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האשה. לא תנשא – since her husband went [abroad] without children.

Introduction This mishnah deals with a woman whose husband died abroad and she is not sure whether or not she is obligated to have yibbum with his brother.

ולא תתיבם – for perhaps her rival/associate wife gave birth, and if she should say, perform the ritual of removing the shoe of the brother-in-law who refuses to perform levirate marriage, and afterwards marry whomever you want in the world whichever way you turn. They answered in the Gemara (Tractate Yevamot 119b) because a woman whose husband died without children who has performed the rite of Halitzah with a brother of the deceased is disqualified of [marrying into] the priesthood and if she should perform the rite of Halitzah and it is found afterward that her rival/associate wife gave birth to a living child, her Halitzah is not anything, they need to announce concerning her that she is fit for the priesthood, and was not disqualified on account of that rite of ahalitzah. And whomever that it is found at the time of her Halitzah, and is not found at the time where they announced about the Halitzah, it is nothing and she is not disqualified from the priesthood through her and when he sees her afterwards married to a Kohen, he would say that a woman who had performed the rite of Halitzah is permitted to a Kohen.

A woman whose husband and rival wife went to a country beyond the sea, and to whom people came and said, “your husband is dead”, must neither marry nor contract yibbum until she has ascertained whether her rival wife is pregnant. In this case, the husband and a rival wife went abroad, and at that time the husband had no children. Although the wife who remained behind is certain that her husband is dead, she does not know whether she is liable for yibbum, because she doesn’t know if her rival wife had children while abroad. Therefore she cannot remarry.

היתה לה חמות – abroad.

If she had a mother-in-law she need not be concerned [she had another son]. But if [the mother-in-law] departed while pregnant she must be concerned [that another son was born.
Rabbi Joshua says: she need not be concerned. If the husband traveled abroad and at that time he had no brothers, his wife need not be concerned lest her mother-in-law gave birth to a child before her husband died. Perhaps this is because it is uncommon for a woman to give birth to another child after her older child is already married. Furthermore, even if the mother-in-law gave birth, only a male child will make the wife liable for yibbum. This distinguishes this case from the case in section where a child of other sex will exempt the wife from yibbum, and therefore we are concerned lest she be exempt. If, however, the mother-in-law was pregnant when she traveled, the daughter must be concerned, lest she gave birth to a male child. The wife must wait until she is certain that her mother-in-law did not have a boy. Rabbi Judah holds that in this case as well, the wife need not be concerned and may remarry immediately. This is because there are “two doubts”. The mother-in-law may have miscarried (as older women often do), and even if she gave birth to a viable child, the child might be female. In cases of “two doubts”, the halakhah is generally more lenient.

אינה חוששת – perhaps she had been given a levir even though we suspect above lest her rival wife had given birth whether to a male or a female, he exempts her to this one who is performing the duty of levirate marriage but her mother-in-law, if she also gave birth, she would not be needed for her for this one but if she had given birth to male, it is possible to state that perhaps she aborted, and if you can assume that she did not abort, perhaps it was a girl.

יצתה מלאה – pregnant.

חוששת – perhaps she had been given a levir. But the Halakha not according to Rabbi Yehoshua who said that she does not have to worry/scruple [concerning her].

שתי יבמות – the wives of two brothers.

Introduction This mishnah deals with a situation in which, while it may be assumed that a husband is dead, it cannot be assumed that his brother, the yavam is dead. We should remind ourselves of two rules learned in the previous chapter: 1) a woman is believed when she says, “My husband is dead”; 2) a sister-in-law is not believed when she says, “Your husband is dead.”

מפני בעלה של זו – perhaps he is living and she is bound/chained to him, and even though that his wife states that he has died, she is not believed to permit this one (i.e., the woman) to the whole world through her [words on her] lips for the widow of a brother who died without issue does not provide testimony on her fellow widow of a brother who died without issue.

Two sisters-in-law, one says, “My husband is dead”, and the other also says, “My husband is dead”, this one is forbidden on account of the husband of this one, and this one is forbidden on account of the husband of this one. Although in this case we believe each sister-in-law when she states that her own husband is dead, neither sister-in-law is free to remarry lest the yavam, her brother-in-law is alive. Even though each woman’s sister-in-law says that the other’s yavam is dead, sisters-in-law are not allowed to testify for one another, because they might hate each other. Our mishnah teaches that these women are not believed vis-a-vis the other, even though they are believed vis-a-vis themselves..

לזו עדים – whose husband died and the other [woman whose husband died] does not have witnesses.

If one had witnesses and the other had no witnesses, she who has the witnesses is forbidden, while she who has no witnesses is permitted. If there are witnesses that one woman’s husband has died, the other woman may remarry without fear that he is alive and she is liable for yibbum. That is to say, she is believed with regard to her own husband, and the witnesses are believed with regard to the other husband (her yavam). However, the woman who has witnesses that her own husband died but does not have witnesses that her yavam died, cannot rely on her sister-in-law’s testimony that he died, and therefore cannot remarry.

זו שיש לה עדים אסורה – to marry to the entire world, for she is a widow of a brother who died without issue who did not have witnesses that he died.

If the one has children and the other has no children, she who has children is permitted and she who has no children is forbidden. The woman who had children is, of course, exempt from yibbum. The woman who did not have children is liable.

וזו שאין לה עדים מותרת – for on account of her husband, she is not forbidden, for she is believed to state: “my husband died,” and because of her being a widow of a brother who died without issue also, she is not forbidden for witnesses came testifying that he had died.

If they contracted yibbum, and the yevamim died, they are forbidden [to marry again]. Rabbi Elazar says: since they were permitted to marry the yevamim, they are subsequently permitted to marry any man. In this case two sisters-in-law, both of whom say, “My husband died”, have no witnesses and no children, and then have yibbum with two other brothers (not married to either of these two women). This is permitted, as we learned in 15:1. If afterwards, one of these brothers dies, the women may not remarry, lest the other brother-in-law still be alive, as we learned in section one. The innovation is that even though an assumption was made that both original husbands had died, and therefore both women were permitted to have yibbum, nevertheless, we continue to fear that one of the women is lying and that the other woman’s brother-in-law is still alive. Rabbi Elazar holds that since we made the assumption that both original husbands were dead, we cannot go back to assuming that they might be alive. Therefore the women are permitted to marry whomever they want, without fear that they are still tied to their brothers-in-law.

לזו בנים ולזו אין בנים – and there are witnesses neither to this one nor to that one; the woman who has children is permitted [to remarry] and the one who has no children is prohibited [from remarrying].

נתיבמו – that they had here two widows of brothers who died without issue and they married their levirs and the levirs died, they are forbidden to marry anyone in the whole world: this one (i.e., the first woman), because of the first husband of the other one, and that one (i.e., the second woman) because of the first husband of the other one, even though both were married to their levirs because of the presumption that their husbands had died, through their own testimony hey married, and they were believed, for the woman who said: “my husband died,” should be married by her levir. But now, that they would will be married to anyone in the world, no, for if they would marry to anyone in the world, it would be found that the testimony of this woman would be beneficial to that one (i.e., woman) and the testimony of that one (i.e., woman) would be beneficial to the other (i.e. woman), and widows of brothers who died without issue cannot give testimony one for the other.

הואיל והותרו ליבמין – on the presumption their husbands had died, they were permitted to marry anyone in the world, and furthermore, we don’t suspect lest that they are living, but the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Eleazar.

פרצוף פנים עם החוטם – if he did not see him with the appearance of his face or that his nose was taken , we don’t testify to permit [someone else] to marry his wife, for perhaps it is not him.

Introduction This mishnah provides rules of what a witness needs to see in order to testify that someone is dead.

מגוייד – dissected like [Daniel 4:14]: “Hew down the tree, [lop off is branches].”

They are allowed to testify only about the face with the nose, even though there were also marks on the man’s body or clothing. A person is identifiable only through his face and his nose. Therefore, if someone sees other parts of his body or face, but not his face and nose, he cannot testify that the person is dead.

או חיה אוכלת בו – specifically in he place where his soul does not depart from [his body], but if it in the place where the soul departs, he testifies about him that he has died.

They are allowed to testify only when his soul has departed, even though they have seen him cut up or crucified or being devoured by a wild beast. The person must already be dead in order to establish testimony of his death. It is not sufficient to see him being cut up, crucified or devoured by a wild beast. Even though his imminent death in these situations is nearly certain, this is not sufficient.

אין מעידין אלא עד ג' ימים – if they did not see him until after three days of his death, we don’t testify regarding him, for we suspect lest the appearance of his face has changed and this [individual] is not that whom they think [that it is].

They are allowed to testify only [if they saw the body] within three days [of death]. The witness must testify within three days of the death. Otherwise the body may begin to decompose and identity cannot be provided with certainty.

ר' יהודה בן בבא אומר לא כל אדם וכו' – there are people who speedily blows/swells up, such as a heavy persn, and there is a place where a person speedily decomposes and to change, such as in a hot place, and there is a time when the world is hot and a person speedily decomposes and changes, and everything is according to the individual, and the place and the time, whether for leniency or for stringency and the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Judah ben Baba says: not all men, all places, or all times are alike. According to Rabbi Judah ben Baba it is impossible to set uniform rules for identifying bodies. Some men’s faces will change quicker than others at death, in some places decomposition will take place quicker, and much depends on the time of year as well (rain or sun). Therefore each situation must be ruled upon based on the circumstances of that situation.

מים שיש להם סוף – that appears all four directions that surround the water and water that is not in sight of shore, that a person cannot see all about him. But Rabbi Meir does not make a distinction between a body of water that is not within sight of shore and a body of water that is within sight of shore but the Sages dispute in the Baraita (see Tosefta Yevamot, Chapter 14, Halakha 5 and Talmud Yevamot 121a) and state that a body of water that is within sight of shore, his wife is permitted if he tarried there a period of time where it is impossible that he would live, according to this period of time within the water. But water that is not in sight of shore, his wife is forbidden [to remarry] for lest after he came up from there, he left and went on his way, as Rabbi Yosi stated in our Mishnah, and the Halakha is according to the Sages.

Introduction This mishnah deals with deciding whether a person who has entered into a body of water and not reappeared can be assumed to have drowned.

ועלה לאחר שלשה ימים – for Rabbi Meir holds that a person can live within the water for a number of days, and because of this, even in water that is within sight of a shore, that if he comes out, someone will see him, for we suspect that perhaps after he would come out after many days and they wouldn’t see him. But Rabbi Yosi disputes on this and says that there is an incident about a blind person who went down to ritually immerse in a cave and the cave had water that is in sight of a shore and they remained until they died and their married off their wives.

If a man fell into water, whether it had [a visible] end or not, his wife is forbidden [to marry again]. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, even though a man may have fallen into a large body of water and not reappeared, we cannot assume that he is dead. In the Talmud, this opinion is ascribed to Rabbi Meir. The Sages hold that if the water has an end, then his wife may remarry. If the water has an end and we did not see him come out, then we know that he didn’t come out the other side and we can assume that he has drowned. However, if the water has no end, he might have washed up alive on some distant shore and his wife should not remarry.

מן הארכובה ולמטה – since he would be able to live, [his wife] should not remarry lest he leaves and no one sees him, for they are a body of water that is not within sight of a shore.

Rabbi Meir said: it once happened that a man fell into a large cistern and came out after three days. Rabbi Meir now offers a story that illustrates his principle, that even if the water has an end, the person might be alive. In such a case, if people saw that he didn’t come up, they might have left the place where he allegedly drowned, assuming that he was dead. Therefore, we cannot make such an assumption and his wife cannot remarry.

Rabbi Yose: it once happened that a blind man descended into a cave to immerse and his guide went down after him; and after waiting long enough for their souls to depart, permission was given to their wives to marry again. Rabbi Yose disagrees with Rabbi Meir. He brings a story where a blind man and his guide fell into a cave that had water in it and the Sages waited a while and then left and declared that the wife could remarry. If we extrapolate, we can conclude that if the water has an end, she may remarry.

Another incident occurred at Asia where a man was lowered into the sea, and only his leg was brought up, and the Sages ruled: [if the recovered leg contained the part] above the knee [the man’s wife] may marry again, [but if it contained only the part] below the knee, she may not marry again. This mishnah deals with a case where a person was cast into the sea and according to the Talmud he was bound. Later, they drag his leg out of the water. If when they drag the leg out of the water, it is from the knee and up, then we can assume that the person is dead. Even if he survived the loss of part of his leg, he would not be able to swim without a full leg. However, if only the lower part of the leg was cut off, the man might have been able to swim and he might have come out of the water somewhere else. Therefore his wife cannot remarry. Note that this mishnah became all too relevant in determining whether widows of Sept. 11 victims could remarry. Since the World Trade Center is like “water that has an end”, it can be assumed that someone who didn’t show up afterwards had indeed died, and his widow was allowed to remarry.

אפילו שמע מן השנשים – that they don’t intend to testify, he can go to testify so that his (i.e., the dead person) wife may marry.

Introduction This mishnah talks about the acceptability of hearsay regarding a person’s death. Note that such testimony is generally not acceptable in a court of law. The Sages were lenient in these cases in order to make it somewhat easier for a woman to remarry.

הרי אנו הולכים לספוד ולקבור את איש פלוני – in the Gemara (Tractate Yevamot 121b) that one requires that they would say, “we come from eulogizing and burying this particular individual,” and it also requires that he would hear them telling of the matters of the eulogy: “such-and such Rabbis were there,” “such-and-such eulogies were there,” because it is the manner of young children to pay and to bring up names and lest it was an ant or locust that they buried, and bring them in with the name of that certain individual.

Even if he only heard from women saying, “so-and-so is dead”, this is enough. If one hears women saying amongst themselves that a certain man has died, the one who overhears them may go to the court and testify as to his death. This is true even though the women themselves did not intend to testify. If they had intended to testify their testimony would certainly be acceptable, as we learned in the previous chapter. Indeed, they themselves may come to court.

Rabbi Judah says: even if he only heard children saying, “behold we are going to mourn for a man named so-and-so and to bury him” [it is enough]. A second category of people who cannot generally provide testimony is children. However, in this case, in order to make it easier to establish a man’s death, overhearing children speaking about a certain person’s funeral or burial is sufficient.

Whether [such statement was made] with the intention [of providing evidence] or was made with no such intention [it is valid]. Rabbi Judah ben Bava says: with an Israelite [the evidence is valid] only if the man had the intention [of acting as witness]. In the case of a non-Jew the evidence is invalid if his intention was [to act as witness]. According to the first opinion, hearing a person say that so-and-so is dead always allows the hearer to testify as to his death in court, whether or not the person intended to testify. Rabbi Judah ben Bava holds that an Israelite must intend to testify for the one who hears him to be able to repeat his words in court. A non-Jew’s words can be brought to court only if he doesn’t intend to testify. Note that there are some versions of the mishnah in which Rabbi Judah ben Bava says, “with an Israelite [the evidence is valid] even if the man had the intention [of acting as witness].” According to this reading, Rabbi Judah ben Bava agrees with the previous opinion about the Israelite’s testimony (it is acceptable whether or not he intended to testify), but disagrees about the non-Jew’s.

משיאין על פי בת קול – [if] they heard [the voice] crying out that so-and-so has died.

Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss cases of hearsay or other less than perfect testimony about a person’s death.

בצלמון – the name of a place.

They may testify [even if the body was seen] in candle light or in moonlight. Even if a witness only saw the person’s body in candle light or moonlight, he may subsequently testify that he was dead.

And a woman may be given permission to marry again on the evidence of a mere voice. It once happened that a man was standing on the top of a hill and cried, “so-and-so son of so-and-so from such-and-such a place is dead”, but when they went [to the top of the hill] they didn’t find anyone there. [Nevertheless], they allowed his wife to remarry. A “mere voice” is either an echo, or a voice heard from a large distance. In either case, if such a voice is heard saying that a certain person has died, his wife may remarry. This is illustrated in the next case, where people only hear from a distance someone say that so-and-so is dead. They never find the person who said it, so that they could interrogate him further. Nevertheless, the Sages allowed his wife to remarry.

In another instance, at Zalmon a person declared, “I am so-and-so son of so-and-so; a snake has bitten me, and I am dying”; and when they went [to examine the corpse] they did not recognize him, they [nevertheless] allowed his wife to remarry. In this case, that happened in Zalmon (found in the lower Galilee), the person himself stated that he was about to die. He also provided his full name. By the time the witnesses found the body, it had been disfigured and was not identifiable. In any case, since he had stated his name, his wife is allowed to remarry.

ונומיתי לו – I said to him.

Introduction The final mishnah of Yevamoth relates some debates between rabbis over the testimony concerning a man’s death. In our mishnah these debates are set within historical frameworks which relate interesting information as to how the Sages made decisions and about the historical period in which they lived.

כן הדברים – for all of his colleagues dispute him.

Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. This story takes place when Rabbi Akiva is going to Nehardea, which is in Babylonia, in order to intercalate the year, that is to decide whether an extra month must be added in order to adjust the lunar year to the solar year. Normally intercalation is done only in the land of Israel. This event must have occurred during a time of persecution, when courts could not gather in Israel to deal with calendar issues. In any case, when Rabbi Akiva arrives at Bet D’li a man named Nehemiah asks him if it is true that among the rabbis in Israel, only Rabbi Judah ben Bava rules that a woman may marry based on the testimony of a single witness. When Rabbi Akiva confirms this, Nehemiah apologizes that due to the marauders, he cannot reach the land of Israel to talk to the Israeli sages himself, but that he knows a tradition according to which Rabban Gamaliel the Elder allowed a woman to remarry upon the testimony of one witness. When Rabbi Akiva returns, he relates the tradition to the current patriarch, Rabban Gamaliel (Rabban Gamaliel the Elder’s grandson). Rabban Gamaliel rejoices, for a supporting tradition has been found for Rabbi Judah ben Bava’s tradition. Note that Rabban Gamaliel was previously not willing to accept Rabbi Judah ben Bava’s opinion, even though he obviously approved of it. Only when he learns of a supporting tradition, does he accept that a woman may remarry based on the testimony of one witness. After hearing Nehemiah’s words, Rabban Gamaliel himself remembers hearing of an incident where his grandfather permitted the wives of some fallen soldiers to remarry based on the testimony of one witness. At that precedent-setting incident, several others laws were established regarding testimony over a man’s death. Hearsay was declared acceptable, as was the testimony of women and slaves. That is to say the normal rules of testimony were suspended.

משובשת בגייסות – and I am not able to go to you to testify on what I heart, but rather, say to them: You are who have offered testimony in my name.

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him. This section contains a debate between Rabbis Joshua, Eliezer, Akiva and perhaps other Sages, concerning these halakhot. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer both disagree with the halakhah that seems to have been accepted by everyone in the mishnah, up until this point. They hold that for a woman to remarry she needs two valid witnesses to testify that her husband died. Rabbi Akiva, who lived a generation after Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer, and was a student of both of them, agreed partially with them, but also partially with Rabban Gamaliel. According to Rabbi Akiva, women, slaves and relatives cannot testify. However, one witness is sufficient. As a proof against Rabbi Akiva, the other Sages (probably not Rabbi Joshua or Rabbi Eliezer, who lived before Rabbi Akiva) bring a story where an innkeeper testified that someone staying at her inn had died, and the rabbis allowed his wife to remarry. If a mere innkeeper’s testimony is acceptable, then a woman of higher social standing, such as a priest’s wife, can surely testify in such a case. Rabbi Akiva answers that the innkeeper did not merely state that he had died, but she brought out his belongings as well. If the man had been alive, then he would not have left his belongings there. In such a case, where a woman has evidence that he died, she is believed. However, her testimony alone is not sufficient. Despite the fact that the tractate ends by stating that women may not testify about a man’s death, since all of the anonymous mishnayoth above allowed this, and allowed slaves and relatives to testify, as well as hearsay, the accepted halakhah is that all of these are permitted. Indeed, this is a classic case where we can sense that while the earlier tannaim were generally stricter, later tannaim, including the anonymous editors of the mishnah, were more lenient. Congratulations! We have finished Yevamoth. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Tractate Yevamoth was the longest tractate we have yet learned (but it is not the longest in the Mishnah), and parts of it were quite confusing (especially the beginning). For those of you who have learned with us the entire tractate, a hearty Yasher Koach (congratulations). You have accomplished a great deal and you should be proud of yourselves. Many of the principles learned in Yevamoth will appear in other places in the Mishnah, especially in other mishnayoth in Seder Nashim. It will be an especially helpful tractate to remember. Tomorrow we begin to learn Ketuboth.

ר' אליעזר ור' יהושע אומרים כו' ור"ע אומר כו' – but the Halakha is not like one of them bu rather the Halakha is that we marry on the word of a woman and on the word of relatives except for five women that are taught in our Mishnah (see Tractate Yevamot, Chapter 15, Mishnah 4). But on the evidence of a single witness, on the evidence of a woman, on the evidence of a slave, on the evidence of a maid servant is fit for the testimony of a woman.

לא תהא כהנת כפונדקית – meaning to say, of distinguished birth, she is not believed like an heathen inn-hostess, in astonishment, and if they believed the heathen inn-hostess, she makes a statement in ignorance of its legal bearing, all the more so, that they would believe an Israelite woman.

לכתהא פונדקית נאמנת – meaning to say, that the inn-hostess is not believed.