Commento su Nedarim 11:14

ואלו נדרים – In the Gemara (Tractate Nedarim 80b) it explains that vows and oaths are taught, that in the language of the Sages, oaths are within the category of vows.

Introduction Numbers 30:14 states, “Every vow and every sworn obligation of self-denial may be upheld by her husband or annulled by her husband.” From this verse the rabbis conclude that only vows which are of “self-denial” can be annulled. Furthermore, vs. 17 states, “These are the laws that the Lord commanded Moses between a man and his wife.” From this verse the rabbis learned that even if the vow is not one of self-denial, if it involves an issue between the woman and her husband, the man may annul the vow. This chapter discusses these issues. We should note that by placing these limits on her vows, the rabbis limit the power the husband has over his wife. She has the ability to vow without his interference; only those things that will come in between their marriage or cause her to be denied something are subject to his approval.

אם ארחץ ואם לא ארחץ – this is what it said: “the benefit of washing is forbidden upon me forever if I shall wash today,” behold this is a vow. “If I shall not wash, an oath that I shall not wash,” behold this is an oath. And similarly, “if I shall adorn myself, the benefit of adorning/dressing is forbidden upon me forever if I adorn myself today,” “if I don’t adorn myself,” is an oath that I will not adorn myself.

And these are the vows which he can annul: vows which involve self-denial. [For instance:] “If I bathe” or “If I do not bathe;” “If I adorn myself,” or, “If I do not adorn myself.” Rabbi Yose says: these are not vows of self-denial. If the woman vows, “A certain something shall be konam (forbidden) to me if I bathe, but if I don’t bathe it shall be permitted to me,” the husband can annul her vow because not bathing or not adorning oneself is considered self-denial. Another interpretation of this mishnah is that the woman says, “Bathing is forbidden to me forever if I bathe today” or “A shevuah that I shall not bathe”. Again, since these are examples of self-denial the husband may annul the vow. Rabbi Yose does not believe that these are vows of self-denial. Rabbi Yose’s definition of vows self-denial will be brought up in the next mishnah.

אמר ר"י אין אלו נדרי עינוי נפש (vows referring to privation of the necessities of life) – regarding the vow alone Rabbi Yossi disputes the first Tanna/teacher, and [when he] states that the benefit of washing is forbidden upon me if I shall wash today,” this is not a vow of privation of the necessities of life, for behold, it is possible for her that she will not wash today and that the benefit of washing won’t be forbidden upon her forever. But the prevention/refraining from washing for one day is not a privation of the necessities of life, for a neglected appearance for one day (by not bathing) is not considered self-neglect (see Tractate Nedarim 80a). But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Yossi. But whether the father or the husband, vows of privation of the necessities of life are ones that are absolved, as it is written (Numbers 30:17): “[These are the laws that the LORD enjoined upon Moses] between a man and his wife, and between a father and his daughter [while in her father’s household by reason of her youth],” there is an analogy between two laws that rest on a biblical intimation of the father to the husband. Just as the husband does not absolve anything other than vows of privation of the necessities of life, so also the father does not absolve anything other than vows of privation of the necessities of life. But Maimonides made the legal determination that the father absolves all vows and oaths, even those that are not referring to privation of the necessities of life, as it states (Numbers 30:6): “none of her vows or self-imposed obligations [shall stand].”

אם לא היתה פרנסתו אלא ממנו – that he believes in him until he will earn enough and will repay him.

Introduction This mishnah is the continuation of Rabbi Yose’s opinion, begun in yesterday’s mishnah. Yesterday Rabbi Yose said that if the wife vows not to adorn herself or not to bathe the husband cannot annul because these are not considered vows of self-denial. In our mishnah Rabbi Yose provides his definition of vows of self-denial.

הרי זה יפר דברי ר' יוסי – Rabbi Yossi, according to his reasoning who holds that the husband does not absolve every vow that has in it privations of the necessities of life, since he distinguishes between greater privation and lesser privation and between privation for a lengthy period of time to that of a short period of time, but all of the Mishnayot of this chapter go according to him and are not Halakha. Rather, the husband annuls/absolves all vows that have in them privations of the necessities of life, whether of one day and even one hour, whether for a lengthy period of time, whether the privation is great or whether the privation is small, and similarly absolves vows and oaths in matters that are between him and her, even though they are not privations of the necessities of life, as, for example, if she took an oath or a vow not to paint her eyelids or not to adorn herself. And similarly, if she vowed that she would not eat from the produce of this province, the husband annuls/absolves, for it is troublesome for him to bring her produce from another province, and these are things between him and her. But what is the difference between vows and oaths that are between him and her to vows and oaths that have in them privations of the necessities of life? Vows and oaths that have in them privations of the necessities of life he absolves/annuls for himself and for others, as for example, if she took a vow that she would not eat meat or drink wine, he absolves her and she is permitted ot eat and to drink and even after she becomes a widow or a divorcee and marries another [man]. But vows and oaths that are between him and her, as, for example, if she forbade upon herself sexual intercourse of every man in the world, or that she wouldn’t ever paint her eyelids or adorn herself, he absolves his part, and she would perform her marital duty and paint her eyelids and adorn herself all the time that she is under him , and when she is widowed or divorced, she would be forbidden in engaging in sexual relations with all men and to paint her eyelids and to adorn herself And so forth in a similar manner.

But these are vows of self-denial:
If she says, “Konam be the produce of the [whole] world to me”, he can annul. If the woman forbids upon herself all produce everywhere the husband may annul the vow because this is certainly considered a vow of self-denial.

“Konam be the produce of this region to me,” he should bring her that of a different region. In this case he cannot annul the vow because he may bring her produce from another region.

“[Konam be] the produce of this shopkeeper to me”, he cannot annul. But if he can obtain his sustenance only from him, he can annul, the words of Rabbi Yose. Similarly, if she vows not to eat the produce of a certain shopkeeper, he may not break the vow because he may bring her produce from other shopkeepers. However, if the husband has a deal with the shopkeeper from whom she swore not to receive benefit, whereby the shopkeeper provides him with food on credit, then he may annul the vow. Since the husband will not be able to bring his wife food from the other shopkeepers who do not give to him on credit, he will not be able to provide her with food, and therefore her vow will be one of self-denial. The Sages disagree with Rabbi Yose and hold that even though she has sworn not to receive benefit only from one specific person and she could receive from others, this is still considered a vow of self-denial and the husband may annul it.

קונם שאיני נהנית לבריות אינו יכול להפר – this is not from the vows of privations of the necessities of life, for behold she is able to support herself from that of her husband, for the husband is not included in the category of בריות/humanity. But our Mishnah is also according to Rabbi Yossi, and it is not the Halakha, as I have explained above (see the Bartenura commentary to Mishnah 2). And not only/needless to say, if she said, “KONAM, that I will not benefit from anyone,” that she forbids the benefit of all of humanity upon her, that he absolves her because according to the Sages, these are vows of privation of the necessities of life, but even if she said, “KONAM, that I will not benefit from this certain individual,” that she only forbade for herself the benefit of that person alone the husband absolves [the vow] because of matters between him and her, for it is trouble for him that she will not benefit from that person, and the Torah stated (Numbers 30:17): “Between a man and his wife,” everything that is between a man and his wife, the husband can absolve/annul.

Introduction The first section of the mishnah continues to discuss which vows a husband may annul. The second section of the mishnah discusses a person who swears that priests and Levites may not derive benefit from him.

ויכולה ליהנות בלקט שכחה ופאה – this is what it says, and furthermore, another reason that “KONAM that I don’t benefit from humanity,” that the husband does not annul, for she can benefit from gleanings, the forgotten sheaf and the corner of the field, that she doesn’t benefit from anyone, for these are the gifts to the poor, and it is found that there is no privations of the necessities of life.

[If she vows], “Konam, that which I benefit from mankind,” he cannot annul, and she can benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of the field. The husband cannot annul this vow because there are still people from whom she may receive benefit (food, clothing etc.). “Mankind” implies people other than her husband. Since her husband may still provide for her, this is not a vow of “self-denial”. Furthermore, she may still collect the produce which is mandated to be given to poor people from people’s fields. These do not actually belong to the owner of the field; rather they are considered ownerless. This includes “gleanings” which is the wheat which falls from people’s hands as they collect, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of fields.

קונם כהנים ולוים נהנים לי – for just as that “KONAM that I don’t benefit from anyone,” but she is permitted [to benefit from] the gifts to the poor, so also, he who makes a vow against Kohanim and Levites from benefitting from his property are permitted to the gifs of the priesthood and the Levitical class.

[If one says], “Konam be the benefit which priests and Levites have from me”, they can take [from him] against his will. A person must give certain parts of his produce to priests and Levites. He must give terumah to priests and first tithe to Levites. If he vows that priests and Levites should not be able to derive benefit from him, they still may take terumah and tithe, because these do not actually belong to the one who vowed. The connection between this section and what we learned above is that just as things left for the poor do not actually belong to the owner of the field, so too terumah and tithes do not actually belong to the person who separates them to give them to the priests and Levites.

[But if he vows,] “Konam be the benefit these priests and Levites have from me,” other [priests and Levites] should take. In this case the one who vows does not prohibit all priests and Levites from benefiting from him, just certain priests or Levites. In this case the vow is effective and other priests and Levites should take the terumah or tithes. Although as we stated above the person does not own these, he has the right to choose to whom to give them. Therefore the vow is effective.

קונם שאיני עושה על פי אבא – [It will be prohibited like] being dedicated to the Temple all what I do from coming [to work] for Father, meaning to say, that Father will not be able to benefit from the work of my hands.

Introduction The first part of the mishnah discusses a woman who vows not to provide benefit for either her own or her husband’s father or brother. The second part discusses a woman who vows not to provide benefit for her husband himself.

אינו יכול להפר – this is not one of the matters between him and her, and in this everyone agrees that she prohibits her benefit upon a particular person, the husband cannot absolve it. And such is the Halakha.

[If she vows,] “Konam that which I do for my father,” [or] “your father,” [or] “my brother,” [or] “your brother,” [the husband] cannot annul it. In all of these cases the woman vows that anything that she produces shall be forbidden to either her or her husband’s father or brother. Since none of these vows involves self-denial, the husband may not annul the vow.

על פיך אינו צריך להפר – because she is subjugated to him and even though that [stating that] something is dedicated to the Temple removes it from subjugation, the Rabbis strengthened her subjugation to the husband for [the use of] KONAM does not release from his subjugation.

[“Konam] “that which I do for you,” he need not annul it. Rabbi Akiva says: he should annul it, lest she make more than is fitting for him. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: he should annul it, lest he divorce her and she thereby be forbidden to him. We learned in the fifth chapter of Ketuboth that a woman is obligated to perform certain duties for her husband and her handiwork belongs to him. Since she has this obligation, she may not vow that her husband may not benefit from her handiwork. In essence, she does not own her handiwork and therefore it is not hers to prohibit by vow. Rabbi Akiva points out that not all of the handiwork automatically goes to her husband. According to Ketuboth 5:9, she has a set amount of handiwork which she must do; anything over that amount she gets to keep. If so, the vow is potentially effective for this extra amount. Since if she does produce an extra amount, it will be difficult for a husband not to derive some benefit from it, he should annul the vow to avoid the potential problem. The reason that he has a right to annul the vow even though it is not a vow of self-denial is that this is something that comes between him and her. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri points out that if the husband divorces his wife, the vow will become valid, since she is no longer obligated to provide him with her handiwork. Once divorced, he will also no longer be able to annul the vow. In such a case he would not be able to remarry her. To avoid this problem, Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri suggests that the husband annul the vow.

יפר שמא תעדיף עליו יותר מן הראוי לו (let him annul it lest she place a burden upon him more than is appropriate for him) – since [the vow] of dedicating something to the Temple takes effect on the excess part which is not under his subjugation, therefore, he must annul/absolve [her vow], and the absolution is effective for him because this is a matter that is between him and her, for it is impossible that the surplus will not be mixed in with that of her husband.

רבי יוחנן בן נורי אומר יפר שמא יגרשנה – and the essence/principal of her handiwork requires absolution lest he divorce her and her husband’s subjugation will be released, and then the vow will take effect and she will be forbidden from returning to him. And the Halakah is according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri. But when she says, “May my hands be sanctified to their Maker (i.e., God), her hands are already in existence and the dedication to the Temple takes effect.

הרי זה יחזור ויפר – for it is an errant absolution is not an absolution until he intends regarding the woman that vowed, as it is written (Numbers 30:12): “[And her husband learns of it, yet offers no objection-] thus failing to restrain her – [all her vows shall stand and all her self-imposed obligations shall stand],” until the abolution will be for herself of the person making the vow. And also, that he should intend to the vow that she made (Numbers 30:5): “and her father learns of her vow,” until he knows which vow that she made.

Introduction Our mishnah teaches that if a husband/father annuls a vow of his wife/daughter but is mistaken with regard to who vowed, what type of vow they took or what was being prohibited, he must annul the vow again in order for it to be annulled.

If his wife vowed, and he thought that his daughter had vowed, or if his daughter vowed and he thought that his wife had vowed; In this case the husband/father was mistaken with regard to who vowed.

If she took the vow of a nazirite, and he thought that she had vowed by a korban, or if she vowed by a korban, and he thought that she vowed a nazirite vow; In this case the mistake was with regard to the type of prohibition. For instance, she vowed by a nazirite vow but her husband/father thought that the vow was a vow using a korban to prohibit wine (i.e. “wine is a korban to me”), or vice versa. Although in both cases she would be forbidden to have wine, the husband still annulled the wrong type of vow.

If she vowed [to abstain] from figs, and he thought that she vowed [to abstain] from grapes, or if she vowed [to abstain] from grapes and he thought that she vowed from figs, he must annul [the vow] again. In this case the husband was mistaken with regard to what was being prohibited, figs or grapes. In all three cases, since the husband did not have full grasp of who was vowing, what type of vow they were taking, or what they were prohibiting, he must annul the vow again. If he does not, the vow is valid.

קיים לתאנים כולו קיים כו' (he confirmed the vow regarding figs, the whole is deemed confirmed) – and the reason, as it is written (Numbers 30:14): “[Every vow and every sworn obligation of self-denial] may be upheld by her husband [or annulled by her husband,” he will uphold from it, that when he upholds part of it, he upholds all of it. But, (ibid.,) “annulled [by her husband],” one cannot expound as such, for it is not annulled until he annuls all of it. But these are the words of an individual opinion, and is not Halakha, but the Halakha is according to the Sages who sate that one makes an analogy on the principle common in both, making an analogy between הקמה/upholding and הפרה/nullifying/absolving. Just as regarding absolution, what he absolved, he absolved, and what he didn’t absolve, he didn’t absolve, for there is no expounding from annulling/יפרנו (Numbers 30:14), partial annulment, even upholding – what he upheld heupheld, and what he didn’t uphold, he didn’t uphold, and from יקימנו/upheld [by her husband] (Numbers 30:14),also, we don’t expound partial upholding, but it is the manner of Scripture to write like this. But even though the declaring permitted by a Sage we state that a vow that was partially permitted, all of it was permitted, but the absolution of the husband and the father is not like this.

Introduction This mishnah teaches that a vow that has been partially annulled is not annulled at all. We should note that this is a different rule than that which we saw with regard to the releasing of vows done by a sage. There we saw that according to Rabbi Akiva a vow that has been partially released is fully released (9:6). According to the Talmud, Rabbi Akiva disagrees with our mishnah.

If she vows, “Konam these figs and grapes which I taste”, and he [the husband] confirms [the vow] in respect of figs, the whole [vow] is confirmed; In the cases in this mishnah, the woman vows not to have figs and grapes. If the husband confirms part of the vow, the whole vow is confirmed. After he has confirmed it, he can no longer annul it.

If he annuls it in respect of figs, it is not annulled, unless he annuls in respect of grapes too. However, if he annuls part of the vow, the whole vow is not annulled and she is still forbidden in respect to that which he annulled. In this case, she would be forbidden to have both figs and grapes. For the vow to be annulled he must annul the whole vow.

If she vows, “Konam the figs that I taste and these grapes that I taste”, they are two distinct vows. In this case the mishnah considers it as if she had taken two vows. Therefore, if he annuls the vow with respect to figs, that vow is annulled and she may have figs but she may not have grapes.

איני יודע שיש מפירין – that I have permission to absolve [a vow].

Introduction Yesterday we learned that if when the husband/father annulled his wife/daughter’s vow he did not have full comprehension of who vowed, what type of vow they took, or what they prohibited, he must annul it again. Generally the vow may be annulled only on the day that the husband/father hears of the vow (see 10:5). However, in this case he may annul the vow when he learns the details, even though the day that he heard the vow has passed, because for him the day that he learns of the vows correct details is considered the day that he heard the vow. Our mishnah discusses a husband who did not know that he could annul the vow, or that there was even a vow to annul. The question is can he annul the vow when he learns that he has such a power, or that it was a vow.

יפר – on the day that it becomes known to him that he has permission to absolve [vows], it is upo him like (Numbers 30:13): “the day that he finds out.”

[If the husband declares,] “I knew that there were vows, but I did not know that they could be annulled”, he may annul them [now]. In this case the husband/father knew that there was a vow, but did not know that he could annul the vow or that in general he can annul vows. The mishnah rules that he may annul the vow later when he learns that he has such a right. The day that he learns that he can annul vows is considered the “day that he heard the vow”.

אינו יודע שזה נדר – and it requires absolution.

[But if he says:] “I knew that I could annul them, but I did not know that this was a vow,” Rabbi Meir says: he cannot annul it, But the Sages say: he can annul. In this case the father/husband knew that he has the right to annul vows in general, but did not know that what his daughter/wife had said was considered a vow. Hence he did not annul the vow on the day that he heard the original remark. When he later learns that this was a vow, Rabbi Meir says he can no longer annul it. Since he knew on the day that he heard the vow that he can annul vows, he should have annulled what she had said in any case, even though he was not sure that it was a vow. The Sages, however, rule that he may still annul the vow when he learns that it was truly a vow. According to their opinion, this is the day that is actually called “the day that he heard the vow.”

רבי מאיר אומר לא יפר for since he knows that he has in his hand [the ability] to absolve, even though he doesn’t know that it is a vow, nevertheless, he should have absolved/nullified [the vow]. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Meir.

ובלבד שלא יהא לבעליך רשות בהם – and his condition is fulfilled, and the husband did not acquire it (i.e., the money). But even though this that this present saves im from the the troubler, for behold, his wife is supported/fed from these monies, but her sustenance was upon him, hs being saved from the trouble is not considered benefit.

Introduction This mishnah discusses a situation in which a man is under a vow not to provide any benefit to his son-in-law. The mishnah teaches how the father may give money to his daughter without allowing his son-in-law to receive benefit. We should note that this mishnah probably more properly belongs in chapter four where the mishnah discussed circumventing vows such as these. Assumedly, the mishnah is brought in this chapter because it mentions fathers and daughters.

If a man is under a vow that his son-in-law shall not benefit from him, and he wants to give money to his daughter, he must say to her, “This money is given to you as a gift, providing that your husband has no rights with it, [and it is only given to you] so that may put to your personal use.” If the father wants to give his daughter money he may make a stipulation that the son-in-law should have no rights to the money and that the only use for the money is for the personal use of the daughter. In this way, the father can circumvent the vow prohibiting his son-in-law from deriving benefit from him. Were the father not to make such a stipulation, the present would be a transgression of the vow because anything that the wife owns the husband has rights over as well.

ונדר אלמנה וגרושה – for itself, it does not require a [verse from] Scripture, for since she doesn’t have a husband, who will annul/absolve [her vow? But rather, when she made a vow when she is a widow for a time, and the time for the vow didn’t arrive until she married.

Introduction The Torah states that a widow and a divorcee’s vows are binding. This ruling is seemingly obvious, for a widow and a divorcee do not have any husband who could possibly annul their vows. In order to prevent the Torah from being obvious, the mishnah finds situations in which the ruling is not so obvious.

אינו יכול להפר – even though that the vow takes effect when she is under him, for we follow/go after the time of the vow.

After quoting the verse from Numbers, the mishnah proceeds to explain it in a way that it is not overly simple.

נדרה בו ביום גרשה בו ביום והחזירה בו ביום – and aftwerards, he heard about her vow.

“But every vow of a widow and of a divorcee… shall be binding upon her” (Numbers 30:9).
How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days”, even if she married within the thirty days, he cannot annul it. In this case the woman vowed before she was married but vowed in such a way that the vow would not begin to take effect for another thirty days. During the thirty days before the vow takes effect, she was married. Although the vow begins to take effect when she is already married, her husband cannot annul it because she made the vow before she was married.

אינו יכול להפר – since she left to her own domain, between the vow and its absolution, for the husband does not absolve things that precede [him].

If she vows while in her husband’s domain, he can annul [the vow] for her. How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days,” [and her husband annulled it], even though she was widowed or divorced within the thirty days, it is annulled. This case is opposite to that in the previous section. Here the woman vows while still married, but stipulates that the vow will not take effect for another thirty days. While still married, before the vow takes effect, the husband annuls the vow. Even though by the time the vow took effect she was already divorced, since the husband annulled it while she was still married, the vow is annulled.

If she vowed on one day, and he divorced her on the same day and took her back on the same day, he cannot annul it. This is the general rule: once she has gone into her own domain [even] for a single hour, he cannot annul. In this case, she vowed while married, was then divorced and then remarried on the same day (seemingly a theoretical situation, or two people who have trouble making up their minds!). The mishnah teaches that the husband can no longer annul the vow that she took during their first marriage, even though the second marriage was on the very same day. In the last clause, containing the general rule, the mishnah explains that if she had gone out of her husband’s domain before he annulled the vow, he cannot subsequently annul the vow. This is what the Torah means when it states that a widow or divorcee must keep their vows. Sometimes they must keep them even though they made the vow when they were married.

תשע נערות נדריהן קימים – not specifically lasses/young women.

Introduction At the end of the previous mishnah we learned that a girl who leaves her husband’s domain even for one moment does not return to have her vows annulled by this same husband. Our mishnah teaches that the same is true for a girl who leaves her father’s domain either by reaching majority age, by being married or by her father dying. The mishnah lists nine types of such women. The first three left their father’s domain by being married, the next three by their father dying and the final three by reaching majority age. Hence I have broken this mishnah down in three subsets of three.

בוגרת והיא יתומה – who married and her husband died when she was a young woman/lass, and she is an orphan in her father’s lifetime for after she married, her father does not have domain over her, when she became an adult woman/reached maturity afterwards and made a vow, her vow is upheld, for the father is not able to absolve her vow when she is an adult woman/reached maturity, and furthermore, she is an orphan during her father’s lifetime.

Usually “young girl” refers to a girl who has not yet reached majority age (12 ½). However, here the term is used more loosely and includes even those girls who are already past 12 ½.

נערה ובגרה והיא יתומה – that she married and her husband died. Hat she made a ow when she was a young woman and she reached maturity after this ,and she is an orphan in her father’s lifetime, as I explained.

There are nine young girls whose vows stand: [1a] a girl who reached majority age who is [like] an orphan; [1b] a young girl [who vowed] and [then] reached majority age who is [like] an orphan; [1c] a young girl who has not yet reached majority age, who is [like] an orphan; [2a] a girl who reached majority age and whose father died; [2b] a young girl [who vowed] and [then] reached majority age and whose father died; [2c] a young girl who has not yet reached majority age and whose father died; [3a] a young girl whose father died, and after her father died she became of majority age; [3b] a girl who has reached majority age whose father is alive; [3c] a young girl who has reached majority age and whose father is alive. Rabbi Judah says: also one who married off his daughter while a minor, and she was widowed or divorced and returned to him [her father] and is still a young girl. The first section lists girls who were married off by their fathers when they were young (before 12 ½) and then were widowed or divorced. Since they were married, their fathers no longer have the ability to annul the vows. Halakhically they are considered “orphans during their father’s lifetime.” There are three types of girls in this category: 1) a girl who vowed after she had reached majority age; 2) a girl who vowed before reaching majority age and has now reached majority age; 3) a girl who is still considered a “young girl” (12-12 ½). Since all three of these girls have no husband and no father, their vows stand.

נערה – [a young woman/lass] at the time that she made a vow. She didn’t reach maturity/become an adult woman as yet, and she is an orphan in the lifetime of her father. And these three: orphan girl during her father’s lifetime are measurements for them.

All three of these girls vowed after their fathers died and have never been married off. Since they have no husbands or fathers, their vows stand. The age categories are the same as in the previous section.

בוגרת ומת אביה – that at the hour/time that she vowed, she was an adult woman/reached maturity, and her father died, that is an actual orphan.

This section lists three girls whose fathers have no authority over them and therefore there is no one to annul their vows. In the first case the father is dead. In the second case she vowed after she had already reached majority age At this point the father may no longer annul her vows. In the third case she vowed before reaching 12 ½ but then reached majority age. According to one interpretation of the last section of this mishnah, Rabbi Judah adds a tenth girl to the list, the girl who was married off as a minor and then widowed or divorced and is still a young girl who has not reached 12 ½. Since she has been married, her father may no longer annul her vows, even though she is still a young girl.

נערה ובוגרת וכו' – and these three also, her father’s passing is measured/generalized to them.

נערה שמת אביה ומשמת אביה בגרה כו' – these three [things] that they taught, her having reached maturity/become an adult woman is measured to them, But in the Gemara (Tractate Nedarim 89b) we stated, that the Sages did not teach any other than three young women: an adult woman/who reached maturity, an orphan, and an orphan during her father’s lifetime.

ור"י אומר כו' – that since she entered the marriage canopy, she left/departed from the domain of her father, through these marriages.

קונם שאינ נהנית לאבא ולאביך כו' הרי זה יפר – for since she was forvidden to the venefit of her father and his father through the fact that she works for her husband, it is a disgrace to the husband for these are matters between him and her.

Introduction Our mishnah returns to discuss the category of vows made between the couple (“between him and her”) the type of vow that in general the husband has a right to annul.

[If she vows,] “Konam the benefit that I derive from my father or from your father if I make anything for you,” In the first case the wife says that she will not benefit from her or her husband’s father if she makes anything for her husband. Seemingly this is not the type of vow that the husband could annul because she could make something for him and then not benefit from her father or his father. This should not be considered a vow “between him and her”, the only type of vow that the husband can break.

Or, “Konam the benefit that I derive from you, if I make anything for my father or your father,” he can annul. Similarly this too is should not be a vow that the husband could annul because she could just refrain from making anything for her or her husband’s father. This also should not be considered a vow “between him and her.” Despite this, the mishnah rules that the husband may annul the vows. This is because the husband does not want work that his wife does for him to come between her and her father or his father. It is also disgraceful for him that she should not be allowed to do anything for her father or his father, lest she not be able to make anything for him. Therefore, in both cases he has the right to annul.

האומרת טמאה אני לך – we are speaking of the wife of a Kohen, that is forbidden to her husband through unavoidable acci and she does not lose her Ketubah [settlement]. And the Sages believed her to forbid herself upon her husband, and since she leaves [the marriage] with a Jewish bill of divorce, she takes her Ketubah [settlement], that from the document of her Ketubah we will learn, that when you get married to another [man], take what is written for you.

Introduction One of the thorniest problems in halakhah is that a woman may not initiate divorce. If a woman is stuck in a bad marriage and wants to be divorced, it is difficult, if not impossible, for her to force her husband to divorce her and still receive her ketubah. We should however note that in talmudic times it was not impossible for a woman to force her husband to divorce her if she was willing to forego her ketubah. Unfortunately, today, even this is difficult. Our mishnah contains fascinating testimony regarding attempts that women made to force their husbands to divorce them. Originally, these attempts were effective, for the sages believed the woman’s claims. However, when they began to suspect these women of lying so that they could marry others, they changed the laws such that these claims would not be an effective means by which a woman could force her husband to give her a divorce and her ketubah.

השמים ביני ובינך – It explains in the Gemara (Tractate Nedarim 91a) that [his] spermatic emission which does not permeate (i.e., shoot forth) like an arrow, that is to say, that things that are before heaven are revealed and she cannot verify them. And we are speaking of when she comes on account of a claim that she stated, that I require a staff for the hand and a master for the grave (which Rashi explains that the staff is for her to lean on in her old age and she dies, he will bury her) for it if is not this, we say to her, go, you do not have marital connection with “being fruitful and multiplying” (see Genesis 1:28 and 9:7 – as it is the male’s prerogative only).

At first they would say that three women must be divorced and receive their ketubah: She who says: “I am defiled to you”; “Heaven is between me and you”; “I have been removed from the Jews.” The mishnah mentions three claims that used to work in forcing a husband to divorce his wife. 1) “I am defiled to you”. The Talmud explains that this claim is made by a priest’s wife who says that she has been raped. As we have learned, a priest may not stay married to his wife if she has had sexual intercourse with someone prohibited to her, even if the intercourse was against her consent. 2) “Heaven is between me and you”. Some commentators interpret this to be a veiled reference to the husband’s inability to perform the sexual act. She is saying, as distant as the heaven is from the earth, that is how distant you and I are from each other in sexual matters. 3) “I have been removed from the Jews”. This refers to a vow she made not to receive sexual benefit from Jews, which includes her husband. She may have made the vow because sexual intercourse is not pleasurable for her. The sages believed these statements because they assumed that a woman would not make such things up.

נטולה אני מן היהודים – that she forbade sexual connection of all Israelites upon her. But even though we stated in the chapter [Tractate Ketubot, chapter 7; Talmud Ketubot 71a] “He who prohibits his wife by vow from deriving benefit from him,” where she vowed and she is divorced without a Ketubah [settlement] and she placed her finger between her teeth, Rashi explained in [Tractate] Yevamot [112a] since she prohibited the benefit of sexual intercourse of all Israelites upon her, she is certainly a victim of unfortunate circumstance, for sexual intercourse is difficult for her. And the earlier version of the Mishnah held that even things are that are between him and her don’t exist, and it is possible that he can divorce her.

But subsequently they changed the ruling to prevent her from setting her eye on another and spoiling herself to her husband: She who said, “I am defiled unto you” must bring proof. “Heaven is between me and you” they [shall appease them] by a request. “I have been removed from the Jews” he [the husband] must annul his portion, and she may have relations with him, and she shall be removed from other Jews. When the sages saw that women were lying and using these claims to leave their husbands because they wanted to marry someone else, they came up with other solutions to these problems. These solutions did not allow the woman to force her husband to divorce her and pay her ketubah. 1) If she says that she has been raped, she must bring proof. Until she does so, she is not believed and she is not prohibited to her husband, nor is he forced to divorce her. 2) If she complains that her husband cannot function sexually, the sages should try to bring them together with words of reconciliation. This may have been the rabbinic equivalent of going to a sex therapist. 3) If she says that she made a vow not to have sex with Jews, the husband may annul that part of the vow that prohibits her from having sex specifically with him, and she will be prohibited from having sex with other Jews, even should she be subsequently divorced. Congratulations! We have finished Nedarim. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Despite the fact that some of these mishnayoth may have been slightly obscure, we should remember what an important role vows played in the religious life of Jews in the mishnaic and talmudic periods. Vows were a way of turning everyday matters into issues of greater significance, from matters between human beings and other human beings, to matter between human beings and God. Learning the laws of vows, and especially how to get out of vows, shows us how humans can make mistakes, get out of them, and yet retain their ultimate covenant with God. Congratulations on making it through this difficult tractate. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah! Tomorrow we begin Nazir.

חזרו לומר כו' – that the generations were corrupted and they suspected that she is lying to release her from under her husband.

תביא ראיה לדבריה – and we don’t believe her without proof.

יעשו דרך בקשה – they would request from her that she not speak any further to him, but in the Jerusalem Talmud it explains, “let them make a meal [together] and let him appease her.

יפר חלקו ותהא משמשתו – and these are things between him and her and he will absolve it to himself.