Talmud zu Nazir 2:11
Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot
21There are many different interpretations of this paragraph, detailed by R. Jehudah Rosanes in his Commentary מִשְׁנֶה לַמֶּלֶךְ to Maimonides, Hilkhot Iššut 23:1. The following explanation is simply one which seems reasonable to the author. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule22This question is very elliptic. It is not obvious whether the document was written before or after the definitive marriage and whether the inheritance was foreseeable or not. If the document was written before the definitive marriage and the wife was in line for the inheritance, there is no reason why the husband’s renunciation of his rights would not be valid since that essentially is the case of the Mishnah. In addition, it is the right of any person not to accept an inheritance. Therefore, in view of the answer given, it seems that one speaks of an inheritance which was unexpected, that at the moment of preliminary marriage the wife was not a probable recipient of the inheritance but that later some prospective heirs died which made the wife the next surviving kin. Since such an occurrence is not foreseeable, no contracts can be concluded about them. If the document was executed after the definitive marriage, it would require an additional statement in which the husband cedes his rights to future yield to his wife.? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence23For example, in talmudic law a farmer cannot write a futures contract on his grain harvest before his seed has sprouted. Similarly, no contract can be written covering unexpected inheritances.? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield24Since the ketubah contract gives the husband the right to the yield of any future properties coming to his wife during their marriage, whether foreseen or not, it follows that he can deprive himself of his right to yield, whether foreseen or not.? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence25,If the succinct language proposed by R. Jeremiah is invalid, the more explicit language of R. Levi is also invalid. The objection of R. Abun bar Hiyya is irrelevant as far as a separate contract is concerned. But certainly it would be possible for the husband to renounce his right to yield in the ketubah document itself, since what he acquires by the ketubah he can renounce in the ketubah. In that case, his wife's hand in acquiring estates never was his hand and she does not need his renunciation.26In Nazir 2:5 (52b l. 41), the question is asked about a vow to pay for somebody's nazir sacrifices if a person will make a nazir vow in the future, an act over which the maker of the original vow has no control. The original vow is declared void since the text proposed by R. Levi ben Haita is also void.?
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Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot
HALAKHAH: “If both of them disavowed simultaneously,” etc. If they dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to disavowe in court. This is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, his sacrifice for the Eternal for his vow of nazir; that his vow of nazir precede his sacrifice, not that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir49Num. 6:21. An obligatory sacrifice cannot be brought voluntarily. Therefore it cannot be dedicated before the obligation exists. The dedication cannot be undone (Lev. 27:9). Therefore, the original sacrifice has to be rededicated as voluntary offering and a new sacrifice be given as obligatory sacrifice. Nazir 2:9 (Note 118), 3:2 (Note 32), Tosephta Nazir 2:6, Num. rabba 10(42).. If they were sworn to out of court, dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to renege in court, how do you treat this? As if his sin did precede his sacrifice or since the are liable only in court as if their sacrifice did precede their sin50The question is not answered. Possibly it is a sequel to R. Jeremiah’s questions in the preceding Halakhah; cf. Terumot 10:11 Note 110.?
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