Commentaire sur Kiddouchine 3:15

האומר לחבירו צא וקדש לי אשה פלונית וקדשה לעצמו – We say in the Gemara (Kiddushin 58b) what is "והלך" /”and he went ? That he went with deception, and for that reason, the Mishnah teaches: “He who says to his friend” and it doesn’t teach: “He who says to his agent,” to teach us that even though he had not made him his agent from the outset to this, but said to him: “Betroth to me a specific woman,” if he betrothed him to himself, , we call him that he went with reception and that he was a deceiver.

Introduction The first section deals with a person who sends an agent out to betroth a woman on his behalf and then the agent betroths the woman to himself. The second section deals with a man who betroths a woman but sets the betrothal date to occur in thirty days. The question is, if someone else betroths her within those thirty days, is she betrothed to the first man or to the second?

ובא אחר וקדשה בתוך ל' יום מקודשת לשני – and he can consummate a marriage by conducting a woman to his home, even within these thirty days.

If he says to his fellow, “Go out and betroth me such-and-such a woman,” and he goes and betroths her to himself, she is betrothed. Reuven sends Shimon out to betroth Rachel on his behalf. Upon seeing Rachel, Shimon decides that he himself wants to betroth her, and when he proposes betrothal, Rachel agrees. She is now betrothed to Shimon and the fact that Shimon was supposed to act as Reuven’s agent is irrelevant. Of course, we can be sure that Reuven will not be happy with Shimon and Shimon has acted shamefully with his friend (sounds like a movie plot). Nevertheless, this fact is not of legal significance.

מקודשת – and she requires a Jewish bill of divorce from both of them.

Similarly, if he says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me after thirty days,” and another comes and betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the second, [and in such cases] an Israelite’s daughter [betrothed] to a priest may eat terumah. The connection between this section and the previous one is that in both the woman under discussion is betrothed to the second man. In this case, Reuven betroths the woman but sets the betrothal to begin in thirty days. When Shimon betroths her within thirty days, she is betrothed to Shimon, because Reuven’s betrothal has not yet begun. When the thirty days are up, Reuven’s betrothal does not “kick-in”, because she is already fully betrothed to Shimon. The mishnah expresses the fact that she is fully betrothed to Shimon by stating that if she is an Israelite’s daughter and therefore prohibited to eat terumah, she is now fully betrothed to Shimon and if he is a priest she may eat terumah. Were she not fully betrothed, the mishnah would not say that she can eat terumah.

בת כהן לישראל – if this woman is the daughter of a Kohen, that became betrothed after thirty days, all thirty days, she may consume the Priest’s sacred gifts, for she was not invalidated from eating Terumah of her father’s house. But if she is the daughter of an Israelite [who is betrothed] to a Kohen, she does not eat Terumah, for she is not yet the wife of a Kohen.

[But if he says, “Be betrothed to me] from now and after thirty days,” and another comes and betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed and not betrothed [to both]: [and in such cases] an Israelite’s daughter [betrothed] to a priest, or a priest’s daughter [betrothed] to an Israelite, may not eat terumah. In this case, Reuven makes an ambiguous statement, “Be betrothed to me from now and after thirty days.” It is unclear whether his betrothal begins now, or after thirty days. Alternatively, she may begin to be betrothed now but not fully betrothed until thirty days. In any case, if Shimon comes along and betroths her within the thirty days, his kiddushin is also doubtfully valid. If Reuven’s betrothal has begun, then she is betrothed to Reuven and Shimon’s act is irrelevant; but if Reuven’s betrothal has not begun, then she would be betrothed to Shimon. Alternatively, if Reuven’s betrothal has begun but not been completed, she may be betrothed to both of them at the same time. In such a situation she would be forbidden to both and require a get from both (see Gittin 7:3). If she was the daughter of a priest and one of them was an Israelite, she would no longer eat terumah lest her marriage to that man was valid. Similarly, if she is the daughter of an Israelite and one of the men was a priest she would not eat terumah lest her marriage to that man was not valid. In other words, we act stringently and she doesn’t get to eat terumah no matter what the case. Again, this is the mishnah’s way of saying that she is doubtfully married to both men and not fully married to either.

הרי את מקודשת לי – with this Perutah/penny on the condition that I will give you two hundred Zuz.

Introduction This mishnah deals with a man who attempts to betroth a woman on condition that he either give her two hundred zuz, has two hundred zuz or owns two hundred zuz.

ויתן – and when he gives it [to her], she is betrothed retroactively, but all who say, on condition is treated like one who says, “from now.”

If one says to a woman. “Behold, you are betrothed to me on condition that I give you two hundred zuz,” she is betrothed, and he must give it. In such a case the woman is immediately betrothed and the man must thereafter give her two hundred zuz. If he does not give her two hundred zuz, the betrothal becomes invalid. The problem is that since he didn’t set a time limit he has an unlimited time to give her the two hundred zuz. Potentially, the only way for the betrothal to become invalid would be for him to die before he gives her the money. In such a case she would not be considered his widow and she would not be liable for yibbum. Therefore, this is not a particularly good way of performing betrothal, especially for the woman.

הרי זו מקודשת ויש לו – if there witnesses that he has it (i.e., the money), and if it is not known that he has it, she is doubtfully betrothed, lest he has it, but that he intends to upset her.

“On condition that I give you [two hundred zuz] within thirty days from now”: if he gives her within thirty days, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. In this case he did set a time limit for the fulfillment of his condition. Therefore, if he doesn’t give her the betrothal within thirty days, she is not betrothed. In fact, this may have been a common form of betrothal. The man would have thirty days (or a longer period of time) to come up with the money necessary to betroth the woman and if he did not, the betrothal was invalidated with no need for a get. This prevented the woman from being left hanging.

ןאם הראה על השלחן – for he was a money-changer and he showed her money on the table that was not his, and she is not betrothed.

“On condition that I have two hundred zuz,” she is betrothed, providing he has [two hundred zuz]. In this case, all the man has to do is demonstrate that he owns two hundred zuz. Again, she is betrothed immediately and he must prove that he has two hundred zuz. However, we should note that in order to be certain that the betrothal is invalid she would have to prove that he doesn’t own two hundred zuz. This will not be easy and again the woman is in a disadvantageous situation.

“On condition that I show you two hundred zuz,” she is betrothed, and he must show her. But if he shows her [money lying] on the table, she is not betrothed. Here he must not only own two hundred zuz, but show her the cash (or its equivalent). He may not show her two hundred zuz lying on a table unless he actually owns them. Just as in section two, this too seems to be better for the woman. Here she can actually see that he owns the two hundred zuz and need not worry about proving (or disproving) it.

בית כור – an appropriate place to seed a Kor, which is thirty Seah..

Introduction This mishnah is quite simple to understand and is nearly the same as yesterday’s mishnah. I will explain it therefore briefly.

ויש לו – If there are witnesses that he has it, she is certainly betrothed, but if it is not known that he has it, she is doubtfully betrothed. And we don’t say that monies that people make is what they hide, for we fear lest he have it and he has the intention to upset her. But land we don’t suspect that perhaps he has it, for if there is that he has land, it has a voice.

[If he says to her “Be betrothed to me] on condition that I own a bet kor of land”, she is betrothed, providing he does own it. A “bet kor” is the amount of land it takes to grow a kor of produce. In modern terms it is about 17,000 sq. meters, a rather large piece of land. This clause is nearly the same as section three from yesterday’s mishnah.

ואם הראה בבקעה – that it is not his, and even though that he set it down for a tenant who will pay a fixed rent payable in kind or land tenancy on a fixed rent, she is not betrothed.

“On condition that I own it in such and such a place”, if he owns it there she is betrothed, but if not she is not betrothed. Land value differs from place to place. It seems here that the woman wants to know that he owns good land, and not a worthless piece of land.

“On condition that I show you a bet kor of land,” she is betrothed, providing that he does show it to her. But if he shows it to her in a plain, she is not betrothed. This is nearly the same as the final section of yesterday’s mishnah. Showing it to her in “the plain” means that he shows her land that is not his. This is not what she thought he meant by his “showing her a bet kor.”

כל תנאי – which is not a double [stipulation] (stating both alternatives) is not a [valid] condition, for even if the condition was not fulfilled, the words/matters were fulfilled.

Introduction This mishnah contains a general principle of Rabbi Meir: any stipulation must be a double stipulation. This means that if I make a stipulation I must state both the consequences of the condition being fulfilled and the consequences of its not being fulfilled. For instance, if I want to say that I will come to your house if you give me chocolate cake (and I would), I must say, “I will come to your house if you give me chocolate cake, and I will not come to your house if you don’t give me chocolate cake.” Otherwise the stipulation is not legally binding, and even if you give me chocolate cake, I am not legally bound to come to your house (but I would never do such a thing). Rabbi Meir derives this principle from Moses’s words to the children of Gad and Reuben, as we shall explain below.

אם יעברו ואם לא יעברו – and if he did not double the words, his condition would be fulfilled and they (i.e., Reuben, Gad, and one-half of the tribe of Manasseh would inherit the land of Gilead, even though they would not cross [the Jordan River to fight the battles in Canaan with their brethren]. And even though he (i.e., Moses) said, “If every shock-fighter among the Gadites and Reubenites crosses the Jordan with you…” we don’t have that it follows from the affirmation, we derive the negative by implication. And we learn from it also, that we require the condition before the action, for since he did not say, “give it to them if they will cross [the Jordan]” implies that if he had said such, its condition would not come and void the action of the gift that preceded it, and we also learn from it that we require the affirmative prior to the negative, for he (i.e., Moses) did not say, “if you will not cross, don’t give them, but if they do cross, give them.”

Rabbi Meir says: every stipulation which is not like that of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben is not a [valid] stipulation, as it say, “And Moses said to them, ‘If the children of Gad and the children of Reuben will pass [with you over the Jordan, then you shall give them the land of Gilead for a possession].” and it is also written, “But if they will not pass over with you armed, [then they shall have possessions among you in the land of Canaan]” (Numbers 32:29-30). Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: the matter had to be stated, for had it not been stated it would have implied that even in Canaan they should not inherit. The children of Gad and Reuven did not want to inherit on the west side of the Jordan river; they wished to remain on the east side, in a place good for their cattle. Moses responded to them that if they cross to help fight in the conquering of Canaan, then they may inherit on the east side of the Jordan. He also added that if they did not cross and fight with the rest of Israel, then they would only be able to inherit in Canaan. From the fact that Moses “doubled” his stipulation, Rabbi Meir derives that all stipulations must be doubled. Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel responds that Moses had to state the second half of his statement. Had he not done so, he might have implied that if they didn’t fight for Canaan they wouldn’t even get an inheritance in Canaan. Since the second half is a necessary statement, we cannot learn that stipulations that don’t need a “negative” side do not need to be doubled. The mishnah ends with Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel’s response to Rabbi Meir. Had Rabbi Meir responded he might have said that it is obvious that the children of Gad and Reuven would inherit in the land of Canaan, since all of the tribes inherited there irregardless of their participation in the conquest. Since the second half of his stipulation was unnecessary, we can learn that the only reason Moses added it in was because all stipulations must be thusly doubled.

ר' חנינא כו' – He disputes the double condition, that there is no need to double, for it follows from the affirmation that we derive the negative by implication, and this is what Moses doubled, there was a need for that matter. And regarding the Halakhic decision, if he said, “on condition,” there is no need for the double stipulation, and neither the affirmation prior to the negative, nor the condition prior to the ac, but the condition stands. But, if he did not say, “on the condition,” he would need all of these things that we mentioned, “and if not,” the condition is void and the action is valid, and it doesn’t make a difference whether the condition was made in monetary matters or in [the realms] of Jewish divorce and betrothal – everything is equivalent in this matter.

והוכר עוברה דבריו קיימין – Maimonides wrote [in his commentary to the Mishnah] that he may not come upon her until he betroth her a second time, for a person does not ever give possession of (i.e., sell) what does not yet exist, and they did not say that his words are fulfilled other than to be stringent upon her so that she cannot marry anyone else.

Introduction The first section of this mishnah teaches that if a man was mistaken about some part of a woman’s identity before he betrothed her but she wasn’t the one who mislead him into making that mistake, the betrothal is still valid. The second two sections of the mishnah deal with a man who tries to betroth a woman who could not currently be betrothed to him. The question is whether the betrothal can become valid at a later point without its being performed again.

If he betroths a woman and then declares, “I thought that she was a priest’s daughter, and behold she is [the daughter of] a Levite” or “a Levite’s daughter whereas she is [the daughter of] a priest”; “Poor, whereas she is wealthy”, or “wealthy, whereas she is poor,” she is betrothed, since she did not deceive him. In this case the man made a mistake with regard to the woman’s identity, but she didn’t cause the mistake. The betrothal is therefore valid. After all, were this grounds to annul a betrothal a man could always annul his betrothal. He could always say that he thought something was true and it turned out to be untrue and there would be no way of falsifying his claim.

If he says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after I convert,” or “after you convert,” “After I am freed from slavery,” or “after you are freed from slavery”; “After your husband dies” or, “after your sister dies”; “After your yavam performs halizah for you”; she is not betrothed. The general principle in this section and in the next is that if the betrothal is invalid now, it cannot become valid later on through an act performed now. There are five things that prevent the betrothal from being possible at this point. 1) Either the man or woman is not Jewish. 2) Either the man or woman is a slave. 3) The woman is married. 4) The man is married to the woman’s sister. 5) The woman is awaiting halitzah (release from levirate marriage). In all of these cases, the betrothal cannot currently occur. Therefore, even if he says that the betrothal should only become valid when their statuses change such that betrothal would become possible, the current act of betrothal is invalid.

Similarly, if he says to his friend, “If your wife gives birth to a female, behold she is betrothed to me,” she is not betrothed. [If his wife is pregnant, and her fetus is discernible, his words are valid, and if she bears a female, she is betrothed.] In this section too the man is attempting to betroth someone in the future to whom he could not be currently betrothed. Here he couldn’t betroth her now because she doesn’t even exist. She hasn’t even yet been conceived. This guy is really trying to get his bid in early! Again, the mishnah rules that his kiddushin are invalid. The last section of the mishnah is an addition to the mishnah (meaning it is missing in mishnaic manuscripts). It is clause from the Talmud that somehow crept in and it changes the meaning of the mishnah, for here we have an example where kiddushin that could not currently occur can be currently contracted. According to this clause, as long as it is already recognized that the woman is pregnant, the betrothal is valid and if a girl is born she is betrothed to that man. In order to make this clause match the remainder of the mishnah, the Rambam explains that he must betroth her again when she is born.

ואעשה עמך כפועל – with the labor of one day [as the betrothal monies], and not that he is betrothing her with the salary of the work for since we hold that there regarding hiring there is from the beginning to the end, hence it is found that when he completes his work, his hire is like a loan to her, and one who betroths with a loan is not betrothed, but he betroths her now with a Perutah/penny , on the condition that afterward, he will act with her like a [day] laborer.

Introduction The first section of the mishnah teaches that a man may stipulate that his betrothal to a woman is contingent upon his performing for her a certain favor. The second section of the mishnah discusses a man who makes his betrothal contingent upon his father’s approval.

ע"מ שירצה אבא – In the Gemara (Kiddushin 63b), it explains that the father will not protest, and when they established the time for his protest, such as if he (i.e. the potential husband) said if the father will not protest all thirty days. Therefore, the father desired it, if the thirty days passed and he did not protest, then she is betrothed. If he didn’t want it (i.e., the betrothal to take place), that he protested within the thirty day [period], she is not betrothed.

If he says to a woman, “Behold you are betrothed to me on condition that I speak to the government on your behalf”, or “That I work for you as a laborer”, if he speaks to the government on her behalf or works for her as a laborer, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. This mishnah is fairly straightforward. We should note that the favor is not the money for kiddushin itself. Rather it is a condition upon which the betrothal is contingent. In addition to the act which he must perform, according to halakhah he would also need to give her money to effect the kiddushin.

מת האב – within the thirty day [period], she is betrothed, for as we said, who is protesting?

[If he says,] “[Behold you are betrothed to me] on condition that [my] father consents,” if his father consents, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. If his father dies, she is betrothed; if the son dies, the father is instructed to say that he does not consent. The first part of this section is straightforward. Slightly more complicated is the second part. If the father dies, he cannot consent to the betrothal. Nevertheless, the mishnah rules that she is betrothed. The assumption is that when the man said “on condition that my father consents” he really meant to say, “on condition that my father does not disapprove.” Since after his death the father cannot disapprove, the betrothal is valid. If the son dies, the mishnah finds a convenient way for the woman to avoid the need for yibbum (levirate marriage to her husband’s brother). The court would instruct the father to state that he did not approve of the marriage and he would thereby annul the betrothal. If the betrothal was annulled, the woman would not be liable for yibbum.

מת הבן – within the thirty day [period], we teach the father that he should protest so that she would not be in need of her brother-in-law (i.e., the husband’s brother – in the case of his dying without issue, enters his estate and marries his wife).

אני קדשתיה נאמן – to wed her, that he would not be arrogant before the father that who received the betrothal [monies] to say, “I am he,” for if it was not the truth, he would be afraid, as perhaps he would contradict him.

Introduction A father has a right to betroth his daughter before she reaches majority age, defined by halakhah as being 12 1/2. Our mishnah deals with a father who says that he has betrothed his daughter but does not remember to whom.

[If a father declares,] “I have given my daughter in betrothal, but do not know to whom I have betrothed her,” and then a man comes and states, “I betrothed her,” he is believed. The father does not remember to whom he betrothed his daughter. At this point she is in a terrible situation; she could be married to anybody therefore she is forbidden to everybody, lest she be married to someone else. Comes along a man and says that he was the one who betrothed her. He is believed, since there is no contradictory testimony.

If one says, “I betrothed her,” and another [man] says, “I betrothed her,” both must give a get; but if they want, one may give a get and the other marry her. In this case two men come along and claim that they are the ones who betrothed her. Neither can marry her lest she is betrothed to the other. They must both give her a get. However, if they come to an agreement, one may give a get and then the other may marry her.

וגרשתיה – I received her Jewish bill of divorce.

Introduction The main topic discussed in this mishnah is when a man is believed with regard to statements he makes that impact his children’s personal status. The general rule is that a man is believed to say that he has done something which he currently has the legal ability to do. We shall see examples of this in the mishnah.

והרי היא קטנה – now when I said this about her.

[If a man declares] “I have given my daughter in betrothal,” [or] “I gave her in betrothal and divorced her while she was still a minor,” and she is [now] a minor, he is believed. As we have learned already, a man has the legal right to betroth his daughter before she reaches majority age. He also has the legal right to accept a get on behalf of his married daughter as long as she has not reached majority age. If the daughter about whom this father is testifying is now a minor, he is believed to say that he betrothed her, or that he betrothed her and then accepted her get, since he currently has the power to perform either activity. The ramification of his being believed to state that he accepted her get, is that she will be disqualified from subsequently marrying a priest.

נאמן – to make her disqualified from the priesthood [through marriage]. He is believed about his daughter all the time that she is a minor, as it is written (Deuteronomy 22:16): “[And the girl’s father shall say to the elders,] ‘I gave this man my daughter to wife…” When he said “[this] man, he prohibited her to everyone else, for we do not know to whom [it was that he was talking about], and when he returned and said to this one, he made her permissible to him.

“I gave her in betrothal and divorced her while she was still a minor,” and she is now of majority age, he is not believed. If she is now an adult (past 12 1/2 years old), he is no longer believed if he makes these statements, since he no longer has the legal right to either accept betrothal or a get on her behalf. We should note that this limits the power of the father over his daughter. Once she is past a relatively young age, he has no legal right to make decisions regarding her kiddushin, nor can he make any statement which would severely impact her status.

והרי היא גדולה – and if he said this after she had grown [into adulthood], but did not say this when she was still a minor, he is not believed.

“She was taken captive and I redeemed her,” whether she is a minor or of majority age he is not believed. A woman who was taken captive is forbidden from subsequently marrying a priest (see Ketubot 2:5). This is because it is assumed that her non-Jewish captors had sexual relations with her and a woman who has had intercourse with a non-Jew is forbidden from marrying a priest. The father is not believed if he states that his daughter was taken captive, no matter how old she is when he offers such testimony. A father does not have the legal right to give his daughter in marriage to a non-Jew and therefore he doesn’t have any special right to testify about this having happened in order to thereby prohibit her to a kohen. Note that when she is a minor the father does have another means by which to prohibit his daughter to the priesthood; he can testify that he betrothed her and then accepted her divorce. Nevertheless, he does not have the right to testify that she was taken captive.

נשבית ופדיתיה וכו' אינו נאמן – to disqualify her from the priesthood, for regarding marriage, the All-Merciful (i.e., the Torah) believes the father; regarding her being taken captive, he is not believed.

If a man declares at the time of his death “I have sons,” he is believed; “I have brothers,” he is not believed. This section discusses a man who offers testimony which will impact his wife’s subjectivity to the laws of yibbum. By stating that he has sons he is exempting her from yibbum. He is believed because if all he wanted to do was exempt her from yibbum he could divorce her. However, he is not believed to state that he has brothers, thereby obligating her for yibbum. Unless we know that he has brothers, he (or others) would have to bring evidence to make his wife subject to yibbum.

יש לי בנים – and my wife will not be dependent upon her brother-in-law (who in the case of his brother dying without issue enters into his estate and marries his wife).

If one betroths his daughter without specifying which, the daughters of majority age are not included. This section connects back to the previous mishnah as well as to the next mishnah. If a father states that he betrothed one of his daughters, but does not remember which one he betrothed, all of his minor daughters are in a state of possible betrothal, since he has the legal right to betroth any of them. None of them can marry until the matter is clarified. However, the girls who are of majority age are not doubtfully betrothed since the father has no legal right to betroth them.

יש לי אחים – and my wife will be dependent upon her brother-in-law, but up until now, she was in the status that she would not be dependent.

אין הבוגרות בכלל – because they are not in the domain of the father to become betrothed, and even though he had made the adult daughter an agent to receive her betrothal, we say (Kiddushin 64b) that a person does not put aside a Mitzvah which [primarily] rests on him [to see to the betrothal of his daughter] and perform one which is not incumbent upon him [concerning his adult daughter]. But minors and girls between the ages of twelve and twelve-and-one-half require a Jewish bill of divorce, out of doubt, for we don’t know which of them he (i.e., the father) had betrothed.

קדשתי את בתי גדולה – it was necessary for the Tanna [of our Mishnah] to teach us of the dispute of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi in the case of: “I betrothed the eldest” and “I betrothed the youngest.” For had [the Mishnah] only taught us regarding “I betrothed the eldest,” I would think that on this which Rabbi Meir is commenting upon, and since there is a younger [daughter] than her, it is to this one, “the elder” that he calls her, for it is praiseworthy for a person to call his daughter with the language of “older” even though she is “younger,” when there is younger sister younger than her. But, regarding a minor, I would say that he (i.e., Rabbi Meir) would agree with Rabbi Yosi, that all the while that he can call her “elder,” he would not call her “younger.” But if [the Mishnah only taught] that alone (i.e., the statement of Rabbi Meir), it is on that alone which Rabbi Meir is commenting upon but on this one (“I betrothed the younger”), I would say that Rabbi Yosi agrees with Rabbi Meir. Therefore, it was necessary to teach both of them. And the Halakha is according to Rabbi Yosi in both cases.

Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss a father who betroths one of his daughters but does not remember which one he betrothed. Specifically, the mishnah refers to a situation where a man has two sets of daughters with two different wives and one set of daughters is older than the other set (i.e. all of the daughters of one wife are older than the eldest daughter of the other wives.)

If one has two groups of daughters by two wives, and he declares, “I have given in betrothal my eldest daughter, but I do not know whether the eldest of the seniors or the eldest of the juniors, or the youngest of the seniors who is older than the eldest of the juniors,” all are forbidden [to marry other men], except the youngest of the juniors, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: they are all permitted, except the eldest of the seniors. The father says he has given in betrothal his “eldest daughter” to a man, and he has forgotten who that man is, and the question is who his “eldest daughter” is? Once we figure out whom the eldest daughter is that daughter will be forbidden to marry any other man, and his other daughters will be permitted. Again, the man has two sets of daughters; one set is a group of “seniors” in that they are all older than the other set which are “juniors.” According to Rabbi Meir, any daughter who has a younger sister may be called the “eldest daughter” since she is older than another daughter. The only daughter who cannot possibly be called the “eldest daughter” is the youngest daughter of the youngest set. Rabbi Yose rules that only the eldest daughter of the seniors is called the “eldest daughter” and therefore only she is prohibited.

“I have betrothed my youngest daughter, but I do not know whether the youngest of the juniors or the youngest of the seniors, or the eldest of the juniors who is younger than the youngest of the seniors,” they are all forbidden, except the eldest of the seniors, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: they are all permitted, except the youngest of the juniors. This section is basically the same as the previous section, except that in this section the father claims that he gave his “youngest daughter” in betrothal. The opinions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose are consistent with those above.

האומר לאשה קדשתיך וכו' – it is necessary for us to mention the case of when he says, “I have betrothed you,” and [the case] when she says, “you have betrothed me.” For if it (i.e., the Mishnah) [only] taught when he says to the woman: “I have betrothed you,” he is forbidden to her relatives while she is permitted to his relatives, I would think that the law is that she does not make herself forbidden to his relatives, for if he were to tell a lie, as a man doesn’t care [and hence speaks thus] if he forbids himself to her relatives for no reason, and he lies when he says, “I have betrothed you,” even though he has not [in reality] betrothed her, but she, when she states “You have betrothed me,” prohibits herself to the entire world until he gives her a Jewish bill of divorce, for if he had not established this for her, she would not have said it, and through her mouth he would be forbidden to all of her relatives, and even if he gave her a Jewish bill of divorce; this is what it comes to tell us, [that this is not the case]. (see Kiddushin 65a)

Introduction This mishnah and the next one deal with cases where a man says that he betrothed a certain woman and she contradicts him or where she claims that he betrothed her and he denies it. The general principle upon which this mishnah stands is that a person can make a statement which impacts himself/herself but does not impact others. Stated otherwise, a person is believed with regard to personal consequences but not with regard to consequences to others.

קדשתיך והיא אומרת לא קדשת אלא בתי וכו' – because you might think to say that since according to the Torah, the father is believed about his daughter, that the mother would be believed about her daughter, according to the Rabbis, but what it comes to tell us is that she is not believed.

If he says to a woman, “I betrothed you,” and she says, “You did not betroth me”: he is prohibited to her relatives, but she is permitted to his relatives. The man claims he has betrothed the woman, and therefore he is believed with regard to himself. The consequence is that all of the woman’s relatives (daughter, mother, sister etc. for a full list see Yevamot 4:7) are prohibited to him, because according to him, he is betrothed to their relative. However, the woman denies that this man betrothed her. Hence she is not prohibited to his relatives.

If she says, “You betrothed me,” and he says, “I did not betroth you,” he is permitted to her relatives but she is prohibited to his relatives. This is the opposite case. Since she claims to be betrothed to him, she is prohibited from marrying his relatives. Since he denies being betrothed to her, he is permitted to her relatives.

“I betrothed you,” and she says, “You betrothed my daughter,” he is forbidden to the relatives of the senior [the mother], but the senior is permitted to his relatives; he is permitted to the junior’s [the daughter’s] relatives, and the junior is permitted to his relatives. The mishnah adds a wrinkle to the previous cases. Here the husband claims that he betrothed a woman and she responds that he didn’t betroth her but rather he betrothed her daughter (again, one can imagine a Hollywood scenario lurking behind this mishnah!). As above, he is prohibited to her relatives because he claims that he betrothed her. The mother (the senior woman) is not prohibited to his relatives, because she claims that she is not betrothed to that man. The man is not prohibited to the daughter’s relatives because he denies having betrothed her. The daughter is also permitted to his relatives, since she didn’t claim that she was betrothed to him, but rather the mother did. A mother does not have the legal ability to give her daughter in betrothal and hence, unlike a father who does have such a legal ability, she is not believed to say that she has done so.

קדשתי את בתך וכו' – Since the [Mishnah] taught above these clauses above [in the previous Mishnah], it (i.e., the Mishnah) also teaches this, and even though it is a Mishnah that is not necessary, and in all of these [sections] when she says: “You have betrothed me,” we request from him that he give [her] a Jewish bill of divorce in order that it will permit her [to marry others]. And if he gave a Jewish bill of divorce on his own accord, we force him to give [her] the Ketubah [settlement].

Introduction This is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.

[If a man says to a woman], “I betrothed your daughter,” and she replies, “You betrothed me”; he is forbidden to the junior’s [the daughter’s] relatives, while the junior is permitted to his relatives; he is permitted to the senior’s [mother’s] relatives, while the senior is forbidden to his relatives. This mishnah provides the opposite scenario to that which we saw at the end of yesterday’s mishnah. The man claims that he betrothed the woman’s daughter, and is therefore forbidden to the daughter’s relatives. However, the daughter is still permitted to his relatives, since neither she nor her mother claimed that she was betrothed to him. The mother’s relatives are permitted to him, because he doesn’t claim to have betrothed her. However, she is forbidden to his relatives because she claims to have been betrothed to him.

כל מקום שיש קדושין ואין עבירה – that the betrothal takes effect, and there is no sin [associated] with her marriage. And this principle is not exact, for a male convert who marries an illegitimately born female, the betrothal is valid but there is no sin [associated] with it, for a community/congregation of converts is not called a community. And even though any child-born goes after the [status] of the male, [in this case] the child is illegitimate (i.e., a Mamzer), both whether a convert married an illegitimately born female or whether a Mamzer married a woman convert.

Introduction This mishnah begins discussing a subject which will be covered throughout the remainder of Kiddushin: lineage. We have already encountered throughout Seder Nashim many different genealogical statuses: priests, Levites, Israelites, converts, mamzerim, natinim and more. Our mishnah discusses how these lineages are transmitted from generation to generation, namely the issue of whom the child’s lineage follows, that of the father or that of the mother. We should note that lineage was probably the most important factor in choosing a spouse in the ancient Jewish world and probably was a key factor in the entire ancient world. Indeed until the modern period many matches between young men and women were made based on lineage. Lineage largely determined a person’s social standing. It is sometimes hard to relate to this value for those of us living in 20-21st century America, a country where societal standing is perhaps less based on lineage than almost any nation throughout history. The final clause of our mishnah contains the famous principle of “matrilineal descent” the “Jewishness” of the child follows the mother and not the father. This principle is surprising since ancient Jewish society was clearly patriarchal. Men were almost always the heads of their households, the woman would typically leave her family to enter the man’s house, men had custody and overall responsibility for their children etc. Furthermore, it seems quite clear that the Bible operates on the principle of “patrilineal descent.” Throughout the Tanakh men marry women of foreign descent and the women assimilate into their husband’s culture and homes (or notoriously fail to assimilate). The same is true of Second Temple literature such as the later books of the Bible, Josephus and Philo. How the matrilineal principle came to dominate rabbinic halakhah and literature is a mystery. There are a few places in rabbinic literature with a hint of a patrilineal principle, but there are few of them and they are usually rejected. A good discussion of these issues can be found in Shaye Cohen’s excellent book, The Beginnings of Jewishness.

וכל מי שאין לה עליו קדושין וכו' הולד ממזר – In [Tractate] Yevamot (49a) we derive it from Scripture, as it is written (Deuteronomy 23:1): “No man shall marry his father’s former wife, [so as to remove his father’s garment],” and near it (verse 3), [it states]: “No one misbegotten [shall be admitted into the congregation of the LORD; none of his descendants, even in the tenth generation, shall be admitted into the congregation of the LORD].” And we maintain her as a widow whose husband died childless waiting for her brother-in-law to act (i.e., either to marry her or to absolve her of the obligation through the Halitzah/refusal ceremony) of his father, as she is the wife of the brother of his father and she is liable to Divine extirpation through him.

Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this? When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite. In normal marriages the status of the child follows that of the father: the child of a priest is a priest, of a Levite is a Levite and of an Israelite is an Israelite.

על אחת מכל העריות – of those liable for Divine extirpation.

And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this? When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin. However, if the marriage is valid, meaning that the woman requires a get to separate from the man, but the marriage involves a transgression, the child receives the lower status. Therefore, the child of a mamzer or a mamzeret is a mamzer(et). Furthermore, if the marriage is prohibited but neither parent is “flawed” (such as a mamzer or a natin), a female child from such a marriage is disqualified from subsequently marrying a priest. For instance the daughter of a priest and divorcee cannot marry a priest.

ולד שפחה ונכרית – as it is written [regarding] a female maidservant (Exodus 21:4): “the wife and her children shall belong to the master…” and [regarding] a heathen woman, it is written (Deuteronomy 7:4): “For they will turn your children away from Me [to worship other gods]…,” and because it is not written, “and she will turn [your children] away [from Me], we learn from it that this is how it should be understood: “do not give your daughters to their sons [or take their daughters for your sons]” (Deuteronomy 7:3), for the husband of your daughter will turn away your son that your daughter will give birth to through him from Me, but, it does not repeat “his daughter you shall not take for your son,” for the child (literally “male,”) that comes from the heathen is not called “your son,” but rather, “her son.”

And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this? One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah. If the marriage is invalid, but the woman could be betrothed to other men, the child is a mamzer. The example given is incest.

And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this? The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman. This section is where we see the famed “matrilineal principle.” We should note that it is incomplete. The mishnah states that the child of non-Jewish woman or slave is not Jewish or is a slave, but it does not specifically address the status of the child of a Jewish mother and male father.

ממזר שנשא שפחה – and even ab initio, a Mamzer can marry a maid-servant in order to purify his children. And the Halakah is according to Rabbi Tarfon. But Rabbi Tarfon admits that a slave who married a Mamzeret, the child is a Mamzer, for the slave has no pedigree

Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss personal status and lineage. The specific issue is whether or not a mamzer can purify his lineage.

Rabbi Tarfon says: mamzerim can be purified. How is this so? If a mamzer marries a slave woman, her son is a slave; if he frees him, it is found that the son is a free man. Rabbi Eliezer says: behold, he is a slave mamzer. Rabbi Tarfon uses the rules in the previous mishnah to find a means by which a mamzer can have a child that is not a mamzer. A mamzer is allowed to marry a slave woman, even though a non-mamzer cannot. If the mamzer owns the slave woman, then he owns the child. If he frees the child the child loses his mamzer status and becomes a regular Israelite. Rabbi Eliezer, however, holds that such a “trick” does not work. The status of the child is “slave mamzer.” When his father/master frees him, he is no longer a slave but he is still a mamzer.