Commentary for Shevuot 3:12

שבועות שתים. שאוכל ושלא אוכל – these are the two which are explained, as it is written (Leviticus 5:4): “[Or when a man utters an oath] to bad or good purpose –[whatever a man may utter in an oath] that implies in the future, I will not eat for a bad purpose. I will eat for a good purpose.

Introduction Our mishnah begins to discuss oaths, the main topic of the tractate. The oaths discussed in the beginning of this chapter are oaths of utterance, whereby one swears that he has or has not done something, or that he will or will not do something. One who breaks such an oath is liable for a sliding scale sacrifice, described in chapters one and two and in Leviticus 5:6-13.

שאכלתי ושלא אכלתי – these are additional two from the exposition of the Sages.

Oaths are two, subdivided into four. “I swear I shall eat”, and “[I swear] I shall not eat”; “[I swear] I have eaten”, and “[I swear] I have not eaten”. The first line of this mishnah is a quote of the first mishnah of the tractate. After two chapters of digression, we return to the main topic at hand, oaths. Our mishnah lists all four types of oaths of utterance, two with regards to the past and two with regards to the future, two negative and two positive. Eating is just an example of a common oath. An oath can involve most types of actions.

מדבר ומביא קרבן – because of the abrogation/nullification of his speech, and since it is because of the abrogation of his speech, even this is an abrogation of his speech for when he says: “I will not eat”, his intention is to prohibit himself from any amount.

“I swear I shall not eat”, and he ate [even] a minute quantity, he is liable, the words of Rabbi Akiva. They [the Sages] said to Rabbi Akiva: “Where do we find that he who eats a minute quantity is liable, that this one should be liable?” Rabbi Akiba said to them: “But where do we find that he who [merely] speaks brings a sacrifice, that this one should bring a sacrifice?” According to Rabbi Akiva, one who swore not to eat and then ate is liable to bring a sacrifice even if he ate the most minute amount of food. The Sages raise a difficulty on this Rabbi Akiva’s position. Generally, a person is not obligated for having eaten a forbidden food unless he ate a minimum measure of the food, usually the size of an olive. Rabbi Akiva responds that we cannot compare the laws of oaths of utterance to any other laws, for an oath of utterance can obligate a person to bring a sacrifice of atonement just by his having said something. In all other realms of law in order to be liable to bring a sacrifice of atonement one has to actually perform a sin. Only with regards to oaths of utterance can a person merely retract on his words, and thereby be obligated for a sacrifice. Since the laws of oaths of utterance are already different, there is no room, according to Rabbi Akiva, to compare them to other laws.

שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל ושתה – evn though that drinking is included with eating, he is not liable other than for one [sacrifice], for it is to him like eating and he goes back and eats in one act of forgetfulness [as the cause of the transgression].

[If a man says,] “I swear I shall not eat” and he ate and drank, he is liable only once. “I swear I shall not eat and I shall not drink,” and he ate and drank, he is liable twice. This section deals with the question is drinking subsumed under the category of drinking. According to the mishnah, generally drinking is considered a form of eating and therefore, if after having sworn not to eat, he eats and drinks, he is liable for only one sacrifice. Drinking is considered a separate violation from eating only if he specifically swore not to eat or drink. In this case if he ate and drank he would be obligated to bring two sacrifices.

שלא אוכל ושלא אשתה – these are two oaths to them. And even though when he stated “I will not eat,” he also forbids himself to drink, for drinking is included with eating, and he then retraced and stated: “and furthermore, I will not drink,” he should have said that an oath does not take effect on another oath, it is different here since he said at the outset [in the first part of the Mishnah], “I will not eat.” And then afterwards stated, “I will not drink,” he has revealed his intention that the “eating” that he stated at the outset [at the beginning of the Mishnah] was only for eating [and not anything else].

Questions for Further Thought:
• What might be other reasons behind Rabbi Akiva’s opinion?
• What would be the ruling if someone swore not to eat and then drank but did not eat? Would he be liable to bring a sacrifice for having violated his oath?

חייב על כל אחת ואחת – for since he stated, “bread” and “bread of each and every species,” one learns from it to allot/assign, for if it is to prohibit upon him these species and no others, he would have had to state, bread [made from] wheat, and similarly that of barley and that of spelt.

“I swear I shall not eat,” and he ate wheat bread, barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable only once.
“I swear I shall not eat wheat bread, barley bread, and spelt bread,” and he ate [all three], he is liable for each one.
Mishnah two discusses a person who swears not to eat different types of bread. The question again is, how many different oaths did he make.
Similar to the end of the first mishnah, we learn here that if a person made one oath not to eat and did not specify what foods were covered, he will be obligated to bring only one sacrifice if he were to break the oath. If, however, he specifically swore not to eat three different types of bread and he ate all three, he is obligated to bring three sacrifices. In this case he has actually sworn three oaths and subsequently broken three oaths, thereby making him obligated for three sacrifices.

שבועה שלא אשתה יין ושמן ודבש – In the Gemara (Tractate Shevuot 23b) it establishes it as, for example, when his fellow urges him and says to him: “Come and drink with me wine, oil and honey. He should have said to him an oath that he I would not drink with you and nothing further. For when he took an oath, why did he urge him that I will take an oath regarding wine, oil and honey.” We learn from it that he comes to allot/assign (i.e., to divide).

“I swear I shall not drink,” and he drank many liquids, he is liable only once.
“I swear I shall not drink wine, oil, and honey,” and he drank [all three], he is liable for each one.
Mishnah three discusses a person who swears not to drink. The question again is, how many different oaths did he make.
This mishnah teaches the same law as the previous mishnah, except it discusses drinking. Again we learn that if he specifies what he will not drink, he has sworn (and then broken) three separate oaths and he will be obligated for three separate sacrifices. If he makes one general oath, he will be obligated to bring only one separate sacrifice.

ואכל נבלות חייב – that they are appropriate for eating, for if not, for the All-Merciful forbad them.

Introduction Mishnah four continues to discuss how many oaths one is liable for when he takes an oath not to eat. This mishnah talks about one who violates the oath by eating things that are either not fit to be eaten or forbidden.

ר"ש פור – that was subjected to an oath and he stands over them, and the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the first Tanna/teacher [concerns] including things that are permitted with things that are forbidden, as for example when one states an oath “that I will not eat slaughtered and meat of animals torn, the First Teacher holds that since the oath takes effect with that which is slaughtered, it also takes effect on that of torn animals, for the prohibition can take legal hold where another prohibition already exists regarding a more comprehensive prohibition (i.e., having a wider range of prohibited objects), but Rabbi Shimon holds that one prohibition can take no legal hold where another prohibition already exists (i.e., you can punish, or impose sacrificial expiation only for the first one) But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Shimon.

“I swear I shall not eat,” and he ate foods which are not fit to be eaten, and drank liquids which are not fit to be drunk, he is exempt. Again this mishnah discusses a person who swears not to eat. In this case after having sworn not to eat he eats food which are not fit to be eaten, for example rotten fruit, or drinks liquids not fit to drink. The mishnah teaches that in such a case he is exempt from having to bring a sacrifice. The assumption is that when a person swears not to eat his intention is not to eat food that is fit for consumption. Therefore, by eating food not fit for consumption he has not in actuality broken his oath.

אשתו אסורה – for he ate food, and even according to Rabbi Shimon. For the reason that he is exempt in the first [oath] is not because they are not things eaten, but rather, that the oath doesn’t take effect on something that is forbidden.

“I swear I shall not eat,” and he ate carrion, trefot, and reptiles and creepy things, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts him. In this case the person who swore not to eat, ate foods which are forbidden to a Jew. Carrion are animals that died either a natural death or died as a result of an improperly carried out act of ritual slaughter. Trefot are animals that were either torn by beasts of prey or afflicted with severe diseases or defects that would have caused them to die within 12 months. They are both forbidden to eat, as are reptiles and creepy things. If one swears not to eat them and does eat them, according to the first opinion he is liable to bring a sacrifice. Even though he is forbidden to eat them, they are still considered edible food, which other people eat, and therefore he has broken his oath. Rabbi Shimon disagrees. According to his opinion, at Mount Sinai the Jewish people took an oath not to break the commandments. This oath was binding for all future generations as well. Therefore, one cannot add another oath to that which he has already sworn not to do. One who does so has not done anything legally significant, and is therefore not obligated to bring a sacrifice.

He said, “I vow that my wife shall not benefit from me, if I have eaten today,” and he had eaten carrion, trefot, forbidden animals, or reptiles, his wife is prohibited to him. This section discusses vows (nedarim) which are halachically different from oaths (shevuoth). If a man took a vow that if he had already eaten today his wife would be forbidden to benefit from him or his property, and he had in fact eaten a forbidden thing, she is forbidden to benefit from him. This law is agreed upon by all of the Sages, even Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Shimon in essence does consider eating forbidden food to be considered eating. The reason that he exempted the one who swore not to eat and then ate forbidden food was that there was a prior existing oath upon him not to eat. In the case in our section, this logic is not applicable.

Questions for Further Thought:
• Section three: How do you know that Rabbi Shimon would agree to the ruling stated in section three?

ואחד דברם של אחרים – as he explains that I will give [something] to so-and-so.

Introduction Our mishnah teaches that a person can swear with regards to things that concern himself or others. He also may swear about things whether or not they have substance. The second half of the mishnah contains an important debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael with regards to the validity of oaths taken about the past.

שאין בהן ממש – it implies two ways, as, for example, he changed and implies that he changed it and it implies that there is no benefit in them, as for example, “that I will throw a stone into the sea.”

It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”, or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.] An oath of utterance is valid, according to the mishnah, whether or not it was taken with respect to himself or with respect to his involvement with others. It is also valid even if the oath is made on a non-substantive thing. The mishnah now gives example of all of these categories.

מרבוי הכתוב (from an extension supplied by Scripture) – (Leviticus 5:4): “whatever a man may utter in an oath [- and, though he has known it, the fact has escaped him].” But there is a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael, for Rabbi Akiva expounds throughout the Torah extensions [of the scope of Biblical texts] and limitations of Biblical texts, but Rabbi Yishmael expounds general rules/principles and specifications; Rabbi Akiva expounds (Leviticus 5:4): “Or when a person utters an oath” is an extension, “to a bad or good purpose” is a limitation. What is an extension. What is an extension of scope? An extension are all words of what he did in the past like what will take place in the future; and what is a limitation? He limits the matter of a commandment. But Rabbi Yishmael expounds (Leviticus 5:4): “Or when a man utters an oath,” is a generalization; “to a bad or good purpose” (Leviticus 5:4) is a specification; “whatever a man may utter by an oath” (Leviticus 5:4), he once again states a generalization: “a generalization and a specification and [followed by] a generalization, one is guided by what the specification implies; just as the specification is interpreted for what happens in the future, so also everything regarding what will happen in the future. But the Halakha is according to Rabbi Akiva.

It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”, or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.] One who takes an oath with regards to giving things to others has taken a valid oath, whether it was to give, not to give, that he had given or that he had not given. This is an example of an oath with regards to others. If he breaks any of these oaths, or any of them turn out to be false, he will be obligated to bring a sliding scale sacrifice.

It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”, or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.] Oaths regarding sleeping are also valid even though sleep is not a substantive thing.

It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”, or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.] Throwing a pebble into the sea is a useless action that has no value to a human being. For this reason the mishnah considers it a type of action that has no substance. Nevertheless, if one takes an oath regarding throwing a pebble into the sea, the oath is valid.

Rabbi Ishmael says: “He is liable only for [an oath with regards to] the future, for it says, “To do bad or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). Rabbi Akiva said to him: “If so, we would know only such cases where doing evil and doing good are applicable; but how do we know such cases where doing evil and doing good are not applicable? He said to him: “From the amplification of the verse.” He said to him: “If the verse amplifies for that, it amplifies for this also.” Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree with regards to the validity of oaths taken about the past, such as “I swear that I did eat” or “I swear that I did not eat”. Up until now, we have assumed that such oaths were valid (see mishnah one, and the first half of this mishnah). Rabbi Yishmael disagrees. According to Rabbi Yishmael oaths taken with regards to the future, i.e. “I swear that I will eat”, or “I swear that I will not eat” are valid. Oaths taken with regards to the past are not valid. Rabbi Yishmael learns this from Leviticus 5:4, which states “to do bad or to do good”. The simple meaning of this verse is that the person is swearing to do or not do something in the future. Rabbi Akiva responds to Rabbi Yishmael by pointing out that we cannot take the verse literally. If we were to do so, we would rule that oaths are only valid if they are about doing something good or something evil. However, we know that oaths can involve neutral activities as well, such as eating or drinking, which are neither “good” nor “evil”. Rabbi Yishmael responds that the second half of the aforementioned verse in Leviticus which states, “whatever a man may utter in an oath” expands the category of oaths, thereby making neutral oaths also valid. Rabbi Akiva argues that if the second half of the verse expands the validity of oaths to include neutral oaths, it also expands the category of oaths to include oaths with regards to past actions. To summarize: for Rabbi Yishmael the first half of the verse refers to oaths for the future involving “good or bad” while the second half of the verse expands the category of oaths to include all oaths about the future. To Rabbi Akiva, the second half of the verse expands the category of oaths to include even oaths about the past.

Questions for Further Thought:
• Section two: Whose opinion seems to be closer to the literal reading of the verse in Leviticus, Rabbi Yishmael’s or Rabbi Akiva’s?

נשבע לבטל את המצוה – because of the oath on a statement [to reinforce a promise or an obligation or to confirm the veracity of a story], but he is flogged because of an oath taken in vain.

Introduction Mishnah six discusses swearing to either break or fulfill a commandment.

שהיה בדין שיהיה חייב. כדברי ר' יהודה בן בתירא – meaning to say, that whereas according to the words of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, he is liable because of an oath on a statement for Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira would say: “Now if concerning matters of free choice, etc.”

The subject of this mishnah is swearing with regards to positive and negative commandments, a subject that the Mishnah dealt with briefly in mishnah four.

שלא עשה בה לאו כהן – and in the Biblical verse it is written (Leviticus 5:4): “[Or when a person utters with his lips an oath] to bad or good purpose,” which implies a matter which has a positive (i.e., yes) and a negative (i.e., no), but the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira.

If he swore to annul a commandment, and did not annul it, he is exempt. [If he swore] to fulfill [a commandment], and did not fulfill it, he is exempt. For it would have been logical [in the second instance] that he should have been liable, as is the opinion of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra. If a person swears not to fulfill a positive commandment, for instance he swears not to eat matzah on Passover, and he does eat it, he is not obligated for having broken his oath. The positive commandment of matzah takes precedence over his oath. Similarly, if a person swears to break a negative commandment, such as eating forbidden foods, and he then does observe the commandment by not eating the food, he is also exempt. These cases are agreed upon by all of the Sages. The dispute in our mishnah is about a person who swears to observe a commandment and then does not. For instance he swears to eat matzah on the first night of Passover and then he does not. According to the Sages in section one, he is not obligated for having broken his oath. Since he was already obligated to eat matzah on Passover, his oath did not add upon him any new obligation. It is as if it had no effect and therefore if he breaks the oath by not eating matzah he will not be liable for having broken the oath. Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra disagrees with this ruling, as we will learn in section two.

[For] Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said, “Now, if for [swearing with regards to] an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable [should he not fulfill his oath], for [swearing with regards to] a commandment, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable [should he not fulfill his oath]! They said to him: “No! If you say that for an oath with regards to an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has in that case made negative equal to positive [for liability]; But how can you say that for an oath [to fulfill] a commandment [he is liable], since [Scripture] has not in that case made negative equal to positive, for if he swore to annul [a commandment], and did not annul it, he is exempt! Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra analogizes swearing on a commandment to swearing on an optional, non-commandment activity. His argument is that just as a person is liable if he makes an oath about an optional activity and then breaks the oath, even though he had no prior obligation to perform this activity, all the more so he should be obligated if he makes and then breaks an oath with regards to a commandment, which he had a prior obligation to observe. This type of argument is called a “kal vechomer” argument. It takes a “light” law (the kal) and says that if the law is such in this case all the more so must it be in the “serious” law (the chomer). Swearing on an optional activity is “light” and swearing on a commandment is “heavy”. If one is obligated for the “light” all the more so is he obligated for the “heavy”. The Sages respond that the two cases are too dissimilar to be comparable. In the case of swearing about optional activities, the oath is valid whether he swore in the positive (“I swear to eat”) or in the negative (“I swear not to eat”). However, in the case of swearing about a commandment there is a difference between positive and negative swearing. As we learned in section one, all of the Sages agree that if one swears not to perform a commandment he is exempt. Since the two cases are already dissimilar, the Sages conclude that even if he swears positively with regards to a commandment he is exempt.

שבועה שלא אוכל ככר זו. שבועה שלא אוכלנה – the reason that he said that “I will not eat” and then he repeats saying that I won’t eat it, he is not liable other than one [count], for the oath does not take effect on [another] oath, but if he stated first that he would not eat it and then repeats that he will not eat it and then repeats saying that he will not eat and he eats all of it, he is liable for two [counts], for if he stated that he will not eat it, he is not liable until he eats all of it, and if he repeats and states that he will not eat, since he ate from an olive’s [bulk], he is liable, therefore, the final oath takes effect and makes him liable when he eats from it an olive’s [bulk]. And when he repeats and eats all of it, he is liable because of the concluding oath.

Introduction Mishnah seven concludes the mishnah’s discussion of “oaths of utterance.”

שבועה שלא אוכלנה שבועה שלא אוכלנה – even though that from the second oath “that I will not eat it,” we learn that an oath does not take effect on [another] oat, The Mishnah teaches us a third oath to inform us that is an obligation for there isn’t in the last oaths but these oaths and they did not go to idleness but if they found a place, they would take place and if he did consulted with a Sage [for absolution] on the first [oath]. The second [oath] is neutralized in its place and he is forbidden in the manner because of the second oath, and similarly, if he consulted [with a Sage] on he two [oaths], the third takes effect, because the Sage uproots the vow from its essence and it is like he had not taken an oath and the second one takes effect retroactively for the first [oath] is like he it didn’t exist and similarly, when he consults [with a Sage] about the two [oaths], it is like they didn’t exist and the third [oath] takes effect retroactively.

“I swear I shall not eat this loaf”; “I swear I shall not eat it”; “I swear I shall not eat it”; and he ate it, he is liable only once. If one repeats the same oath several times and then breaks the oath(s) he is only liable for having broken one oath. Since after he made the first oath the loaf was already forbidden to him, he cannot make the same loaf any more forbidden to him. The repeated oaths do not create any new forbidden things, and therefore they do not count.

This is the oath of utterance, for which one is liable, for its willful transgression, flogging; and for its unwitting transgression, a sliding scale sacrifice. For a vain oath one is liable for willful transgression, flogging, and for unwitting transgression one is exempt. This is the concluding section of mishnah which began at the beginning of the chapter and which has discussed “oaths of utterance.” For intentionally breaking an oath of utterance one is flogged and for unintentionally breaking an oath of utterance one must bring a sacrifice. The mishnah now mentions “vain oaths” a topic which will be discussed throughout the remainder of the chapter. For intentionally swearing a vain oath one is flogged. There is no punishment for unintentionally swearing a vain oath.

אם לא ראיתי גמל פורח באויר – meaning to say, they will forbid all produce/fruit that is in the world if I didn’t see, etc. [i.e., a camel flying in the air].

נחש כקורת בית הבד – like the shape of the beam of an olive press and its form. As if like the thickness of the beam of olive press, this would not be an oath taken in vain/false oath, asserting something impossible, where there a lot [of them].

At the end of the previous mishnah we were introduced to the concept of a vain oath, which is forbidden in Exodus 20:7, one of the verses of the Ten Commandments. The punishment for intentionally swearing in vain is lashes and for unintentional swearing in vain there is no punishment. Our mishnah lists four different types of vain oaths.

שבועה שלא נדיעך – it is the abrogation/nullification of a commandment, for he is obligated to testify as it states (Leviticus 5;1): “he does not give information – so that he is subject to punishment.”

What is a vain oath?
If he swore that which is contrary to the facts known to people, saying of a pillar of stone that it is of gold; or of a man that he is a woman; or of a woman that she is a man. If one swears about something that is obviously false, for instance if he looks at a pillar of stone and swears that it is gold, then he has taken God’s name in vain by swearing in vain.

If he swore concerning a thing which is impossible, [for instance if he said,] “If I have not seen a camel flying in the air”, or “If I have not seen a serpent as thick as the beam of the olive press”. Similarly, if he swears by something that cannot happen, for instance he swears that he saw a camel fly in the air, he has also sworn in vain.

If he said to witnesses, “Come and bear testimony for me”, [and they replied,] “We swear that we will not bear testimony for you”. According to Leviticus 5:1, if a person has been witness to an event he is obligated to testify. If a person asks another person to testify and he has testimony to give, and he swears that the he will not testify, then he has sworn in vain. This example actually can fit into the example in the next section, one who swears not to observe one of the commandments. Since testifying is a positive commandment one who swears not to do so has sworn in vain.

If he swore to annul a commandment, [for example] not to make a sukkah, or not to take a lulav, or not to put on tefillin. These are vain oaths, for which one is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression one is exempt. One who swears not to observe one of the commandments has sworn in vain.

Questions for Further Thought:
• Why does the mishnah consider all of these oaths to be in vain?
• What is the difference between a false oath and a vain oath?

אכלה עבר על שבועת שוא – this is what he said: if he ate it , he has violated a oath taken in vain alone. If he didn’t eat it, he violated even an oath on a statement/rash oath (i.e., an oath taken by a person to reinforce a promise or an obligation or to confirm the veracity of a story – and is liable to bring a sing-offering). For once he swore that he would eat this loaf, he is obligated to eat it, and when he then took another oath [afterwards] that he would not eat it, he swore to abrogate/nullify the Mitzvah, and is flogged eause of the oath taken in vain, whether he would eat it or whether he would eat it, and if he did not eat it, he would be liable for two [violations], because of an oath taken in vain and because of oath on a statement/rash oath.

Introduction Mishnah nine discusses one who takes two oaths, the second oath being the exact opposite of the first oath.

[If one said:] “I swear I shall eat this loaf”; [and then he said,] “I swear I shall not eat it,” the first is an oath of utterance, and the second is a vain oath. If he ate it, he transgressed the vain oath; if he did not eat it, he transgressed the oath of utterance. In the case in our mishnah a person swears two oaths, the second oath contradicting the first. The first oath is considered to be a normal oath of utterance, which he must observe or be liable for breaking his oath. The second oath is considered a vain oath, since it is forbidden to observe the oath. In other words, similar to one who swears not to observe a commandment, this person has sworn to do that which is forbidden for him to do. If he eats the loaf, as he swore to do in the first oath, he is liable for having broken the second oath. If he does not eat it, he is liable for having broken his oath of utterance. In the Talmud it is explained that if he does not eat the loaf he has transgressed not only his oath of utterance but he has also made a vain oath, despite the fact that he kept the oath. Since at the time that he made the oath it was forbidden to keep, he is liable for having made a vain oath even if he does keep it.

באנשים ובנשים – since it was necessary to teach [in the Mishnah] that the oath of testimony (i.e., that witnesses have information supporting his case and the plaintiff requests that they testify on his behalf, and they refuse, and deny that they have this information, they have to take an oath to this effect) applies to men and not to women, etc. (see Tractate Shevuot, Chapter 4, Mishnayot 1-4), it teaches that the oath of a statement/rash oath that applies to all of these (i.e., both men and women, etc.).

Introduction The mishnah that we will learn today contains a list of when the oath of utterance is applicable. A similar list will appear in tomorrow’s mishnah with regard to vain oaths. The similarities between these two types of oaths will be contrasted with the rules of the testimonial oath, to be learned in the first mishnah of chapter four. Some of the points in these mishnayoth may seem obvious. They are included here only to be contrasted with what we learn in chapter four mishnah one.

ברחוקים ובקרובים – as, for example, I will give to so-and-so, whether he is not related or is related.

The oath of utterance applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those not qualified, [whether uttered] before the court, or not before the court, [but it must be uttered] with a man’s own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression, a sliding scale sacrifice. An oath of utterance equally applies to men and women. Similarly it does not matter if the person swears concerning a relative or non-relative, one who is fit to testify or not fit to testify. It can be uttered before or not before a court. Again, these laws may seem obvious, but we will see in chapter four that they are different with regards to testimonial oaths. The oath of utterance must be uttered by the one swearing. We will learn at the end of mishnah eleven that he may also swear by being adjured by someone else and answering amen. The end of the mishnah reiterates the punishments for breaking an oath of utterance. The punishments for oaths of utterance and vain oaths were already taught in mishnah seven.

בכשרים ובקרובים – with someone who is fit to give testimony and t one who is unfit/ineligible.

מפי עצמו – that he himself uttered an oath from his own mouth, but if others made him swear that he ate but he didn’t eat, and he said, “I will not eat” but he ate or the reverse, he is exempt if he did not respond “Amen.” But if he responded “Amen,” after his fellow made him take an oath, it is as if he swore out of his own mouth.

שבועת שוא, ברחוקים ובקרובים – he swears concerning a man that he is a woman, whether he is not related or whether he is related.

Introduction This mishnah is similar to the previous mishnah except that it discusses the vain oath. The end of the mishnah discusses a similarity between the two oaths: in both cases one person can adjure another person.

אחת זו ואחת זו – the oath taken in vain/false oath and the oath of testimony are one and the same, if others forced him to take an oath he is liable if he responded, “Amen.”

A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those not qualified, [whether uttered] before the court, or not before the court, [but it must be uttered] with a man's own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, stripes, and for unintentional transgression he is exempt. This section is the same as the previous mishnah. It is here only to contrast it with the rules of the testimonial oath taught in the next chapter.

[In the case of] both this and that [oath], if he was adjured by the mouth of others, he is liable. How so? If he said, “I have not eaten today,” or, “I have not put on tefillin today” [and the another person said,] “I adjure thee,” and he said, “Amen!”, he is liable [if his oath was false]. A person need not utter the entire oath on his own in order for it to be valid. If he makes a statement without using the language of an oath, and then another person adjures him with regards to the truth of his words, and he answers “amen”, he has sworn an oath. In this case his answer “amen” to another person using the language of an oath makes it as if he himself swore. If his oath is false he will be liable.