תלמוד על תרומות 7:8
Jerusalem Talmud Makkot
Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, if two alternatives are presented to the court, one chooses one of them9As a general principle, no crime can be punished by more than one punishment. There never can be separate penalties for testifying falsely (Ex.20:13) and plotting (Deut. 19:19). This justifies the alternative presented in the preceding paragraph.
The text is copied from Terumot 7:1 Note 14; also Bava qamma 7:2, Note 30.. This excludes matters in the Power of Heaven10This sentence refers to the topic in Terumot; it is irrelevant here..
The text is copied from Terumot 7:1 Note 14; also Bava qamma 7:2, Note 30.. This excludes matters in the Power of Heaven10This sentence refers to the topic in Terumot; it is irrelevant here..
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Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma
18This is a reformulation of the discussion in Terumot 7:5, Notes 92–95. The Babli, 115a, deals with the case that the robber sold the garment. If he robbed a stole and gave it to another person. Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya, one takes away from the first one but not from the second19Tosephta 10:20.. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai said, one takes away even from the second. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, even Rebbi Ḥiyya will agree with this since Rebbi Ḥiyya said, one takes away even from the second20In this version, R. Abba bar Mamal contradicts R. Eleazar. In the version of Terumot, one only states that R. Ḥiyya agrees that the robber cannot be sued if the recipient voluntarily gives the item back to its original owner..
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Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot
HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable88The wording is correct in Tosephta 9:3: “For if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to enable it also should not be action to disable.” S. Lieberman (Tosephta ki-fshutah Yebamot, pp. 83–85) shows that the question is restricted to the fetus.. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat89See above, Notes 9–10. Since in Sifra this is an argument of R. Simeon, S. Lieberman (l. c.) concludes that the objection of R. Simeon is a rhetorical device.. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat90This is a quote from Sifra Emor Pereq 5(4), quoted in Babli 69b; the scenario is elaborated in Mishnah 7. According to Halakhah 6, Gentile or slave disable the woman partner from the priesthood; whether the child is a bastard is a matter of dispute (in Galilee, not in Babylonia). One has to assume that the desecrated mother of the disabled child has died. Since the verses Lev. 22:11,12 speak only of “born in the house” and “descendants” without qualifications, the child from an improper union is as good as one from a proper union for the rules of eating heave. The biological fathers do not disable since they cannot be legal fathers; the child is the child of his mother and God alone, cf. Peah 1:1, Note 116, Babli Niddah 31a.! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house91Lev. 22:11. The simple meaning of the text is that slaves of a Cohen may eat heave, whether they are born in the house or bought by the master. The expression “born in the house” is extended here to disqualified children of the house.”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, 92Sifra Emor Pereq 6(1) on Lev.22:12, speaking about the issueless daughter of a Cohen returning to her father’s house to eat sanctified food. The text is also quoted in Babli 67b. since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that93The language is not quite appropriate; it is influenced by the context of the quote at the end of the paragraph. R. Yose notes that the Tanna of Sifra interprets the biblical verse as implying the status of the fetus as described in the sentence; he should have said “the verse considers …”. The formulation as given is appropriate for the version of Ze‘ira/the rabbis who refer to rabbinic rules; “they” are the men of the Great Assembly who voluntarily reintroduced the rules of heave and tithes. means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira94Cf. Berakhot 2:1, Note 54. said, there95In Babylonia. No parallel to this statement is found. they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth96If a person who is not enabled to eat heave transgresses and eats it, in general he is liable to pay for the amount he took plus a 25% fine to the priesthood; cf. Terumot, Chapters 6,7. Mishnah Terumot 7:2 states that the daughter of a Cohen never loses her priestly status, even if she is disabled from eating heave, to the effect that she never pays the fine.. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth97Since even the marriage of the daughter of an Israel to a Cohen does not free her from the fine incurred before her marriage, Mishnah Terumot 6:2. This proves that the rule cannot be biblical; the reference to the verse is not a proof.?
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