Kommentar zu Keritot 3:12

אמרו לו – even if one [witness] says to hm, “you ate forbidden fat,” and he is silent and doesn’t contradict him.

Introduction Our mishnah talks about various types of cases where a person might or might not have eaten forbidden fat, a transgression that would cause him to bring a hatat for atonement.

מביא חטאת – by his word.

If they said to him: you ate forbidden fat, he is liable to a hatat; This is the obvious case. If a person ate a piece of fat and doesn’t know whether it was helev (forbidden fat) or shuman (permitted fat), then he must bring a hatat.

שנים אומרים לו אכלת חלב – and even one-hundred [witnesses], but he contradicts them and says: “I am sure that I did not eat [prohibited fat],” he does not bring a sacrifice through their word, as it is written (Leviticus 4:28): “Or the sin of which he is guilty is brought to his knowledge,” and not that others would inform him.

If one witness says: he ate, and another says: he did not eat, or if one woman says, he ate, and another says, he did not eat, he is liable to an asham talui. In this case, there is contradictory testimony with regard to whether the fat he ate was forbidden. Furthermore, there is either only one witness who testifies that he ate forbidden fat, or that witness is a woman, whose testimony does not fully count. Since there is no proper testimony, he does not bring a hatat. However, he does bring an asham talui, a “suspended asham.” As I explained in the introduction to Keritot, this is a sacrifice brought when it is not clear if a person transgressed.

רבי מאיר מחייב – but the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Meir.

If one witness says: he ate, and another says: he did not eat, or if one woman says, he ate, and another says, he did not eat, he is liable to an asham talui. In this case, there is no solid testimony that he ate forbidden fat, and he himself denies having done so. These two factors combine to exempt him from having to bring a sacrifice.

אם הביאוהו שנים כו' – as, for example, if they testified against him that he killed a person.

If one witness says, he ate, and he himself says, I did not eat, he is exempt. In this case, there is proper testimony against him, but he himself denies having eaten forbidden fat. Rabbi Meir argues that just as in a case of the death penalty, where two witnesses can make him liable, so too here, when it comes to bringing a sacrifice to atone for a sin, two people can make him liable, even if he denies having transgressed. The other rabbis argue against Rabbi Meir by noting that there is a difference between testimony for a capital crime, such as murder, and testimony with regard to liability for a sacrifice. In the case of the sacrifice, if the person admits to having eaten the forbidden fat, but claims to have done so intentionally, he is not obligated for a sacrifice, because sacrifices are brought only for accidental sins. Therefore, when he says, “I didn’t eat” he is believed.

ם ירצה לומה מזיד הייתי – if he would want to exempt himself through a lie, he would be able to say, “I acted willfully” for a person who acts willfully is exempt from a sacrifice.

חלב וחלב – two olives of forbidden fat.

Introduction This mishnah begins discussing the topic of how to divide one act of transgressing into several transgressions, such that a person would be considered as having transgressed only one, or join separate acts into one act such that a person would be liable independently for each act. This is a topic of immense interest to the rabbis and they will continue to discuss it throughout the chapter and even in chapter four.

בהעלם אחד – but two acts of forgetfulness/brought to his knowledge, he would be liable on each one, for we hold that the acts of forgetfulness divide.

If one twice ate forbidden fat in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to but one hatat. If a person ate forbidden fat twice, but both times he was unaware of what he was doing, for instance he didn’t know that what he was eating was forbidden fat, he is liable for only one hatat. As long as he was not informed of his sin in between the acts, this counts as only one sin.

ממין אחד חייב – this comes to tell us that even though the two halves of olives are not from one tray/charity plate, , that is, from one cooked dish, but they are cooked separately, even so, ethey combine, because the plates do not separate.

If one ate forbidden fat, blood, piggul and notar in one spell of unawareness, he is liable for each kind. However, if he ate different kinds of prohibited substances within one period of unawareness, meaning he was not told in between each item that what he is eating is prohibited, he is liable for a hatat for each kind of prohibited substance. This is because each is its own prohibition. “Piggul” is sacrificial meat that was offered with a disqualifying intention, and “notar” is remnant, sacrificial meat left over beyond the time when it must be eaten.

This is an instance where different kinds [of food] are more stringent than one kind. As the Mishnah so often does, it compares the above case with another case, noting that sometimes eating differently prohibited substances is treated more stringently, and sometimes it is treated more leniently. The above case is one in which it was treated more stringently.

In the following instance, however, one kind [of food] is more stringent than several kinds: if one ate half an olive-size and then again half an olive-size, both in one spell of unawareness, if of one kind he is liable, if of two kinds, he is exempted. In contrast, if a person eats half of an olive’s worth of one prohibited substance and then another half of an olive of the same substance, he is liable for a hatat, because he ate one olive’s worth, the amount necessary to be liable. If the two half-olives were of different substances, then he is exempt because he didn’t eat an olive’s worth of a single prohibited substance.

כמה ישהה האוכלן – for the two halves of olives that we mentioned combine.

Introduction At the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if a person eats two halves of an olive’s worth of one prohibited substance, he is liable. Our mishnah deals with the question of how close these two acts must be for them to be considered one act of eating, such that he would be liable.

כאילו אוכלן קליות – we see them as if they had been broken into [thin] crumbs like parched corn and eat them one by one closely after the other, and in this we estimate if he ate one-half of an olive and he ceased and an hour ate another half-olive, but if he delayed from the beginning until the end in order to eat parched corn at close intervals to each other, they combine, but if he did not stop from eating, but rather that he delayed in chewing them and swallowing them, even the entire day, they combine, according to the words of Rabbi Meir.

Within what time must he eat them [for him to be liable]? [The time he would need] if he ate a similar amount of parched grains of corn, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir holds that we imagine the prohibited substances as if they were parched grains of corn. If it took him longer to eat the prohibited substances than it would have to have eaten a similar amount of parched grains of corn, then he is exempt.

וחכמים אומרים עד ישהה מתחילה ועד סוף כדי אכילת פרס (eating a piece/a certain quantity of bread) – meaning to say, even if he didn’t stop between eating one-half of an olive and the eating of the other half, but rather, that he delayed in chewing the two halves of olives [for the time it would take] in order to eat a piece of bread, from the beginning of eating until the end of swallowing, they combine. But more than [the time it would take] in order to eat a piece of bread, it would not combine. And the Halakha is according to the Sages.

But the rabbis say: he must take from the beginning to the end [of his eating] no more time than is required for the eating of a peras (a half a loaf of [to be liable]. The other rabbis say that as long as he ate the half-olives within the amount of time it would take to eat half a loaf of a standard sized loaf of bread (four olive’s worth of bread) then he is liable. We should note that in later halakhah this became a standard as far as eating obligatory substances, such as matzah on Pesah. One must eat the matzah within this period of time for it to count as his obligatory matzah. Tiny pieces of matzah eaten throughout the meal are not sufficient to fulfill one’s obligation.

פרס – the language of breaking bread/piece of bread and reciting Birkat HaMazon. And this is one-half a loaf of the Eruv (i.e., to establish the joining of borders), from three loaves to a Kab, for each loave is eight eggs; it is found that one-half of a loaf is four eggs. Such is what my Rabbis have explained. But Maimonides states that it is three eggs worth.

If one eats unclean food or drinks unclean drinks, or if he drinks a quarter [of a log] of wine and then enters the Temple [he is liable if it takes less time] than it takes to eat a peras. This section deals with a priest who does something to disqualify himself from either eating holy food (terumah and sacrifices) or from entering the Temple. If he eats or drinks impure foods he cannot eat holy foods. If he drinks wine, he cannot go into the Temple (see Leviticus 10:9). Our mishnah teaches that if he eats or drinks these things within the amount of time it would require to eat half of a loaf of bread, then he cannot eat holy food (if he ate impure food or drink) or go into the Temple (if he drank wine).

אכל אוכלים טמאים – A person who consumes impure foods the equivalent one-half of a loaf which is two eggs, according to the interpretation of my Teachers. But, according to Maimonides, an egg and a half, his body is disqualified from eating heave-offering/Terumah (if he is a Kohen) until he immerses [in a Mikveh]. But the person who drinks one-fourth of a LOG of wine or enters into the Temple is liable for extirpation. But now, as we state, if he delayed in the eating of half-of loaf of ritually impure food or in the drinking of one-fourth of a LOG of ritually impure drinks, that would be considered as consuming one-half a loaf, they combine to the measurement and his body is disqualified from consuming heave-offering [if he is a Kohen]. But if he delayed more than this measure, they don’t combine. And the same law applies to the measurement of a quarter of a LOG of wine of entering into the Temple, for if he delayed in his drinking in order to eat half-a-loaf or less, he is liable; more than this, he is exempt.

Rabbi Elazar says: if the drinking was interrupted or if he diluted it, he is exempt. Rabbi Elazar provides a different measure when it comes to drinking the wine. If he interrupted his drinking, or if he stopped long enough to dilute it with water, meaning he didn’t drink the whole quarter log at once, then he is allowed to go into the Temple.

אם הפסיק בה (if he interrupted) – and didn’t drink the entire quarter of a LOG at one clip and entered in the Temple, he is exempt, as it is written (Leviticus 10:9): “Drink no wine or other intoxicant, [you or your sons, when you enter the Tent of Meeting, that you may not die],” wine in the manner of his drunkenness. But if he doesn’t drink it at one clip, this is not the manner of his drunkenness. And similarly, if he placed water in it. And the Halakha is according to Rabbi Eliezer. And these words refer to when he drinks an actual one-quarter of a LOG, but if he drank more than one-quarter of a LOG, Rabbi Eliezer admits that he is liable, even if he didn’t drink all of it at one clip.

ארבע חטאות – one is because of [eating] forbidden fat, and one is because of eating Holy Things while [in a state of] ritually impure, and one is because of a remnant/left over (i.e., part of an offering left over after the time permitted for it to be eaten), and one because it was on Yom Kippur, for we hold throughout the entire Torah, that a prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition , these words refer to a mere prohibition, as for example, a person who consumes the carrion of n impure animal, he is not liable because of he carrion because it is a mere prohibition that is not inclusive, nor does it add [to the prohibition]. But here, a person who was from the outset ritually pure, he was prohibited to consume prohibited fat and permitted with the rest of the meat of Holy Things. If he became ritually impure, since he became prohibited as regards the rest of the pieces of the meat of Holy Things because of ritual impurity, he is prohibited also [to consume] the prohibited fat, even though he was forbidden from the outset, and that is, an inclusive prohibition, that the final prohibition includes and prohibits other things on a person that were permitted to him from the outset. But however, it doesn’t add a prohibition on a sacred object held in hand at the delivery of an oath, but rather on the person it adds a prohibition regarding other things, and whetting the appetite and measuring also for this in his prohibition. This forbidden fat becomes a left-over (i.e., after the time permitted for it to be eaten, which is a prohibition that adds, that ab initio for a regular Kohen, is prohibited but for the Most High is permitted, since when it became a left-over, added a prohibition on the piece [of meat] itself to be forbidden even to the Most High. But since the name of a left-over prohibition takes effect upon it to make it forbidden to the Most High, it also takes affect the title of left-over regarding an ordinary [Priest] to make it liable because of left-overs, even though that without this, it would be forbidden to the regular [Priest]. The [prohibition] of Yom Kippur occurs to it, since a prohibition was added regarding a person to prohibit him from [partaking of] non-consecrated things which were permitted to him prior to Yom Kippur, whetting the appetite and measuring for this prohibited fat of Holy Things explicitly to be liable for it because of the Day of Atonement.

Introduction In this mishnah the rabbis try to figure out how a person could eat one piece of forbidden fat and by that one act become liable to four hatats and an asham. As we have seen before, this is the kind of question the rabbis like to ask. Think of this as a rabbinic riddle, almost like asking a Scrabble or Boggle player, how many words you can make from another word. Fun!

ואשם אחד – the guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated articles that he benefitted from that which was consecrated [to the Temple] inadvertently. But even this prohibition adds on the sacred object that is held at the delivery of an oath, for prior to his sanctifying it, this forbidden fat was prohibited to eat, but permissible in deriving benefit, once it was sanctified, it becomes prohibited even for deriving benefit, and because the name of “dedicated to the Temple” takes effect on the forbidden fat to prohibit him from deriving benefit, it also takes effect to make him liable for eating it because he is benefitting from that which is dedicated to the Temple.

It is possible that by one act of eating a person could become liable to four hatats and one asham:
If an unclean person eats forbidden fat, which was at the same time notar of an offering, and [it was on] Yom Kippur. Let’s list the hatats and asham. First the hatats: 1) For eating holy food while in an impure state. 2) For eating forbidden fat. 3) For eating notar. 4) For eating on Yom Kippur. The asham is for eating sacrificial meat in the first place. This is called “meilah” and it means illicit transgression of holy property.

אם היה שבת והוציאו בפיו – while he was eating it [going from one domain to another].

Rabbi Meir says: if it was on Shabbat and he carried it out, he is liable [to yet another hatat]. But they said to him: this is a different name. Rabbi Meir adds a fifth hatat if it was on Shabbat and he carried it from one domain to another. The other rabbis disagree because this hatat is for carrying and not for eating. All of the other hatats and the asham were for the eating itself.

חייב – [he is liable] also on he removal from one domain to another. Bur in the Gemara (Tractate Keritot 14a) it explains that this is what he said: If it was Yom Kippur that fell on the Sabbath and he took it out, he is liable for two [sins] on his removing it – because of the Sabbath and because of Yom Kippur, the two of them come as one, for at the time that he sanctified the day for Sabbath, he sanctified also for Yom Kippur. And just as there is an Eruv and removal [from one domain to another] for Shabbat, so too, there is an Eruv and removal [from one domain to another] on Yom Kippur. And the prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition with the prohibition at one time.

אינו מן השם – meaning to say the Tanna/teacher (i.e., Rabbi Meir) did not consider anything other than sin-offerings that come because of eating, but this is because of removal [from one domain to another].

בתו ואחותו – as, for example, he who has sexual intercourse with his mother and gives birth from this to a daughter, and she is his daughter and his sister from his mother, but his brother’s wife who was married to him prior to this and he died, and after his death, she married his father’s brother, and her father had sexual intercourse with her while she was a menstruant woman, and now we have the prohibition of his daughter and his sister that come as one. But even though she is illegitimate and prohibited to enter into the congregation/community [of the LORD], when she married to her father’s brother, the betrothal/Kiddushin was valid with her, because Kiddushin/betrothal takes effect in those who are liable for violating a negative commandment. Alternatively, if her father’s brothers were illegitimate/Mamzerim they are permitted to marry her ab initio, but she is prohibited to her father because of the prohibition of his brother’s wife because he is an additional prohibition, for at the outset, she was permitted to all the brothers of her father, and when she married to one of them, she became prohibited to all of the rest of the brothers [of her father], and because the name of brother’s wife takes effect regarding the rest of the brothers that she was permitted to him, the name of the brother’s wife also takes effect regarding her father to make her liable also because of the wife of his brothers. If his brother died and she married the brother of her father’s father, since it adds to her a prohibition regarding the rest of his father’s brothers, it adds to her the prohibition regarding himself. She would be a married woman, since she added a prohibition regarding the world (i.e., by being married), a prohibition added to her regarding him. If she became menstruous, since a prohibition was added regarding her husband, a prohibition was also added regarding him.

Introduction We’ve talked about food, now let’s talk about sex! Seriously, today’s mishnah is similar to yesterday’s in its form and style, but instead of discussing how many hatats one can be liable for eating forbidden food, now the rabbis try to figure out how many hatats one can be liable for one act of forbidden sex.

חייב עליה משום בת בתו וכלתו – as for example, when she married his son.

By one act of intercourse one may become liable for six hatats: If one had intercourse with his daughter, he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter, his sister, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, and [he can also be guilty] of intercourse with a married woman and a menstruant. Try to follow this one. A man has sex with his mother and they have a daughter. She is his sister and his daughter. If she marries his paternal brother (this is legal) she is now his brother’s wife. When she is divorced or widowed, she marries his father’s brother (this is also legal). When he has relations with this one woman, he has transgressed four incest prohibitions, all at the same time. In addition, if she is married at the time and she is also a menstruant, he has transgressed six times with one act. [I hope it was worth it!].

ואחות אשתו – when he married the daughter of his brother-in-law, who is the sister of his daughter’s daughter from/through the father.

If one had intercourse with his daughter’s daughter he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter's daughter, his daughter-in-law, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, his wife's sister, a married woman, and a menstruant. If six hatats wasn’t enough for you, here’s the seventh. If his daughter’s daughter marries his son (possible if they were from different mothers), and she is his wife’s sister (if his wife is his son-in-law’s daughter from a different wife), then it turns out that his daughter’s daughter can be his daughter-in-law and his wife’s sister (three hatats). Then she marries his brother, and then his father’s brother (as in section one). If she is married and a menstruant when he has relations with her, he is liable for seven hatats.

ואשת אחיו – when his son died and she married the brother of this one.

Rabbi Yose said: if the grandfather transgressed and married her first, he may thereby become guilty for offending with his father's wife. In this case, his father can marry her, although this is prohibited by the rabbis. She is his great-granddaughter, and this is only a rabbinic prohibition. Note that he can only marry her in a case of yibbum, because she was married to his brother. She is not his daughter-in-law because she was married to his son’s maternal brother and not maternal brother. This would add another hatat. I know this is complicated, so if you would like to send me a chart, I’d be happy to check it for you.

ןאשת אחי אביו – that his brother died and she married his father’s brother.

So too, if one had intercourse with his wife's daughter or her daughter's daughter. A person can be liable for the same number of hatats if he has the same scenario but with his wife’s daughter and with his wife’s granddaughter. You might ask how his wife’s daughter can be his sister, since he can’t normally marry his sister’s mother. This could happen if his father had a daughter out of wedlock with a woman and he married this woman (this is permitted, although prohibited rabbinically). It now turns out that this child is wife’s daughter and his paternal sister.

אם עבר הזקן (if the grandfather transgressed) – the father of this one, and he married her, and afterwards, he had sexual relations with her, e is liable even on the [prohibition of] the father’s wife. But even though she is the wife of his brother, for we obligate him to an entity because of the wife of his father’s brother, so we see that she is forbidden to him, to his father because of her being his brother’s wife and she has no marital status with her, what are we dealing with here? As for example, when she fellow before him for a levirate marriage from his brother, who died without children and he engaged in levirate marriage and married her, but this grandfather who sinned who is taught in the Mishnah, which is because she is to him only a second level prohibition, because of the daughter of his son’s daughter and because of the wife of his son, because from the words of the Scribes, both of them are secondary relationships. But if you say that she is his daughter-in-law, we obligate him to an entity because she is the brother’s wife, which is not a refutation/objection, for one could establish that she is the brother’s wife of his son from his mother, and not the daughter-in-law of the father, but rather, the wife of his stepson and she is permitted to him. But if you should say, what prohibition is there that is added with the daughter of his daughter, when his father sinned and married her, for she is liable to him also, because of the prohibition of being the wife of the father, This matter is asked in the Gemara (Tractate Keritot 14b) and they answered that there is a son to the grandfather and he is the brother of that one (the Gemara uses the illustration of Ishmael dying without children and Isaac, his brother, who is the father of Jacob, engaged in a levirate marriage with Ishmael’s wife; but even though she is the wife of the brother of Jacob his son (i.e., Esau), she is not his daughter-in-law, for we are speaking here of the brother of Jacob from the mother, for he was not the son of Isaac), for since a prohibition was added through her regarding that son because of her father’s wife, a prohibition was added also regarding him.

וכן הבא על בת אשתו – he is liable for her because of of these that he is liable with his daughter.

ועל בת בת אשתו – he is liable because of all of those that he is liable for engaging in sexual intercourse with the daughter of his daughter. But the daughter of his wife who is his sister is found with her. As, for example, that his father either raped or seduced a woman and through her gave birth to a daughter, and afterwards he married the raped or seduced wife of his father who is permitted to him, for that daughter is his sister or the daughter of his wife. But the daughter of his wife’s daughter and the siser of his wife is found, as for example, that the father of his wife had sexual relations with the daughter of his wife, and she gave birth to a daughter, that daughter is the daughter of his wife’s daughter and the sister of his wife.

משום חמותו וכלתו ואחות אשתו (because of his mother-in-law, his daughter-in-law and his wife’s sister) – the father who had sexual intercourse with his daughter and produced from her a daughter, Reuven married this daughter, her mother is prohibited to him because she is his mother-in-law and [because] she is his wife’s sister; If she married the son of Reuven, there is added to her the prohibition because of his daughter-in-law. If the son of Reuven died, or he divorced her and she married his brother, there is added to her the prohibition of being the wife of his brother. If his brother dies or he divorced her and she married his father’s brother, there is added to her the prohibition of being the wife of his father’s brother. If she merely married and she is a married woman and is menstruating. If Reuven had sexual relations with her while she was married and a menstruating woman, he is liable for her because of all of these prohibitions listed by name.

Introduction Today’s mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. There are more attempts to figure out how many transgressions a person can transgress with one act of intercourse.

וכן הבא על אם חמותו – Laban has sexual relations with Dinah, the daughter of Leah his daughter, and he sires a daughter, whose name is Serah; the person (i.e., man) who marries Serah is forbidden to Leah because of the mother of his mother-in-law and because she is the sister of his wife, for Serah his wife and Leah are the daughters of Laban. If Leah is married to the daughter of the husband of Serah,, and becomes his daughter-in-law, and afterwards to his brother, and afterwards to the brother of his father, if the husband of Serah has sexual relations while she is a married woman and a menstruating woman, he is liable for her because of all of the categories mentioned.

If one had relations with his mother-in-law he may thereby become guilty for [having relations] with his mother-in-law, his daughter-in-law, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, his wife's sister, a married woman, and a menstruant. I’ll use some names for this one. Let’s say Lavan has sex with Leah his daughter and they have a daughter, Dina. Yaakov marries Dina, so that Leah is his mother-in-law and his wife’s sister. Leah marries Reuven, Yaakov’s son, and now Leah is his daughter-in-law. If Reuven dies or divorces her and then she marries Yaakov’s brother, she is now his brother’s wife. Then, after death or divorce, she marries Yaakov’s father’s brother, so she is his father’s brother’s wife. If she is married and a menstruant when Yaakov has relations with her, he is liable for seven hatats.

ואם חמיו – Reuven has sexual relations with his grandmother, the wife of Laban, the mother of his mother Leah, and he sires a daughter and her name is Dinah, the person who marries Dinah will be forbidden to Leah, the mother of Reuven will be forbidden to him because of [the prohibition] of the mother of his father-in-law and because of the [prohibition] of the sister of his wife, for Dinah, his wife, and Leah, the mother of his father-in-law, both of them are the daughters of the wife of Laban. If she became his daughter-in-law and afterwards the wife of his brother and afterwards the wife of his father’s brother and a married woman and a menstruating woman, he is liable for her because of all of these categories mentioned.

And so too, if one had intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law or of his mother-in-law. One can become liable for the same hatats if the woman is the mother of his father-in-law or the mother of his mother-in-law.

הבא על חמותו חייב עליה כו' – The wife of Laban had two daughters, Leah and Rachel, and one son, whose name is Asher, and the name of Asher’s daughter is Serah, and one came from the marketplace and married Rachel and Yocheved the daughter of Leah and Serah the daughter of Asher, and afterwards, the person who marries these three women has sexual relations with the wife of Laban, he is liable on her account because of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. Because of his mother-in-law, for she is the mother of Rachel his wife. And because of the mother of his mother-in-law, for she is the mother is Leah his mother-in-law. And because of the mother of his father-in-law, because she is the mother of Asher his father-in-law.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: if one had intercourse with his mother-in-law he may thereby become guilty for [having relations] with his mother-in-law, the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. They said to him: all these three are the same name. Eve has two daughters Rachel and Leah and one son, Lavan. If Yaakov marries Rachel and Leah’s daughter and Lavan’s daughter, then Eve is his mother-in-law (Rachel’s mother), his mother-in-law’s mother-in-law (Leah’s daughter’s mother) and his father-in-law’s mother (Lavan, his father-in-law’s, mother). If you added these prohibitions to the previous scenario, you could come up with nine hatats (don’t try this at home!). The other rabbis say that “mother-in-laws” are all one name, meaning that they are all one prohibition. This is because the prohibition of various types of mother-in-law’s is included in Leviticus 18:17: “Do not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; nor shall you marry her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter and uncover her nakedness: they are kindred, it is depravity.” Since they are all included in one verse if someone manages to have a woman who is all three at the same time, there is only one hatat for the “mother-in-law” prohibitions.

שלשתן שם אחד הם – in one Biblical verse it is written (see Leviticus 18:17 – “Do not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; nor shall you marry her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter and uncover her nakedness: they are kindred; it is depravity”) and one it is not. Therefore, there is no separation of sin-offerings between them. And this is the Halakha (i.e., only one sin-offering).

באיטליס – a marketplace where they sell meat there.

Introduction In our mishnah Rabbi Akiva begins to ask concerning the question of how one distinguishes between separate transgressions, for which one is liable for each individually, and one extended transgression, for which one is liable only once.

של אמאום – the name of a city.

Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua at the meat-market of Emmaus, where they went to buy meat for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamaliel's son: The mishnah begins with an interesting tidbit of historical information. Rabbi Akiva was in Emmaus (near the Latrun exit on the Tel-Aviv-Jerusalem highway, not far from my house). There he ran into Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua buying meat for Rabban Gamaliel’s son’s wedding. Feeling himself lucky to run into some rabbis, probably not an everyday occurrence, he decides to ask them a halakhic riddle. Note that the question is not a practical one, but rather an academic one. This is an interesting window into what kinds of questions rabbis asked each other when they met.

הבא על אחותו וכו' – this is what he said: he who has sexual relations with his sister who is the sister of of his father and the sister of his mother, and we have found such a case, as, for example, when Reuven had sexual relations with his mother and fathered from her two daughters and then he returned and had sexual relations with one of these daughters and from her fathered a so, and the son had sexual relations with his sister, who is the sister of his father and the sister of his mother.

What [is the law concerning] a man who had intercourse with his sister, his father's sister and his mother's sister? Is he liable for one sacrifice for all of them, or to one [separate sacrifice] for each of them? The case is one in which a man had relations with three women prohibited to him, all of whom are different types of prohibited “sisters.” All three transgressions were done in one period of unawareness. Either he didn’t know that there was such a prohibition, or he didn’t know that these women were his sister, father’s sister and mother’s sister. Thus the question is, if in one period of unawareness one commits three transgressions that are called by a similar name, is he liable for three hatats or one?

וחומר – And what if a person had sexual intercourse with five wives who are menstruating women which are one category (Leviticus 18:19): “Do not come near a woman during her period of uncleanness,” he would be liable for each and every one. A person who has sexual relations with his siter, who is the sister of his father and the sister of his mother, which are three categories, meaning to say, three negative commandments that are divided, is it not the case that he should be liable for each and every one? But this a fortiori is refuted/raises an objection, for how can five women who are menstruating be separate/distinct bodies? But the reason, is because as Scripture states (Leviticus 20:17): “He has uncovered the nakedness of his sister, etc.,” and it is an extra verse, for at the beginning of the verse, it is written “If a man marries his sister….so that he sees her nakedness, etc.” Why should he review further “that he has uncovered his sister’s nakedness,” but rather to teach about his sister who is the father’s sister and his mother’s sister, who is liable for each and every one.

They replied: we have heard nothing [about this], but we have heard that if one had intercourse with five menstruants in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to a sacrifice for each [act], and it seems to us that the case [you asked about] may be derived by an a fortiori conclusion (kal. Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua respond that they don’t have an answer to the question, at least not one that they have received from their teachers. In other words, Rabbi Akiva has thought of a new situation that was never before discussed. [Good job, Rabbi Akiva!] While they don’t have a received answer, they do have a similar received tradition concerning a man who has relations with five menstruants in one period of unawareness. Despite the fact that this is one type of transgression (prohibition of sex with a menstruant) he is liable for a hatat for each transgression. It seems that he is liable for five hatats because each one is a different woman. The distinctness of their bodies one from the other makes these five sins and not one sin of transgressing the prohibition of sex with a menstruant. From this case Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua conclude that all the more so (kal vehomer) in the case of the three sisters, he would be liable for a hatat for each sister, because there is some difference between the status of each sister while they are all sister’s they are different types of sisters.

אבר המדולדל בבהמה – most of it is detached and part of it is interwoven.

Introduction Rabbi Akiva asks another question to Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua.

מהו – that he should become defiled because of [the prohibition of] a limb from a living animal, as if it was detached completely, but we hold in [Tractate Hullin, Chapter 9, Mishnah 8] “The Flesh and the Juice,” that a limb from a living animal defiles like a carrion. But a limb that is detached completely from a human being completely defiles like the dead person.

Rabbi Akiva further asked: If a limb hangs loose from the body of a living beast, what is the law? A limb removed from a living animal is considered to convey impurity like carrion. Rabbi Akiva asks concerning a case of a limb that is hanging loose from an animal. A sinew or some skin is connecting it to the animal, but the limb will not heal and become fully reattached to the animal. Does such a limb convey impurity even though it is still attached?

באבר המדולדל באדם – that it is partly interwoven, it is ritually pure.

They replied: We have heard nothing about this, but we have heard about a limb hanging loose from the body of a man, that it is clean. As was the case in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua do not have a received tradition, but they can again figure out the answer by comparing it to a case for which they do have a tradition. If a person has a limb hanging loose from his body, it does not convey impurity as if it were a dead body.

מוכי שחין (afflicted with boils) - that their limbs are falling.

And thus those that were afflicted with boils used to do in Jerusalem. He would go on the eve of Pesah to the doctor, and he would cut the limb until only contact of a hairbreadth was left; he then stuck it on a thorn and then tore himself away from it. In this manner both that man and the physician could make their pesah offering. They now explain how people would use this halakhah to prevent them from becoming impure on the eve of Pesah, and thereby lose their ability to sacrifice and eat the pesah offering. People who had boils and needed to have a limb removed would go to the doctor. He could not cut off the limb because then he would become impure. To solve this problem, he would cut off most of the limb until it was only connected by a hairbreadth. At this point the limb was still pure. He would then stick the limb on a thorn stuck into the ground like a peg. The person with boils would then rip his own limb off (ouch!). In this way, the doctor would not touch the limb while it was being ripped off. Both the doctor and his patient could then offer their pesah sacrifice that evening.

וחותכה – not because of ritual purity, for before this, it is also ritually pure, but rather so that it is not detestable on the Festival with a dangling limb.

And it seems to us that your case may be derived from this by a kal vehomer. From this case we can draw a “kal vehomer” argument. If the limb hanging from a human body which would convey the more serious impurity of a dead body is pure as long as it is still hanging from the body, all the more so the limb hanging from a live animal, which would have the lesser impurity of “carrion,” is pure if it is still hanging.

שמניח בו כשערה – but doesn’t cut it off completely, so as to not defile the person who cuts it (i.e., the doctor) when he touches it at the time of its separation.

ותוחבו – to the limb.

בסירה – with a thorn that is attached the ground.

והוא – the sick person.

נמשך – and the limb is torn away on its own, and the sick person is not ritually impure because he pulls himself with strength at one clip and the limb is detached from im with power and there is no contact at the time of separation.

שהדברים קל וחומר – for just as a person is susceptible to ritual defilement while alive, the dangling limb from him is ritually pure, an animal which is not susceptible to ritual impurity while alive, is it not the case that the limb that is dangling from it is ritually pure?

באוכל מזבח אחד בחמשה תמחויין – with five cooked dishes separated from each other, he is liable for religious sacrilege if he consumed them prior to the sprinkling of their blood.

Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all?
They replied: we have heard nothing about this.
Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer.
Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar ( from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them?
They replied: we have heard nothing about this.
Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer.
Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal.
He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it.
He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar ( where not one of these laws applies.
Rabbi Akiva continues to ask questions. This mishnah returns to the subject of mishnah seven what constitutes separate transgressions?
Section one: After having heard from Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua that if a man has relations with five different menstruants during one period of unawareness he is liable for five separate hatats, Rabbi Akiva asks a follow-up question concerning a person who slaughters five sacrifices outside the Temple, all in one period of unawareness. We might say that in the case of the menstruants there were five separate transgressions because the prohibition of relations with a menstruant applies to the women as well, and therefore, since each woman is transgressing, so too the man must be committing a separate transgression with each woman. In contrast, when it comes to the sacrifices, they can all be treated as one, because they (obviously) are incapable of committing their own transgressions.
Section two: Again, both rabbis respond that they do not have an answer to his question.
Section three: Rabbi Joshua derives a kal vehomer from a person who illegally eats one sacrifice which has been put onto five plates. Here, the fact that the meat is on different plates serves to separate these into different transgressions of sacrilege, even though it is only one sacrifice. If the separate plates make us consider one act to be several different acts, all the more so would we consider five different sacrifices to be five different acts, for which he is liable for five hatats.
Sections 4-6: Rabbi Shimon, a student of Rabbi Akiva’s, rejects the previous version of the question and answer between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Joshua, because it made a comparison between slaughtering and eating. Rather Rabbi Akiva asked Rabbi Joshua about a person who ate “remnant” (sacrificial meat left over beyond the time in which it must be eaten) from five different sacrifices. To this question Rabbi Joshua responded with the same answer given above. If someone is guilty for five different offenses for eating one sacrifice divided into five different plates, all the more so he is guilty of five separate transgressions for eating remnant from five different sacrifices.
Section seven: Rabbi Akiva responds that if what Rabbi Joshua is saying is a received tradition, one that Rabbi Joshua learned from his teachers, then he will accept it. But if it is deduced logic, he can offer a logical rebuttal.
This answer is generally understood as showing a preference for revealed tradition over logic Rabbi Akiva would have accepted Rabbi Joshua’s answer if it was a tradition, but logic can be refuted. However, in my opinion, this is merely lip service. It is easy for Rabbi Akiva to say that he would accept Rabbi Joshua’s answer if it was a revealed tradition when he knows very well that it is not so Rabbi Joshua said it was a “kal vehomer,” a type of reasoned argument. Rather, Rabbi Akiva and the editors of the mishnah espouse a philosophy of accepting tradition over reason, but at the same time undermine that preference by pointing out that tradition does not answer many questions, and that therefore one must rely on reason to arrive at answers to new questions. Although reason is susceptible to argumentation, it is, in the end, what we must rely upon to know what to do.
Sections 8-9: Rabbi Joshua now gives Rabbi Akiva a chance to rebut his answer, and Rabbi Akiva eagerly takes up the challenge. He points out that Rabbi Joshua was dealing with a case of “sacrilege” a person eats holy things when he is not allowed to do so. Sacrilege is treated strictly in three ways: 1) a person who gives to another person to eat is just as guilty as if he ate it himself; 2) similarly, if he allowed others to benefit from holy things, he is guilty as if he himself benefited; 3) if a person ate or derived benefit today from a half a perutah’s worth of holy things, and then at a much later period derived benefit from another half of a perutah, these two half perutahs are joined together and he is liable for sacrilege. None of these stringencies apply to notar, remnant. Therefore, one cannot make an analogy from a tradition concerning sacrilege which is treated stringently, to a question concerning notar, which is treated more leniently.

שהדברים קל וחומר – just as one altar where the bodies are not divided, one is obligated on each and every one because the dishes are divided, five sacrifices whose bodies are divided, is this not the case all the more so?

לא כך שאלן ר' עקיבא – for if he asked them about the slaughterer, what proof did they bring to him from the food, for it is possible to refute him: just as the food which is enjoyed, but rather, perforce, he didn’t ask Rabbi Akiva other than with left-over food from five sacrifices, and he also brought him a proof from food.

אם הלכה – that this is what you received from your Rabbi/Master, he is liable for [sacrilege] for each one of the sacrifices.

ואם לדין – that you learn it from an a fortiori from the laws of religious sacrilege, there is a response.

את המאכיל כאוכל – for if he gave food dedicated to the Temple to his fellow, he is liable as if he at him himself, for we hold that a person who removes something dedicated to be unconsecrated, he has committed sacrifice and not the individual to whom it is was given.

והמהנה כנהנה – with a matter that is not something eatable.

צריף את המעילה לזמן מרובה – meaning to say, and there is another stringency regarding religious sacrilege, that if he benefited today with half of a penny, and from here until a year with another half-penny, they combine to form a penny, as well that we make a profit from (Leviticus 5:14): “When a person commits a trespass, [being unwittingly remiss about any of the LORD’s sacred things],” he increased.

תאמר באכילת נותר – that we judge upon him that he doesn’t have one of these stringencies, and the matter is not made clear if Rabbi Yehoshua accepted that response or did not accept it. But the Halakhic decision is that a person who eats left-overs from five sacrifices in one act of forgetfulness is not liable other than for one sin-offering, and the dishes are not divided whether for leniency or stringency.

מלאכות הרבה מעין מלאכה אחת – many derivatives of one chief category [of work on Shabbat].

Introduction In today’s mishnah, the last one of this fascinating chapter, Rabbi Akiva asks Rabbi Eliezer a question concerning Shabbat. As background we should remind ourselves of a couple of general rules concerning Shabbat. There are 39 different categories of prohibited labor on Shabbat. If one performs labor from different categories, for instance he cooks and he plants, he is liable for a hatat (if done unwittingly) for each labor. However, if one performs two different acts that stem from the same category, for instance he cooks and bakes, he is liable for only one hatat. Our mishnah deals with a person who does many acts that all belong to the same category (cooking for instance) but he does them on different Shabbats. Is he liable for each transgression?

ובשבתות הרבה – those that he did on that Shabbat he did on other Sabbaths, and all of them were in one act of forgetfulness. But in the Gemara (Tractate Keritot 16a and continued on Keritot 16b) raises the objection: Why was it necessary that it mentioned [in the Mishnah] many Sabbaths and many and many derivatives, why did it [i.e., the Mishnah] take “derivatives” and not chief categories of labor? And it answers that Rabbi Akiva asked two things from him: One: A person who does one form of work on many Sabbaths and he knows that it is Shabbat, but that he held that this labor is permitted, meaning, willfully, regarding [knowledge of] Shabbat and Inadvertently regarding labors, and this is what he asked him: this [individual] that performed one [prohibited] form of work on two Sabbaths, shall we say that since that they are on two days, even though it is one act of forgetfulness, regarding the [prohibited] work, these Sabbaths would be like divided bodies of [forbidden] labor , that are not similar one to the other, as for example, that he sowed [a field] and repeated in one act of forgetfulness - that is a willful violation of Shabbat but an inadvertent [form of] labor, that he is liable for each and every one [of the labors], or they are not like divided bodies, and it is as if he performed through one act of forgetfulness one [forbidden] form of labor ten times and is not liable for each and every one, for one can’t say here that the days in-between are a knowledge [of the violation on Shabbat] to divide, for specifically, regarding the matter of an inadvertent [violation of] Shabbat there is the awareness to know that it was Shabbat, but regarding the inadvertent nature of the labors performed, there isn’t awareness until he studies. And further, they inquired of him, if he performed many derivative acts from one primary form of labor [of the thirty-nine mentioned in Tractate Shabbat, Chapter Seven, Mishnah Two], is he liable for one [violation only] or on each and every act [performed, and for this reason, it (i.e., the Mishnah) refers to derivatives [of the primary forms of labor].

Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? Rabbi Akiva asks concerning a person who does many acts of forbidden labor, all from the same category, on many different Shabbats, all within one period of unawareness. For instance, he does not know that it is forbidden to cook on Shabbat, so he cooks, bakes, broils, boils, etc. on many different Shabbats. Does the fact that these acts were performed on different Shabbats make him liable for one hatat for each Shabbat, or do we consider this one sin of cooking, and he is liable for only one hatat?

אמר לו חייב על כל אחת ואחת – He (i.e., Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyranus) explained to him (i.e., Rabbi Akiva) that on both [questions], a stringent [response], that a person who performs one [forbidden] labor on many Sabbaths willfully disregarding Shabbat while the [individual prohibited] forms of labor are inadvertent, is liable for each and every Sabbath [when this particular prohibited labor is violated], for these Sabbaths are compared to divided bodies, and the derivates of these [forbidden] forms of labor are like [forbidden] forms of labor, and he is liable for each and every derivative, and even though they are from one chief category [of forbidden work], it is as if he did many chief categories of labor.

He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! Rabbi Eliezer responds with the same kal vehomer argument that Rabbi Joshua used in the previous mishnah. If one is liable for one hatat for every menstruant he has relations with, even though this prohibition does not have categories and many ways of sinning as does Shabbat, all the more so one is liable for one hatat for every transgression of Shabbat.

ומה נדה – in the Gemara (Tractate Keritot 17a) we state that it teaches menstruating women (i.e.. plural), he who has sexual relations with five menstruating women is liable for each and every act, for they are separated entities/bodies.

I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? Rabbi Akiva rebuts Rabbi Eliezer’s comparison. Relations with different menstruants are considered different transgressions because the women are also sinning, as we explained in yesterday’s mishnah. Since the women are warned against sinning just as much as the men, we must consider these different acts. In contrast when it comes to Shabbat, there is only one warning, because there is only one party.

תוצאות הרבה – many different matters, as, for example, the Sabbath which has chief categories of labor and their derivatives. But [concerning] a menstruating woman, the only legal obligation that she has is [the prohibition] from sexual intercourse.

He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. Rabbi Eliezer defends his answer by slightly adjusting the question. Instead of basing his kal vehomer on relations with five menstruating women, whom he admits are liable for transgressing the prohibition, he bases the kal vehomer on a man who has relations with five menstruating minors. Because they are minors they are not liable, and nevertheless, he is liable for five separate transgressions. Therefore, the same is true with regard to Shabbat.

והנדה מוזהרת עליו – as it is written (Leviticus 20:18): “[If a man lies with a woman in her infirmity and uncovers her nakedness, he has laid bare her flow and she has exposed her blood flow;] both of them shall be cut off from among their people.”

I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? Rabbi Akiva rejects this by noting that although minors are not now liable, they will be in the future. In other words, this is a transgression that still counts as having two parties, unlike Shabbat, where there is only the transgressor.

הבא על הקטנה – He who has sexual relations with five menstruating minor [females] is liable for each and every one of them, even though the minor [female] is not warned [regarding this prohibition].

He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. Rabbi Eliezer finds another case of sexual transgression, where there is a sin but only one person sins the case of intercourse with an animal. Just as one is guilty for five hatats if he has intercourse with five different animals, so too he is guilty if he performs one forbidden labor on five different Shabbats.

הבא על הבהמה יוכיח – [a male who has sexual intercourse with an animal] is liable for each and every act of sexual intercourse.

I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat. Finally, Rabbi Akiva admits that the analogy is appropriate, yet he still rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s answer. He says that his question is about the case of intercourse with animals just as it is about Shabbat. In both cases you have one sin done on multiple occasions and he wants to know if the act should be divided into different acts for which he is liable for each individual sin, or if this is considered just one sin, for which he is liable only one hatat. Final notes on Rabbi Akiva: In my opinion this debate should be looked upon as a debate between two different approaches to law: realistic versus nominal. To Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Joshua and Rabban Gamaliel, if one does several different acts, each of which is a transgression, one is liable for each act. This is a “realistic” approach it examines what a person has actually done. In contrast, Rabbi Akiva adopts a more “nominal” approach. The person has committed one transgression, even though he did so on separate occasions. He ate forbidden foods, he had forbidden sex or he broke the prohibition of cooking, for instance, on Shabbat. Nominally, or legally, speaking, these are all one transgression, and therefore he should be liable for only one hatat. In general, I think that there is a trend in rabbinic Judaism to go from a more “realistic” approach, which probably typified an approach to halakhah commonly found among the priests, to a more “nominal” one. The leader of this movement seems to have been Rabbi Akiva.

בהמה כשבת – meaning to say, just as I need to mention it regarding Shabbat, it is also necessary to mention it regarding [sexual intercourse] with animals. But Rabbi Akiva did not accept from Rabbi Eliezer [ben Hyrcanus], neither in the matter that he mentioned about one who does one chief form of labor on many Sabbaths that they are like separate bodies, nor regarding the matter of derivatives of primary forms of labor are like primary forms of labor. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Eliezer.