Shevuot 3

שְׁבוּעוֹת שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֹכַל וְשֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל, שֶׁאָכַלְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל וְאָכַל כָּל שֶׁהוּא, חַיָּב, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ בְּאוֹכֵל כָּל שֶׁהוּא שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב, שֶׁזֶּה חַיָּב. אָמַר לָהֶן רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, וְכִי הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ בִּמְדַבֵּר וּמֵבִיא קָרְבָּן, שֶׁזֶּה מְדַבֵּר וּמֵבִיא קָרְבָּן. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל וְאָכַל וְשָׁתָה, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא אַחַת. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה וְאָכַל וְשָׁתָה, חַיָּב שְׁתָּיִם:

Oaths are two, which are four: I swear that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat [These are the two which are explicitly written. Viz. (Leviticus 5:4): "to do ill or to do good," implying in the future: I shall not eat — "to do ill"; I shall eat — "to do good."]; (I swear) that I have eaten, or that I have not eaten [These are the additional two derived by the sages.] "I swear that I shall not eat," and he ate any amount, he is liable. These are the words of R. Akiva. They asked him: Where do we find that one who eats any amount is liable, that this one should be liable! He countered: And where do we find that one who speaks brings an offering [for breaking his word] that this one should speak and bring an offering! [And since it is because of breaking his word (that he is liable), this, too, is breaking his word. For when one says "I shall not eat," he means any amount.] "I swear that I shall not eat," and he ate and drank, he is liable only for one (offering). [Even though drinking is included in eating, he is liable only for one, for it is as if he eats, and eats again, in one act of forgetfulness.] "I swear that I shall not eat and that I shall not drink," and he ate and drank, he is liable for two. [This constitutes two oaths. And even though when he said "I shall not eat," drinking (too) was forbidden to him, drinking being included in eating, so that when he then said "I shall not drink," there is reason to say that one oath does not "take" on another (of the same kind), it is different here. For since he first said "I shall not eat," and then, "I shall not drink," it is made manifest that by "eat" he meant eating alone.]

שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל, וְאָכַל פַּת חִטִּין וּפַת שְׂעֹרִין וּפַת כֻּסְּמִין, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא אַחַת. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל פַּת חִטִּין וּפַת שְׂעֹרִין וּפַת כֻּסְּמִין, וְאָכַל, חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת:

"I swear that I shall not eat," and he ate a loaf of wheat, and a loaf of barley, and a loaf of spelt, he is liable only for one. "I swear that I shall not eat a loaf of wheat, and a loaf of barley, and a loaf of spelt," and he ate, he is liable for each one. [His repeating "loaf," "loaf," indicates that he intended a distinct oath for each. For if he intended no more than to forbid these kinds to himself and no more, he would have said "a loaf of wheat, and also of barley, and also of spelt."]

שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה וְשָׁתָה מַשְׁקִין הַרְבֵּה, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא אַחַת. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה יַיִן וָשֶׁמֶן וּדְבַשׁ וְשָׁתָה, חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת:

"I swear that I shall not drink," and he drank many (different kinds of) drinks, he is liable only for one. "I swear that I shall not drink wine, and oil, and honey," and he drank, he is liable for each one. [The Gemara construes this as an instance of one's urging him: "Come and drink with me wine, oil, and honey." (If he intended one oath,) he would have said "I swear I shall not drink with you," and no more, the oath applying to what was being urged upon him. Why "wine, oil, and honey," if not to render them distinct?]

שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל, וְאָכַל אֳכָלִים שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִין לַאֲכִילָה וְשָׁתָה מַשְׁקִין שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִין לִשְׁתִיָּה, פָּטוּר. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל, וְאָכַל נְבֵלוֹת וּטְרֵפוֹת שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים, חַיָּב. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר. אָמַר, קוֹנָם אִשְׁתִּי נֶהֱנֵית לִי אִם אָכַלְתִּי הַיּוֹם, וְהוּא אָכַל נְבֵלוֹת וּטְרֵפוֹת שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים, הֲרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ אֲסוּרָה:

"I swear that I shall not eat," and he ate things which are not fit for eating and drank things which are not fit for drinking, he is not liable. "I swear that I shall not eat," and he ate carrion and treifoth, forbidden animals and reptiles, he is liable. [For they are fit for eating; it is just that the Torah forbids them.] R. Shimon rules not liable. [For he is already besworn (by the Torah) against them. And the dispute between R. Shimon and the first tanna obtains where he includes permitted things with forbidden ones, as where he says "I swear that I shall not eat slaughtered meat and treifoth." The first tanna holds that since the oath "takes" with slaughtered meat, it also takes with treifoth, for one prohibition takes effect upon another in the instance of an inclusive prohibition. And R. Shimon holds that it does not. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon.] If one says: "I bevow my wife benefit from me if I have eaten today," and he had eaten carrion and treifoth, forbidden animals and reptiles, his wife is forbidden (to benefit from him). [For he had eaten foods. And even R. Shimon (agrees in this.) For the reason he rules not liable in the first instance is not that they are unfit for eating but because an oath does not take on something forbidden.]

אֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ, וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁל אֲחֵרִים, וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן מַמָּשׁ, וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶם מַמָּשׁ. כֵּיצַד. אָמַר, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֶתֵּן לְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶתֵּן, שֶׁנָּתַתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא נָתַתִּי, שֶׁאִישַׁן וְשֶׁלֹּא אִישַׁן, שֶׁיָּשַׁנְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא יָשַׁנְתִּי, שֶׁאֶזְרֹק צְרוֹר לַיָּם וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶזְרֹק, שֶׁזָּרַקְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא זָרַקְתִּי. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעָתִיד לָבֹא, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא ה) לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב. אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אִם כֵּן אֵין לִי אֶלָּא דְבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה, דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה מִנַּיִן. אָמַר לוֹ, מֵרִבּוּי הַכָּתוּב. אָמַר לוֹ, אִם רִבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ, רִבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ:

(He is liable) both for things that relate to himself and for things that relate to others, [as follows: "I shall give to that man, etc."], both for things of substance and for things lacking substance. [Two types are implied: Things like sleeping and things devoid of benefit, e.g. "I shall throw a stone into the sea."] How so? I swear that I shall give that man or that I shall not give. That I have given or that I have not given. That I shall sleep or that I shall not sleep. That I have slept or that I have not slept. That I shall throw a rock into the sea or that I shall not throw. That I have thrown or that I have not thrown. R. Yishmael says: He is liable only for the future, it being written (Leviticus 5:4): "to do ill or to do good." R. Akiva said to him: If so (he should be liable) only for things involving ill or good. Whence do I derive (that he is also liable for) things not involving ill or good? He answered: From the amplification of the verse, [(Ibid.): "…for all that a man will pronounce."] R. Akiva: If the verse was amplified for this (i.e., all things), it was also amplified for that (i.e., to include the past). [The (rationale) of the dispute between R. Akiva and R. Yishmael: In all the Torah, R. Akiva expounds amplification and limitation, and R. Yishmael, general and particular. R. Akiva expounds: "Or if a soul swear" — amplification; "to do ill or to do good" — limitation; "for all that a man will pronounce" — reversion to amplification. Amplification - limitation - amplification — Everything is included. What is included? All past things are included (for oath liability) just as future (things are indicated.) And what is excluded? Oaths involving mitzvoth. And R. Yishmael expounds: "Or if a soul swear" — general; "to do ill or to do good" — particular; "for all that a man will pronounce" — reversion to general. General - particular - general — What is derived must accord with the nature of the particular. Just as the particular is explicitly in future state, so all must be in future state. The halachah is in accordance with R. Akiva.]

נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא בִטֵּל, פָּטוּר. לְקַיֵּם וְלֹא קִיֵּם, פָּטוּר. שֶׁהָיָה בַדִּין, שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּב, כְּדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא, מָה אִם הָרְשׁוּת שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֻשְׁבָּע עָלֶיהָ מֵהַר סִינַי, הֲרֵי הוּא חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ, מִצְוָה שֶׁהוּא מֻשְׁבָּע עָלֶיהָ מֵהַר סִינַי, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בִשְׁבוּעַת הָרְשׁוּת, שֶׁכֵּן עָשָׂה בָהּ לָאו כְּהֵן, תֹּאמַר בִּשְׁבוּעַת מִצְוָה שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה בָהּ לָאו כְּהֵן, שֶׁאִם נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל וְלֹא בִטֵּל, פָּטוּר:

If one swore to refrain from (the performance of) a mitzvah, but did not do so, he is not liable. If he swore to fulfill it, but did not do so, he is not liable [by reason of an oath of pronouncement, but he is liable by reason of a vain oath.] For according to R. Yehudah b. Betheira he should be liable [by reason of an oath of pronouncement.] (For) R. Yehudah b. Betheira said: Now if with something optional, for which he is not besworn from Mount Sinai, he is liable for it — a mitzvah, for which he is besworn from Mount Sinai, does it not follow that he should be liable for it! They said to him: No, it is so with an oath for something optional, where not doing is equated with doing, [it being written "to do ill or to do good," implying something which may either be done or not done], as opposed to an oath for a mitzvah, where not doing is not equated with doing, so that if he swears to refrain from doing and does not do so, he should not be liable. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]

שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכֲלֶנָּה, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכֲלֶנָּה, וַאֲכָלָהּ, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא אַחַת. זוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי, שֶׁחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ קָרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד. שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא, חַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ פָּטוּר:

"I swear that I shall not eat this loaf. I swear that I shall not eat it. I swear that I shall not eat it," and he ate it, he is liable only for one. [The reason that he is liable only for one is that the (second) oath does not "take" on the first. But if he first said: "I shall not eat it," and then: "I shall not eat," and he ate the whole thing, he is liable for two. For when he says: "I shall not eat it," he is not liable until he eats the whole thing, and when he then says: "I shall not eat," once he eats an olive-size of it, he is liable. Therefore, the second oath takes, and he is liable when he eats an olive-size of it. And when he then eats the whole thing, he is liable by reason of the first oath. ("I swear that I shall not eat it. I swear that I shall not eat it":) Even though the second oath, "I shall not eat it," is enough to apprise us that one oath does not "take" on the other, the third is still taught to apprise us that even though there is no liability for the latter oaths, they are nonetheless oaths, and not vain words, and if they can "find a place," they take effect. For if a sage absolves him of the first, the second takes effect and it is forbidden to him by reason of the second oath. Likewise, if he is absolved of the first two, the third takes effect. For the sage uproots the vow completely, so that it is as if he had never vowed, and the second "takes" retroactively, the first being regarded as non-existent once he has been absolved of it.] This is an oath of pronouncement, where for willful transgression one is liable to stripes, and for unwitting transgression, to an oleh veyored offering. With a vain oath, for willful transgression one is liable to stripes, and for unwitting transgression, he is not liable.

אֵיזוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא, נִשְׁבַּע לְשַׁנּוֹת אֶת הַיָּדוּעַ לָאָדָם, אָמַר עַל הָעַמּוּד שֶׁל אֶבֶן שֶׁהוּא שֶׁל זָהָב, וְעַל הָאִישׁ שֶׁהוּא אִשָּׁה, וְעַל הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהִיא אִישׁ. נִשְׁבַּע עַל דָּבָר שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר, אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי גָמָל שֶׁפּוֹרֵחַ בָּאֲוִיר, וְאִם לֹא רָאִיתִי נָחָשׁ כְּקוֹרַת בֵּית הַבַּד. אָמַר לְעֵדִים בֹּאוּ וַהֲעִידוּנִי, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא נְעִידֶךָ. נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה, שֶׁלֹּא לַעֲשׂוֹת סֻכָּה, וְשֶׁלֹּא לִטֹּל לוּלָב, וְשֶׁלֹּא לְהָנִיחַ תְּפִלִּין, זוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא, שֶׁחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ פָּטוּר:

Which is a vain oath? Swearing to what is at variance with what is known to man: saying about a pillar of stone that it is gold; about a man, that he is a woman; about a woman, that she is a man. Swearing to the impossible: If I did not see a camel flying in the air. [i.e., Let all the fruits in the world be forbidden to me if I did not see a camel flying in the air] and if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. [i.e., in the shape of the beam of the olive press. For (if he said) as thick as the beam of the olive press, this would not be a vain oath, there being many such.] If he said to witnesses: "Come and testify for me," (and they said:) "We swear that we will not testify for you," (this is a vain oath). [This is negating a mitzvah, for they are obliged to testify, it being written(Leviticus 5:1): "If he does not tell (i.e., testify), then he shall bear his sin."] Swearing not to perform a mitzvah: not to make a succah, not to take a lulav, not to put on tefillin. This is a vain oath, where for willful transgression one is liable to stripes, and where for unwitting transgression, he is not liable.

שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֹכֲלֶנָּה, הָרִאשׁוֹנָה שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא. אֲכָלָהּ, עָבַר עַל שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא. לֹא אֲכָלָהּ, עָבַר עַל שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי:

"I swear that I shall eat this loaf. I swear that I shall not eat it," the first is an oath of pronouncement; the second, a vain oath. If he eats it, he is in transgression of a vain oath. If he does not eat it, he is in transgression of an oath of pronouncement. [This is the intent: If he eats it, he transgresses a vain oath alone. If he does not eat it, he transgresses an oath of pronouncement as well. For when he swears "I shall eat this loaf," he is obliged to eat it. So that when he then swears "I shall not eat it," he is swearing not to perform a mitzvah, and he receives stripes by reason of a vain oath whether he does or does not eat it. And if he does not eat it, he is liable twice: by reason of a vain oath and by reason of an oath of pronouncement.]

שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי נוֹהֶגֶת בַּאֲנָשִׁים וּבְנָשִׁים, בִּרְחוֹקִים וּבִקְרוֹבִים, בִּכְשֵׁרִים וּבִפְסוּלִין, בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין, מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ. וְחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ קָרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד:

An oath of pronouncement obtains with men and with women. [Since it is to be taught (4:1): "The oath of testimony obtains with men and not with women, etc.", it is taught that an oath of pronouncement does obtain with all of these.], with non-kin and with kin, [e.g., "I shall give that man," whether non-kin or kin], whether kasher [to testify] or not, both before beth-din and not before beth-din — by his own mouth. [He must utter the oath with his own mouth, but if others beswore him: "Did you eat or did you not eat?" and he said "I did not eat," when he did, or the opposite — he is not liable if he did not answer "Amen." And if he did answer "Amen" after another beswore him, it is as if he swore himself, and he is liable.] For willful transgression, one is liable to stripes; for unwitting transgression, to an oleh veyored offering.

שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא נוֹהֶגֶת בַּאֲנָשִׁים וּבְנָשִׁים, בִּרְחוֹקִים וּבִקְרוֹבִים, בִּכְשֵׁרִים וּבִפְסוּלִים, בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין, וּמִפִּי עַצְמוֹ. וְחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ פָּטוּר. אַחַת זוֹ, וְאַחַת זוֹ, הַמֻּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים, חַיָּב. כֵּיצַד. אָמַר, לֹא אָכַלְתִּי הַיּוֹם וְלֹא הֵנָחְתִּי תְפִלִּין הַיּוֹם, מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אָנִי, וְאָמַר אָמֵן, חַיָּב:

A vain oath obtains with men and with women, with non-kin and with kin [e.g., if he swore about a man, whether non-kin or kin, that he is a woman], whether kasher (to testify) or not, both before beth-din and not before beth-din — by his own mouth. For willful transgression, one is liable to stripes; for unwitting transgression, he is not liable. With both [a vain oath and an oath of pronouncement], if he is besworn by others, he is liable [if he answers "Amen."] How so? If he said: "I did not eat today," or "I did not put on tefillin today," (and another said:) "I beswear you," and he answered "Amen," he is liable.