Talmud zu Gittin 8:1

²¹There are many different interpretations of this paragraph, detailed by R. Jehudah Rosanes in his Commentary מִשְׁנֶה לַמֶּלֶךְ to Maimonides, Hilkhot Iššut 23:1. The following explanation is simply one which seems reasonable to the author. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule²²This question is very elliptic. It is not obvious whether the document was written before or after the definitive marriage and whether the inheritance was foreseeable or not. If the document was written before the definitive marriage and the wife was in line for the inheritance, there is no reason why the husband’s renunciation of his rights would not be valid since that essentially is the case of the Mishnah. In addition, it is the right of any person not to accept an inheritance. Therefore, in view of the answer given, it seems that one speaks of an inheritance which was unexpected, that at the moment of preliminary marriage the wife was not a probable recipient of the inheritance but that later some prospective heirs died which made the wife the next surviving kin. Since such an occurrence is not foreseeable, no contracts can be concluded about them. If the document was executed after the definitive marriage, it would require an additional statement in which the husband cedes his rights to future yield to his wife.? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence²³For example, in talmudic law a farmer cannot write a futures contract on his grain harvest before his seed has sprouted. Similarly, no contract can be written covering unexpected inheritances.? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield²⁴Since the ketubah contract gives the husband the right to the yield of any future properties coming to his wife during their marriage, whether foreseen or not, it follows that he can deprive himself of his right to yield, whether foreseen or not.? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence^25,If the succinct language proposed by R. Jeremiah is invalid, the more explicit language of R. Levi is also invalid. The objection of R. Abun bar Hiyya is irrelevant as far as a separate contract is concerned. But certainly it would be possible for the husband to renounce his right to yield in the ketubah document itself, since what he acquires by the ketubah he can renounce in the ketubah. In that case, his wife's hand in acquiring estates never was his hand and she does not need his renunciation.²⁶In Nazir 2:5 (52b l. 41), the question is asked about a vow to pay for somebody's nazir sacrifices if a person will make a nazir vow in the future, an act over which the maker of the original vow has no control. The original vow is declared void since the text proposed by R. Levi ben Haita is also void.?

MISHNAH: If [a girl] repudiates a man, he is permitted [to marry] her relatives and she is permitted [to marry] his relatives; he did not disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, he is forbidden [to marry] her relatives and she is forbidden [to marry] his relatives; he did disable her for the priesthood⁶⁸If the marriage of a man with an underage girl is dissolved by the initiative of the man, she is treated as a divorcee forbidden his relatives and forbidden to a Cohen, and he is forbidden her close relatives. But if she walks out on him, there never was any marriage, neither side is forbidden the close relatives of the other, and she is not forbidden to marry a Cohen. This is all explained in the next Mishnah.. If he gave her a bill of divorce and later took her back, then she repudiated him⁶⁹This repudiation is applied not only to the Second but also to the first marriage; then she is not divorced from him and may marry him anew after divorce or widowhood from another man. and married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is permitted to return to him. If she repudiated him and he took her back, then he gave her a bill of divorce⁷⁰This divorce stands, and so stands the prohibition to take back the divorcee who was otherwise married (Deut. 24:4). and she married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is prohibited to return to him. That is the principle: By divorce after repudiation she is prohibited to return to him; by repudiation after divorce she is permitted to return to him.

Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody wanted to change his mind after he had promised a gift to another person, he may change his mind¹³³Also in Ma‘ser Šeni 4:7 (fol. 55b), Baba Meẓi‘a 4:2 (fol. 9c-d), Babli Baba Meẓi‘a 49a. In the Babli, the statement is restricted to large gifts.. Rebbi Yose was with Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi; he said to him: Is that just no (Lev. 19:36) “and just yes?¹³⁴This cryptic statement is explained in Sifra Qedošim Pereq 8(7), Babli Baba Meẓi‘a 49a: “Why does the verse mention ‘a just epha and a just hin’? Is not a hin a part of an epha, how can one have correct measures for one and not the other? One takes biblical hîn as rabbinic hēn ‘yes’. That your yes should be a yes and your no a no, the same in your mind and your mouth.”” He said, when he said it, it was a just yes. Rav disagrees since Rav said, when I tell my family to give a gift to somebody, I never change my mind¹³⁵This is taken as a legal statement; at the end it will be accepted as a moral precept only.. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “¹³⁶Tosephta Qiddušin 1:8, Baba Batra 5:2; Yerushalmi Qiddušin 1:4 (fol. 60b), Giṭṭin 8:1 (fol. 49b); Babli Baba Batra 85a. Where did they say that movables are acquired by being drawn close? In the public domain or in a courtyard which is not their joint property. In the domain of the buyer, when the deal was accepted¹³⁷Things deposited on a persons’s real estate are his property as soon as he has the right to them.; in the domain of the seller one never acquires until either he lift it up or he draw and remove everything from the prior owner’s property. In the domain of a depositary he cannot acquire unless he gave permission or rented their place out to him.” What does Rav do with this¹³⁸Why should he not change his mind since there was no acquisition and no money given?? One is if he was standing with him¹³⁹In this provisional answer, it is only asserted that the promise of a gift to another person is binding. But the question remains, why should it be binding if there was no acquisition, which could only be effected by removing the gift from the donor’s property?, the other if he was not standing with him. Rav disagrees since Rav said, when I tell my family to give a gift to somebody, I never change my mind. You should know because somebody had given surety on salt¹⁴⁰In the Babli, Baba Meẓi‘a 48b, the story is told of R. Ḥiyya bar Josef, who appeared before R. Joḥanan.; it rose in price. He came before Rav who said, either he should give corresponding to the surety¹⁴¹In the Babli, loc.cit., Rav holds that a surety gives a claim for the value of the surety while R. Joḥanan holds that a surety establishes a claim for the entire lot in question. The version of the story here implies that Rav was the judge. or he should be given up to “Him who made pay”. The arguments of Rav are contradictory. There he says, when I tell my family to give a gift to somebody, I never change my mind and here he says so¹⁴²For his own gifts he establishes the rule that a gift is unchangeable, for commercial transactions he says that they are reversible, even if that would be morally wrong.? There it is for a legal rule; what Rav did himself was a measure of piety.