Comentário sobre Yevamot 10:10

האשה. ואמרו לה מת בעליך – that one witness said to her: “your husband has died,” and she married upon the testimony of one witnesses, and therefore, she should leave from this one and that one according to the law of a married woman who has been unchaste who is forbidden to her husband and forbidden to the person who initiated sexual intercourse with her for she is not an outraged woman and even though the Rabbis believe one witness regarding a woman because of being a chained woman. What is the reason? Because she herself is evidence by implication and she marries and this which is not evidence by implication, we fine her but she is married by [the testimony] of two witnesses who said to her that your husband died, but we say at the end, that she marries according to the testimony of the Jewish court, meaning to say, that she didn’t need the permission of the Jewish court since there were two witnesses testifying in the matter. She is permitted to return to her first husband for she is an outraged woman for what could she do? In the Gemara (Talmud Yevamot 88b) it proves that the Halakha is not this, but rather there is no difference whether she married according to the Jewish court with one witness and whether she married through [the testimony] of two witnesses, if her first husband comes, she should leave from this marriage (i.e., the second marriage) and that one (i.e., with the other husband) and all of these paths are concerning her.

Introduction This mishnah, and several mishnayoth which follow deal with the unfortunate situation where a woman thinks her husband has died, she gets remarried, has kids, and then her husband reappears. The mishnah lists the consequences of her now having unwittingly committed adultery. The usual interpretation of this mishnah is that the marriage to the second husband was not valid, since a married woman cannot marry again. The penalties which she receives in this mishnah are because she didn’t check well enough to make sure her first husband is dead. As we shall see, this interpretation has certain difficulties. A teacher of mine, Professor Shamma Friedman, suggested an alternative explanation of the mishnah, an explanation that was based on a comparison of the mishnaic law with other laws found in ancient near eastern law codes, such as the Code of Hammurabi. He proposed that the mishnah actually means that she is married to both men at the same time. The problem with this is that it is forbidden to be married to two men at the same time. Since each marriage is valid but forbidden, she cannot stay married to either and doesn’t get the benefits of either marriage. In other words, both marriages are biblically valid, but each husband makes the other husband’s marriage illegitimate. According to this interpretation, the woman is not penalized for not having checked. Rather the problems she encounters are the result of her being married to two men at the same time.

וצריכא גט מזה ומזה – the reason that she requires a Jewish bill of divorce from the second [husband] for when they see that the first [husband] is alive, they would think that he divorced her, and as a result of this, she married the second [husband] and she is completely his (i.e., the second husband’s) wife, but if he removes her without a Jewish bill of divorce, she is found to be a married woman who leaves without a Jewish bill of divorce.

A woman whose husband had gone to a country beyond the sea and they came and told her, “Your husband died”, married, and then her husband returned: She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum. This section lists all of the results of her having married another man while her first husband is still alive. I will go through each one by one: She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one: She must be divorced from each of them, for she is forbidden to each. She also needs a get from each of them. According to the talmudic interpretation, the get from the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, for according to biblical law, she is not married to the second man. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one: She does not receive any of the financial benefits that she would have accrued from her husband. This clause was explained above in 9:3. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it: If she had taken any of these things to which she is not entitled, she must return them. Some times, in cases of doubt, possession is enough for a person not to have to return something. However, in this case, her possession is considered truly illegal and she must return what she took. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer: The child from the second husband is a mamzer because she gave birth to him while married to the first husband. Should she return to the first husband, the subsequent child will also be a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her: A priest is allowed to impurify himself to bury his wife. In this case, if either husband is a priest and she dies, they may not impurify themselves for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows: These are all rights given to a husband during marriage. Since the marriage is now invalid, he loses all these rights. Invalidating vows is discussed in Numbers 30. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah: The illicit marriage to the second husband disqualifies her from all rights that might be accrued from either kohanic or levitical status. The result is that she could no longer marry a priest nor eat tithe if her father was a Levite, nor eat terumah if her father was a priest. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah: According to a ketubah clause which we will see in chapter four of tractate Ketuboth, a woman’s male children inherit her ketubah. However, in this case they too are penalized and lose their inheritance. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum: Since both marriages were invalid, the brothers cannot perform yibbum. Note that according to the talmudic interpretation, the halitzah of the brother of the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, since according to Torah law the second marriage was not valid.

ולא בלאות – that were lost but her right to claim compensation for the wear and tear or ruin of the things which she brought along on her property that exist she did not lose.

Rabbi Yose said: her ketubah remains a charge upon the estate of her first husband. The mishnah now brings up opinions that do not agree with the long list seen in section. Rabbi Yose holds that she does receive her ketubah from her first husband, since she only committed adultery unintentionally.

והולד ממזר מזה ומזה – if she gave birth from the second [husband] he is a complete Mamzer/illegitimate child, and if the first [husband] took her back and she gave birth, he is a Mamzer from Rabbinic law.

Rabbi Elazar said: the first husband is entitled to whatever she may find, and what she makes with her hands, and also has the right to invalidate her vows. Rabbi Elazar adds that the first husband continues to receive the economic benefits from his wife.

לא זה ולא זה זכאין במציאתה – that the reason - why did the Rabbis state that what his wife finds belongs to her husband? It is because of enmity; here it should be enmity and hostility.

Rabbi Shimon said: intercourse or halitzah with the brother of the first husband exempts her rival, and the child from him is not a bastard. Rabbi Shimon holds that the brother of the first husband may have yibbum with her, and that by performing yibbum or halitzah, the rival wife is exempted from yibbum or halitzah. Assumedly he also holds that she does not need halitzah from the second husband’s brother. Finally, should she go back to her first husband, the child from such a relationship is not a mamzer.

ולא במעשה ידיה – that the reason – why did the Rabbis states that her handiwork belongs to her husband? It is because of sustenance and here, where she doesn’t have sustenance, her handiwork is not his.

If she married without an authorization, she may return to him. This section really belongs to the following mishnah. It teaches that if she married without the permission of the court, she is allowed to return to her first husband, because in this case the second marriage was totally accidental. However, if she married with the permission of the court, the second marriage is valid and all of the above listed results occur.

ובהפר נדריה – that the reason of why the husband annuls his wife’s vows, just as she should not make herself reprehensible to her husband, here, she would make herself look ever so repulsive (Talmud Yevamot 90b).

נפסלה מן הכהונה – because she is a harlot.

מן המעשר – it is fine, for the daughter [of a Levite] who ran about as a prostitute is not disqualified from the first tithe.

מן התרומה – even the priest’s due of the Rabbis.

יורשים כתובתה – the Ketubah of male issue.

חולצין ולא מיבמין – the brothers of the first [husband] perform the act of Halitzah according to the Torah, but the Rabbis decreed that he should not engage in a levirate marriage, and the brothers of the second [husband] perform the act of Halitzah according to the Rabbis, just as she requires a Jewish bill of divorce from the second [husband] according to the Rabbis.

ביאתה או חליצתה – he disputes with the first part of the Mishnah as it is taught they don’t perform levirate marriage.

ואין הולד ממנו ממזר – if the first [husband] took her back but the Halakha is neither according to Rabbi Yosi, nor according to Rabbi Eliezer nor according to Rabbi Shimon.

נשאת שלא ברשות – of the Jewish court, such as the example when two witnesses said to her: “your husband died,” that she doesn’t need the legal permission of the Jewish court.

ופטורה מן הקרבן – for an individual who acted according to the [errant] instruction of the Jewish court is exempt from the sacrifice.

Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss the situation of a woman who was told that her husband was dead and she remarried, and then her husband returned.

שלא ע"פ ב"ד – but rather with two witnesses, she is a liable for a sacrifice for she errs inadvertently, but the Halakha is not like this Mishnah, but rather, whether she married by word of mouth of the Jewish court with one witnesses, whether by word of mouth of two witnesses, they are liable for a sacrifice – she and her second husband.

If she married with the authorization of the court, she must leave, but is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. If she married without the authorization of the court, she must leave and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The authority of the court is thus more greater in that it exempts her from the sacrifice. If she asked the court before she remarried, and they allowed her to remarry, she must leave her second husband, should her first husband return (she cannot return to her first husband either, as we saw in mishnah one). However, she is not liable to bring a sacrifice (sin offering) since she acted with the court’s permission. It is as if the court takes upon itself the responsibility for her accidentally having sinned. However, if she acted on her own without permission, she must bring a sin offering. The reason that she is able to bring a sin offering to atone for her sin is that her sin was unintentional; she didn’t know her husband was alive when she married someone else. Had she sinned intentionally, an offering would not have been effective.

If the court ruled that she may be married and she went and disgraced herself, she must bring a sacrifice, because the court permitted her only to marry. If the court ruled that she could remarry and she disgraced herself by marrying someone forbidden to her, for instance if she was a widow and she married the high priest, or if she was a divorcee and she remarried a priest, etc., she is liable to bring a sacrifice. When the court allowed her to remarry, the intention was a permitted marriage. By marrying someone not permitted to her, she is actually marrying on her own accord, and is therefore liable to bring a sacrifice as an unintentional sinner. Note that the sacrifice is for the adultery and not the forbidden marriage. Most forbidden marriages are not atoned for by sacrifices.

ואחר כך מת בנך – she did not depend upon having a levirate marriage.

Introduction This mishnah discusses other scenarios where a woman was told that her husband died and it turns out that the information she received was not 100 per cent correct.

ונשאת – to anyone [in the world].

If a woman whose husband and son went to a country beyond the sea was told, “Your husband died and your son died afterwards”, and she married again, and later she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer. When this woman hears that her husband died while her son was still alive, she thinks that she is not liable for yibbum or halitzah, since her husband died while his son was alive. Therefore she remarried someone else, without halitzah or yibbum. When she finds out that she should have had yibbum, it turns out that she was a shomeret yavam who remarried without halitzah or yibbum. Our mishnah’s ruling goes according to Rabbi Akiva who rules that any children from such a marriage are mamzerim. This is true whether the child was born while her husband was alive or even if the child was born after her husband died, for she should have had halitzah or yibbum. She must also leave this marriage.

ראשון ואחרון – the first [husband] before the report, and the last [husband] after the report. And according to Rabbi Akiba, it is established that he said, thee is a Mamzer when one is liable for violating negative commandments, but it is not Halakha.

If she was told “Your son died and your husband died afterwards”, and she had yibbum, and afterwards she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer. In this case she thought that she was liable for yibbum, so she went and had yibbum with her brother-in-law. Afterwards she finds out that she was exempt from yibbum, since her husband died while her son was still alive. Since the yibbum was forbidden, any child that she has with the yavam is a mamzer, whether or not he was born while her husband was still alive.

If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she married, and afterwards she was told, “He was alive but is now dead”, she must leave, and any child born before [the death of her first husband] is a mamzer, but one born after it is not a mamzer. In this case, at the point when she married the second husband, she was in fact married to the first husband. Therefore she must leave the second marriage. The child born before the first husband died is a mamzer, for the union was adulterous. However, the child born after the first husband died is not a mamzer. In other words, even though she must leave the second husband in any case, not every child that she has with him is a mamzer.

If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she was betrothed, and afterwards her husband appeared, she is permitted to return to him. Although the second one gave her a get he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying a priest. This Rabb Elazar ben Mathia expounded: “A woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7) not from a man who is not her husband. If she is only betrothed to the second husband, and then she finds out that she is still married to the first husband, she may return to her first husband. In the other cases in our mishnah and in the previous one, she was forbidden to do so because she had, albeit unwittingly, committed adultery by having relations with the second husband. However, in this case, she has not had relations with the second husband, therefore she may return to the first. The mishnah further emphasizes that the second marriage is totally invalid by stating that even if the second husband gives her a get, she may still potentially someday marry a priest. This last halakhah is supported by a midrash by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya. Leviticus 21:7 states that a priest may not marry a woman “divorced from her husband”. The verse could have merely stated “divorced”. The extra words “from her husband” teach that if she is divorced from someone who is not her husband, a priest may still marry her.

מותרת לחזור לו – for the second betrothal is not anything, and he came upon her in prostitution, and we say in the Gemara (Tractate Yevamot 95a) (Numbers 5:13): “in that a man has had carnal relations with her [unbeknown to her husband , and she keeps secret the fact that she has defiled herself without being forced],” her carnal relations forbid her, but the carnal relations of her sister do not forbid her.

Introduction This mishnah and the next discuss the ramifications of situations where a husband was told that his wife had died, and he married her sister.

ומותר בקרובות השניה – to marry her (i.e. second wife’s) daughter for ewe hold that one marries the outraged or seduced woman.

If a man’s wife had gone to a country beyond the sea and he was told, “Your wife is dead”, and he married her sister, and afterwards his wife came back, [the latter] is permitted to return to him. He is permitted to marry the relatives of the second woman, and the second woman is permitted to marry his relatives. If the first wife died he is permitted to marry the second. The man’s marriage to his wife’s sister was obviously forbidden, since one cannot marry one’s wife’s sister. However, his original wife is permitted to return to him, since the second marriage was totally invalid. By his first wife returning to him, this would not count as marrying his wife’s (his second wife’s) sister. Furthermore, since the marriage was invalid, he may marry the second wife’s relatives (for instance her daughter). This is true even if he has had sexual relations with her. She too is permitted to marry his relatives. If his first wife dies, he can now remarry the second wife. Even though he already had relations with her when she was forbidden to him, since she is now permitted to him, he may marry her.

רבי יוסי אומר כל שפוסל ע"י אחרים פוסל ע"י עצמו – Rabbi Yosi is the attendant of the first Tanna/teacher when he says, it makes no difference that his wife went and his brother-in-law (wife’s sister’s husband) who is the husband of his wife’s sister abroad nor whether his betrothed and his brother-in-law went and they came and said to him: “your wife died and your brother-in-law died,” and he married her sister and afterwards, his wife and his brother-in-law came; the wife of his brother-in-law is prohibited to his brother-in-law and his wife is permitted to him. And Rabbi Yosi said to him: His betrothed and his brother-in-law, for one is able to state that there was a condition in the betrothal, and this one who married her sister , married well, and requires a Jewish bill of divorce from him, so that they don’t say that a married woman goes out [from a marriage] without a Jewish bill of divorce for it invalidates her in regards to others, which are his brother-in-law, for since she left him with a Jewish bill of divorce, it invalidates her from her husband, it also invalidates her for marriage for himself and his wife is forbidden to himself because she is the sister of his divorced wife. But, where his wife and his brother-in-law went abroad and he married her sister that one is not able to say that there was condition for him in the marriage, and he married her well to this one, where it is possible to say that with regard to betrothal, one does not require a Jewish bill of divorce from him and does not invalidate [his wife] to others, for he did not invalidate the wife of his brother-in-law to his brother-in-law, he doesn’t invalidate her for himself. And his wife is permitted to him for she is not the sister of his divorced wife.

If he was told that his wife was dead, and he married her sister, and then he was told that she was then alive but had since died, any child born before [his first wife’s death] is a mamzer, but anyone born after [her death] is not a mamzer. This section teaches that any child he had with his wife’s sister while his wife was still alive is a mamzer, since this is a prohibited relationship, and punishable by kareth. However, children born after his original wife died are not mamzerim.

Rabbi Yose says: whoever disqualifies for others disqualifies for himself and whoever does not disqualify for others does not disqualify for himself. The Talmud explains that Rabbi Yose refers to a situation where Reuven was married to Leah and Moshe was married to Rachel, Leah’s sister. Leah and Moshe (Reuven’s wife and his brother-in-law) go abroad and Reuven receives a report that both of them have died. Reuven now marries Rachel, who he thinks is Moshe’s widow and his dead wife’s sister. When both Leah and Moshe come back, since Rachel is forbidden to return to Moshe (see mishnah one), Leah is forbidden to return to Reuven. The previous tanna would have held that while Rachel was forbidden to return to Moshe, Leah was permitted to return to Reuven. However, if there was a case where the woman whom he married was not forbidden to return to a previous husband, for instance she was not married or she married him (Reuven) without the permission of the court, since he does not make her forbidden to someone else, his own wife is not forbidden to return to him.

אמרו לו מתה אשתך ונשא אחותה מאביה – [he married his sister from her father] that was not from her mother and they retracted and said to him: “the second degree (i.e., first cousin) died,” and he married the sister of the second degree from her mother and not from her father, and it was found that this third [wife] is a stranger regarding the first wife. And they retracted and said to him, that the third-degree wife had died and he married the sister of the third wife from her father but not from her mother. It was found that the fourth is distant from the second, and all the more so, from the first. And they retracted and said to him, that this fourth wife had died,

Introduction This mishnah deals with a quite complicated situation in which a man marries a series of sisters, thinking that each previous one was dead, and then finds out that they are all alive. If we sort out all of the details, this braintwister shouldn’t be so bad.

ונשא אחותה מאמה – and he married her sister from her mother, and she is distant from the third, and similarly from the fist and second, and afterwards, they said to them that all of them are living.

If a man was told “Your wife is dead” and he married her paternal sister; [and when he was told] “She is dead’, he married her maternal sister; [and when he was told] “She is dead”, and he married her paternal sister; [and when he was told] “She is dead, he married her maternal sister; and later it was found that they were all alive, he is permitted to the first, third and fifth, and they exempt their rivals; But he is forbidden to the second and the fourth, and intercourse with one of these does not exempt her rival. A man was married to Rachel (1), and when told that she died, he married Hana (2), Rachel’s paternal sister. When told that Hana died, he married Tova (3), Hana’s maternal sister. Rachel (1) and Tova (3) do not share any parents. When told that Tova has died, he marries Yael (4), Tova’s paternal sister. Yael (4) does not share any parents with Rachel (1) or Hana (2). When told that Yael has died, he marries Rivka (5), Yael’s maternal sister. Rivka (5) does not share any parents with Rachel (1), Hana (2) or Tova (3). At this point, the hapless husband finds out that all of these women are still alive (you can just imagine the shock on the poor guy’s face!). The mishnah rules that he may stay married to the first, the third and the fifth. This means that even though the third woman is the second woman’s sister, and he is forbidden to the second woman, he may stay with the third (the same with the fifth, who is the fourth’s sister). This is because the marriage to the second and the fourth was not valid marriage, because he had already married the first and the third, and they were still alive. Since the marriage with the second and the fourth was not valid marriage, he is permitted to marry their sisters. The mishnah also teaches that the first, third and fifth women exempt their rival wives from the need for yibbum. This means that should this husband die without children, when one of his brothers does yibbum or halitzah with one of these women, the rest of the women are exempt. He is forbidden to stay married to the second and the fourth women, since they are the sisters of the first and third respectively. Since both of these women are not validly married, and therefore are not liable for yibbum or halitzah, should someone perform yibbum or halitzah with them, it would not exempt their rivals.

מותר בראשונה ובשלישית ובחמישית – who are not related to each other, and even though the third [wife] is the sister of the second [wife], it is permitted for the betrothal of the betrothal of the second did not take effect because she is the wife’s sister to the first [wife] whom he took [as a wife] earlier, and she is like a ravaged or seduced woman and [it is taught In a Baraitha] that if he ravaged a woman, it is permitted [for him] to marry her daughter for the Torah did not prohibit other than the wife’s sister alone, and where Kiddushin/betrothal did not take effect, she is not his wife’s sister, and similarly, the fifth [wife] even though she is the sister of the fourth [wife] she is permitted [to him] for since Kiddushin/betrothal effect with the third [wife], it is found that sexual connection with the fourth [wife] who is the sister of the third is considered a coition of prostitution, and the [fifth wife] is not forbidden to him.

If he had intercourse with the second after the death of the first, he is permitted to the second and fourth, and they exempt their rivals; But he is forbidden to the third and the fifth, and intercourse with one of these does not exempt her rival. After the death of the first wife, he is permitted to have relations with the second wife. If he does so, then he can no longer stay with the third wife, and he can now have relations with the fourth wife (since the marriage with the third wife is now invalid). Since he can have relations with the fourth wife, he cannot stay married to the fifth wife. In this case, the second and fourth wife would be liable for yibbum and therefore they make their rival wives exempt. The third and fifth wife are not liable for yibbum, therefore they would not make their rival wives exempt.

ופוטרות צרותיהן – if he died and the levir came and performed levirate marriage with of them, it exempts her rival wife.

ואסור בשניה – because o the first [wife] and the fourth because of the third.

ואם בא על השנייה לאחר מיתת הראשונה – for the words were true of the first [wife] , and the rest of the words were lies, he is prohibited to the third [wife] because of the second [wife] and on the fifth [wife] because of the fourth [wife].

בן ט' שנים ויום אחד פוסל – [a child nine years and one-day old invalidates] the deceased childless brother’s widow to the brothers if he had come upon her, for his act of sexual coition is [a valid] coition. Or, if he gave a Jewish bill of divorce or made a betrothal of a dead brother’s wife by statement with money or a document for he has a Jewish bill of divorce and a betrothal by statement of a dead brother’s wife, but it is not a complete Jewish bill of divorce, nor a complete betrothal by statement.

Introduction This mishnah discusses the ramifications of a boy, nine years and one day old, performing an act of yibbum, divorce, halitzah or ma’amar. The mishnah teaches that a boy of this age is capable of having sex which is a purely physical act. However, he does not have the requisite knowledge (da’at) to give a get, perform ma’amar or halitzah. One other issue which we must keep in mind while learning this mishnah is that once a woman awaiting yibbum (a shomeret yavam) has had one of these acts performed with her by one of the brothers, she may no longer marry any of the other brothers of her dead husband. We should note that in the time of the Mishnah, not only was marriage considered possible at a very young age, but concepts of childhood were different. Our perception of childhood as extending well into one’s teens and our assumption that children deserve protection during these years and are not to be treated as adults, are, to a large extent, more modern perceptions. The mishnah, as we shall see, is therefore not squeamish about discussing sex and children. Today, in our society children are (or should be) distanced from sex.

אלא הוא פוסל תחלה – In the Gemara (Tractate Yevamot 96a) it explains that with betrothal of a dead brother’s wife by statement, he disqualifies at the outset, but not at the conclusion, but if his older brother had made the statement of betrothal [to the dead brother’s childless widow] and [he] afterwards made the statement of betrothal, that which the nine-year and one-day old [did] did not invalidates her from his brothers, but through his act of coition, the nine-year and one-day old invalidates whether at the outset or at the conclusion, and our Mishnah is deficient and should be read as follows: but rather he invalidates at the outset and they invalidate at the outset and at the conclusion. When is this said? Through betrothal by statement, but an act of coition even at the end also invalidates. How so? A child who is nine years and one day old who came upon his dead brother’s childless widow, etc.

A boy of the age of nine years and one day disqualifies [his sister-in-law for marriage] with his brothers, and his brothers disqualify her for him, but while he disqualifies her from the outset only, the brothers disqualify her from the outset and at the end. The first section of the mishnah is a brief, memorable way of stating that which will be explained in section two and in the following mishnayoth. I will explain the concepts as they are fleshed out in the mishnah.

How is this so? A boy of the age of nine years and one day who had intercourse with his sister-in-law disqualifies her [for marriage] with his brothers; If a boy of nine years and one day has intercourse with a shomeret yavam, that is his dead brother’s wife, the other, older brothers may no longer have yibbum/intercourse with her. This means that his act of intercourse “counts” sufficiently that she is tied to him, and no longer liable for yibbum or halitzah to the other brothers. Since she is no longer liable for yibbum or halitzah, they are forbidden to have intercourse with her.

The brothers disqualify her [for marriage with him] whether they had intercourse with her, did ma’amar, gave her a get or submitted to her halitzah. In contrast to the nine year old boy, the older brothers disqualify the shomeret yavam from having relations with any of the other brothers in four different ways: intercourse (yibbum), ma’amar (betrothal), divorce (get) and halitzah. Even though ma’amar and a get are only of rabbinic origin for the shomeret yavam, and she still requires halitzah before she may remarry, they are sufficient to disqualify her from the other brothers. The difference between the older brothers and the nine year old brother is that for the older brothers there are legal consequences to their performance of acts that require knowledge, such as ma’amar, divorce, or halitzah, whereas for the nine year old, there are legal consequence only to physical acts such as intercourse.

פסל על ידו – for it is to him like a statement of betrothal after a statement of betrothal and both of them take effect with regard to her.

Introduction This mishnah explains the status of an act of sexual intercourse done by a boy who has reached nine years and one day old, but is not yet of majority age.

ר"ש אומר לא פסל – For the act of coition of a child who is nine years old, according to Rabbi Shimon doubtfully acquires [as a wife] and doubtful does not acquire [as a wife]; if it acquires, it acquires completely, and does not benefit his brother’s act of coition. And if he doesn’t acquire, it is to him like someone who did not engage in sexual intercourse, neither for him, nor his brother. Therefore, he did not invalidate, but the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Shimon.

If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his yevamah and then his brother who was of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with her, [the latter] disqualifies her for [the former]. Rabbi Shimon says: he does not render her unfit. As we learned yesterday, the sexual intercourse of a boy nine years and one day old has legal ramifications. In our case of yibbum, if a boy who has reached this age has relations with his yevamah, he disqualifies her from being permitted to have yibbum with another one of the brothers. However, this act of sexual intercourse is not sufficient to completely make her his wife. The Talmud states that it is not a “complete acquisition”, as it would be if he was of majority age. Therefore, when another brother, who has also reached this age, has intercourse with her, he causes her prohibited to the first brother. Since she has now had quasi-yibbum with two brothers (akin to ma’amar with two brothers, see above 5:1), she is forbidden to both. Rabbi Shimon holds that it is doubtful whether sexual intercourse with a boy nine years and one day old can acquire a woman as a wife. In our case, if it does, then she is the wife of the first brother, and the intercourse with the second brother does not disqualify her to the first. If such intercourse does not acquire her as a wife, then neither does the intercourse with the second brother, and she is not disqualified to the first brother. Should she wait around as a shomeret yavam until he is of majority age, he may then have yibbum with her. To summarize, the first opinion holds that an act of intercourse by a boy nine years and one day, certainly acquires a woman as a wife, but the acquisition is not complete. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon holds that it is uncertain whether this act of intercourse acquires. However, if it does acquire, it acquires fully.

בן ט' שנים ויום אחד שבא על בימתו ומת חולצת ולא מתיבמת – for she upon her the interdependence of a childless widow and her late brother’s brothers (i.e., the levirate relation) two brothers-in-law for the act of coition of this one, the younger (i.e., nine days and one-day old) is like the statement of levirate marriage from the older. She does not leave the levirate relation of the falling of the first [brother], and there falls upon her the levirate relationship through the falling of the second [brother] (see Rashi on the concluding Mishnah in Tractate Yevamot 96b). But it is taught in the Mishnah in Chapter Three (“Four Brothers”) (Tractate Yevamot, Mishnah 9, [referring to] the one who is subject to the levirate power of a single brother-in-law, and not the one who is subject to the levirate power of two brothers-in-law.

Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss the ramifications of an act of intercourse performed by a boy of the age of nine years and one day.

נשא אשה – [he married a woman] who is not his sister-in-law (i.e., the widow of the deceased childless brother), and he has brothers,

If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his yevamah and afterwards had intercourse with her rival wife, he has disqualified [both women for marriage] with himself. Rabbi Shimon says: he does not disqualify them. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, according to the rabbis an act of intercourse done by a boy nine years and one day old partially acquires a yevamah as a wife. It is akin to ma’amar, which also partially acquires the yevamah as a wife. Therefore, if the boy has intercourse first with one yevamah, and then with another one, who is also a yevamah, it is like giving ma’amar to two different yevamoth. In such a case, he may not marry either one. Rabbi Shimon holds that it is doubtful whether the sexual act of a boy nine years and one day old acquires a wife. Therefore, if it does make her his wife, then the first yevamah is his wife, and the intercourse with the second woman is inconsequential. If such an act does not acquire her as a wife, then neither did the intercourse with the second woman, and neither are prohibited to him. Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, when he reaches majority age he may marry either woman.

הרי זו פטורה – she is exempt, even though his sexual coition (i.e., of the brother who is nine years and one day old) is considered coition but his acquisition is not an acquisition at all until he brings forth two [pubic] hairs. But the widow of the childless dead brother, since she is dependent upon him, the Rabbis made her like a statement of betrothal.

If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his yevamah and then died, she must undergo halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. As stated above, intercourse with a boy nine years and one day old is legally equivalent to ma’amar. It therefore creates a tie to the yevamah, but does not totally remove the ties that she still has to her first husband. Should this boy now die, she has ties to two yevamim (two brothers, both of whom were her husband). As we learned in mishnah 3:9, when a woman has ties to two yevamim she must undergo halitzah, and may not have yibbum with another brother.

If he had married [any other] woman and she subsequently died, she is exempt [from both halitzah and yibbum]. If a boy three years and one day old tries to marry a woman, and then he dies, she is not liable for yibbum or halitzah. This is because a boy this young cannot legally contract marriage. Throughout this chapter we have learned that there are some legal ramifications to his having sex with a woman. This section teaches that those ramifications are limited to the realm of yibbum. For regular marriage, there are no ramifications.

אם לא ידע הראשונה משהגדיל ראשונה חולצת ולא מתיבמת – for the levirate relationship of two levirs is upon her, for since he did not know her [sexually] once he grew up, she did not leave from the first falling [of the levir to her].

If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his sister-in-law, and after he had come of age he married another woman and then died, if he had not known the first woman after he had become of age, the first one must have halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum, while the second may either have halitzah or yibbum.
Rabbi Shimon says: [the yavam] may perform yibbum with whichever one he wants, and he must perform halitzah for the other [woman].
[The same law applies] whether he is of the age of nine years and one day, or whether he is of the age of twenty years but had not produced two pubic hairs.
The final mishnah of chapter ten contains another dispute between the sages and Rabbi Shimon over the status of an act of intercourse performed by a nine year old boy. As we have learned before, according to the sages, such an act partially acquires the yevamah as his wife. According to Rabbi Shimon, it is doubtful whether the act acquires her as a wife, but if it does, she is fully his wife.
Section one: When the nine year old boy has relations with his yevamah, according to the sages, he partially acquires her as his wife. If he later dies, without having intercourse with her from the time he reached majority age, she may not have yibbum, as we learned in the previous mishnah, since she is tied to two yevamim (the minor and the brother who first married her). Had he had intercourse with her after having reached majority age, he would have completely severed her ties to her first husband, and she would be able to subsequently have yibbum.
Concerning the woman he married after having reached majority age, she may have either yibbum or halitzah. The question we must ask about this clause is why we would have thought that she is not allowed to have yibbum. The issue is connected to that which we learned in 3:9, concerning an adult who performed ma’amar with his yevamah, but before he had a chance to have yibbum with her he died. There we learned that just as she must have halitzah and not yibbum (since she is tied to two yevamim), so too must her rival wife. Our mishnah deals with a similar situation, where a man dies having ties equivalent to ma’amar with one wife, and full marriage with another wife. Either our mishnah disagrees with the opinion held in 3:9, or it makes a distinction between the two situations, holding that in one case the woman may have yibbum and in the other she may not.
Rabbi Shimon holds that an act of intercourse performed by a minor doubtfully acquires the yevamah as a wife. If it does acquire her as a wife, then she is fully his wife and she may have yibbum. If it does not acquire her as a wife, and he has not had relations with her since, then she was never the minor’s wife, and the woman may have yibbum with his brother (in this case she is still tied to the first brother). In either case, the yavam may have yibbum with either woman. He must have halitzah with the woman with whom he does not have yibbum or halitzah, lest the intercourse of a minor does not acquire. If this is so, then the second wife is not the rival wife of the first wife. If he had yibbum with the first wife, the second wife still needs to be released. If he had yibbum with the second wife, the first wife still needs halitzah on account of her previous marriage to the first brother. Whichever wife did not already have yibbum lest the intercourse of the minor does acquire, and then the surviving brother would have had yibbum with two yevamoth, which is forbidden.
Section two: The final section of the mishnah relates to the entire second half of the chapter (mishnayoth 6-9). A boy who reaches nine years of age is considered a minor until he reaches puberty, or until he reaches twenty years of age. According to the talmud, this is actually true until he reaches the age of 35. If at 35 he still has not shown signs of puberty, he is classified as a natural-born eunuch.

רבי שמעון אומר מיבם לאיזה שירצה – for Rabbi Shimon does not hold by the levirate relationship of two levirs , and these words, we mentioned in the chapter of “Four Brothers” (Tractate Yevamot, Chapter 3, Mishnah 9).

וחולץ לשניה – for they are not rival wives to exempt one of them with the levirate marriage of her colleague. But a levirate marriage of both of them does not occur since she is her rival wife as part of the statement of levirate marriage of the Rabbis, but it appears as two widows of a brother who died without issue who come from one house.

אחד בן תשע ואחד בן כ' – both are equal for everything mentioned above, for as long as they haven’t brought forth two [pubic] hairs, he is a minor. Until he will be thirty five years of age and if he arrive at the thirty five years and did not bring forth two [pubic] hairs, even though they didn’t appear on him, they are a sign of his being castrated/a eunuch that is explained above (see Tractate Yevamot, Chapter Eight, Mishnah Four) – which is that of a natural eunuch.