Sanhedrin 3

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. זֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד, וּשְׁנֵיהֶן בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, שְׁנֵי דַיָּנִין בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד. זֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּנוֹ שֶׁל זֶה וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּנוֹ שֶׁל זֶה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵימָתַי, בִּזְמַן שֶׁמֵּבִיא עֲלֵיהֶן רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִין אוֹ פְסוּלִין, אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְשֵׁרִים אוֹ מֻמְחִין, אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפָסְלָן. זֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵימָתַי, בִּזְמַן שֶׁהוּא מֵבִיא עֲלֵיהֶם רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִים אוֹ פְסוּלִים. אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְשֵׁרִים, אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפָסְלָן:

Monetary litigations (are presided over) by three (judges). One [of the litigants] selects for himself one [judge], and one selects for himself another, and the two [litigants together] select for themselves another, [a third judge. In this way, a true judgment is secured. For the litigants accept the verdict, saying: "They judged us fairly." For the one found liable says: "I myself selected one judge, and if he could have found something in my favor, he would have." And the third judge himself is inclined to find something in favor of both, both having selected him.] These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: The two judges select a third, [without the knowledge of the litigants, so that the third judge not be inclined to either one of them. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] Each (of the litigants) may disqualify the judge of the other. [He may say to him: "I do not wish the case to be tried by the beth-din that you chose."] These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: When is this so? When he brings proof against them [(the judges that the other selected)] that they are kin or (otherwise) unfit. But if they were kasher or expert, he cannot disqualify them. [This is the intent: But if they were kasher, i.e., neither kin nor (otherwise) unfit, even if they were "corner-sitters," they are regarded as experts, and he cannot disqualify them. The halachah: If the litigants accept someone to judge their case (whether one or many), and he rendered a decision, his ruling stands and they cannot controvert it, even if he is not "an expert for the many." And if it were found that he erred — If he erred in a ruling of the Mishnah or in something adduced in the Gemara, the case is returned and judged as per the halachah. And if it cannot be returned (as when the one who was awarded money erroneously, went abroad), the judge is exempt from payment; for even though he contributed to the (financial) loss, he did not do so intentionally. And if he erred in his judgment, in something where tannaim, amoraim, or geonim differ, the ruling being in accordance with one, and this judge ruling in accordance with that gaon whose ruling is not the accepted one — If he had not taken (money from one) and placed (it) into the hand (of the other), the case is returned. And if it cannot be returned, he pays from his pocket. And if had "taken and placed in hand," what is done is done, and he pays from his pocket. And a judge who had not been accepted by the litigants, but who arose (to judge) of himself, or one who had been appointed by the king or by some of the elders of the congregation — If he is not "an expert for the many," even if he was granted permission by the Exilarch, his ruling is no ruling, whether or not he erred, and he is not in the class of the judges, but in that of the "despots." And either of the litigants, if he wishes, may controvert his ruling and return the case to beth-din. And if he erred, and did not "take and place in hand," the case is returned. And if it cannot be returned, he pays from his pocket, as per the halachah for all who contribute to (monetary) loss. And if he "took and placed in hand," he pays from his pocket and he then takes (the money back) from the litigant he awarded it to contrary to the halachah. And "an expert to the many" who was accepted by the litigants or who was granted permission by the Exilarch — Even if he was accepted by the litigants; or if he were granted permission by the Exilarch, even if the litigants did not accept him — since he is an expert, if he erred, whether in a ruling of the Mishnah or in his judgment, and the case cannot be returned, he need not pay. And an expert who was granted permission by the Exilarch may compel the litigants to try their case before him, whether they wish to or not, both in Eretz Yisrael and outside it. And if one were granted permission by the Nassi in Eretz Yisrael, he can compel the litigants only in Eretz Yisrael. An "expert" is one who is versed in the written and the oral law and who can reason, draw comparisons, and understand one thing from another. And when he is recognized and acknowledged by the men of his generation, he is called "an expert to the many," and he may judge alone, even without having been granted permission by the Exilarch.] Each (of the litigants) may disqualify the witnesses of the other. These are the words of R. Meir. The sages say: When (may he do so)? When he brings proof against them that they are kin or (otherwise) unfit. But if they were kasher, he cannot disqualify them. [The Gemara construes the difference between R. Meir and the sages as obtaining in an instance where a litigant says: "I have two pairs of witnesses in this case," and he brought the first pair, and the other litigant and one other (witness) arose and said: "They are unfit." R. Meir says that they may do so, not being considered "interested witnesses," the first litigant maintaining that he has another pair. And if he seeks (that pair) and cannot find them, it is his loss. And the rabbis hold that even though he says at first that he has two pairs of witnesses, he may retract and say: "I have only these," so that the ones who come to disqualify them are considered "interested witnesses" and their testimony is invalid. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]

אָמַר לוֹ נֶאֱמָן עָלַי אַבָּא, נֶאֱמָן עָלַי אָבִיךָ, נֶאֱמָנִין עָלַי שְׁלֹשָׁה רוֹעֵי בָקָר, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, יָכוֹל לַחֲזֹר בּוֹ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחֲזֹר בּוֹ. הָיָה חַיָּב לַחֲבֵרוֹ שְׁבוּעָה וְאָמַר לוֹ דּוֹר לִי בְחַיֵּי רֹאשְׁךָ, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, יָכוֹל לַחֲזֹר בּוֹ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵין יָכוֹל לַחֲזֹר בּוֹ:

If one said: "I trust my father" [to be a judge, even though the Torah disqualifies him from judging me, both for acquittal or for liability, viz. (Deuteronomy 24:16): "Fathers shall not be put to death by (cause of) sons"], "I trust your father," "I trust the three cattle herders" [to judge (for, as witnesses, they are kasher)] — R. Meir says: He can retract, [even after the ruling, after the judge accepted the testimony and said: "So and so, you are acquitted."] The sages say: He cannot retract. [The rabbis differ with R. Meir only (in an instance) where the verdict has been pronounced; but before it has been pronounced, the sages concur with R. Meir that he can retract. And also if they (the judges) "acquired from his hand" (by symbolic act) that he will accept the testimony or the judging of a certain man, then even before the verdict he cannot retract, for "nothing preempts acquisition (kinyan)." And this is the halachah.] If one owed his neighbor an oath, and he (the latter) said to him: "Swear to me by 'the life of your head'" [and I will give you what you claim (and, it goes without saying, "I shall waive my claim against you"), and he swore or they "acquired from his hand" (that he would swear) although he had not yet done so, he cannot retract (as per the sages. This is the halachah.)] R. Meir says: He can retract. The sages say: He cannot retract.

וְאֵלּוּ הֵן הַפְּסוּלִין, הַמְשַׂחֵק בְּקֻבְיָא, וְהַמַּלְוֶה בְרִבִּית, וּמַפְרִיחֵי יוֹנִים, וְסוֹחֲרֵי שְׁבִיעִית. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, בִּתְחִלָּה הָיוּ קוֹרִין אוֹתָן אוֹסְפֵי שְׁבִיעִית, מִשֶּׁרַבּוּ הָאַנָּסִין, חָזְרוּ לִקְרוֹתָן סוֹחֲרֵי שְׁבִיעִית. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אֵימָתַי, בִּזְמַן שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם אֻמָּנוּת אֶלָּא הִיא, אֲבָל יֵשׁ לָהֶן אֻמָּנוּת שֶׁלֹּא הִיא, כְּשֵׁרִין:

These are the ones who are invalidated [to judge and to testify]: One who games with kuvia (dice) (see Rosh Hashanah 1:8). [He is unfit to testify for he does not engage in "the habitation of the world." And one is forbidden to engage in his world in anything except Torah and lovingkindness, or in trade, craft, or work conducing to the habitation of the world.], one who lends on interest [Both the borrower and the lender are invalidated, it being ruled that both are in violation of a negative commandment], those who race pigeons [Some understand this as a form of gambling, viz.: "If your pigeon comes before my pigeon, I will give you, etc."; and some understand it as training pigeons to "abduct" other pigeons to their dove-cote, this being "theft by reason of (i.e., by violation of) 'the ways of peace,'" and not absolute theft], and those who trade in (produce of) shevi'ith (the sabbatical year), [of which it is written (Leviticus 25:6): "And the resting of the land shall be for you to eat" — and not for trade.] R. Shimon said: In the beginning they called them "the gatherers of shevi'ith" [The Gemara interprets R. Shimon thus: In the beginning they called them "the gatherers of shevi'ith." That is, those who gathered the fruits of shevi'ith for themselves were unfit to testify, just as those who traded in the fruits of shevi'ith.] With the increase of the "extorters" [those who requisitioned the king's portion, e.g., so many and so many korin of grain each year, so that they had to gather the produce of shevi'ith to fill the king's quota], they reverted to calling them "traders in shevi'ith" [i.e., they reverted to saying that "the traders" in the fruits of shevi'ith alone were unfit to testify, but those who gathered the produce of shevi'ith to give it to the king are fit to testify, since they do not gather it to store it for themselves. As to the halachah: Whoever commits a transgression punishable by judicial death penalty, kareth (cutting-off) or stripes, is unfit to testify, for one who has incurred the death penalty is called "an evildoer," viz. (Numbers 35:31): "...who is an evildoer (condemned) to die," as is one who has incurred stripes, viz. (Deuteronomy 25:2): "And it shall be, if liable to stripes is the evildoer," and it is written (Exodus 23:1): "Do not place your hand with an evildoer to be a false witness," which is expounded: "Do not make an evildoer a witness." And if he receives stripes, he reverts to his fitness, viz. (Deuteronomy 25:3): "And your brother (in receiving stripes) shall be demeaned before your eyes" — Once he has been smitten, he is as your brother. And if he took money unlawfully, even though he incurs neither the death penalty nor stripes, he is unfit to testify, e.g., a thief, a robber, and a lender on interest. And if he took money in violation of a rabbinic ordinance, he is unfit to testify by rabbinic ordinance, e.g., pigeon racers, and "forcers," who give money and take things that the owners do not wish to sell, charity collectors and tax collectors who take for themselves, and those who accept charity from gentiles in public — these and their like are unfit to testify by rabbinic ordinance. And their testimony is not invalid until they are exposed and publicized; but those who are unfit to testify by Torah law need not be thus exposed. And all who are unfit to testify, whether by Torah law or by rabbinic ordinance, if it can be ascertained that they have fully repented, and returned the money that they took unlawfully, and made a "fence" for themselves in the matter in which they sinned, so as not to repeat it, they return to their (state of) fitness. And those who game with kuvia, even though they are not guilty of theft even by rabbinic ordinance, they are unfit to testify, for they do not engage in "the habitation of the world" and have no fear of Heaven. And (they are thus unfit) only when they have no occupation but that, as per R. Yehudah (below). And this is the halachah. And when are they considered to have repented? When they break their dice and take it upon themselves not to game even gratis.] R. Yehudah said: When (are they unfit to testify)? When they have no occupation but that. But if they have an additional occupation, they are fit.

וְאֵלּוּ הֵן הַקְּרוֹבִין, אָבִיו וְאָחִיו וַאֲחִי אָבִיו וַאֲחִי אִמּוֹ וּבַעַל אֲחוֹתוֹ וּבַעַל אֲחוֹת אָבִיו וּבַעַל אֲחוֹת אִמּוֹ וּבַעַל אִמּוֹ וְחָמִיו וְגִיסוֹ, הֵן וּבְנֵיהֶן וְחַתְנֵיהֶן, וְחוֹרְגוֹ לְבַדּוֹ. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, זוֹ מִשְׁנַת רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. אֲבָל מִשְׁנָה רִאשׁוֹנָה, דּוֹדוֹ וּבֶן דּוֹדוֹ. וְכָל הָרָאוּי לְיָרְשׁוֹ, וְכָל הַקָּרוֹב לוֹ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה. הָיָה קָרוֹב וְנִתְרַחֵק, הֲרֵי זֶה כָּשֵׁר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, אֲפִלּוּ מֵתָה בִתּוֹ וְיֶשׁ לוֹ בָנִים מִמֶּנָּה, הֲרֵי זֶה קָרוֹב:

And these are the (invalidated) kin (vis-à-vis judging and testifying): his father, his brother, his father's brother, his mother's brother, his sister's husband, [the husband being like his wife], his mother's sister's husband, his mother's husband, his father-in-law, his brother-in-law [i.e., the husband of his wife's sister] — they, their sons, and their sons-in-law. [Only sons and daughters that his brother-in-law has from his wife's sister. But if he has sons from another wife, or sons-in-law married to daughters from another wife, they are not considered kin.] And his stepson alone [is considered kin, but not his stepson's son or his stepson's son-in-law. And he may not testify for his stepson's wife, for a woman is like her husband. And brothers, one vis-à-vis the other, whether from the father or from the mother, are first (of kin) in (i.e., vis-à-vis) first. Their sons, vis-à-vis each other are second in second. And the sons of their sons, vis-à-vis each other, are third in third. Third in first is always kasher, and it goes without saying, third in second. But second in second, and, it goes without saying, second in first, are both pasul (unfit). And just as you reckon for males, so you reckon for females. And every woman that you are pasul to, you are pasul to her husband. And every man that you are pasul to, you are pasul to his wife.] R. Yossi said: This is the Mishnah of R. Akiva, but an earlier Mishnah (reckons as invalidated kin) his uncle and his uncle's son. [The halachah is not in accordance with the earlier Mishnah.] And (also pasul are) all who are fit to inherit him [This is the conclusion of the Mishnah of R. Akiva and not of the earlier Mishnah. ("all who are fit to inherit him:") i.e., the father's kin. But the mother's kin, such as "his mother's brother" above, are kasher (to testify) for him. For his mother's brother is not fit to inherit him. He, however, is fit to inherit his mother's brother, for which reason he is pasul to testify for him.] and all who are kin to him at that time (the time of the testimony). If he were (once) kin [e.g., his son-in-law, who is fit to inherit him by reason of his (the son-in-law's) wife], and he became removed, [his wife having died before he witnessed this (matter of potential) testimony], he is kasher. R. Yehudah says: Even if his daughter died, but he had children from her, he is (considered) kin. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Akiva.]

הָאוֹהֵב וְהַשּׂוֹנֵא. אוֹהֵב, זֶה שׁוּשְׁבִינוֹ. שׂוֹנֵא, כָּל שֶׁלֹּא דִבֶּר עִמּוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים בְּאֵיבָה. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, לֹא נֶחְשְׁדוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל עַל כָּךְ:

The lover and the hater (are invalidated). Lover — his groomsman. [He is pasul for him all the days of the wedding.] Hater — whoever does not speak with him for three days out of hatred. They said to him: Israel is not suspect of this [to testify falsely out of hatred or love. And this is the halachah. It is only in respect to testifying that the rabbis differ. But in respect to judging they agree that he is pasul. For if he loves him, he will not find anything in his disfavor; and if he hates him, he will not try to find anything in his favor.]

כֵּיצַד בּוֹדְקִים אֶת הָעֵדִים, הָיוּ מַכְנִיסִין אוֹתָן וּמְאַיְּמִין עֲלֵיהֶן וּמוֹצִיאִין אֶת כָּל הָאָדָם לַחוּץ, וּמְשַׁיְּרִין אֶת הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבָּהֶן, וְאוֹמְרִים לוֹ אֱמֹר הֵיאַךְ אַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁזֶּה חַיָּב לָזֶה. אִם אָמַר, הוּא אָמַר לִי שֶׁאֲנִי חַיָּב לוֹ, אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אָמַר לִי שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב לוֹ, לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם, עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר, בְּפָנֵינוּ הוֹדָה לוֹ שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב לוֹ מָאתַיִם זוּז. וְאַחַר כָּךְ מַכְנִיסִין אֶת הַשֵּׁנִי וּבוֹדְקִים אוֹתוֹ. אִם נִמְצְאוּ דִבְרֵיהֶם מְכֻוָּנִים, נוֹשְׂאִין וְנוֹתְנִין בַּדָּבָר. שְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים זַכַּאי, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר חַיָּב, זַכַּאי. שְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים חַיָּב, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר זַכַּאי, חַיָּב. אֶחָד אוֹמֵר זַכַּאי, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר חַיָּב, וַאֲפִלּוּ שְׁנַיִם מְזַכִּין אוֹ שְׁנַיִם מְחַיְּבִין וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ, יוֹסִיפוּ הַדַּיָּנִין:

How are the witnesses examined (to ascertain that they are telling the truth)? They would bring them in and intimidate them. [They would apprise them that the hirers of false witnesses themselves scorn them and call them wicked, viz., in respect to Navoth (I Kings 21:10): "And seat two worthless people opposite him, and let them testify (falsely)," the king's counselors themselves, who counseled hiring them, calling them "worthless."] And they would take everyone out and leave the senior (witness) there, and they would say to him: "How do you know that this one owed that one?" If he said: "He (the borrower) told me that he owes him," "That man told me that he owes him," he has said nothing. [for people are wont to say that they owe in order not to be thought rich.] (He is not accepted as a witness) until he says: "Before us he admitted to him that he owes him two hundred zuz." [i.e., Both of them were before us and his intent was to acknowledge the debt and have them witness the acknowledgement.] Then the second one is brought in and he is examined. If their stories jibe, they (beth-din) deliberate. If two say "Not liable," and one says "Liable," he (the borrower) is not liable. If two say "Liable," and one "Not liable," he is liable. If one says "Not liable," and one says "Liable" — and even if two say "Not liable" or two say "Liable," and one says "I do not know" — they add judges. [And even though if he had differed with the others, he, being in the minority, would be overruled, when he says "I do not know," it is as if he had not sat in judgment, so it is as if the judgment were with two, and we require three.]

גָּמְרוּ אֶת הַדָּבָר, הָיוּ מַכְנִיסִין אוֹתָן. הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבַּדַּיָּנִים אוֹמֵר, אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אַתָּה זַכַּאי, אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אַתָּה חַיָּב. וּמִנַּיִן לִכְשֶׁיֵּצֵא אֶחָד מִן הַדַּיָּנִים לֹא יֹאמַר אֲנִי מְזַכֶּה וַחֲבֵרַי מְחַיְּבִין אֲבָל מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה שֶׁחֲבֵרַי רַבּוּ עָלָי, עַל זֶה נֶאֱמַר לֹא תֵלֵךְ רָכִיל בְּעַמֶּךָ (ויקרא יט), וְאוֹמֵר הוֹלֵךְ רָכִיל מְגַלֶּה סּוֹד (משלי יא):

When they (beth-din) finished the matter, they would bring them [the litigants] in. [For after hearing their claims, they would take them out so that they (beth-din) could deliberate and the litigants not hear who ruled liable and who not liable.] The senior judge would say: "So and so, you are not liable; so and so, you are liable." And whence is it derived that when one of the judges goes out, he should not say: "I found you not liable, but my colleagues found you liable. What can I do? They are the majority." From (Leviticus 19:16): "Do not go as a tale-bearer among your people," and (Proverbs 11:13): "He who reveals a secret is a tale-bearer."

כָּל זְמַן שֶׁמֵּבִיא רְאָיָה, סוֹתֵר אֶת הַדִּין. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, כָּל רְאָיוֹת שֶׁיֶּשׁ לְךָ הָבֵא מִכָּאן עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם. מָצָא בְתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, סוֹתֵר. לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, אֵינוֹ סוֹתֵר. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, מַה יַּעֲשֶׂה זֶה שֶׁלֹּא מָצָא בְתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים וּמָצָא לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים. אָמְרוּ לוֹ הָבֵא עֵדִים וְאָמַר אֵין לִי עֵדִים, אָמְרוּ הָבֵא רְאָיָה וְאָמַר אֵין לִי רְאָיָה, וּלְאַחַר זְמָן הֵבִיא רְאָיָה וּמָצָא עֵדִים, הֲרֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ כְלוּם. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, מַה יַּעֲשֶׂה זֶה שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁיֶּשׁ לוֹ עֵדִים וּמָצָא עֵדִים, לֹא הָיָה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁיֶּשׁ לוֹ רְאָיָה וּמָצָא רְאָיָה. אָמְרוּ לוֹ הָבֵא עֵדִים, אָמַר אֵין לִי עֵדִים, הָבֵא רְאָיָה וְאָמַר אֵין לִי רְאָיָה, רָאָה שֶׁמִּתְחַיֵּב בַּדִּין וְאָמַר קִרְבוּ פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי וְהַעִידוּנִי, אוֹ שֶׁהוֹצִיא רְאָיָה מִתּוֹךְ אֲפֻנְדָּתוֹ, הֲרֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ כְלוּם:

Whenever he brings proof (in his favor), he can overturn the verdict. If they said to him: "Whatever proofs you have, bring them within thirty days" — If he found (proof) within thirty days, he overturns it; if not, not. R. Shimon b. Gamliel asked: "What is one to do if he did not find it within thirty days but did find it afterwards!" If they (beth-din) said to him: "Bring witnesses," and he said: "I have no witnesses"; if they said: "Bring proof" [a writ of credit], and he said: "I have no proof," and afterwards he brought proof or found witnesses, it is of no account. [For he said "I do not have," and we suspect him of forgery or of having hired false witnesses.] R. Shimon b. Gamliel said: "What is one to do if he did not know that he had witnesses and he found witnesses, or if he did not know that he had proof and he found proof!" [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamliel.] If they said to him: "Bring witnesses," and he said: "I have no witnesses"; "Bring proof," and he said: "I have no proof," and then, seeing that he would lose the case, said: "You and you come here and testify for me," or he produced proof from his afundah [(his belt; others say: a garment worn close to the skin)], it is of no account. [In this, even R. Shimon b. Gamliel concurs. For since he knew of them and denied it, he is certainly a liar. But if one says: I have witnesses or proof across the seas, he is not heeded to delay judgment until he sends abroad; but the ruling is given according to the evidence available at that time, and when he brings witnesses or proof, the ruling is overturned and the case is heard again as per the witnesses or proof that he brought.]