Shevuot 4

שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת נוֹהֶגֶת בַּאֲנָשִׁים וְלֹא בְנָשִׁים, בִּרְחוֹקִין וְלֹא בִקְרוֹבִין, בִּכְשֵׁרִים וְלֹא בִפְסוּלִין. וְאֵינָהּ נוֹהֶגֶת אֶלָּא בָרְאוּיִין לְהָעִיד, בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין, מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ, וּמִפִּי אֲחֵרִים, אֵין חַיָּבִין עַד שֶׁיִּכְפְּרוּ בָהֶן בְּבֵית דִּין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, בֵּין מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ וּבֵין מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים, אֵינָן חַיָּבִין עַד שֶׁיִּכְפְּרוּ בָהֶן בְּבֵית דִּין:

The oath of testimony obtains with men, and not with women, [it being written (Leviticus 5:1): "and he is a witness." Scripture speaks of one who is fit to testify, and a woman is not fit to testify, it being written (Deuteronomy 19:17): "Then the two men shall stand" — men and not women. And that verse speaks of witnesses, it being written there: "two," and elsewhere (Ibid. 14): "By word of two witnesses."], with non-kin, and not with kin, [kin being unfit to testify, it being written (Ibid. 24:16): "Fathers shall not be put to death by sons" — by the testimony of sons. And the same applies to the other kin.], with those who are kasher, and not with those who are pasul ("rejected"), [such as those liable to the death penalty, those liable to stripes, and robbers, these being called "evildoers," and the Torah writing (Exodus 23:1): "Do not make an evildoer a witness."] And it obtains only with those who are fit to testify, [to exclude a king, who does not testify, and those who are unfit to testify by rabbinic ordinance, such as gamblers and pigeon racers.], before beth-din and not before beth-din by his own mouth [i.e., If he himself says "I swear that I know of no testimony for you," he is liable, whether he swore before beth-din or not before them.] And (if besworn) by others, they are not liable unless they deny (possessing testimony) in beth-din. [e.g., If one says to them: "I beswear you to come and testify for me," and they say: "We know of no testimony for you," they are not liable unless they deny it in beth-din, it being written (Leviticus 5:1): "If he does not know, he shall bear his sin" — in a place (beth-din), where if he told, it would avail. And the verse speaks of one who is besworn by others.] These are the words of R. Meir. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Meir.] The sages say: whether swearing by himself or besworn by others, they are not liable unless they deny it in beth-din.

וְחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹן הַשְּׁבוּעָה, וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ עִם זְדוֹן הָעֵדוּת, וְאֵינָן חַיָּבִין עַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ. וּמַה הֵן חַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹן הַשְּׁבוּעָה, קָרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד:

And they are liable [for an oleh veyored offering] for willfulness in the oath, ["and it be hidden" not being written in this connection], and for unwittingness with willfulness in (withholding) testimony, [i.e., where they know that the oath is forbidden, but not that it makes them liable for an offering.] And they are not liable for unwittingness [if they were completely unwitting, assuming that they had no testimony for him, and then remembered. For in that instance they could not help it, and (Leviticus 5:22): "…and he swear falsely, etc." does not apply to them.] And for what are they liable for willfulness in the oath? For an oleh veyored offering.

שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת כֵּיצַד. אָמַר לִשְׁנַיִם בֹּאוּ וַהֲעִידוּנִי. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לְךָ עֵדוּת, אוֹ שֶׁאָמְרוּ לוֹ אֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לְךָ עֵדוּת, מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם וְאָמְרוּ אָמֵן, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ חַיָּבִין. הִשְׁבִּיעַ עֲלֵיהֶן חֲמִשָּׁה פְעָמִים חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין וּבָאוּ לְבֵית דִּין וְהוֹדוּ, פְּטוּרִים. כָּפְרוּ, חַיָּבִים עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת. הִשְׁבִּיעַ עֲלֵיהֶן חֲמִשָּׁה פְעָמִים בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין וְכָפְרוּ, אֵינָן חַיָּבִין אֶלָּא אַחַת. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מַה טַּעַם, הוֹאִיל וְאֵינָם יְכוֹלִין לַחֲזֹר וּלְהוֹדוֹת:

The oath of testimony. How so? If he said to two: "Come and testify for me" (and they responded:) "We swear that we know no testimony for you"; or if they responded: "We know no testimony for you," (and he said:) "I beswear you," and they said: "Amen," they are liable. If he beswore them five times outside of beth-din, and they came to beth-din and admitted (that they knew testimony), they are not liable, [even if they denied it for every oath outside of beth-din. For denial outside of beth-din is not deemed denial.] If they denied it (in beth-din), they are liable for each one, [it being written (Leviticus 5:5): "And it shall be, if he be guilty for one of these" — to make him liable for each one.] If he beswore them five times before beth-din, and they denied it, they are liable only for one. R. Shimon said: Why is it [that they are liable only for one even if they kept silent and denied it at the end? Why do we not say that the denial applies to all of the oaths, to render them liable for each one?] (The answer:) Since [if they denied it in beth-din the first time], they cannot go back and admit it. [i.e., Since they already said that they know no testimony for him, they cannot go back and testify (otherwise), therefore, even though they denied it only at the end, all of the oaths were superfluous, except the first. For if their silence at the first is regarded as denial, it is no longer fit to beswear them; and if it is not regarded as denial, they are already besworn, and the subsequent oaths are "oaths upon an oath." Perforce, then, "'for one,' to make him liable for each one" speaks of oaths outside of beth-din and denial in beth-din. For oaths by which he beswears them to come and testify in beth-din are not superfluous and lend themselves to division. For if they denied it there at the first, they could be besworn again.]

כָּפְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן כְּאַחַת, שְׁנֵיהֶן חַיָּבִין. בָּזֶה אַחַר זֶה, הָרִאשׁוֹן חַיָּב וְהַשֵּׁנִי פָטוּר. כָּפַר אֶחָד וְהוֹדָה אֶחָד, הַכּוֹפֵר חַיָּב. הָיוּ שְׁתֵּי כִתֵּי עֵדִים, כָּפְרָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ כָּפְרָה הַשְּׁנִיָּה, שְׁתֵּיהֶם חַיָּבוֹת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהָעֵדוּת יְכוֹלָה לְהִתְקַיֵּם בִּשְׁתֵּיהֶן:

If both denied it at the same time [i.e., in the same "speaking span"], both are liable. (If they denied it) one after the other, [i.e., after the "speaking span"], the first is liable, and the second, not. [For since the first denied it (i.e., that he could testify), the second can no longer testify, being only one.] If one of them denied and the other admitted, the denier is liable. If there were two sets of witnesses — If the first denied it and then the second denied it, they are both liable, because the testimony can obtain through both. [The Gemara asks: Why should the first set be liable if there is a second set? What loss did they cause him by their denial? And it answers that our Mishnah is speaking of an instance where the witnesses in the second set were kin through their wives, not being kasher to testify when the second set denied, and their wives were gosesoth (at the point of death). I might think that since the ruling is: "most gosesim die," it is as if they are already dead, and the first set should not be liable, for there is still a second set; we are, therefore, apprised (that this is not so) for now (at the time of the denial) they had not yet died. It is found, then, that only the first set was there at the time of the denial, for which reason they are liable.]

מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם אִם לֹא תָבֹאוּ וּתְעִידוּנִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְיַד פְּלוֹנִי פִּקָּדוֹן וּתְשׂוּמֶת יָד וְגָזֵל וַאֲבֵדָה. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לְךָ עֵדוּת, אֵין חַיָּבִין אֶלָּא אַחַת. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין שֶׁיֵּשׁ לְךָ בְיַד פְּלוֹנִי פִּקָּדוֹן וּתְשׂוּמֶת יָד וְגָזֵל וַאֲבֵדָה, חַיָּבִין עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת. מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם אִם לֹא תָבֹאוּ וּתְעִידוּנִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְיַד פְּלוֹנִי פִּקְדוֹן חִטִּין וּשְׂעֹרִין וְכֻסְּמִין. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לְךָ עֵדוּת, אֵין חַיָּבִין אֶלָּא אַחַת. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לְךָ עֵדוּת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לְךָ בְיַד פְּלוֹנִי חִטִּין וּשְׂעֹרִין וְכֻסְּמִין, חַיָּבִין עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת:

"I beswear you if you do not come and testify for me that that man owes me a pledge, and tsometh yad (lit., "a placing in the hand") [i.e., a loan, money "placed in another's hand"], and (restoration of) theft, and a lost object" [i.e., He found something that I lost] — (If they say:) "We swear that we do not know any testimony for you," they are liable only for one. (If they say:) "We swear that we do not know that that man owes you a pledge, and a tsometh yad, and theft, and a lost object," they are liable for each one. "I beswear you if you do not come and testify for me that that man owes me a pledge of wheat, barley, and spelt." "We swear that we do not know any testimony for you," they are liable only for one. "We swear that we do not know testimony for you that that man owes you wheat, and barley, and spelt, they are liable for each one. [The former apprises us of one kind (i.e., money) and distinct claims; the latter, of one claim — a pledge — and distinct kinds.]

מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם אִם לֹא תָבֹאוּ וּתְעִידוּנִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְיַד פְּלוֹנִי נֶזֶק וַחֲצִי נֶזֶק, תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל, תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה, וְשֶׁאָנַס אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אֶת בִּתִּי, וּפִתָּה אֶת בִּתִּי, וְשֶׁהִכַּנִי בְנִי, וְשֶׁחָבַל בִּי חֲבֵרִי, וְשֶׁהִדְלִיק אֶת גְּדִישִׁי בְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ חַיָּבִין:

"I beswear you if you do not come and testify for me that that man owes me damages (or) half-damages" [half-damages of tzroroth (stones flung from under the feet of walking animals), considered mamon (money, principal,) and not knass.]; "four and five" payment, [(beswearing them) by reason of the principal]; that he ravished or seduced my daughter, [(beswearing them) by reason of boseth ("shame") and p'gam ("injury"), which is monetary payment]; that my son struck me [a blow which did not cause a wound, in which instance there is no death penalty, in the absence of which monetary liability obtains]; and that my neighbor wounded me or that he set fire to my sheaves on Yom Kippur [This is included because even though he incurs kareth, he is still liable to pay] — they are liable (for transgression of the oath of testimony.)

מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם אִם לֹא תָבֹאוּ וּתְעִידוּנִי שֶׁאֲנִי כֹהֵן, שֶׁאֲנִי לֵוִי, שֶׁאֵינִי בֶן גְּרוּשָׁה, שֶׁאֵינִי בֶן חֲלוּצָה, שֶׁאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי כֹהֵן, שֶׁאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי לֵוִי, שֶׁאֵינוֹ בֶן גְּרוּשָׁה, שֶׁאֵינוֹ בֶן חֲלוּצָה, שֶׁאָנַס אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אֶת בִּתּוֹ, וּפִתָּה אֶת בִּתּוֹ, וְשֶׁחָבַל בִּי בְנִי, וְשֶׁחָבַל בִּי חֲבֵרִי, וְשֶׁהִדְלִיק גְּדִישִׁי בְשַׁבָּת, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְטוּרִין:

"I beswear you if you do not come and testify for me that I am a Cohein, that I am a Levite, that I am not the son of a divorcée, that I am not the son of a chalutzah, that that man is a Cohein, that that man is a Levite, that he is not the son of a divorcée, that he is not the son of a chalutzah," [they are not liable. For the witnesses are not liable unless they deny (knowing testimony) concerning something involving a monetary claim.], "that that man ravished or seduced that man's daughter" ["his daughter" refers to "that man is a Cohein, etc." (above). Or it may refer to the daughter of the man spoken of until now. They are not liable because it is necessary that they (the witnesses) hear it from the claimant. The Gemara construes this as an instance of one's coming with power of attorney (harsha'ah). If it were a claim for other monies, they would be liable. We are here apprised that the one granted the harsha'ah is not regarded as the claimant himself here as he generally is. For since the monies being claimed were never in his (the claimant's) hand, he cannot write a harsha'ah upon them.], "that my son wounded me" [They are not liable, for if they testified, he would be liable to death and not to monetary payment], or "that my neighbor wounded me or set fire to my sheaves on Shabbath," they are not liable [For both are liable to death and not to monetary payment.]

מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם, אִם לֹא תָבֹאוּ וּתְעִידוּנִי שֶׁאָמַר אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי לִתֶּן לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז וְלֹא נָתַן לִי, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְטוּרִים, שֶׁאֵין חַיָּבִין אֶלָּא עַל תְּבִיעַת מָמוֹן כְּפִקָּדוֹן:

"I beswear you if you do not come and testify for me that that man said he would give me two hundred zuz, and he did not," they are not liable. For they are liable only for a claim of money like a pledge, [it being written in respect to the oath of testimony (Leviticus 5:1): "sin," and, in respect to the oath over a pledge, "sin." Just as the oath over a pledge is for a claim of money owed him, so the oath of testimony must be for a claim of money owed him. And the above is not such a claim. For even if the other did say that he would give him two hundred zuz, this does not make him liable to do so.]

מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם, כְּשֶׁתֵּדְעוּן לִי עֵדוּת שֶׁתָּבֹאוּ וּתְעִידוּנִי, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְטוּרִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקָּדְמָה שְׁבוּעָה לָעֵדוּת:

"I beswear you that when you know testimony for me you come and testify for me," they are not liable, for (in such an instance) the oath precedes the testimony, [whereas the Torah states (Leviticus 5:1): "…and he hear the voice of a curse (i.e., the oath) and he saw or knew, etc.", the witnessing preceding the oath, and not the oath preceding the witnessing.]

עָמַד בְּבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת וְאָמַר, מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם שֶׁאִם אַתֶּם יוֹדְעִים לִי עֵדוּת שֶׁתָּבֹאוּ וּתְעִידוּנִי, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְטוּרִין, עַד שֶׁיִּהְיֶה מִתְכַּוֵּן לָהֶם:

If he stood up in the house of prayer and said (to the congregation): "I beswear you that if you know testimony for me, you come and testify for me," they are not liable, until he designates them, [it being written (Leviticus 5:1): "…and he be a witness" — he must designate his witnesses.]

אָמַר לִשְׁנַיִם, מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי, שֶׁאִם אַתֶּם יוֹדְעִין לִי עֵדוּת שֶׁתָּבֹאוּ וּתְעִידוּנִי, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לְךָ עֵדוּת, וְהֵם יוֹדְעִין לוֹ עֵדוּת עֵד מִפִּי עֵד אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה אֶחָד מֵהֶן קָרוֹב אוֹ פָסוּל, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְטוּרִין:

If he said to two: "I beswear you and you, if you know testimony for me, that you come and testify for me." (They:) "We swear that we do not know testimony for you" — and they do know testimony for him, one witness by way of another — or if one of them were kin or pasul (unfit to testify) — they are not liable. [For if they did testify, their testimony would avail him naught.]

שִׁלַּח בְּיַד עַבְדּוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לָהֶן הַנִּתְבָּע מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם שֶׁאִם אַתֶּם יוֹדְעִין לוֹ עֵדוּת שֶׁתָּבֹאוּ וּתְעִידוּהוּ, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְטוּרִין עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁמְעוּ מִפִּי הַתּוֹבֵעַ:

If one sent his servant (to make his claim) or if the claimee said to them: "I beswear you that if you know testimony for him you come and testify for him," they are not liable, until they hear it from the mouth of the claimant, [it being written (Leviticus 5:1): "if he does not (lo) tell," (lamed, vav, aleph) to be expounded: If to him (lamed vav), i.e., to the claimant, he does not (lamed aleph) tell, then he shall bear his sin. But if he does not tell another, he is not liable.]

מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם, מְצַוֶּה אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם, אוֹסֶרְכֶם אָנִי, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ חַיָּבִין. בַּשָּׁמַיִם וּבָאָרֶץ, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְטוּרִין. בְּאל"ף דל"ת, בְּיו"ד ה"א, בְּשַׁדַּי, בִּצְבָאוֹת, בְּחַנּוּן וְרַחוּם, בְּאֶרֶךְ אַפַּיִם וְרַב חֶסֶד, וּבְכָל הַכִּנּוּיִין, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ חַיָּבִין. הַמְקַלֵּל בְּכֻלָּן, חַיָּב, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין. הַמְקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ בְּכֻלָּן, חַיָּב, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין. הַמְקַלֵּל עַצְמוֹ וַחֲבֵרוֹ בְּכֻלָּן, עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה. יַכְּכָה אֱלֹהִים, וְכֵן יַכְּכָה אֱלֹהִים, זוֹ הִיא אָלָה הַכְּתוּבָה בַתּוֹרָה. אַל יַכְּךָ, וִיבָרֶכְךָ, וְיֵיטִיב לְ ךָ, רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּב וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין:

"I beswear you," "I command you," "I ban you" — they are liable. [This, if he says: "I command you with an oath," "I ban you with an oath."] "By heaven and earth" — they are not liable. "By Aleph-daleth," "By Yod-keh," "By Shakkai," "By Tzevakoth," "By Chanun Verachum," "By Erech Apayim Verav Chesed," and by all the (other) epithets — they are liable. One who curses [the L rd] with any one them is liable (to stoning). These are the words of R. Meir. The sages exempt him, [holding him to be liable to stoning for cursing the Name (the tetragrammaton) alone, it being written (Leviticus 24:6): "If he blasphemes the Name, he shall be put to death." And for the epithets, he is in transgression of the exhortation (Exodus 22:27): "Elokim you shall not revile." And in respect to the oath of testimony, the sages concur with R. Meir that they are liable for the epithets as well as for the Name, it being written (Leviticus 5:4): "…and he hear the voice of a curse."] If one curses his father or mother with any one of them, he is liable. These are the words of R. Meir. The sages exempt him. If one curses himself or his neighbor with any one of them, he transgresses a negative commandment. [("himself"): (Deuteronomy 4:9): "Take heed to yourself, and heed your soul exceedingly." Wherever "Take heed," "Lest," or "Do not," is written, a negative commandment is indicated. ("his neighbor":) (Leviticus 19:14): "Do not curse a deaf man" — Do not curse even the deaf man, who does not hear and is not offended by the curse. How much more so, those who hear and are offended.] "May G d smite you," "And so may G d smite you" — this is the "curse" stated in the Torah (Leviticus 5:2). "May He not smite you," "May He bless you," "May He do good to you" — R. Meir rules liable, and the sages, not liable. [If he said to the witnesses: "May G d smite you if you do not testify for me," or if he heard one reading in the (section of) the curses in the Torah (Deuteronomy 28:22): "May G d smite you," and he said to the witnesses: "And so may G d smite you if you do not testify for me"; or "May G d not smite you if you testify for me," or "May the L rd bless you if you testify for me," (or) "May He do good to you if you testify for me" — In all of these instances, R. Meir rules liable, the negative implying the affirmative, e.g., "May G d not smite you if you testify for me," implying: "May He smite you if you do not testify for me"; likewise: "May G d bless you if you testify for me," implying: "May He curse you if you do not testify for me." In all of these the halachah is not in accordance with R. Meir.]