Talmud zu Keritot 4:7

If he ate a full olive sized piece⁸⁰Kosher food, which only is forbidden on the Day of Atonement. but there is doubt whether he ate it on the Day of Atonement or before the Day of Atonement. The atonement atones for the doubt⁸¹Cf. Chapter 1, Note 19.. Whether he ate it on the Day of Atonement or after the Day of Atonement. The colleagues say, atonement atones for the doubt⁸²If the food was eaten in the twilight at the end of the Day of Atonement and the next day already had started, no sin was committed (Lev. 23:32). If it still was the day of Atonement, doctrine is that in the absence of a scapegoat the end of the day provides the Atonement [Yoma 8:8 45c l. 15; Ševuot 1:9 33c l. 3, lacunary Sanhedrin 10:1 Note 34; Tosefta Kippurim 4:17].. Rebbi Mattaniah said, the atonement atones only for doubt of the kinds of blood⁸³R. Mattaniah holds that the Day of Atonement only eliminates a suspended reparation sacrifice which certainly was due. But in the case where the doubt arises whether it was the Day of Atonement or not, there is no prior obligation and, therefore, it cannot be eliminated.. A Mishnah supports the colleagues: “Sabbath and the Day of Atonement and he worked in twilight.⁸⁴Mishnah Keritut 4:2. The Mishnah deals with a case which is impossible in our computed calendar, where the Day of Atonement was either Friday or Sunday and somebody was doing some forbidden work during the twilight between the days. R. Joshua, the overriding authority, holds that in this case no suspended sacrifice is due since one may assume that part of the work was done on the day of Atonement; this part of an unintended sin then is eliminated, leaving an incomplete work for the Sabbath which needs no sacrifice (Note 60). This shows that the colleagues are correct in extending the power of the Day of Atonement.” As you take it, if it was the Day of Atonement, it atoned. If it was weekday, it is permitted. But did we not state “he ate”⁸⁵The questioner thinks that the food in question was forbidden fat. In that case, the Day of Atonement cannot eliminate the obligation of a suspended sacrifice for the following night. The answer is that in contrast to the cases considered earlier, one supposes that kosher food was eaten.? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, eating permitted [food].

Does Rebbi Joḥanan agree that if the first one was still in existence it is pushed aside⁹²R. Yose ben R. Abun will show that the often repeated statement that “everybody agrees” is false; R. Johanan disagrees; the explanation given in Note 36 has to be amended.? What should be done with it? Rebbi Yasa said, it is suspended for atonement⁹³These two sentences are copied from the previous statement; they are copied to point out that R. Zeˋira’s statement is disregarded since it would lead to a complication in R. Simeon ben Laqish’s statement.. Therefore Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun discussed it. If he ate five times the volume of an olive⁹⁴While he ate the five pieces, he was oblivious either of the fact that these were forbidden fat or of the law that certain kinds of fat are forbidden. Then he was informed of the forbidden character of these pieces one by one and immediately after each information dedicated an animal but did not sacrifice yet.; the first became known to him and he brought a sacrifice. The second, and he brought a sacrifice. The third, and he offered a sacrifice. The fourth, and he offered a sacrifice. The fifth, and he offered a sacrifice. Rebbi Joḥanan said, his sin is atoned for by the first which precedes the eating of all of them; the remainder shall fall to voluntary offerings⁹⁵The argument is the same as in the case of three pieces discussed earlier; one constructs a case for five only because for R. Joḥanan in the case of three only one animal was needed. One could have done with four pieces.
For R. Joḥanan, the validity of the dedication of the first animal can be extended to cover all five pieces. The other four animals cannot be used, but dedicated animals cannot become undedicated. They are sent to graze until they either develop a defect which makes them unfit for the altar or they exceed the age limit for sacrificial animals (Mishnah Parah 1:1) when they can be sold and the money used for voluntary elevation offerings.. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his sin is atoned for by the last which follows the eating of all of them; the others shall be set aside⁹⁶Since for him dedications cannot be extended, only the last animal can legitimately be sacrificed. The others have to be sent to graze.. Rav Ḥisda and Rav Hamnuna. Rav Ḥisda like Rebbi Joḥanan; Rav Hamnuna like Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rav Ḥisda remarked to Rav Hamnuna, there is a Mishnah which seems to support you and disagrees with me⁹⁷Mishnah Keritut 4:2.: “If there was awareness in between, just as he brings a purification sacrifice for each single one, so he brings a suspended reparation sacrifice for each single one⁹⁸Since temporary oblivion is a prerequisite for the possibility of a purification sacrifice, sins committed when there was an interval of awareness between them cannot be atoned for by one and the same sacrifice. This rule is extended to suspended sacrifices. Since in the case in question the selection of new sacrifices was in response to information, one should read the Mishnah as forbidding the extension of the meaning of dedications..” If he had stated the reparation sacrifice and stopped⁹⁹The formulation of the Mishnah and the explanation given in the preceding Note are all wrong. The verses introducing purification sacrifices emphasize that these atone only for unintentional sins. The requirement of oblivion is only mentioned for the suspended reparation sacrifice (Lev. 5:17). The Mishnah should have mentioned suspended sacrifices first. Since purification sacrifices were mentioned first, the Mishnah cannot be read as referring to the effect of information after the fact, only to information reaching the person between two intrinsically forbidden acts.! Rebbi Ḥinena said, even so, for all eventualities you may say so¹⁰⁰Rav Hisda’s objection is well taken. The formulation of the Mishnah is elliptic. One should read it as follows: “Just as he brings a purification sacrifice for each single one if there was awareness of certainty in between, so he brings a suspended reparation sacrifice for each single one if there was awareness of doubt in between.”.

HALAKHAH: There, we have stated⁴³Mishnah Keritut 4:3. A purification offering is possible only for the awareness that an inadvertent sin punishable with extirpation has been committed. In the interpretation of R. Simeon fron Shezur and R. Simeon (ben Yoḥai), for R. Eliezer, the awareness of a sin generates the liability, for R. Joshua only the awareness of the exact circumstances of the transgression causes liability, even if the category of the sin is not in doubt.: “Rebbi Simeon from Shezur and Rebbi Simeon say, they did not disagree about anything which falls under the same appellation that he is liable. Where did they disagree? About something which is because of two appellations, where Rebbi Eliezer holds him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua holds him not liable.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Following him who said that they disagreed about two appellations, but not following him who said that they disagreed about one appellation. Here there are two appellations and he is not liable⁴⁴R. Eleazar rejects the interpretation of Mishnah 4 that a person who intended to carry something in front but in fact carried it on his back did not execute his intention whereas one who intended to carry something on his back but in fact carried it in front did better than intended. Then the question arises why in one case is there liability but not in the other. If we say that carrying in front or back are two different appellations within the one category of “taking out”, then we should expect R. Eliezer to declare liability in both cases and R. Joshua no liability in either case. Therefore the Mishnah follows R. Eliezer in its first statement, R. Joshua in the second. Since both statements are anonymous, one would expect consistency. The text has to be read as follows:
Following him who said that they disagreed about two appellations, it is clear that R. Eliezer declares liable but not R. Joshua. But not following him who said that they disagreed about one appellation. Since the distinction is made only by two authors it is clear that there is an assumption that there is an opposing opinion which holds that R. Joshua frees from liability in any case where there is a doubt even if it is only in the way an intention was executed. Here there are two appellations and he is not liable according to both interpretations of R. Joshua (whose opinion is followed in general against R. Eliezer.). “On his back and he carried on his front he is liable;” following him who said that they disagreed about one appellation. But following him who said two appellations? Here it is one appellation and he is liable⁴⁵Here one reads: “On his back and he carried on his front he is liable;” following him who said that they disagreed about one appellation there is a problem to explain this following R. Joshua. But following him who said two appellations it is obvious that this Mishnah cannot follow R. Joshua. Here it is one appellation and he is liable, according to everybody in the interpretation of RR. Simeon from Shezur and R. Simeon.. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: it is a case of Tannaim⁴⁶It is possible to read the entire Mishnah as following R. Joshua as required by our practice, but the second statement follows RR. Simeon from Shezur and R. Simeon in their interpretation of R. Joshua’s position and the first statement follows their opponents.. He who says there “liable”, also here “liable”; he who says there “not liable”, also here “not liable”.