Komentarz do Ketuwot 13:16

שני דייני גזילות (note that the opening words of this comment are different from what is written in the Mishnah, and seem to reflect a different manuscript in the hands of Rabbi Obadiah of Bertinoro) – they were making decrees regarding thieves and imposing fines upon them.

Introduction Chapter thirteen of Ketuboth is organized differently from the other chapters of Ketuboth, or for that matter, differently from most of the Mishnah. Instead of being organized topically, it is organized mostly according to the sayings of two judges who lived in Jerusalem during the Second Temple period: Admon and Hanan ben Avishalom. The mishnah calls them “judges of fines”; they were probably civil judges. The first mishnah concerns a wife whose husband has gone abroad and did not leave her sufficient money to provide for her maintenance. The wife then approaches the court, asking permission to sell the husband’s property in order to provide maintenance for herself. It is assumed by all that she must take an oath when he returns, that she used the proceeds for her maintenance, and that she has not kept anything for other use. Alternatively, if her husband claims that he did leave her with provisions, she might taken an oath that he did not. The question is, must she also take an oath before she sells his property, that he did not leave her with anything.

שני דברים – that the Sages do not agree with him.

There were two judges of fines in Jerusalem, Admon and Hanan ben Avishalom. Hanan stated two rulings and Admon stated seven. This section introduces the rest of the chapter. We shall see that the two things that Hanan says were both disputed by a group called “the sons of the high priest”. Assumedly, this was a priestly court, whose center was the Temple. Admon was disputed by “the sages” in all seven things that he said. This gives us an opportunity to realize why these traditions and not others by Admon or Hanan were preserved. These were the issues upon which there were debates.

תשבע בסוף – when they heard regarding him that he (i.e., the husband) had died, and she (i.e., the wife, now the widow) comes to collect her Ketubah, she takes an oath that she has not held back any property of her husband at all (after her husband’s death).

If a man went to a country beyond the sea and his wife claimed maintenance: Hanan says: she must take an oath at the end but not at the beginning. The sons of the high priests differed from him and ruled that she must take an oath both at the beginning and at the end. According to Hanan, the woman takes an oath only when her husband returns, but not when she initially sells his property. In contrast, the sons of the high priests say that she must take an oath both at the beginning and at the end. Note, that all agree that she may sell his property, for according to the marriage contract, he owes her maintenance. The only question is, when must she swear.

ולא תשבע בתחלה – at the time of collection of support. But Maimonides explained that she should take an oath at the end when her husband would come and contradict her and say, “I left you support,” she should take an oath claiming that he had not left her anything.

Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agreed with their ruling. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Hanan has spoken well; she need take an oath only at the end. The final section of this mishnah is attributed to later sages, ones that lived after the destruction of the Temple. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agrees with the sons of the high priests, but the final word is given to Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakai who agrees with Hanan.

רבי יוחנן בן זכאי אומר – and the Halakha is according to him, and especially after three months from the husband departing, they provide/assign support to the wife if she claimed support, but not prior to this time, for it is a legal presumption that a man does not leave his house empty and leaves.

אבד את מעותיו – that he said, “I did not say to you, lend me and I will pay it back,” but if he lent the woman money for her support/maintenance on the condition that she should pay him, he makes a claim [against her] and she makes a claim the husband and he pays. But if the husband claims, “I left her support,” and she states, “he did not leave me, and wants to remove [money] from him, the husband takes an oath of inducement (an oath instituted by the Sages where the defendant completely denies a claim, based upon the tradition of Rav Nahman – to clear himself of suspicion), and he is exempted, and the moneys would be liability upon her when she becomes a widow or a divorcee, and in this Mishnah also, the Halakha is according to Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai.

Introduction The format of this mishnah is identical to yesterday’s mishnah. The subject is whether or not a person who provided out of his own pocket for a woman whose husband went overseas without leaving her with maintenance can demand his money back from the husband.

If a man went to a country beyond the sea and someone came forward and financially supported his wife, Hanan says: he lost his money. According to Hanan, the person who financially supported the wife cannot recover his money, since there was no promise from the husband that he would repay him, nor was there any indication from the woman that she was receiving his help as a loan. He helped her out of the goodness of his own heart, but this does not give him the right to recover his expenses.

The sons of the high priests differed from him and said: let him take an oath as to how much he spent and recover it. The sons of the high priests rule that the man can take an oath when the husband returns and recover what he spent. This is probably because the husband neglected the basic responsibility for providing for his wife. He should not, therefore, benefit from the other man’s generosity. Furthermore, we might assume that the man did not provide for her as a gift but rather assumed that he would recover his money.

Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agreed with their ruling. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Hanan has spoken well [the man] put his money on the horn of a deer. Again, Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agrees with the sons of the high priests. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai uses some colorful language to express his agreement with Hanan. The provider has “put his money on the horn of a deer”. Just as a deer will run away and be hard to catch, so too the provider has made his money hard to recover.

בנכסים מועטים – that they lack support for twelve months for males and females. And Maimonides explained that everyone who lack the means to support the boys and girls until the girls become adults is called meager resources/a small amount of property.

Introduction The mishnah now begins to list Admon’s rulings. You will note that instead of the “sons of the high priests” or R. Yohanan ben Zakkai, in these mishnayoth R. Gamaliel is the respondent. The first ruling deals with a situation in which a man dies and does not leave an estate large enough for his sons to inherit and his daughters to be maintained. Note that we learned this mishnah already in Bava Batra 9:1.

בשביל שאני זכר הפסדתי – meaning to say, with the fact that I am a male and designated/predestined to inherit with a great deal of property, I have lost out when there is a small amount of property/meager resources. But the Halakha is not according to Admon.

Admon said seven [rulings]:
If a man dies and leaves sons and daughters, if the estate is large, the sons inherit it and the daughters are maintained [from it]. According to Jewish inheritance law, daughters do not inherit if there are sons. According to a mandatory stipulation written in every ketubah (see Ketuboth 4:11), girls are provided for by the man’s inheritance until they reach a certain age, or are married. If the estate is sufficient, then both of these rules can be fulfilled and there is no problem.

And if the estate is small, the daughters are maintained from it, and the sons can go begging. Admon said, “Just because I’m a male I lose out!” Rabban Gamaliel said; I agree with the words of Admon. If, however, there was not enough property, the daughters maintenance takes precedence over the sons inheritance. In such a case the sons will have to beg at people’s doors. In what might seem like an ironic statement to some women reading this mishnah, Admon complains that one should not lose out just because he is male. It is not entirely clear from the mishnah itself what Admon thinks the halakhah should be. In any case, Rabban Gamaliel agrees with Admon. We should note that the accepted halakhah is against Admon.

והודה בקנקנים – empty [jars] without oil as for example where his fellow made a claim against him for ten pitchers of oil that I have that are with you.

If he claims from his neighbor jars of oil, and he admits [his claim to the empty] jars, Admon says, since he admits to him a portion of the claim, he must swear. But the Sages say: the admission is not of the same kind as the claim.
Rabban Gamaliel said: I agree with the words of Admon.
In chapter six of Shevuoth we learned that one who admits to part of a debt, must take an oath that he does not owe the rest. Our mishnah deals with the case where Reuven claimed that Shimon owed him jars of oil and Shimon admitted only that he owes empty jars. The question is, is this a case of partial admission. The same mishnah was brought in Shevuoth 6:3.
In this scenario Reuven claimed that Shimon owed him jars of oil. Shimon admitted that he owed Reuven jars but denied that he owed the oil. According to Admon, an early Sage, this is considered a partial admission to the claim: Reuven claimed jars and oil and Shimon admitted only to the jars but denied the oil. Therefore Shimon must swear that he doesn’t owe the oil. The other Sages who disagree with Admon say that Reuven really only claimed oil. The fact that Reuven said “jars of oil” was in order to express the amount of oil that he was claiming from Shimon. Since the claim and the admission were of different kinds, Shimon does not swear. Rabban Gamaliel says that he agrees with Admon.

Admon states that there is an implication in this claim [for] oil and pitchers, and when he admitted to him about the empty pitchers, that is a partial admission of guilt and he requires taking an oath.

But the Sages state that there is no implication in this claim other than the oil alone which is the measure of ten pitchers, and when he admitted to him regarding the empty pitchers, what he claimed against him was not admitted to him, and what he admitted to him was not claimed against him, and there is no partial admission from the kind of a claim and he is not liable to take an oath, but the Halakha is according to Admon.

ופשט את הרגל – it is the language of contempt/disgrace, meaning to say, “take the plaster and dust that is under my feet. Another explanation: “Suspend me by my feet on the tree, for I lack what I can give to you” (i.e., he defaulted). And Maimonides explained, “and he shows him the foot”/ופשט את הרגל (i.e., refuses to give it to him), that he walked on the road from afar.

Introduction This mishnah deals with the case of a father-in-law who at the time of betrothal promised to give his prospective son-in-law money and then reneged on his promise, before the marriage to his daughter. From the mishnah it is not entirely clear why he reneges, or whether he just cannot afford to pay the promised sum. The question is, what happens to the daughter in this case if the son-in-law does not want to marry her until the father gives him the money. We can see here in this mishnah a reflection where marriage choice was often tied to economic matters. Indeed, this was typically the situation in most Jewish marriages, and probably in most non-Jewish marriages as well, until modern times. This is not to say that attraction between the couple was not a factor at all; just that it was probably not the primary factor.

עד שתלבין ראשה – until she gets old and we don’t force him neither to marry [her] or to set her free.

If a man promised a money to his [prospective] son-in-law and then defaulted, [his daughter] shall sit until her hair turns white. In this situation, the father has reneged on the money, but the girl is already betrothed to the man. She cannot marry anyone else without first receiving a get. According to the first opinion, the son-in-law can effectively hold the girl hostage as a betrothed woman, until the father-in-law pays him the promised money. This is certainly a grave situation for her, much worse than not being married at all.

Admon says: She may say, “Had I myself promised the sum I would sit until my hair turns white, but now that my father has promised it, what can I do? Either marry me or set me free.” Rabban Gamaliel said: I agree with the words of Admon. Admon holds that since it is not the girls fault herself, she can force the husband to either marry her or divorce her so that she may marry others. If she herself had promised the money, the husband could force her to remain betrothed and not married or divorced. However, since the father made the promise, why should she suffer. Again, Rabban Gamaliel agrees with Admon.

העורר על השדה וכו' – Reuven protests concerning the field that is in the hand of Shimon, and says to him: “Levi who sold it to you stole it from me, and he is inscribed on the bill of sale that Levi wrote to Shimon who sold it to him.

Introduction The fourth ruling stated by Admon is not connected at all to the issue of marriage, but rather has to deal with a person who signed on another person’s deed to a piece of land but later claims that the land is actually his own. Note that in this and the following mishnayoth, Admon disputes with the Sages and that Rabban Gamaliel is absent. It seems that this is a second collection of Admon’s sayings, joined by the editors of the Mishnah to the first.

אדמון אומר יכול הוא שיאמר – just as I did not protest at the time when you purchased this field from Levi and I signed/inscribed as a witness in the midst of the document because Levi is a strong man and difficult to remove something from his hand, it was pleasant for me that it should be in your hand than that I would [try] to remove it from you in court.

If a man contests [the ownership of] a field and he has signed as a witness on [its deed of sale], Admon says: He can say, “[Litigation with] the second is easier for me, since the first is a more difficult person than he”. But the Sages say: He lost his right. In this case Reuven claims that a piece of land that Shimon possesses is actually his. Shimon proves that the land is his by showing a sale document on which Reuven is signed as a witness. The deed says that Shimon bought the land from Levi. Shimon says that Reuven’s signature is de facto proof that he admits that the land is Shimon’s. According to Admon, Reuven may claim that he signed on the deed because he preferred to claim the land from Shimon than claim it from Levi. His signature on the deed is therefore not proof that he has admitted that the land belongs to Shimon. He can still bring other proof that the land belongs to him. The Sages disagree and state that the signature is proof of such an admission and therefore even if Reuven brings proof that the land actually belongs to him, he cannot reclaim it.

אבד את זכותו – for since and he signed, he admitted that he had no business with this, but the Halakha is not like Admon, and especially when he signed it as a witness, this is what Admon and the Sages were arguing about, but if he is signed as a judge to uphold the document, everyone agrees that he did not lose his right because he would be able to say: “I did not know what was written in the document for the judge who signs as the legal endorsement of a note, stating that it has been produced in court and found valid – to uphold the document and it is not necessary that he knew what was written in the document other than that he should recognize the signatures alone.

If [the protester] made it a boundary mark [when selling an adjacent piece of land to] another person he has lost his right [to protest]. In this cases, Reuven again claims that a piece of land that Shimon possesses actually belongs to him. However, Shimon brings a deed of sale for another piece of land, in which Reuven used the piece of land under dispute as a border marker for the property being sold. Reuven would not have used this piece of land as a border marker had he thought the land belonged to him himself. Since in this case Reuven cannot say he did so because litigation with the second is easier, he has lost his right to make a claim.

ואבדה דרך שדהו – that the owners of the field who took possession of it that was in his narrow path marking the boundary between fields.

Introduction Another dispute between the Sages and Admon.

ילך לו בקצרה – by force against their will, he should take for himself the path to his field, but he should choose for himself the shortest path so that he would not have to take a lot. And at the time when people surround it from the four directions Admon agrees with the Sages that each person can say, “I brought proof that your path is [where the money was] collected and taken. But if one person surrounded it from the four directions, the Sages agree that whatever side you take, his path is with him. They did not dispute other than when one person surrounded it when he came under the power of four people. Admon states that one can say to him, whatever side you take, my path is with you. But the Sages say that one can say to him: How? If you were silent, you were silent, but if not, return the document to his master, and you will not be able to talk about the law with/to sue him. And the Halakha is according to the Sages.

If a man went to a country beyond the sea and [in his absence] the path to his field was lost, Admon ruled: let him walk [to his field] by the shortest way. But the Sages say: let him purchase a path for himself even if it costs him a hundred maneh or let him fly through the air. A man owns a path that goes to his field through other fields. When the man returns from having gone abroad, the path has been overgrown (for no one was there to take care of it) and it is no longer distinguishable from the remainder of the field. Admon says that he may walk through the shortest path available to get to his field. The owner of the field through which he walks must allow him to use this ground. However, he can only take the shortest path, since that is the least damaging. The Sages say that he must purchase a path from the owner of the field through which he wants to walk, even if that owner will only sell it to him for a hundred maneh (10,000 zuz, an exaggerated amount). His only alternative is to fly through the air to get to his field.

והלה הוציא שמכר לו את השדה – the borrower brought out against him the latter bill of sale to the loan document and stats that your document is forged, or it is paid off , for if I had been liable to you, you would not have sold me the field that was yours to collect your lien.

Introduction In the scenario in this mishnah, Reuven takes out a document that says that Shimon owes him money. Shimon claims that he paid back the debt, but that he lost his receipt. The mishnah then discusses a possible clue that Shimon might bring to prove that he already paid Reuven back. Again, Admon and the Sages disagree.

זה היה פקח שמכר לו את השדה – because this one abandoned his movable property, and he did not have from where he could he could mortgage on his lien and now he takes the property. Bu in a place where the purchaser gives Zuzim/money and afterwards the writing of a bill/document of sale, everyone does not disagree that the seller should have tarried with his lien of the money that received and should not write for him the document and since he wrote it, it proves that he does not have a lien upon him, but they argue in a place where they wrote the document and afterwards the purchaser gives the Zuzim/money. Admon holds that he should have sent a declaration (especially a protest before witnesses against a forced or unduly influenced action): “I will not see you other than in order that I am able to mortgage it.” But the Sages state: the fact that he did not send a declaration because he was afraid lest the matter should become known and he would have been prevented from purchasing the field, and the Halakha is according to the Sages.

If a man produced a debt document against another, and the latter produced [a deed of sale showing] that the former had sold him a field, Admon ruled: [The other] can say, had I owed you [anything] you should have been paid pack when you sold me the field”. But the Sages say: This [seller] was clever, since he may have sold him the land in order to be able to take it from him as a pledge. In this case, Reuven takes out a document which states that Shimon owes him money. In response, Shimon takes out a sale document which shows that Reuven sold him a field. Shimon says the fact that Reuven sold him a field and collected money from him, proves that Reuven didn’t believe that Shimon still owed him money. Had Reuven thought that Shimon owed him money, he should have taken out the debt document then and taken the money and not given him the field. Admon rules that Shimon’s words are accepted and that he does not have to repay the debt. However, the Sages rule that Reuven was clever. He may have sold Shimon the land so that later if Shimon defaulted on the debt, Reuven would be able to collect the land. In other words, the fact that Reuven sold him the land does not mean that Reuven didn't think that Shimon owed him money.

וחכ"א זה גובה שטר חובו – And the Halakha is according to the Sages.

Introduction This is the last teaching of Admon. It concerns two people who each have a document of debt from the other.

If two men produced debt documents against one another, Admon says; [the holder of the later document can say to the other,] “Had I owed you [any money] how is it that you borrowed from me?” But the Sages say: This one collects his debt and this one collects his debt. In this case Reuven has a document saying that Shimon borrowed from him, and Shimon has a later document that says that Reuven borrowed from him. Shimon claims that he already paid Reuven back, but that he lost his receipt. According to Admon, Shimon says that if he really owed money to Reuven, how come Reuven did not just collect his debt, and instead borrowed money from him. Since, according to Admon, this is not logical, it must be that Shimon did not owe Reuven money when Reuven borrowed. Therefore, Shimon collects his debt and Reuven does not collect his. The Sages say that nevertheless, since both men have documents of debt, they can both collect.

שלש ארצות לנשואין – if a person married a woman in one of these [lands], he cannot force her to go out after him one country/land to another.

Introduction The final two mishnayoth of Ketuboth deal mostly with a husband (and in the next mishnah) a wife’s ability to force the other spouse to change residences. Our mishnah presents limitations on when a husband is allowed to force his wife to move. Note that if both parties agree to the move, there is no problem. The mishnah only discusses cases where one party does not want to move. We should also note that when the mishnah mentions “force” it does not mean that the husband can physically force his wife to move. It means that if she disagrees, he may divorce her without paying her the ketubah. The Mishnah never sanctions physical force of a wife. The consequences of non-compliance are always economic.

כרך – larger than a city, and it is a place of markets, and from everywhere around it, [people] come there for business and for all things that are found in it.

[The following regions are regarded as] three countries in respect of marriage: Judaea, Transjordan and Galilee. The mishnah divides the land of Israel into three parts: Judea, the other side of the Jordan river (Transjordan) and the northern region the Galilee. This separation is important for issues of marriage because, as we shall see, a husband can never force his wife to move from one region to another, but within the same region he can sometimes force her to move with him.

אבל לא מעיר לעיר – for dwelling in the cities is hard for everyone resides there and crowds and the houses are close to one another and there is no air.

[A husband] may not take out [his wife with him] from one town to another or from one city to an other. But within the same country he may take her out with him from one town into another town or from one city into an other city, but not from a town to a city nor from a city to a town. The husband cannot force his wife to move from one region to another, even from one town (small) to another town, or from one city (larger than a town) to another city. However, within the same region he may force her to move from one type to the same type; from a town to a town or from a city to a city. He may never force her to move from a town to a city, for she may like the intimacy of living in a small town. Similarly, he may never force her to move from a city to a town, for she may prefer the hustle and bustle of the city. The mishnah does not believe that either a city or a town is objectively better than the other; both have pluses and minuses.

ולא מכרך לעיר – since in the [big] city, is found all kinds of things; in the town, all sorts of things are not found.

[A man] may take out [his wife with him] from an inferior to a superior dwelling, but not from a superior to an inferior dwelling. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: not even from an inferior dwelling to a superior dwelling, because the [change to a] superior dwelling tests. According to the first opinion, no woman should prefer to live in an inferior dwelling place. In this case, we can objectively determine which is preferable and therefore the husband can force his wife to move. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that a superior dwelling place is not necessarily in every way better than an inferior one. The superior dwelling “tests” the body. This means that any move may be harmful to one’s physical health, even to a better place. Therefore, if the woman does not want to move, her husband cannot force her to do so. An alternative explanation for “tests” is that in a superior dwelling a woman will constantly have to check her appearance. She may not want the pressure of having to always keep up appearance in front of the neighbors.

מפני שהנוה היפה בודק – the body and makes it sick. For the change in the period, even for [her] good is the beginning of stomach illness. But the Halakha is according to Rabban Gamaliel. But if a person from the land of the Galilee married a woman from the land of Judea or its opposite, we force her to go out with him, for it is on that account that he married her. And in every place, we remove [someone] from a city where most of it is idolatrous to a city where the majority is Israelite, but not from a city where its majority is Israelite to a city where its majority is idolatrous.

הכל מעלין – a person may force all the members of his household to make Aliyah with him to Jerusalem, and even if he purchased a Hebrew slave, that slave should go after him against his will, and even from a nice neighborhood to a bad neighborhood, and even from a city whose majority was Israelite to a city whose majority was idolatrous.

Introduction The final mishnah of Ketuboth deals with the important and moving problem of a couple, one of whom wants to make aliyah to Israel and one of whom does not. The second subject with which this mishnah deals are cases in which a man married his wife in one place and divorced her in another. The question is, with which coinage must he pay her ketubah.

ואין הכל מוציאין – and we do not remove any individual [from Jerusalem].

Everyone may compel [their spouse] to go up to the land of Israel, but none may compel [their spouse] to leave. Everyone may compel [their spouse] to go up to Jerusalem, but none may compel [their spouse] to leave. The same is true for both men and women and [slaves]. If one of the members of the household, either the husband or the wife, wishes to move from outside of the land to the land of Israel, s/he may compel the other to join. As I stated before, “compelling” does not imply physical compulsion. Rather what it implies is that if the other party does not agree to go, there is a financial penalty. If the wife wants to go and the husband does not, the wife may receive her ketubah; if the husband wants to go and the wife does not, the husband may divorce his wife without paying her the ketubah. The opposite is true with regard to staying in the land of Israel. Anyone can financially compel the other to stay. The same is true with regard to moving from outside of Jerusalem to Jerusalem. Either party may force the other party to move up to Jerusalem, but neither may force the other to leave Jerusalem for other parts of Israel. Some versions of the mishnah read that even a slave has this right. However, even according to these versions, a slave only has the right to prevent a move, but does not have the right to force his master to move to Israel or to Jerusalem. One may legitimately wonder whether these mishnayoth were issues of practice. It seems to me more likely that this is the way that the rabbis express their values. Rather than just stating that it aliyah is a mitzvah, or that it is at least an important value to move to Israel and to stay there, the rabbis express their values in concrete halakhah. Values are important not just as values; they must also be manifested by our actions. I realize that I am probably touching a nerve here. Most people reading this do not live in Israel and yet probably feel that they do value the state of Israel. The perennially asked question is “How can one be a Zionist and not live in Israel?” I don’t have a particularly good answer for this tension, only that it is a choice that a person might make and with which s/he will have to live. At least we should recognize that we do have a choice as to where we live.

אחד האנשים ואחד הנשים – If he (i.e., the husband) says to make Aliyah and she says that she doesn’t make Aliyah, she should be divorced without her Ketubah [monies], but if she states that [that she wants to make] Aliyah and he he says not to make Aliyah, he should divorce her and give her her Ketubah [monies].

If a man married a woman in the land of Israel and divorced her in the land of Israel, he must pay her [her ketubah] in the currency of the land of Israel. If he married a woman in the land of Israel and divorced her in Cappadocia he must pay her [her ketubah] in the currency of the land of Israel. If he married a woman in Cappadocia and divorced her in the land of Israel, he must a gain pay [her ketubah] in the currency of the land of Israel. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that he must pay her [her ketubah] in the Cappadocian currency. If a man marries and divorces in the land of Israel, he of course has to pay the ketubah using the coinage of the land of Israel. The question arises if one of the actions occurs outside of the land. If he marries her in the land of Israel, and divorces her in Cappadocia (the name of a land in Asia Minor), he must still pay the ketubah using the coinage of the land of Israel. This is because the debt was incurred in the land of Israel. If he marries her in Cappadocia and divorces her in Israel, there is a debate between Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel and the anonymous opinion. According to the anonymous opinion, he must pay the ketubah using Israeli coinage; according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel he uses Cappadocian coinage. The Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds debate the explanation of this mishnah. According to the Babylonian Talmud, Cappadocian coins are worth more. Therefore, the one who holds that in this case he pays with Cappadocian coins (Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel) holds that the ketubah is of toraitic origin and therefore must be paid with the higher coinage, which is also where the debt was incurred. The one who holds that he pays with Israeli coins (the anyonymous opinion) holds that the ketubah is of rabbinic origin, and therefore he may pay with the lesser coins. The Palestinian Talmud explains that Israeli coins are worth more; therefore Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that the ketubah is only of rabbinic origin and the other opinion holds that it is toraitic. All of the Sages agree that if he marries and divorces in Cappadocia, he pays the ketubah with Cappadocian coinage. Congratulations! We have finished Ketuboth. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Tractate Ketuboth is an especially important tractate since many of the principles in it are found in many other places in the Mishnah. In fact, since the seventeenth century it has been called “Shas Katan/Talmud Katan”, the “Little Talmud” for it contains many of the most important talmudic principles. Your having learned it is therefore even more impressive. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning Mishnah! Tomorrow we begin Nedarim.

קפוטקיא – this is Caphtor, and we call it Dima’t in Arabic. Its monies are large and weigh more than tose of the land of Israel. But because the Ketubah/marriage contract of a woman is from the words of the Scribes, they were lenient concerning it to pay her off with the least [amount of] money. But Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that the Ketubah is from the Torah, and because of this, he goes according to the stricter position in this. But, the Halakah is not according to him.