Commentary for Sanhedrin 3:1
דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. זֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד, וּשְׁנֵיהֶן בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, שְׁנֵי דַיָּנִין בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד. זֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּנוֹ שֶׁל זֶה וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּנוֹ שֶׁל זֶה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵימָתַי, בִּזְמַן שֶׁמֵּבִיא עֲלֵיהֶן רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִין אוֹ פְסוּלִין, אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְשֵׁרִים אוֹ מֻמְחִין, אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפָסְלָן. זֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵימָתַי, בִּזְמַן שֶׁהוּא מֵבִיא עֲלֵיהֶם רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִים אוֹ פְסוּלִים. אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְשֵׁרִים, אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפָסְלָן:
Monetary litigations (are presided over) by three (judges). One [of the litigants] selects for himself one [judge], and one selects for himself another, and the two [litigants together] select for themselves another, [a third judge. In this way, a true judgment is secured. For the litigants accept the verdict, saying: "They judged us fairly." For the one found liable says: "I myself selected one judge, and if he could have found something in my favor, he would have." And the third judge himself is inclined to find something in favor of both, both having selected him.] These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: The two judges select a third, [without the knowledge of the litigants, so that the third judge not be inclined to either one of them. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] Each (of the litigants) may disqualify the judge of the other. [He may say to him: "I do not wish the case to be tried by the beth-din that you chose."] These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: When is this so? When he brings proof against them [(the judges that the other selected)] that they are kin or (otherwise) unfit. But if they were kasher or expert, he cannot disqualify them. [This is the intent: But if they were kasher, i.e., neither kin nor (otherwise) unfit, even if they were "corner-sitters," they are regarded as experts, and he cannot disqualify them. The halachah: If the litigants accept someone to judge their case (whether one or many), and he rendered a decision, his ruling stands and they cannot controvert it, even if he is not "an expert for the many." And if it were found that he erred — If he erred in a ruling of the Mishnah or in something adduced in the Gemara, the case is returned and judged as per the halachah. And if it cannot be returned (as when the one who was awarded money erroneously, went abroad), the judge is exempt from payment; for even though he contributed to the (financial) loss, he did not do so intentionally. And if he erred in his judgment, in something where tannaim, amoraim, or geonim differ, the ruling being in accordance with one, and this judge ruling in accordance with that gaon whose ruling is not the accepted one — If he had not taken (money from one) and placed (it) into the hand (of the other), the case is returned. And if it cannot be returned, he pays from his pocket. And if had "taken and placed in hand," what is done is done, and he pays from his pocket. And a judge who had not been accepted by the litigants, but who arose (to judge) of himself, or one who had been appointed by the king or by some of the elders of the congregation — If he is not "an expert for the many," even if he was granted permission by the Exilarch, his ruling is no ruling, whether or not he erred, and he is not in the class of the judges, but in that of the "despots." And either of the litigants, if he wishes, may controvert his ruling and return the case to beth-din. And if he erred, and did not "take and place in hand," the case is returned. And if it cannot be returned, he pays from his pocket, as per the halachah for all who contribute to (monetary) loss. And if he "took and placed in hand," he pays from his pocket and he then takes (the money back) from the litigant he awarded it to contrary to the halachah. And "an expert to the many" who was accepted by the litigants or who was granted permission by the Exilarch — Even if he was accepted by the litigants; or if he were granted permission by the Exilarch, even if the litigants did not accept him — since he is an expert, if he erred, whether in a ruling of the Mishnah or in his judgment, and the case cannot be returned, he need not pay. And an expert who was granted permission by the Exilarch may compel the litigants to try their case before him, whether they wish to or not, both in Eretz Yisrael and outside it. And if one were granted permission by the Nassi in Eretz Yisrael, he can compel the litigants only in Eretz Yisrael. An "expert" is one who is versed in the written and the oral law and who can reason, draw comparisons, and understand one thing from another. And when he is recognized and acknowledged by the men of his generation, he is called "an expert to the many," and he may judge alone, even without having been granted permission by the Exilarch.] Each (of the litigants) may disqualify the witnesses of the other. These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: When (may he do so)? When he brings proof against them that they are kin or (otherwise) unfit. But if they were kasher, he cannot disqualify them. [The Gemara construes the difference between R. Meir and the sages as obtaining in an instance where a litigant says: "I have two pairs of witnesses in this case," and he brought the first pair, and the other litigant and one other (witness) arose and said: "They are unfit." R. Meir says that they may do so, not being considered "interested witnesses," the first litigant maintaining that he has another pair. And if he seeks (that pair) and cannot find them, it is his loss. And the rabbis hold that even though he says at first that he has two pairs of witnesses, he may retract and say: "I have only these," so that the ones who come to disqualify them are considered "interested witnesses" and their testimony is invalid. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]
Bartenura on Mishnah Sanhedrin
English Explanation of Mishnah Sanhedrin
This [litigant] chooses one and this [litigant] chooses one and then the two of them choose another, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “The two judges choose the other judge.”
This [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, and this [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid and experts, he cannot invalidate them.
This [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses and this [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid, he cannot invalidate them.
Chapter Three begins to discuss the court procedure in cases of financial matters, which only require three judges. The first mishnah discusses the selection of judges.
This mishnah contains three disputes between Rabbi Meir and the Sages with regards to the selection of judges and witnesses in cases concerning property disputes. All agree that the first two judges are selected by the litigants themselves, each litigant choosing one judge. However, Rabbi Meir and the Sages dispute with regards to the selection of the third judge. Rabbi Meir holds that the litigants together select a third judge and the Sages hold that the first two judges, those already selected by the litigants, are the ones to select the third judge.
With regards to the invalidation of the judges, Rabbi Meir holds that each litigant can indiscriminately invalidate the judge who was chosen by the opposing litigant. The Sages hold that the judges may only be invalidated on objective grounds, for either being relatives of the litigant or otherwise invalid. (We will learn more about the what cause a person to be invalid to be a a judge in mishnah three). If the judges are otherwise valid the opposing litigant may not disqualify them.
The Sages and Rabbi Meir have basically the same dispute with regard to witnesses. Note, that in this case Rabbi Meir’s opinion is much more radical. If a litigant can disqualify his rival’s witnesses without any due cause, how could anyone ever be convicted. The Talmud deliberates at length on this problem and makes several suggestions: 1) the litigant can only disqualify witnesses when there is only one witness. In such a case, since there are not the requisite number of witnesses, the litigant is not truly destroying his rival’s case; 2) the mishnah deals with a case where a person has two sets of witnesses, and the rival disqualifies only one set; 3) the rival has another witness who testifies with him that the other witnesses are disqualified; 4) the litigant claimed that the judges and witnesses were not valid. When it is established by independent evidence that he told the truth about the judges, he is believed with regard to the witnesses.
In any case, from the fact that there are four solutions to this problem, we can see how puzzling Rabbi Meir’s opinion truly is.