to be considered eating. The reason that he exempted the one who swore not to eat and then ate forbidden food was that there was a prior existing oath upon him not to eat. In the case in our section, this logic is not applicable.

Questions for Further Thought:
• Section three: How do you know that Rabbi Shimon would agree to the ruling stated in section three?