El rabino Akiva dijo: Le pregunté al rabino Eliezer: ¿Cuál [es el fallo] si uno realiza muchos actos dentro de la misma categoría de Melakhah [una actividad constructiva prohibida en Shabat y festivales] en muchos Shabat bajo un hechizo de desconocimiento? ¿Es responsable de un [sacrificio] para todos ellos, o uno [sacrifica cada] para cada uno de ellos? Él me dijo: [Podemos razonar a través de] un Kal Vachomer [que] él es responsable de un [sacrificio] por cada uno de ellos. Si con respecto a un Niddah [una mujer que ha menstruado y por lo tanto es impura], para quien no hay muchas categorías ni muchas [posibilidades de ser responsables de] chata'ot , uno todavía es responsable de cada [acto de congreso con ella , en el caso de] Shabat para el cual hay muchas categorías [de actividad] y muchas [posibilidades de ser responsable de] chata'ot , ¿no es lógico que uno sea responsable de cada una? Le dije: No, aunque lo dices con respecto a Niddah , eso tiene dos advertencias, porque él está advertido con respecto a Niddah , y Niddah está advertido con respecto al hombre; ¿Puedes decirlo con respecto al Shabat que solo tiene una advertencia? Él me dijo: Alguien que tiene relaciones con menores de [ Niddah ] [que es una prohibición] con solo una advertencia demostrará [el punto desde que] él es responsable de cada uno. Le dije: No, aunque tú lo dices con respecto a alguien que tiene relaciones con menores, aunque no hay [prohibición] para ellos [es decir, desde la perspectiva de las niñas] ahora, hay [una prohibición] para ellos. luego; ¿Lo dirás con respecto al Shabat donde no hay [segunda advertencia] ahora ni más tarde? Él me dijo: Alguien que tiene relaciones con un animal probará [el punto]. Le dije: [El razonamiento con respecto a] un animal es comparable al [con respecto a] Shabat.
Bartenura on Mishnah Keritot
מלאכות הרבה מעין מלאכה אחת – many derivatives of one chief category [of work on Shabbat].
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English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot
Introduction
In today’s mishnah, the last one of this fascinating chapter, Rabbi Akiva asks Rabbi Eliezer a question concerning Shabbat.
As background we should remind ourselves of a couple of general rules concerning Shabbat. There are 39 different categories of prohibited labor on Shabbat. If one performs labor from different categories, for instance he cooks and he plants, he is liable for a hatat (if done unwittingly) for each labor. However, if one performs two different acts that stem from the same category, for instance he cooks and bakes, he is liable for only one hatat. Our mishnah deals with a person who does many acts that all belong to the same category (cooking for instance) but he does them on different Shabbats. Is he liable for each transgression?
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Bartenura on Mishnah Keritot
ובשבתות הרבה – those that he did on that Shabbat he did on other Sabbaths, and all of them were in one act of forgetfulness. But in the Gemara (Tractate Keritot 16a and continued on Keritot 16b) raises the objection: Why was it necessary that it mentioned [in the Mishnah] many Sabbaths and many and many derivatives, why did it [i.e., the Mishnah] take “derivatives” and not chief categories of labor? And it answers that Rabbi Akiva asked two things from him: One: A person who does one form of work on many Sabbaths and he knows that it is Shabbat, but that he held that this labor is permitted, meaning, willfully, regarding [knowledge of] Shabbat and Inadvertently regarding labors, and this is what he asked him: this [individual] that performed one [prohibited] form of work on two Sabbaths, shall we say that since that they are on two days, even though it is one act of forgetfulness, regarding the [prohibited] work, these Sabbaths would be like divided bodies of [forbidden] labor , that are not similar one to the other, as for example, that he sowed [a field] and repeated in one act of forgetfulness - that is a willful violation of Shabbat but an inadvertent [form of] labor, that he is liable for each and every one [of the labors], or they are not like divided bodies, and it is as if he performed through one act of forgetfulness one [forbidden] form of labor ten times and is not liable for each and every one, for one can’t say here that the days in-between are a knowledge [of the violation on Shabbat] to divide, for specifically, regarding the matter of an inadvertent [violation of] Shabbat there is the awareness to know that it was Shabbat, but regarding the inadvertent nature of the labors performed, there isn’t awareness until he studies. And further, they inquired of him, if he performed many derivative acts from one primary form of labor [of the thirty-nine mentioned in Tractate Shabbat, Chapter Seven, Mishnah Two], is he liable for one [violation only] or on each and every act [performed, and for this reason, it (i.e., the Mishnah) refers to derivatives [of the primary forms of labor].
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English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? Rabbi Akiva asks concerning a person who does many acts of forbidden labor, all from the same category, on many different Shabbats, all within one period of unawareness. For instance, he does not know that it is forbidden to cook on Shabbat, so he cooks, bakes, broils, boils, etc. on many different Shabbats. Does the fact that these acts were performed on different Shabbats make him liable for one hatat for each Shabbat, or do we consider this one sin of cooking, and he is liable for only one hatat?
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Bartenura on Mishnah Keritot
אמר לו חייב על כל אחת ואחת – He (i.e., Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyranus) explained to him (i.e., Rabbi Akiva) that on both [questions], a stringent [response], that a person who performs one [forbidden] labor on many Sabbaths willfully disregarding Shabbat while the [individual prohibited] forms of labor are inadvertent, is liable for each and every Sabbath [when this particular prohibited labor is violated], for these Sabbaths are compared to divided bodies, and the derivates of these [forbidden] forms of labor are like [forbidden] forms of labor, and he is liable for each and every derivative, and even though they are from one chief category [of forbidden work], it is as if he did many chief categories of labor.
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English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot
He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! Rabbi Eliezer responds with the same kal vehomer argument that Rabbi Joshua used in the previous mishnah. If one is liable for one hatat for every menstruant he has relations with, even though this prohibition does not have categories and many ways of sinning as does Shabbat, all the more so one is liable for one hatat for every transgression of Shabbat.
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Bartenura on Mishnah Keritot
ומה נדה – in the Gemara (Tractate Keritot 17a) we state that it teaches menstruating women (i.e.. plural), he who has sexual relations with five menstruating women is liable for each and every act, for they are separated entities/bodies.
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English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot
I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? Rabbi Akiva rebuts Rabbi Eliezer’s comparison. Relations with different menstruants are considered different transgressions because the women are also sinning, as we explained in yesterday’s mishnah. Since the women are warned against sinning just as much as the men, we must consider these different acts. In contrast when it comes to Shabbat, there is only one warning, because there is only one party.
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Bartenura on Mishnah Keritot
תוצאות הרבה – many different matters, as, for example, the Sabbath which has chief categories of labor and their derivatives. But [concerning] a menstruating woman, the only legal obligation that she has is [the prohibition] from sexual intercourse.
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English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot
He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. Rabbi Eliezer defends his answer by slightly adjusting the question. Instead of basing his kal vehomer on relations with five menstruating women, whom he admits are liable for transgressing the prohibition, he bases the kal vehomer on a man who has relations with five menstruating minors. Because they are minors they are not liable, and nevertheless, he is liable for five separate transgressions. Therefore, the same is true with regard to Shabbat.
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Bartenura on Mishnah Keritot
והנדה מוזהרת עליו – as it is written (Leviticus 20:18): “[If a man lies with a woman in her infirmity and uncovers her nakedness, he has laid bare her flow and she has exposed her blood flow;] both of them shall be cut off from among their people.”
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English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot
I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? Rabbi Akiva rejects this by noting that although minors are not now liable, they will be in the future. In other words, this is a transgression that still counts as having two parties, unlike Shabbat, where there is only the transgressor.
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Bartenura on Mishnah Keritot
הבא על הקטנה – He who has sexual relations with five menstruating minor [females] is liable for each and every one of them, even though the minor [female] is not warned [regarding this prohibition].
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English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot
He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. Rabbi Eliezer finds another case of sexual transgression, where there is a sin but only one person sins the case of intercourse with an animal. Just as one is guilty for five hatats if he has intercourse with five different animals, so too he is guilty if he performs one forbidden labor on five different Shabbats.
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Bartenura on Mishnah Keritot
הבא על הבהמה יוכיח – [a male who has sexual intercourse with an animal] is liable for each and every act of sexual intercourse.
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English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot
I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat. Finally, Rabbi Akiva admits that the analogy is appropriate, yet he still rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s answer. He says that his question is about the case of intercourse with animals just as it is about Shabbat. In both cases you have one sin done on multiple occasions and he wants to know if the act should be divided into different acts for which he is liable for each individual sin, or if this is considered just one sin, for which he is liable only one hatat. Final notes on Rabbi Akiva: In my opinion this debate should be looked upon as a debate between two different approaches to law: realistic versus nominal. To Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Joshua and Rabban Gamaliel, if one does several different acts, each of which is a transgression, one is liable for each act. This is a “realistic” approach it examines what a person has actually done. In contrast, Rabbi Akiva adopts a more “nominal” approach. The person has committed one transgression, even though he did so on separate occasions. He ate forbidden foods, he had forbidden sex or he broke the prohibition of cooking, for instance, on Shabbat. Nominally, or legally, speaking, these are all one transgression, and therefore he should be liable for only one hatat. In general, I think that there is a trend in rabbinic Judaism to go from a more “realistic” approach, which probably typified an approach to halakhah commonly found among the priests, to a more “nominal” one. The leader of this movement seems to have been Rabbi Akiva.
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Bartenura on Mishnah Keritot
בהמה כשבת – meaning to say, just as I need to mention it regarding Shabbat, it is also necessary to mention it regarding [sexual intercourse] with animals. But Rabbi Akiva did not accept from Rabbi Eliezer [ben Hyrcanus], neither in the matter that he mentioned about one who does one chief form of labor on many Sabbaths that they are like separate bodies, nor regarding the matter of derivatives of primary forms of labor are like primary forms of labor. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Eliezer.
