Comentario sobre Arakhin 1:5

הכל מעריכין (dedicate the value of a person or of an animal unfit for the altar) – "הכל" /everyone includes a male who is thirteen years and one day old who did not bring forth two [pubic] hairs, that he dedicates the value of a person or of an animal unfit for the altar, or he is a minor one year before he (or she) reaches majority/adulthood [if it can be shown that the child understood the nature of the vow] (which is based upon Numbers 6:2: “If anyone, man or woman כי יפלא/explicitly utters a Nazirite’s vow to set himself apart for the LORD”), and he is called מופלא/uttering a distinct vow because they examine him if he knows how to utter a vow distinctly and to explain in the name of Whom he made the vow, and in the name of whom he dedicated [to the altar]. And even though it is written (Leviticus 27:2): “[Speak to the Israelite people and say to them:] When anyone explicitly vows/"איש כי יפלא נדר בערכך" [to the LORD the equivalent for a human being],” when he is near his period of maturity/adulthood, he is called a man (i.e., an adult) in this matter. And [the word] "הכל"/everyone that also refers to [the individual who is] the subject of the valuation, including someone disfigured/disgraced and/or afflicted with boils, who is not worth anything [financially]. For you might think that I would say that a vow of assessment of a person or animal dedicated to the sanctuary, as it is written (Leviticus 27:2 -see above), he whose person has a value, can vow the value of a person or an animal, but he whose person has no value cannot (see Tractate Arakhin 2a), which comes to tell us that [the word] "הכל"/everyone that refers to those entitled to dedicate, because it is taken for being dedicated, and those being dedicated is necessary [to teach] to include those who are younger than a month old, which can be dedicated [for a sacrifice] even though they are not the subject of valuation.

Introduction In order to understand our mishnah we must understand the distinction between an “evaluation” and vowing someone’s monetary worth. When a person makes a statement such as “My value is upon me,” he must dedicate to the Temple the sum that the Torah determines to be his/her value. He can also make such a statement with regard to another person, i.e. “So and so’s value is upon me.” However, if he states, “My monetary worth is upon me,” then an actual evaluation of his value must be made. This is done by assessing how much he would be worth as a slave if he was sold in the market. Again, one can also make such a statement with regard to another person, i.e. “So and so’s monetary worth is upon me.” In other words there are two types of evaluation. For the first, where he uses the word “erekh,” or value, we use the Torah’s fixed sum. For the second, where he uses the word “monetary worth” we evaluate his actual worth.

מעריכין – if a person said about someone, “I vow the value of so-and-so,” he gives the value of that individual according to his years as it is determined in the [Torah] portion of valuations, as the vow of value is regulated by the condition of the person whose value is vowed.

All [persons] are fit to evaluate or to be made the subjects of evaluation, are fit to vow [another's worth] or have their worth vowed: priests, Levites and [ordinary] Israelites, women and slaves. Generally, all people can evaluate and be evaluated meaning they can either say, “My value is upon me” or have that said about them by another. In this case, the money they or others will owe to the Temple depends upon the value prescribed by the Torah (Leviticus 27). Similarly, all people can vow to give their or another’s person’s monetary worth to the Temple. This is when they say, “My monetary worth is upon me” or have that said by another person. As we shall see, this is just the general rule. There are indeed exceptions, people who cannot evaluate or be evaluated, vow or be vowed.

ונערכין – if another person said about him, “the value of this individual is upon me” or he said himself, “I vow my own value,” (see Talmud Arakhin 7b).

The tumtum and the hermaphrodite are fit to vow [another's worth], or to have their worth vowed, and are fit to evaluate, but they are not fit to be made the subjects of evaluation, for the subject of evaluation must be definitely either male or female. A tumtum is a person’s who has neither male nor female genitalia and a hermaphrodite has both male and female genitalia. The gender of these two people is in doubt. Both can vow another’s monetary worth or have their worth vowed by another, because vowing one’s monetary worth has nothing to do with establishing a certain gender. They can also evaluate another person by saying “So and so’s value is upon me” because they are considered to be intelligent. The one thing they can’t do is have their value dedicated by themselves or by others because in order to be evaluated one must have a certain gender. This is because the Torah determines the value of a human being partly based on the person’s gender. One without a gender cannot have his/her value determined.

נודרין – if he said: “the monetary value of so-and-so is upon me,” he must give according to what is appropriate to be sold in the marketplace.

A deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor are fit to have their worth vowed or be made the subject of evaluation, but they are not fit to make either a vow [of another's worth] or to evaluate, because they have no intelligence. A deaf-mute, imbecile and minor are not considered to be of intelligence and therefore they cannot dedicate anything to the Temple, neither through an evaluation nor a vow. However, they are of value, both according to the Torah’s assessment and as slaves sold in the market, therefore their value or monetary worth can be dedicated.

ונידרין – another person said regarding him: “the monetary value of so-and-so is upon me,” or he himself said: “the monetary value is upon me.”

A person less than one month old may have his worth vowed but not his valuation. The Torah assigns value only to children who have reached thirty days. This is probably because life was so fragile for the first thirty days and so many children would have died (see Leviticus 27:6). Therefore, a child below thirty day’s value cannot be dedicated. But their monetary worth can be vowed because they could be sold on the slave market, even though their value might not be high due to their fragility.

כהנים ולוים – it was necessary for him (i.e., the teacher of this Mishnah) to teach us that they (Kohanim and Levites) are valuated, for you might think that I would say, since it is written (Leviticus 27:8): “[But if one cannot afford the equivalent,] he shall be presented before the priest, and the priest shall assess him,” an Israelite comes before a Kohen but not a Kohen before a Kohen, therefore, a Kohen is not [personally involved] in valuation, for if he is poor, we do not call upon him: “he shall be presented before the priest,” it comes to tell us that Kohanim are included in the laws of Arakhin/valuation, and since it teaches Kohanim [in the Mishnah], it also teaches Levites and Israelites [in the Mishnah].

נשים ועבדים – that the woman pays when she becomes a widow or when she becomes a widow or when she becomes a divorcee, whereas the slave [pays] when he is freed.

טומטום ואנדרוגינוס נודרים ונידרים – for behold they have monetary value.

ומעריכין –(pledge the valuation/dedicate the value of a person or an animal unfit for the altar) – of others, if they said, “the valuation of so-and-so is upon me,” they give the valuation of that individual.

אבל לא נערכין – if he said: “my value is upon me,” or another person said about them: “the value of so-and-so is upon me” (regarding someone who is of doubtful sexual traits or exhibits traits of both sexes), he did not say anything, for a male and a female are mentioned In the [Torah] portion of Arakhin/valuation, until he will be a real male or [she] a real female.

פחות מבן חודש נידר – if [another] person said: “his monetary value is upon me,” because he is worth something fiscally.

אבל לא נערך – for the word ערך/valuation is not mentioned in this [Torah] portion other than with something from one month old and beyond.

הנכרי ר' מאיר אומר נערך – two Biblical verses are written in the [Torah] portion of Arakhin/valuation – one is an amplification and the other is a restriction. The words "בני ישראל" /Israelites (see Leviticus 27:2), excludes heathen. [The words] "איש כי יפלא"/When anyone explicitly vows, amplifies/expands upon "כל איש"/every person, and even a heathen [is included] by implication. Rabbi Meir holds that a heathen is subject to the pledge of Valuation [by others] but does not pledge the Valuation [of others], for we found that Scripture amplified those who are subject to the pledge of Valuation by others more than pledging the Valuation of others, for a deaf-mute, imbecile and a minor are subject to the pledge of Valuation by others, but they do not pledge the Valuation of others, therefore, it is sufficient that the restriction is for those who pledge the Valuation of others and the amplification is for those subject to the pledge of Valuation by others.

Introduction In today’s mishnah Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah debate whether a non-Jew can dedicate his value or have his value dedicated to the Temple.

ר' יהודה אומר נכרי מעריך ואינו נערך – for we have found that a person who is of doubtful sexual traits and a person who exhibits elements of both sexes pledge the Valuation [of others] but are not subject to the pledge of Valuation by others. And the Halakha is according to Rabbi Yehuda. Therefore, a heathen who said: “the value of this Israelite person is upon me is liable to give according to the years of the determined value in the [Torah] portion [of Arakhin]. But an Israelite who said: “the value of this particular heathen is upon me,” or a heathen who said, “my value is upon me,” did not say anything.

A non-Jew: Rabbi Meir says: he can be evaluated but he cannot evaluate. According to Rabbi Meir a non-Jew can be evaluated by others. This means that if a Jew says, “The value of so-and-so [a non-Jew] is upon me,” the Jew will be liable to pay the fixed value of the non-Jew to the Temple. However, he can’t evaluate himself or others.

Rabbi Judah says: he can evaluate but cannot be evaluated. Rabbi Judah holds the opposite. A non-Jew can evaluate himself or others, but he cannot be evaluated. It seems that these two rabbis debate the applicability of Leviticus 27:2, “Speak to the Israelite people and say to them….” The verse can be read as saying that the laws in the chapter refer only to Jews. However, which aspect of the chapter is not clear evaluating others or being evaluated? That is what they debate.

Both agree that he can vow another's worth and have his worth vowed by others. Both Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Meir agree that the non-Jew can vow his own worth or someone else’s worth to the Temple by stating, “The monetary worth of so-and-so is upon me.” Since this type of dedication is not the topic of Leviticus 27, the non-Jew is not excluded. As an aside, it is clear from many historical sources, both rabbinic and non-rabbinic, that non-Jews did donate money to the Temple in Jerusalem.

הגוסס – is not subject to the vow [of payment of their worth to another], for he stands to be dead.

Introduction In today’s mishnah three sages debate whether a person who is about to die can have his worth or value dedicated to the Temple.

ולא נערך – as it is written (Leviticus 27:8): “he shall be presented…and [the priest] shall assess him,” but this one (i.e., the person at the point of death) is presentable nor assessable.

One at the point of death or about to be put to death cannot have his worth vowed, nor be evaluated. A person about to die, either naturally or by being executed, has no worth. Therefore, another person cannot dedicate the dying person’s monetary worth or his value to the Temple. The first opinion in the mishnah makes no distinction between the amount set by the Torah (value) and the amount estimated by his value in the marketplace (his worth).

והיוצא ליהרג – that the proceedings [of his trial] are finished (i.e., the sentence has been pronounced) in an Israelite court. But if he goes to be killed at the hands of the [heathen] kingdom, it does not matter whether it is a kingdom of Israelites or a kingdom of heathens, everyone holds that he pledges the Valuation [of others] and he is subject to the Valuation [by others].

Rabbi Hanina ben Akavia says: he can be evaluated because his value is fixed, but his worth cannot be vowed because his worth is not fixed. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavia does make a distinction between the two. A person’s “value” is set by the Torah and it doesn’t matter whether he is about to die or is alive. Therefore, if someone says, “So and so’s value is upon me,” he is liable to make that payment. However, his monetary worth cannot be vowed through a statement such as, “So and so’s monetary worth is upon me.” This is because there is no fixed “worth” to a human being, and since this human being is about to die, his life has no worth.

לא נידר – that he is not worth anything [monetarily].

Rabbi Yose says: he may vow, evaluate, and consecrate [to the sanctuary], and if he caused damage, he is obliged to make restitution. Rabbi Yose adds that when it comes to the dying person vowing to give someone’s worth or value to the Temple or consecrating an object to the Temple, he has the same ability as everyone else does. Since he will be dead before he pays off these debts, the money will have to be taken out of his estate. Similarly, if he damages another’s property, his inheritors will have to pay out the restitution.

ולא נערך – as it is written (Leviticus 27:29): “No human being who has been proscribed can be ransomed; [he shall be put to death].”But Rabbi Haninah ben Akaviah who stated that he is subject to the Valuation [of others], maintains this Biblical verse (Leviticus 27:29): “No human being who has been proscribed” for a different exposition.

ר' יוסי אומר כו' – Rabbi Yossi and the first Tanna/teacher do not disagree regarding a person who takes a vow and makes an assessment and who sanctifies. But they disagree if it caused damaged. The first Tanna/teacher holds, if it caused damage, it is exempt from payment/indemnity. For even if the one who causes damage is liable for indemnity/payment from the Torah, a loan that is written about in the Torah is not equivalent to something written in a document, but it is an oral loan. And an oral loan does not collect from the heirs. But Rabbi Yossi holds, that the loan that is written in the Torah is equivalent to a loan written in a document and he collects from the heirs. But the Halakha is according to the first Tanna/teacher. But after they have established that an oral loan collects from the heir, the Jewish court collects his money and they pay for what he has damaged.

אין ממתינין לה עד שתלד – for you might have thought that offspring, the monies belong to the husband, as it is written (Exodus 21:22): “the one responsible shall be fined according to the woman’s husband may exact from him.” But we don’t cause him to lose, as it comes to teach us as it is written (Deuteronomy 22:22): “both of them – the man and the woman with whom he lay – shall die,” also including the offspring.

Introduction Since yesterday’s mishnah dealt with the status of someone who was about to be executed, our mishnah continues to provide some information in this subject. It has nothing to do with evaluations.

ישבה על המשבר – it is the place of sitting for the woman in labor is called משבר/the travailing stool.

If a woman is about to be executed, they do not wait for her until she gives birth. The rabbis considered delaying execution to be cruel to the executed person. The ideal was to sentence the person and execute them immediately so that they would not have to wait around a long time contemplating their death. We should remember that in order to sentence someone to death, the proof had to be overwhelmingly certain. In rabbinic law, a conviction would almost never be overturned, and therefore, it would be cruel to delay carrying out the sentence. Our mishnah teaches that this is so even for a pregnant woman. While this may seem cruel, it is in essence stating that the woman takes precedence over her fetus, which is not yet considered to be a full “life.”

ממתינין לה עד שתלד – for since it (i.e., the fetus) is uprooted/removed to depart, it is another body and is not like the body of the mother.

But if she had already sat on the birthstool, they wair for her until she gives birth. However, if she has already begun to have contractions, and is sitting on the birthstool to give birth, they must wait until she gives birth to execute her. It seems that at this point the fetus is close enough to being an actual human being, that it would not be legal to execute it with the mother.

נהנין בשערה – it is not an actual hair that is stated, but rather a wig that she had from the hair of another woman tied to her hair. And especially when she said [to them]: “Give it to my daughter or to so-and-so (i.e., another woman), for since she said, “Give it,” she revealed her intention that it is not appropriate for her that it would be like her body to prohibit it, and when it is taken from a living person it is similar. But for another matter, it is prohibited, for the strangeness of the dead is prohibited to derive benefit from it.

If a woman has been put to death one may use her hair. It is forbidden to derive any benefit from a dead body. However, if a person has been executed, it is permitted to derive benefit from the hair because the rabbis don’t consider hair to be alive, such that it has the status of a dead body.

בהמה שנהרגה אסורה בהנאה – even its hair.

If an animal has been put to death it is forbidden to make any use of it. When it comes to an animal executed for committing a crime (murder or sex with a human being) the law works differently. Once an animal has been sentenced to die it is immediately forbidden to derive benefit from any part of its body, even from its hair. When it dies, it continues to be forbidden to derive benefit from the entire body, and this prohibition continues to apply to its hair. In other words, when it comes to human beings, death makes the body prohibited, and therefore the prohibition does not apply to hair, which is not prohibited. When it comes to animals, sentencing makes the body prohibited and therefore it applies to the entire body, including the hair.