Comentario sobre Horayot 1:7

The beit din told the people that they are permitted to do (i.e. to transgress a commandment) one of the things for which the punishment is “karet”.

If the court ruled that one of the commandments mentioned in the Torah may be transgressed, and an individual proceeded and acted through error in accordance with their ruling, whether they acted and he acted with them or they acted and he acted after them or even if they did not act and he acted, he is exempt, because he relied on the court.
If the court ruled [in error], and one of them knew that they had erred, or a disciple who was himself fit to rule on matters of law, and [one of these] proceeded and acted in accordance with their ruling, whether they acted and he acted with them or they acted and he acted after them or even if they did not act and he acted, he is liable, since he did not rely upon the court.
This is the general rule: he who is [in a position] to rely upon himself is liable, and he who relies upon the court is exempt.
Our mishnah discusses a person who follows a ruling that a court made in error, and thereby accidentally transgresses a commandment.
Section one: If a person follows a court ruling that was made in error, and thereby transgresses a negative commandment which carries with it the liability to bring a sin-offering [when done unintentionally], he is not liable, since this was not his error but their error. This rule is true whether he acted together with them, after them or even if he transgressed and the court itself did not even perform the transgression. In other words, even if he relied on their words and not their concrete example, he is exempt. This is not considered to be an unintentional sin that he has committed and therefore he need not bring a sin-offering.
Section two: However, if the person who committed the transgression was a member of the court who knew that his fellow judges were in error, or was a student who was fit to be a member of the court and he knew that the court was in error, he is liable if he acts according to the wrong ruling. Note that this person is still considered to be an unintentional sinner and not an intentional one. His mistake was that he thought that he should listen to the court, even if he knew they were wrong. Since he did not need to rely on the court, but was fit to rely on his own ruling, he is liable, at least as an unintentional sinner, for his own transgression. He therefore needs to bring a sin-offering.

Rabbi Yehuda says that one who acted based on the beit din’s ruling is exempt. This is not the law. The rabbis said that an individual who acted based on the beit din’s ruling is obligated. He is not exempt until the majority of residents in the Land of Israel, or the majority of the tribes, act according to the beit din’s ruling, and then the beit din brings the bull for a communal error-in-judgment (para ha’elem davar) sacrifice, and those who acted according to the beit din’s ruling are exempt.

To exclude the case of one who does not rely on the beit din’s ruling, such as a case where the beit din ruled that forbidden fat (chelev) is permitted and the forbidden fat was switched with permitted fat (shuman) and he ate it; he is obligated because he did not eat it based on the beit din’s ruling.

If the beit din acted, i.e. upon its erroneous ruling, the individual is exempt and the beit din is obligated. The beit din does not bring an offering/sacrifice except when a person acted on an erroneous ruling, where the community acted and the beit din ruled.

Even though he transgressed wilfully, in that he knew the beit din ruled erroneously and still acted according to its ruling, he is not considered a wilful sinner who must bring an offering because in the gemara it says that he sinned in error, because he thought it was a positive commandment to act according to the beit din’s ruling, even when he knows the beit din is wrong.

That he rejects their ruling, that he does not usually act according to their ruling, but he acted according to the beit din’s ruling not because he relied on it but because in his own opinion it was permitted to do – therefore, he is obligated.

Rabbi Shimon exempts him – Because the ruling had reached the majority of the community.

If a court ruled, and later discovered that they had erred and changed their decision, whether they brought their offering or whether they did not bring their offering, if an individual proceeded and acted in accordance with their [erroneous] decision, Rabbi Shimon exempts him and Rabb Elazar declares [his case] doubtful.
Which case may be regarded doubtful? If he was at home, he is liable. If he went abroad, he is exempt.
Rabbi Akiba said: I agree that a person in such a case is nearer to exemption than to culpability. Said Ben Azzai to him: how does such a person differ from one who remains at home? He who remains at home is in a position to ascertain the facts but the other was not in such a position.
This mishnah discusses a case where a court made a wrong decision and then reversed their decision, thereby correcting it. The question asked is whether or not one who follows the wrong decision after it has been revoked is exempt from bringing a sin-offering for his accidental transgression.
Section one: The offering referred to in this section will be discussed more fully below in mishnah five, specifically the question of who brings the sacrifice.
Rabbi Shimon exempts this person because he relied on the court. As we learned above in mishnah one, a person who relies on the court is exempt from bringing an individual sin-offering. Rabbi Elazar declares this case doubtful, for we do not know if he had already heard that the court had reversed its decision.
The mishnah now continues to discuss in which specific cases the matter is in doubt. If the person was at home and could have known that the court reversed its decision, he is responsible for not having followed the new decision. However, if he had gone abroad, he could not have known of the reversal, and he is therefore exempt.
Rabbi Akiva states that this person, who went abroad, is actually closer to being totally exempt, for it is very unlikely that he knew that the court reversed its decision. As he explains to Ben Azzai, his colleague, the person sitting in his house could have heard, whereas the one who was abroad could not have.

Rabbi Elezar declares this case doubtful – Since he should inquire any time there are new rulings by the beit din and he didn’t inquire, this is similar to the case where he is in doubt whether it is a sin or not and he brings an asham talui. The law is according to Rabbi Elezar’s opinion.

Which case may be regarded doubtful – For example, like what Rabbi Elezar said, the matter being discussed is that he was satisfied with the ruling, whether a sin or not a sin and he is obligated to bring an asham talui.

One who remains at home – When a person is at home in the country where the beit din ruled, he could have heard that the beit din reversed its ruling.

If he went abroad – This does not necessarily mean he already set out, but if he was preparing to travel but had not yet left, Rabbi Akiva holds the opinion that a person who is preparing for a journey will not be able to inquire whether the beit din reversed its ruling and he is exempt from bringing an asham talui. Ben Azzai thinks that since he had not yet set out on the journey, he should have inquired. This is the disagreement in the Gemara. And the law goes according to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion.

An entire principle has to be uprooted – The essence of the commandment, as is explained.

If the court ruled that an entire principle has to be uprooted; if they said that [the law concerning the] menstruant is not found in the Torah or the [law concerning the] Sabbath is not found in the torah or [the law concerning] idolatry is not found in the torah, they are exempt.
If, however, they ruled that a part [of a commandment] was to be annulled and a part fulfilled, they are liable. How is this so? If they said: [the law concerning the] menstruant occurs in the Torah but if a man has relations with a woman that awaits a day corresponding to a day he is exempt, [or that the law concerning the] Sabbath occurs in the Torah but if a man carries anything from a private domain to a public domain he is exempt, [or that the law of] idolatry occurs in the Torah, but if a man only bows down to an idol he is exempt, they are liable, for it says, “And if some matter escapes [the notice of the congregation]” (Leviticus 4:13), “some matter” but not the entire principle.
Our mishnah teaches that if the court rules that an entire commandment does not exist, they are not liable. Whereas if they rule that one part of the commandment does not exist, they are liable.
This mishnah teaches an important principle for establishing when the court is liable to bring the special sin-offering for having made a wrongful ruling. If the court were to state that the entirety of a well-known commandment does not exist, and people were to act upon the court’s ruling, the people who actually sin are liable and not the court. Since these three things, the prohibition of sexual relations with a menstruant, the prohibition of Sabbath laws and the prohibition of idol worship are so clearly stated in the Torah, everyone should have known that the court erred when it ruled that these things don’t exist. This is not even truly considered a ruling by the court, but merely an empty statement against the Torah. While interpretation of the Torah is flexible, it does have its limits.
However, if the court rules that a certain act which is one part of a larger prohibition, is permitted, and people act upon the court’s ruling, the court is liable and not the people. For instance, a woman who sees blood at a time when she is not supposed to be menstruating must wait one day for every day that she saw blood before she can resume sexual relations. If the court ruled that one could have relations with such a woman, they are permitting an act which is against the Torah. Similarly, if they permit a person to remove an object from one domain to another on Shabbat, they are permitting carrying, which is forbidden. Finally, if they admit that idol worship is prohibited, but bowing down is not considered idol worship, they have made an errant ruling. In all of these cases, since they admit that the commandment exists, but have made an error on a detail (these are all well-known and rather large details in rabbinic literature), they are liable if the people listen to their ruling. People might not have known that such actions were prohibited, even though they knew that the general commandment exists. Therefore, they are not liable for following the court’s ruling.
The mishnah ends with a midrash supporting this view. One can understand the word davar to mean “part of the matter”; from here the rabbis learn that if the whole matter escapes the court, the court is not liable.
Questions
Why do you think the rabbis posited this exception to the general rule of the court’s culpability for errors?

They are exempt – As it is written (Leviticus 4) “the thing being hidden”, read it as if it said “and it was hidden from the thing, i.e. part of it [the commandment], not its entirety.

But if a man has relations with a woman that awaits a day corresponding to a day he is exempt – The gemara answers that she who keeps a day for each day, as it is written in the Torah (Leviticus 15) “she shall count for herself” comes to teach that she counts one day for each day [of bleeding], and if something is written in the Torah the beit din does not bring a sacrifice. The Gemara explains, for example, that they are talking about a zava, which is only a case during the day, i.e., when she sees blood during the day and not when she sees at night, as it is written there, “all the days of her issue.”

If a man carries anything from a private domain to a public domain he is exempt – It is forbidden to take things in and out, as it is written (Exodus 16) “let no man go out of his place,” but throwing and proffering are permitted.

Bows down [to an idol] he is exempt - They state that bowing down means stretching out arms and legs and is forbidden, as it is written (Exodus 34) “you shall bow down to no other god” but if the bowing is without stretching out arms and legs it is permitted. The rule of the matter is, not beit din is obligated until it rules on a matter on which the Sadducees do not concur. But if it rules on a matter on which the Sadducees concur, the beit din is exempt from a communal sacrifice, and the majority that acts according to the beit din’s ruling, each one must bring a sacrifice for his erroneous transgression. What is the reason? Go read it in the school house [i.e. every school child understands].

.And one of them knew that they had erred, etc. – As it is written (Leviticus 4) “And if the whole congregation of Israel shall err, until they will all agree that they acted in error.

Introduction This mishnah really contains two totally separate mishnayoth. We will therefore explain each separately.

Mufla of the beit din – the most important/knowledgeable, the head of a yeshiva.

This mishnah teaches three principles. First of all, if even one judge on the court knew that the court had erred in its ruling and told the rest of the court so, and yet his advice was overrode, the court is not liable to bring an offering if people transgress by obeying their ruling. For the special law of the erring court to be in effect, the entire court must err. If the mufla was absent when the errant decision was made, the court is not liable. The mufla was evidently the person who sat on the court and had many, many halakhot memorized. He was like a human archive who could recite orally from the tradition. His absence would have impeded the court’s ability to make the correct decision, and therefore they are not liable. The third rule is that all of the members of the court must be “fit” to issue rulings. Our mishnah lists several categories of people who are not fit for this type of court. Converts, netinim (Temple slaves) and mamzerim (children born of illicit marriages) cannot act as judges in capital cases (see Sanhedrin 4:2). The innovation of our mishnah is that an elder who does not have children can also not act as a judge. This is because we are concerned that he will not have pity on others when it comes to adjudicating capital cases. In other words having children makes a person more compassionate. Personally, I can say that when my first child was born I began to look at other human beings differently; everybody is somebody’s child. Having children can certainly increase a person’s sense of the suffering of others. [I don’t mean to say that one who doesn’t have children is necessarily not sympathetic to others suffering. When the mishnah sets qualities for judges it bases itself on the most likely norm and not on the range of possibilities for human characteristics]. This third rule is learned through a midrashic technique called a gezerah shavah, which is a linguistic comparison. The word “congregation” (edah) is mentioned here in Lev 4 and in Num 35, which discusses capital cases brought before a court. From those verses the rabbis learn that capital cases are tried before a court of 23 (see Sanhedrin 1:6). Just as in capital cases, if there are not 23 qualified judges, the judgment is invalid, so too here, in order for the law that requires an offering for an unwitting errant ruling to be applicable, there must be only qualified judges.

An elder who did not have children – He is not fit to judge in capital cases because he is cruel and will not be compassionate.

If the court ruled and one of them knew that they had erred and said to the others, “You are making a mistake”, or if the mufla of the court was not there, or if one of them was a proselyte or a mamzer or a nathin or an elder who did not have children, they are exempt, for it says here (Lev 4:13) “congregation” and it says later on (Num 35:24) “congregation”; just as the “congregation” further on must be fit to issue rulings, so too the “congregation” mentioned here must be fit to issue rulings
If the court issued a [wrong] decision unwittingly and all the people acted unwittingly, they bring a bull. This first section is the classic case in which the court must bring the bull as a sin-offering (mentioned in Lev 4:14).

It says later on “congregation” – the congregation was judged.

[If the court ruled wrong] intentionally and [the people] acted unwillingly, they bring a lamb or a goat. In this case the court intentionally made the wrong ruling. They therefore cannot bring the bull as a sin-offering because intentional sinners are not allowed to bring offerings to atone for their sins. Sin-offerings are an opportunity for atonement, and not a punishment. Only one who sinned accidentally is given this opportunity to atone through sacrifice. [Intentional sinners can possibly achieve atonement in other ways]. Since the court cannot bring an offering, the people are considered as individual unwitting sinners, and they bring the typical sacrifice for a person in such a category: a lamb or goat (Lev 4:28, 32).

Just as the “congregation” further on, etc. – As it is said that in the Sanhedrin (Numbers 11) “that they may stand there with you,” meaning like you, with a distinguished lineage like you. Except for a convert, a nateen (variously translated as “subject” and “Temple slave”) and a mamzer (child of an illicit marriage) who are not fit to judge in capital cases.

[If the court ruled] unwittingly and [the people] acted willingly accordingly, they are exempt. If the court unwittingly ruled in error but the congregation knowingly sinned, the court does not bring the bull offering because the congregation did not act based on the court’s ruling. The congregation knew that the act was wrong, even though the court said it was permitted. Since they did not act upon the court’s ruling, the court is not held responsible for their transgressions. The congregation cannot bring an offering since they transgressed intentionally. As we learned in the previous section, intentional sinners cannot achieve atonement through sacrifice.

Intentionally – The beit din knew that the matter was forbidden and is exempt from bringing a communal sacrifice because one who wilfully transgresses does not bring a sacrifice. Those who transgress in error bring a ewe or a female goat as an individual sin-offering.

[If the court ruled] unwittingly and [the people] acted willingly accordingly, they are exempt – The beit din is exempt because they did not act, the people acted according to the ruling and not did not make their actions dependent on the beit din because they knew the beit din ruled wrongly. Everyone who acted is exempt because they acted willfully and those who sin wilfully do not bring a sacrifice.

They bring a bull – It says in Leviticus that the congregation sacrifices a bull.

Introduction In the previous mishnah we learned that if the court issued an errant ruling and everyone acted erroneously in accord with that ruling they bring a bull, as it says in Leviticus 4:14, “The congregation shall offer a bull of the herd as a sin offering.” Our mishnah discusses who the “congregation” is that brings the bull. Throughout this mishnah we will read that there is a distinction made between sins involving idol worship and all other sins. In the introduction to the tractate I explained that the rabbis understood Leviticus 4 as referring to regular sins and Numbers 15:22-29 as referring to idol worship. If the sin was idol worship, then the congregation brings a bull and a goat (Numbers 15:24).

And in the case of idolatry they bring a bull and a goat – And if the beit din ruled to permit the prohibition of idol worship, they bring a bull and a goat, as it says in the parasha Shlach Lecha, “When you shall err and not observe all the commandments” the commandment that is equal to all the other commandments is idol worship, as it is written (Numbers 15) “then it shall be, if it be done in error by the congregation, it being hid from their eyes, that all the congregation shall offer one young bullock for a burnt-offering . . . and one he-goat for a sin-offering.” And Rabbi Meir believes that that if the congregation brings a bull, in Leviticus it is referring to transgressing in error all the other commandments, but that in Shlach Lecha when the congregation brings a bull and a goat the error is idol worship, and it is the congregation that ruled, i.e. the beit din gadol [Sanhedrin], that brings the sacrifices.

If the court ruled [in error] and all the people or a majority of them acted accordingly they bring a bull. And in the case of idolatry they bring a bull and a goat; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: the twelve tribes bring twelve bulls;
And in the case of idolatry twelve bulls and twelve goats. R. Shimon says: thirteen bullocks;
And in the case of idolatry, thirteen bulls and thirteen goats: a bull and a goat for each tribe, and a bull and a goat for the court. If the court ruled [in error] and seven tribes or a majority of them acted accordingly, they bring a bull; And in the case of idolatry, they bring a bull and a goat; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah said: the seven tribes who sinned must bring seven bulls and the rest of the tribes who did not sin must bring bulls on their behalf because even those who did not sin must bring on behalf of the ones who sinned. Rabbi Shimon said: eight bulls;
And in the case of idolatry, eight bulls and eight goats, a bull and a goat for every tribe and a bull and a goat for the court. If the court of one of the tribes ruled [in error], and that tribe acted accordingly, that tribe is liable, but all the other tribes are exempt; these are the words of Rabbi Judah. But the Sages say: there is no liability except as a result of the rulings of the highest court; for it says, “And if the whole congregation of Israel shall err”, but not the congregation of one particular tribe. In this section we read three opinions as to who the congregation is that brings sin-offerings if all or most of the nation sins according to the courts errant ruling. According to Rabbi Meir in all sins except idol worship the court brings a bull and if the sin was idol worship they bring a bull and a goat. Rabbi Meir understands that the court is the “congregation” referred to in the verse who brings the offering. Rabbi Judah understands “congregation” to refer to the people of Israel themselves, namely all twelve tribes. Therefore each tribe brings its own bull or bull and goat. Rabbi Shimon agrees in essence with both Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Meir: each tribe brings its own bull (or bull and goat) and the court brings one as well, bringing the total to thirteen.

The twelve tribes bring - Rabbi Yehuda understands that each and every tribe is called a congregation, as it is written (Chronicles II 20), “And Yehoshephat stood before the congregation of Yehuda.”

If only seven of the tribes sin according to the errant ruling, but these seven tribes do not add up to a majority of all of Israel, or a majority of each of the seven tribes sins, Rabbi Meir still holds that the court brings a bull or bull and goat. Rabbi Judah also holds that all twelve tribes still bring a bull, even though only seven sinned. Even the tribes that did not sin are responsible to ask for atonement for those that did sin. Rabbi Shimon, however, holds that only the tribes that actually sinned bring the sacrifices, as well as the court.

Thirteen bulls – Rabbi Shimon understands that the beit din that erred in its ruling cannot atone through the bulls and goats brought by the tribes but must bring their own bull and goat.

If the high court of one of the individual tribes ruled in error and that tribe acted according to its ruling, that tribe is held accountable and must bring a bull, according to Rabbi Judah. Note that if the high court of the entire nation had ruled in error, but only one tribe had followed the ruling, these laws would not be in effect (the individuals who sinned would therefore be regarded as individual sinners and not treated as a collective). The Sages disagree. According to them all of these laws only apply in the case of the high court of the nation. The verse states that “the whole congregation of Israel” must sin, or at least a majority thereof. Therefore, the ruling court must also be the court of all of the congregation of Israel.

Seven tribes – Which comprise the majority of the tribes, even if they contain a minority of the people of Israel. Or a majority of the people of Israel even if they form a minority of the tribes, and even if only one tribe acted and it comprises the majority of the people of Israel. Every other tribe that did not sin must bring a sacrifice to atone for those that did sin.

Eight bulls – Rabbi Shimon believes that the tribes that did not sin need not bring sacrifices to atone for those that did sin. And the law goes according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

That tribe acted accordingly – That tribe’s beit din ruled for it and it acted and it does not comprise the majority of the people of Israel or the majority of the tribes.

But the Sages say: there is no liability etc. – The law goes according to the opinion of the Sages.